¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: November 5, 2024
¶4 S24A0884. POUNDS v. THE STATE.
¶5 WARREN, Justice.
¶6 William C. Pounds III was convicted of malice murder and
¶7other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Kendra
¶8Jackson.1 On appeal, Pounds contends, among other things, that
¶9 1The crimes occurred on June 12, 2015. In December 2015, a Bibb County grand jury indicted Pounds for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. Pounds was tried from October 18 to 24, 2017. The jury found Pounds guilty of all counts, and on October 25, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder. The aggravated assault count merged with the malice murder count for sentencing. The trial court purported to merge the felony-murder count into the malicemurder conviction, but the felony-murder count was actually vacated by operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (434 SE2d 479) (1993). Pounds filed an untimely motion for new trial, which the trial court purported to deny even though it lacked jurisdiction to do so; the trial court then granted Pounds an out-of-time appeal, and Pounds filed a notice of appeal. But because the untimely motion for new trial ripened upon the grant of the out-of-time appeal and was thus still pending, we held that the notice of appeal had not ripened and dismissed the appeal, noting that if the trial court entered the trial court committed several evidentiary errors and that his
¶10trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. For
¶11the reasons explained below, we affirm.
¶12 1. The evidence presented at Pounds’s trial showed the
¶13following. Jackson and Pounds met in early 2000 and began a long-
¶14term relationship. In September 2005, Pounds met and became
¶15romantically involved with another woman, Vicinda Crawford. For
¶16the next 10 years, Pounds maintained romantic relationships with
¶17an order denying the motion, the notice of appeal would ripen. See Pounds v. State, 309 Ga. 376, 385 n.12 (846 SE2d 48) (2020) (“Pounds I”). On remand, on March 17, 2021, the trial court purported to dismiss the motion for new trial, and on July 19, 2023, the trial court granted Pounds an out-of-time appeal. Pounds’s second appeal was then transmitted to this Court as if his notice of appeal had ripened. However, neither the 2021 or the 2023 order recognized that Pounds I’s holding—that the motion for a new trial was procedurally proper and remained pending—was the law of the case, see OCGA § 9-11-60 (h); neither order resolved the motion for new trial on the merits; and thus neither order was effective to allow the notice of appeal to ripen under the law-of-the-case effect of Pounds I. Accordingly, on February 6, 2024, we issued an order vacating the March 17, 2021 and July 19, 2023 orders, dismissing Pounds’s second appeal, and directing the trial court to enter an order resolving the pending motion for new trial on the merits. We again explained that if the trial court entered an order denying that motion for new trial, Pounds’s notice of appeal would ripen. On remand, on March 7, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for new trial on the merits. Pounds’s notice of appeal ripened, and the case was docketed to the August 2024 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 both women. During that period, both women became aware of the
¶18other’s relationship with Pounds. Yet Pounds was repeatedly able
¶19to convince each woman that he had left the other and wanted to be
¶20with her. Throughout this ten-year period, Pounds became engaged
¶21to each woman, sometimes to both at once.
¶22 On Sunday, May 31, 2015—“Pastor Appreciation Day” at the
¶23church where Pounds was the pastor—Pounds brought Jackson
¶24with him to church, and Crawford came separately to church to
¶25surprise him. At the church, the two women saw each other and
¶26began text messaging each other after the service. These texts led
¶27the women to discover that Pounds was cheating on each woman
¶28with the other, despite presently being engaged to be married to
¶29Crawford. Through their text messages, Crawford and Jackson
¶30consoled each other over their situation with respect to Pounds.
¶31Crawford, however, remained engaged to Pounds. The two set a
¶32wedding date of June 12, 2015.
¶33 In the early morning hours of the day of June 12, 2015—the
¶34date Crawford and Pounds had set for their wedding—Pounds was
¶35 3 not with Crawford, but with Jackson. Pounds called 9-1-1 from his
¶36house and reported that Jackson had committed suicide. After
¶37calling 9-1-1, Pounds turned Jackson’s body over and “started to try
¶38and resuscitate her.” Jackson was later found unresponsive in an
¶39upstairs bedroom, having died of a single, contact gunshot wound to
¶40the right side of the head.
¶41 Pounds first spoke to police at around 12:30 a.m. on the day of
¶42the shooting. Pounds said the couple had an argument during which
¶43he told Jackson he no longer wanted to be in a relationship with her;
¶44Jackson then told him that “if we’re going to separate, then one of
¶45us is going to have to leave the world”; Jackson walked over to
¶46Pounds’s dresser and picked up a handgun and pressed it to her
¶47head; and Pounds “attempted to lunge at her” to prevent her from
¶48shooting herself, but he “was too late.” Soon after, Pounds told a
¶49first responder “that he was downstairs and he heard a shot, and he
¶50went upstairs and that’s where he had found” Jackson. At around
¶511:00 a.m., Pounds called a friend, Joey Mullinax, and told Mullinax
¶52that he had come home early from a trip to Dallas, had argued with
¶53 4 Jackson about her infidelities, and that Jackson “had grabbed his
¶54pistol and shot herself.”
¶55 Later, Sergeant Shelley Rutherford arrived at the scene and
¶56spoke to Pounds, who said he and Jackson were lying in bed together
¶57when the conversation turned into an argument about their
¶58relationship; Jackson got up, dressed, came to his side of the bed,
¶59and grabbed his gun from his chest of drawers; she then went to the
¶60foot of the bed and pointed the weapon at him; Pounds initially
¶61thought she was going to shoot him, and he went under the covers;
¶62and he then moved to the end of the bed and tried to grab the gun,
¶63touching it before it went off.
¶64 At around 5:30 a.m., Pounds gave the Sergeant a formal
¶65statement that was transcribed. Pounds stated that on the day of
¶66the shooting, he began talking to Jackson about ending their
¶67relationship; she began screaming; Jackson kept repeating that if
¶68she could not have Pounds, neither one of them would live; he tried
¶69to talk her down; when he tried to grab the gun, she turned it from
¶70pointing at him to herself; he remembered hearing one gunshot; and
¶71 5 he then put on his pants, called 9-1-1, turned Jackson over as
¶72instructed, and tried to resuscitate her. Pounds initially said that
¶73Jackson had the gun in her left hand and her pocketbook in her right
¶74hand, but later said that it was possible that she had the gun in her
¶75right hand.
¶76 Six days after the shooting, during a follow-up interview,
¶77Pounds demonstrated to Sergeant Rutherford how the shooting
¶78occurred. According to Pounds, he was kneeling on the bed and
¶79Jackson was standing in front of him, pointing the gun at him and
¶80holding it “in between the two of them.” Pounds then grabbed the
¶81gun, causing the gun to go off and Jackson and Pounds to fall off the
¶82bed together. In Pounds’s demonstration, he indicated that the gun
¶83was not touching Jackson’s head. This was the first time Pounds
¶84stated that he had also fallen to the floor. On August 14, 2015, about
¶85two months after the shooting, Pounds was arrested.
¶86 At trial, the State’s expert in crime-scene reconstruction and
¶87blood-pattern analysis testified that he saw “no evidence that
¶88[Jackson] had the gun in her hand” and “fire[d] the fatal gunshot.”
¶89 6 The expert testified that, based on the blood coagulation he
¶90observed, “it’s not difficult to say it had to have been at least 10
¶91minutes” that Jackson was laying facedown before Pounds turned
¶92her over and that, in his opinion, “there was seven and a half
¶93minutes between the injury and the 911 call.” The expert added that
¶94he was “confident [Jackson] was not standing” when she was shot
¶95and that her head was below the level of the bed at the time of the
¶96shooting.
¶97 The State also called several witnesses, including a friend who
¶98testified about Pounds’s infidelities and the conflicting stories
¶99Pounds told him about what happened leading up to Jackson’s
¶100death, and two of Jackson’s coworkers, who testified that Jackson
¶101“loved her life,” had spoken about “future plans that she had made
¶102with [Pounds] or friends and family members,” and had once stated
¶103that if it was ever said Jackson committed suicide, “don’t believe it.”
¶104In addition, the State also called Jackson’s daughter to testify that,
¶105around 2007 or 2008, Pounds had hit Jackson and given her a black
¶106eye, and, around 2009, Pounds “came into [Jackson’s] house and . . .
¶107 7 kicked the front door in,” forced Jackson into his car, and “drove
¶108away” with her.
¶109 Pounds testified at trial in a manner consistent with portions
¶110of his pre-trial communications with police, including by testifying
¶111that he had hidden under the covers when Jackson pulled out a gun.
¶112Unlike in two of his earlier accounts to police, however, Pounds
¶113testified that when he came out from under the covers, Jackson was
¶114pointing the gun at herself. And unlike in his three earlier accounts
¶115to police, he testified that he begged her not to shoot herself as he
¶116moved towards her, and that he lunged off the bed and put his
¶117“hands on her hands” while she was holding the gun.
¶118 2. Pounds argues that the evidence was not sufficient as a
¶119matter of constitutional due process to support his conviction for
¶120malice murder.2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99
¶121 2 To the extent Pounds challenges the verdicts on all three counts, Counts 2 (felony murder) and Count 3 (aggravated assault) are moot because those counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. See Malcom, 263 Ga. at 372. See also Anderson v. State, 299 Ga. 193, 196 n.4 (787 SE2d 202) (2016) (explaining that a defendant is not “convicted” on counts that are vacated or that merge with other offenses for sentencing purposes, and challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support those non-existent convictions are moot). 8 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In reviewing this claim, “we view
¶122all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to
¶123the verdicts and consider whether any rational juror could have
¶124found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes
¶125of which he was convicted.” Moulder v. State, 317 Ga. 43, 46-47 (891
¶126SE2d 903) (2023). “We leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or
¶127inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and
¶128reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts.” Perkins v. State,
¶129313 Ga. 885, 891 (873 SE2d 185) (2022) (citation and punctuation
¶130omitted).
¶131 The evidence at Pounds’s trial, viewed in the light most
¶132favorable to the verdicts, authorized the jury to find Pounds guilty
¶133beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. A person commits
¶134malice murder if “he unlawfully and with malice aforethought,
¶135either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.”
¶136OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). Among other things, the evidence showed that
¶137Pounds and Jackson had a tumultuous and, at times, violent
¶138relationship; Crawford, Pounds’s fiancée, testified that she and
¶139 9 Pounds were engaged and that Pounds had planned to marry her on
¶140the same day as Jackson’s death; Pounds offered multiple,
¶141conflicting accounts of what had happened before the shooting and
¶142what his involvement was; and two of Jackson’s coworkers testified
¶143that Jackson “loved her life,” had spoken about her “future plans,”
¶144and had once stated if anyone was ever to say that she committed
¶145suicide, “don’t believe it.”3 Additionally, the jury heard testimony
¶146from the State’s blood-coagulation and crime-scene reconstruction
¶147expert, who testified that, based on the evidence at the scene of the
¶148shooting, he concluded that after Jackson had been shot, Pounds left
¶149Jackson laying facedown “for at least 10 minutes” before Pounds
¶150turned her over, and that there “was seven and a half minutes
¶151between the injury” and the time Pounds called 9-1-1. The State’s
¶152expert further testified that there was no evidence Jackson “had the
¶153 3 In Division 3, we assume, without deciding, that the trial court erroneously admitted the testimony from Jackson’s coworkers pursuant to OCGA § 24-8-803 (3) and OCGA § 24-8-807. But when performing sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, even if the evidence was admitted erroneously. See Thomas v. State, 308 Ga. 26, 28 (838 SE2d 801) (2020) (“[A] sufficiency review under Jackson considers all evidence, whether admissible or not”). 10 gun in in her hand” or that she was “in a standing position” when
¶154she was shot. To the contrary, the State’s expert testified that he
¶155found “evidence that would suggest it’s not likely” that Jackson was
¶156“in possession of the weapon at th[e] moment” she was shot.
¶157 Presented with this evidence, a reasonable jury could find
¶158Pounds guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. See
¶159Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 389 (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (evidence
¶160presented was constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s
¶161convictions for malice murder when the State’s forensic pathology
¶162expert and crime scene investigation expert both determined the
¶163cause of death to be homicide, rather than suicide); Suits v. State,
¶164270 Ga. 362, 362-364 (507 SE2d 751) (1998) (evidence presented was
¶165constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for
¶166malice murder when the defendant claimed that he tried to stop
¶167victim from committing suicide, but defendant had previously given
¶168the police conflicting accounts of what had happened before the
¶169shooting).
¶170 3. Pounds contends that the trial court abused its discretion
¶171 11 by admitting under OCGA § 24-8-803 (3) (Rule 803 (3)) out-of-court
¶172statements that Jackson made to her coworkers, Laquisha Jordan
¶173and Jackie Bush. Assuming without deciding that the trial court
¶174abused its discretion when it admitted Jackson’s statements to
¶175Jordan and Bush under Rule 803 (3), we conclude that any error in
¶176doing so was harmless.
¶177 (a) Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the
¶178declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
¶179to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801 (c).
¶180Hearsay is generally inadmissible, but it may be admitted if any of
¶181several statutory exceptions applies. See OCGA § 24-8-802; State v.
¶182Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116, 121 (3) (839 SE2d 560) (2020). One such
¶183exception is Rule 803 (3), which allows for the admission of a
¶184statement of a declarant’s “then existing state of mind, emotion,
¶185sensation, or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design,
¶186mental feeling, pain, and bodily health.” OCGA § 24-8-803 (3). This
¶187Court has not meaningfully addressed the state-of-mind exception
¶188to the hearsay rule under our current Evidence Code except to
¶189 12 pretermit whether evidence would have been admissible under that
¶190exception. See Lynn v. State, 310 Ga. 608, 618 (852 SE2d 843) (2020)
¶191(pretermitting whether a witness’s testimony would have been
¶192admissible under the state-of-mind exception under Rule 803 (3) and
¶193concluding that the evidence “did not prejudice [the defendant] given
¶194the strength of the evidence against him”).
¶195 (b) Prior to trial, the State sought a ruling admitting several
¶196statements that Jackson had made to close friends about her future
¶197plans with friends and family members. Over Pounds’s objection,
¶198the trial court decided to admit those statements under Rule 803 (3).
¶199At trial, Jordan, who worked with Jackson and had been friends
¶200with her since 2010, testified that, a few months before Jackson was
¶201shot and killed, Jordan told Jackson that someone in Jordan’s life
¶202had a “bout with suicide,” that Jordan would never commit suicide,
¶203and that if Jackson “ever heard that about [Jordan], don’t believe it.”
¶204Jackson “said the same thing”: “you know how much I love life, you
¶205know how much I love my kids, you know how much, you know, we
¶206have just plans for things, so that—if anybody ever told you that [I
¶207 13 committed suicide], you make sure you look in to it.”
¶208 Like Jordan, Bush also testified regarding Jackson’s outlook
¶209and plans for the future. Bush and Jackson were long-time friends,
¶210but lost touch with each other a few years before Jackson’s death.
¶211Bush testified that she had reconnected with Jackson in April 2015,
¶212a few months before Jackson was shot. Bush had two children at
¶213that point and was pregnant with a third child. She testified that
¶214Jackson was surprised that Bush had two children and that Jackson
¶215was “kind of sad” that she had “missed out on those types of events
¶216in our lives together.” Bush added that “this was . . . our opportunity
¶217to have that experience together, so [Jackson] was excited to know”
¶218the gender of the baby Bush was having and “wanted to be a part of
¶219shopping and helping to decorate his nursery.”
¶220 Assuming without deciding that the trial court’s admission of
¶221Jackson’s and Bush’s statements under Rule 803 (3) was an abuse
¶222of discretion, we conclude that any error in admitting these
¶223statements was harmless. Under the nonconstitutional harmless-
¶224error standard, we examine “whether it is highly probable that the
¶225 14 error did not contribute to the verdict” by “review[ing] the record de
¶226novo and weigh[ing] the evidence as we would expect reasonable
¶227jurors to have done so.” Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 (829 SE2d
¶228142) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶229 Here, the evidence showed that Pounds was the only other
¶230person present at the time of the shooting, suggesting that either
¶231Jackson shot herself or that Pounds shot her. To disprove Pounds’s
¶232defense theory that Jackson died by suicide, the State presented
¶233evidence from an expert in crime-scene reconstruction and blood-
¶234pattern analysis that there was “no evidence that [Jackson] had the
¶235gun in her hand” and “fire[d] the fatal gunshot,” that Pounds had
¶236waited nearly 10 minutes after the shooting before turning
¶237Jackson’s body over or calling 9-1-1, and that Pounds provided
¶238contradictory accounts of how Jackson died. In light of all of this
¶239evidence against Pounds, we conclude that it is highly probable that
¶240any error in admitting the out-of-court statements that Jackson
¶241made to Jordan and Bush regarding Jackson’s state of mind did not
¶242contribute to the verdict, and was therefore harmless. See Nundra
¶243 15 v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 9-10 (885 SE2d 790) (2023) (concluding that,
¶244because of the strength of the evidence against the defendant, “the
¶245risk that evidence [improperly admitted] would lead the jury to
¶246convict [the defendant] for some reason other than guilt was fairly
¶247low”). Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.4
¶248 4. Pounds contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
¶249admitting certain other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)
¶250(Rule 404 (b)). See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Evidence of other . . . acts
¶251shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person . . . [i]t
¶252may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not
¶253limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
¶254knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident”).
¶255 4 We also note that, over Pounds’s objection, the trial court admitted the
¶256statements under OCGA § 24-8-807 (Rule 807) (the “residual exception” to the rule against hearsay). In fact, it did so before admitting them under Rule 803 (3). But see State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116, 124 n.10 (839 SE2d 560) (2020) (cautioning trial courts that “the residual exception applies only to statement(s) not specifically covered by any law”) (emphasis original) (citation and punctuation omitted). But even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the hearsay statements under Rule 807, Pounds’s claim still fails under the nonconstitutional harmless-error standard, and does so for the same reasons that his claim fails with respect to his argument about Rule 803 (3). 16 Specifically, the trial court admitted testimony from Chelsey
¶257Brunson, Jackson’s daughter, that Pounds hit Jackson and caused
¶258her to suffer a black eye approximately eight years before Jackson’s
¶259death, and that Pounds kicked Jackson’s front door in and “drove
¶260away” with her approximately six years before Jackson’s death. The
¶261State offered this evidence for the purpose of showing Pounds’s
¶262“feelings for [Jackson], the nature of their relationship, [Pounds’s]
¶263mindset and intent and the time of the alleged criminal act” and for
¶264the purpose of refuting Pounds’s defense of suicide, and the trial
¶265court admitted it over Pounds’s objection.
¶266 Pounds contends that the other acts the State introduced at
¶267trial occurred eight years prior to his trial5 and were therefore so
¶268remote in time that their probative value was substantially
¶269outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Hood v. State,
¶270299 Ga. 95, 102 (786 SE2d 648) (2016) (explaining that “the part [of
¶271 5 Unlike Brunson, Pounds asserts that both acts occurred eight years
¶272before Jackson’s death. Because we assume, without deciding, that the trial court erred in admitting this other-acts evidence, it is not necessary to resolve the discrepancy in timing with respect to those acts. 17 the Rule 404 (b) analysis] that looks to the probative value of
¶273evidence determined to be relevant . . . requires analysis of the other
¶274acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-403”). See also OCGA § 24-4-403
¶275(“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
¶276substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
¶277confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations
¶278of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
¶279evidence.”); Rooks v. State, 317 Ga. 743, 757 (893 SE2d 899) (2023)
¶280(noting that one of the “[f]actors to be considered in determining the
¶281probative value of other act evidence offered to prove intent” is “its
¶282temporal remoteness”) (citation and punctuation omitted). The
¶283State responds that the evidence of “domestic violence between the
¶284parties” was probative of “the nature of the relationship between the
¶285parties, shed[] light on [Pounds’s] conduct toward the victim, was
¶286offered to rebut Pounds’s defense theory that Jackon died by suicide,
¶287and that “an eight-year lapse in time does not render the evidence
¶288inadmissible, but instead goes to its weight and credibility for the
¶289jury to determine.”
¶290 18 We need not decide whether the trial court abused its
¶291discretion in admitting evidence of these prior acts, because any
¶292error in admitting it was harmless. As we discussed in Division 4
¶293above, “[t]he test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error
¶294is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to
¶295the verdict.” Baker v. State, 318 Ga. 431, 448 (899 SE2d 139) (2024)
¶296(citation and punctuation omitted). And as we also discussed above,
¶297the jury was presented with ample evidence of Pounds’s guilt.
¶298Pounds admitted that he was alone with Jackson when she died, the
¶299jury heard testimony from the State’s expert in crime-scene
¶300reconstruction and blood-pattern analysis that there was “no
¶301evidence that [Jackson] had the gun in her hand” or “fire[d] the fatal
¶302gunshot,” and the physical evidence indicated that Pounds waited
¶303nearly 10 minutes after Jackson was shot to roll her over and call 9-
¶3041-1. And the strength of this evidence, combined with the fact that
¶305Pounds told multiple stories about what occurred prior to the
¶306shooting, outweighed any prejudice from Brunson’s testimony that
¶307on two occasions several years before the charged crime, Pounds
¶308 19 acted violently toward Jackson. See Davenport, 309 Ga. at 389-390
¶309(concluding that any error by the trial court in admitting evidence
¶310that the defendant abused his ex-wife more than 20 years before the
¶311victim’s death was harmless because “the evidence presented
¶312against [the defendant], though circumstantial, was very strong”);
¶313Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 152-154 (805 SE2d 873) (2017)
¶314(concluding that any error by the trial court in “admitting evidence
¶315of [the defendant’s] violent acts against two ex-girlfriends” was
¶316harmless, in part, because the defendant “admitted that [the victim]
¶317had died in his presence and “[t]he physical evidence contradicted
¶318[the defendant’s claim that he had tried to revive [the victim]”). We
¶319therefore conclude that it is highly likely that the admission of
¶320Brunson’s testimony did not affect the jury’s verdicts, and Pounds’s
¶321claim fails.
¶322 5. Pounds contends that the trial court abused its discretion
¶323by admitting “character” evidence against Pounds. Specifically, he
¶324complains that the trial court should not have allowed “Joey
¶325Mullinax . . . [to] testif[y] that [Pounds] once commented to him
¶326 20 about having multiple relationships with women” other than
¶327Jackson and Crawford. Pounds argues that “[w]hether [he] had
¶328relationships with other women had no relevance to the issues at
¶329trial and could only go to putting [him] in a bad character light.” .
¶330 It is unclear from Pounds’s brief on appeal whether he
¶331challenges the admission of this testimony as not relevant under
¶332OCGA § 24-4-401 (Rule 401), as inadmissible other-acts evidence
¶333under Rule 404 (b), or both; he cites no statutes or cases to support
¶334this enumeration of error. The trial court’s ruling was likewise
¶335unclear, but the trial transcript suggests that the trial court
¶336admitted the evidence under Rule 404 (b). 6 But because Pounds
¶337cites no legal authority and offers no legal analysis to support this
¶338claim of error, we conclude that he has abandoned it. See Supreme
¶339Court Rule 22 (1) (“Any enumerated error not supported by
¶340argument or citation of authority in the brief shall be deemed
¶341 6 With respect to this ruling, the trial court stated: “If that’s the extent
¶342of the question, [counsel], I’ll let you ask it, but I don’t want to hear anymore else about it.” And the ruling was made in response to argument that the evidence was not merely “bad character” evidence, but that it “fits the motive of our case.” The Georgia Evidence Code was not discussed or cited. 21 abandoned.”). See also Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 748 (864 SE2d
¶34385) (2021) (bald assertion that testimony was “‘inadmissible hearsay
¶344intentionally solicited by the State’” was deemed abandoned because
¶345appellant neither “cite[d] Georgia’s Evidence Code nor offer[ed] legal
¶346analysis to support his contention on appeal”).
¶347 6. Pounds contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
¶348ruling that one of the State’s witnesses, Ross Gardner, was qualified
¶349to give expert testimony about blood coagulation. As with his fifth
¶350enumeration of error, Pounds cites no legal authority and offers no
¶351legal analysis to support this claimed error, so we conclude that he
¶352has abandoned it. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1); see also Sauder
¶353v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 816 n.21 (901 SE2d 124) (2024) (under
¶354Supreme Court Rule 22 (1), when an appellant “makes no specific
¶355argument and cites no authority to support any of the[ir] claims, . .
¶356. we do not address them”).
¶357 7. Pounds contends that his counsel provided constitutionally
¶358ineffective assistance when he failed to object to a certain juror
¶359remaining on the jury. Pounds’s claim fails.
¶360 22 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
¶361defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient,
¶362and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the
¶363defendant. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-695
¶364(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Hill v. State, 319 Ga. 250, 257
¶365(9 SE2d 101) (2024). To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant
¶366must demonstrate that his attorney “performed at trial in an
¶367objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and
¶368in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293
¶369Ga. 339, 344 (745 SE2d 637) (2013). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at
¶370687-688. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish
¶371a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient
¶372performance, the result of the trial would have been different. See
¶373Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
¶374 Pounds argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective
¶375assistance by failing to object to a certain juror remaining on the
¶376jury after the juror revealed that she knew Jackson’s stepmother.
¶377After the State rested, the juror informed the trial court that she
¶378 23 had recently realized that she knew Jackson’s stepmother because
¶379the two had worked together some time ago for the same supervisor,
¶380although they did not “really speak . . . much” anymore but
¶381“maybe . . . see each other’s posts on Facebook.” During questioning
¶382outside the presence of the jury, the trial court asked the juror if that
¶383relationship would affect her ability to listen to the evidence
¶384presented at trial or her ability to be fair and impartial. The juror
¶385said that she “would make the decision that I feel is right, because
¶386someone’s life to me is more important than a friendship ultimately,”
¶387and she agreed that while it might be difficult, she “could render a
¶388decision based on the evidence in this case and not [the]
¶389relationship.” She also stated that although she might be
¶390“sympathetic personally,” she knew “the right thing to do for me
¶391would be to make the right decision based on what I think it is,” and
¶392that “[e]ven though I might still feel bad about it, . . . I would feel
¶393even worse about making the wrong decision.” Pounds’s trial
¶394counsel testified that he made “a strategic decision” not to request
¶395that the juror be removed from the jury, in part, because he “like[d]
¶396 24 jurors that feel the gravity of the case” as opposed to jurors “who
¶397[will] cavalierly convict your client.” The trial court later denied a
¶398new trial on this ineffectiveness claim on the basis that the juror at
¶399issue had explained that her relationship with Jackson’s stepmother
¶400would not have an effect on her ability to be fair and impartial, and
¶401trial counsel elected not to attempt to remove the juror “as a matter
¶402of trial strategy.”
¶403 Pounds has not established that trial counsel’s failure to object
¶404to the juror remaining on the jury constituted deficient performance.
¶405A trial court may replace a juror with an alternate when, as relevant
¶406here, the juror “upon other good cause shown to the court is found to
¶407be unable to perform his duty.” OCGA § 15-12-172.7 But “the court
¶408has broad discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to
¶409remove a juror.” Ware v. State, 305 Ga. 457, 462 (826 SE2d 56) (2019)
¶410(citation and punctuation omitted). As we have previously
¶411 7 OCGA § 15-12-172 provides in full: “If at any time, whether before or
¶412after final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies, becomes ill, upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty, or is discharged for other legal cause, the first alternate juror shall take the place of the first juror becoming incapacitated.” 25 explained, “[a] conclusion on an issue of juror bias is based on
¶413findings of demeanor and credibility which are peculiarly in the trial
¶414court’s province.” Bridges v. State, 314 Ga. 395, 398 (877 SE2d 261)
¶415(2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
¶416 The juror at issue in this case made specific statements to the
¶417trial court expressing her intention to make an impartial decision
¶418even though she had worked with Jackson’s stepmother, and the
¶419trial court was authorized to conclude that the juror could be fair
¶420and impartial. Pounds has “offered no reason to discredit those
¶421responses,” and the juror’s relationship with Jackson’s stepmother
¶422therefore “afforded no basis” for her removal. See id. at 165. See
¶423also, e.g., Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 124-126 (868 SE2d 764)
¶424(2022) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
¶425failing to excuse a juror for cause who stated during voir dire that,
¶426despite “her cousin’s conviction for armed robbery and her ex-
¶427boyfriend’s shooting . . . she would attempt to separate those issues
¶428from anything she heard in this case and would do her best to be
¶429fair”); Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 723 (739 SE2d 332) (2013)
¶430 26 (holding that there was no abuse of discretion when the trial court
¶431denied a motion to strike a prospective juror for cause who stated
¶432during voir dire that he “tended to be analytical, that he could be
¶433fair about the case, and that his relationship with the victim’s
¶434brother would not consciously affect his ability to be impartial”).
¶435 Given that Pounds has offered no other reason this juror
¶436should be disqualified, we cannot say that trial counsel’s
¶437performance was objectively unreasonable, and therefore deficient,
¶438in this regard. Pounds’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
¶439thus fails. See Neal v. State, 313 Ga. 746, 752 (873 SE2d 209) (2022)
¶440(concluding that, because a juror provided credible responses to the
¶441trial court affirming her impartiality, the defendant failed to show
¶442that his counsel was deficient in failing to move to strike the juror).
¶443 8. In his final enumeration, Pounds correctly contends, and the
¶444State concedes, that the trial court erred when it failed to vacate the
¶445felony murder count and instead purported to merge it with the
¶446malice murder count. See Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862, 864-865
¶447(823 SE2d 291) (2019). “This error in nomenclature was harmless,
¶448 27 however, because [Pounds] was not convicted of or sentenced for the
¶449felony murder count[].” Id. at 865. As a result, we need not take
¶450any action on this claim.
¶451 9. Finally, we consider whether the combined prejudicial effect
¶452of the errors we assumed warrants a new trial. In our review of
¶453Pounds’s claims, we have assumed, without deciding, that the trial
¶454court abused its discretion in admitting Jordan’s and Bush’s
¶455testimony about Jackson’s out-of-court statements under Rule 803
¶456(3) and Rule 807 and in admitting Brunson’s testimony about
¶457Pounds’s prior acts under Rule 404 (b). Pounds has not claimed
¶458cumulative error and therefore has not made any specific argument
¶459as to why these errors in combination prejudiced his defense, and
¶460we see none. See White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 398 n.17 (903 SE2d
¶461891) (2024).
¶462 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶463 28