State v. Vasquez-Gonzalez

                                    238

 Argued and submitted July 17, 2020, affirmed September 1, 2021, petition for
               review denied February 3, 2022 (

)


                     STATE OF OREGON,
                      Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                v.
                EFRAIN VASQUEZ-GONZALEZ,
                     Defendant-Appellant.
                Washington County Circuit Court
                     18CR08518; A169589
                                

   Ricardo J. Menchaca, Judge.
   Joshua Crowther, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Erin K. Galli, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before DeVore, Presiding Judge, and DeHoog, Judge, and
Mooney, Judge.
   PER CURIAM
   Affirmed.
Cite as 

 (2021)                            239

        PER CURIAM
         Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of
unlawful possession of methamphetamine, ORS 475.894(2)(a).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to the
police, arguing that he did not knowingly and intelligently
waive his Miranda rights.
         Because a more detailed discussion of the facts of
this case and explanation of our application of the law would
not benefit the bench, the bar, or the public, we affirm based
on the limited discussion below.
         It is the state’s burden to demonstrate that a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights in order for resulting statements to be
admissible. State v. Ward, 

, 

(2020). “The ‘knowing and intelligent’ prong of the waiver
analysis tests whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant knew that he may choose not to talk
to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time.” State v. Bush,

, 

 (2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The inquiry focuses primarily on a defendant’s state of mind. State v. Norgren, 

,

 (2017), rev dismissed, 

 (2018).
          Defendant primarily argues that his state of mind
at the time of waiver was equivalent to that of the defendant
in Norgren. In Norgren, we concluded that under the totality
of the circumstances in that case—where the defendant had
been found in a heavily wooded area, bleeding, unconscious,
and lying naked in the fetal position; told responding officers that he “was a sasquatch and he was from a family of
sasquatches”; his family testified that he was on a medical
leave of absence from school to address his mental health;
and a Mental Health Response Team determined that he
“was having a break from reality”—the defendant’s waiver
could not have been knowing and intelligent. 

.
We also clarified, however, that we did “not mean to imply
that any variant statement made by a person at the time of
a waiver nullifies a waiver.” 

.
240                               State v. Vasquez-Gonzalez

         Here, in concluding that defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights, the trial court
found that he was not “so confused or benumbed by the use
of substances or in a mental health capacity that he did not
realize what was going on.”
          Based on the evidence in the record, there is sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have reached
that conclusion. Unlike in Norgren, the totality of the circumstances here does not compel the conclusion that defendant was suffering a break from reality or intoxication to
the extent that he could not understand the rights conveyed
to him. There was sufficient evidence from which the trial
court could have reached the conclusion that defendant was
capable of understanding and, subsequently, knowingly and
intelligently waiving, his Miranda rights. Given the trial
court’s findings and the record that supports them, the trial
court did not err by denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
        Affirmed.