State v. C. L.

                                      539

                   Submitted June 29, affirmed July 28, 2021


                      In the Matter of C. L.,
             a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                      STATE OF OREGON,
                           Respondent,
                                v.
                              C. L.,
                            Appellant.
                    Coos County Circuit Court
                          6987; A174596
                                  

    Appellant contests an order committing him to custodial treatment, based
on a finding that as a result of mental disorder, he was dangerous to others.
Appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support the trial court’s
finding of dangerousness, but he does not request de novo review of the record.
Held: Although the record contains only one documented instance of actual violence, the record reveals that after appellant discontinued medication in early
2020, his behavior became increasingly concerning and aggressive toward family
members and neighbors. Based that evidence, the trial court did not err in concluding that appellant posed a danger to others.
    Affirmed.



    Megan Jacquot, Judge.
    Alexander C. Cambier and Multnomah Defenders, Inc.,
filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Daniel Norris, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Lagesen, Presiding Judge, and James, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
    JAMES, J.
    Affirmed.
540                                            State v. C. L.

        JAMES, J.
         Appellant appeals from an order finding him to be
a person with a mental illness that is dangerous to others
and committing him to the custody of the Oregon Health
Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days. Appellant
has not asked us to exercise de novo review pursuant to
ORS 19.415(3), and this is not an appropriate case to do so.
Accordingly, we look to whether “the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences,
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition
and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally
sufficient to permit that outcome.” State v. M. A., 

, 

 (2016). We find the evidence here
sufficient and affirm.
        Appellant has a long and documented history of
schizophrenia. However, there is only one documented incident of actual violence by appellant. On Thanksgiving of
2018, appellant, while having delusions, “slugged” his sister on “the side of the head.” As a result of that incident,
the state filed criminal charges against appellant, and he
entered mental health court.
        Appellant initially did well in mental health court.
However, in the beginning of 2020, appellant discontinued
taking his medication and self-medicated with marijuana.
As a result, the record shows increased paranoid and concerning behavior by appellant. Over six months, beginning
in 2020, appellant was admitted to the hospital three times
for mental health treatment. By August 2020, defendant’s
mental health had deteriorated to the point that he could no
longer safely participate in mental health court.
        Prior to a hearing determining his continuation in
mental health court, appellant “was pacing and talking to
people who were not there.” Appellant confronted the mental
health court’s prosecutor in the courthouse hallway causing
the prosecutor to fear for her safety, such that she sought
refuge in the court’s chambers and in a locked attorneys’
room. During the hearing, appellant angrily told the prosecutor that “she was exhausting her right to live.” The prosecutor described how appellant’s threats frightened her and
she later informed the district attorney that she would not
Cite as 

 (2021)                            541

appear in court with appellant unless armed security was
present.
         In July 2020, defendant sent his sister text messages telling her he wanted to kill her and asked her to
“Make it easy for me. Meet me somewhere so I can slit your
throat.”
        On August 7, 2020, a witness called police after
appellant told the witness, numerous times, that the neighbors had been ruining his life since he was 10 or 11. And,
he said “I’m going to take a gun and I’m going to go shoot
them.”
         Around August 12, 2020, police received several
calls expressing concern over appellant’s behavior. The
witness, who had earlier reported the threats to shoot the
neighbors, woke up to appellant screaming. The witness
testified that she “took a step outside and I could start to
hear everything very clearly. And, most of it was unintelligible screaming. But, there was an occasional threat, an
occasional, ‘I’m going to—I’m going to hurt you. I’m going to
kill you guys. I have guns.’ ”
        Another witness called the police about appellant’s
behavior. She testified that appellant appeared to be having delusions and was loudly addressing someone who he
appeared to believe was present and was swinging a two-byfour back and forth at the illusional person. Police found the
two-by-four which was about three feet long and had been
fashioned into a weapon by driving nails through the board
so that the sharp points protruded through the end of the
board.
         Appellant’s mother testified that “[a]ll of a sudden
I seen him out in the driveway with a piece of firewood.
… And, I called 9-1-1 and got out of the house and behind
the house.” She hid in her locked bathroom until police
arrived. When asked why she hid from appellant she replied
“[b]ecause he was fighting me. It was scary. I’ve never
seen—seen that kind of a reaction or actions out of my son.”
In describing why she hid, she testified that “I didn’t know
what else to do. I didn’t—I wanted to be out of his sight. I
didn’t want to be in the—in his line of anger.”
542                                               State v. C. L.

          Under Oregon law, a person may be involuntarily
committed if the person is determined to be a “person with
mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C). A “person with mental
illness” includes a “person who, because of a mental disorder, is … [d]angerous to … others.” ORS 426.005(1)(f)(A).
Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a determination that appellant is a danger to others is a question we
review as a matter of law. State v. T. Y., 

,

 (2017).
          To permit commitment on the basis of dangerousness to others, the state must establish “that actual future
violence is highly likely.” M. A., 

. Although
“[s]pecific acts of violence are not required to establish dangerousness,” State v. M. R., 

, 

 (2009), when a person with a mental disorder “has
threatened others and has also carried out an overt violent
act in the past against another person, those facts generally
constitute clear and convincing evidence that the person is
a danger to others” for purposes of ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C).
State v. D. L. W., 

, 

 (2011).
Past acts, including verbal acts, can justify a finding of dangerousness, if they “form a foundation for predicting future
dangerousness.” M. R., 

 (internal quotation marks omitted). An exception to that general rule exists
when the overt violent act is “isolated” and “not sufficient
to establish that appellant is an ongoing danger to others.”
State v. E. D., 

, 

 (2014); see
also State v. L. D., 

, 

 (2011)
(reversing commitment where the appellant had only once
“pushed” another person).
         In State v. J. T. C., 

, 

,
rev den, 

 (2017), we considered a similar case
where the appellant had only a single documented instance
of violence, but had been off medication and decompensated
as a result. A divided panel of this court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the involuntary commitment. In doing so, we reasoned:
   “Of primary significance is the evidence that, after he
   stopped taking his medication, appellant—who previously
   had been hospitalized for schizophrenia at least in part
   because of his ‘temper’—became increasingly paranoid
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   and aggressive in the months leading up to his most recent
   hospitalization, eventually leading to appellant’s physical
   confrontations with his brother and his grandmother.”
J. T. C., 

.
         As J. T. C. exemplifies, cases where an appellant,
like here, has only a single instance of violent behavior,
are close cases. However, in light of J. T. C., and for similar reasons, we conclude that the evidence here was legally
sufficient. Like J. T. C., appellant’s acts were of increasing
concern—paranoia, threats, and the two-by-four—after he
stopped medication. In reaching that conclusion, we emphasize the standard of review at play. We are not asked to
weigh the evidence ourselves or arrive at our own conclusion about appellant’s risk of future dangerousness. Rather,
we ask whether the trial court was permitted, based on this
evidentiary record, to make that conclusion. The evidence in
this record is legally sufficient for such conclusion.
        Affirmed.