Volume 318 — United States Reports

This is a list of all the United States Supreme Court cases from volume 318 of the United States Reports:

Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943), was a United States Supreme Court case.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80 (1943), is a United States Supreme Court case. It is often referred to as Chenery I, as four years later the case was before the Supreme Court a second time in Chenery II. Chenery I set out what is known as the Chenery Doctrine, a basic principle of U.S. administrative law that an agency may not defend an administrative decision on new grounds not set forth by the agency in its original decision.

Held: that the consumer confusion found by the Administrator affords no basis for his conclusion that the standards of identity adopted by the Administrator will promote honesty and fair dealing.

Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the violation of state law rendered the confession evidence inadmissible. If there is a "working arrangement" where state officials will violate the rights of the accused and federal officials will charge them federally, the fact that the federal officers did not personally violate the law is immaterial to a confession's admissibility.

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that federal negotiable instruments were governed by federal law, and thus the federal court had the authority to fashion a common law rule.

Held: and I think correctly, that where each shareholder got his proportionate part of the new stock there was no change in his ownership in the corporation. That, in a corporation with a million-dollar capital, the distribution of another half million to the holders of the common stock made no change in ownership.

Jamison v. State of Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a Dallas city ordinance, which prohibited distribution of handbills on the streets, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because the material being distributed is religious in its nature.

Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943), was a case involving Jehovah's Witnesses in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a city ordinance of Paris, Texas, requiring permits in order to solicit orders for books is unconstitutional as applied to the distribution of religious publications. The church members were represented by Hayden C. Covington.

Held: the judgment was paid and satisfied by Apartment *517 Investing Corporation. Thereafter, respondent presented his accounts to the state court for settlement. Petitioner applied to the bankruptcy court for an order directing respondent to file his account in that court. While that motion was pending, the motion in the state court came on for a hearing.

Held: $11,212,000 principal amount are held by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as security for its loans. There are $8,923,000 First and Refunding bonds outstanding, all of which are held by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as security for its loans and claims. These .bonds have a first lien generally on the lines west of the Missouri and a second lien on the lines east.

Held: in the circumstances there disclosed, that the dividend was income, but we did not hold that any change whatsoever in the character of the shares issued as dividends resulted in *608 the receipt of income.

Held: nothing is to be accomplished but the liquidation of Fidelity, it is difficult to see why that process and consequent distribution of the proceeds should be held up by the search for causes of action against officers and directors. Nor is any convincing showing made that such investigation cannot, or will not, be made and availed of by the state court receivers.

Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the renewal of copyright for the second term is not an opportunity for an author to renegotiate terms made during the first term that extended beyond the first term's length.