¶1NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
¶2In the Supreme Court of Georgia
¶3 Decided: December 20, 2024
¶4 S24A1083. EDWARDS-TUGGLE v. THE STATE.
¶5 ELLINGTON, Justice.
¶6 A Gwinnett County jury found Sean C. Edwards-Tuggle (“the
¶7appellant”) guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault in
¶8connection with the shooting death of his stepfather, Christopher
¶9Grier.1 The appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed
¶10because the trial court gave a coercive jury instruction, defense
¶11counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of
¶12certain evidence or to move for a mistrial, and the cumulative effect
¶13 1 On July 11, 2018, a Gwinnett County grand jury indicted the appellant
¶14for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in connection with Grier’s death. Following a trial that ended on November 18, 2022, the jury found the appellant guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault but acquitted him of malice murder. The court sentenced the appellant to life in prison for felony murder and merged the aggravated assault count into the felony murder count. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial on December 9, 2022, and new counsel amended it on September 15, 2023. Following a hearing held on September 21, 2023, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial on February 5, 2024. The appellant filed a notice of appeal on March 3, 2024. The case was docketed in this Court to the August 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. of those two errors prejudiced his defense, warranting a new trial.
¶15As explained below, the appellant has not carried his burden of
¶16showing any error that requires reversal. Therefore, we affirm the
¶17trial court’s order denying the appellant’s motion for a new trial.
¶18 The evidence admitted at trial shows the following. The
¶19appellant shot and killed Grier on April 1, 2018, during an Easter
¶20Sunday cook-out at the family’s Gwinnett County home. At the time
¶21of the shooting, the appellant and his half-sister, Camryn Grier
¶22(“Camryn”), as well as their mother, Charnique Edwards
¶23(“Edwards”), lived in the same home with Grier. The appellant, who
¶24was 27 years old at the time, had moved back into the family home
¶25a few months prior to the shooting. Camryn, who described the
¶26family dynamic as “dysfunctional,” testified that her parents argued
¶27frequently and that Grier was verbally abusive to her mother and
¶28the appellant.
¶29 Shortly before the shooting, Grier, Edwards, Camryn, the
¶30appellant, and the appellant’s eight-year-old daughter, S. T., had
¶31gathered at the family home. The appellant and Camryn were in
¶32 2 their rooms. Edwards and S. T. were in the kitchen and Grier was
¶33in the backyard, grilling chicken. While the food was cooking, Grier
¶34and Edwards began arguing. Grier cursed at Edwards and started
¶35calling her and the appellant vulgar names.
¶36 During the argument, the appellant emerged from his room
¶37adjacent to the kitchen and went to the garage, where his car was
¶38parked. When he came back into the kitchen, he had a pistol in his
¶39hand. S. T., who was standing by a door that opened from the
¶40kitchen into the back yard, testified that the appellant pointed his
¶41gun at Grier as Grier returned from the grill. Edwards testified that,
¶42as Grier walked across the patio toward the kitchen door, the
¶43appellant pointed his gun at Grier and said: “Say something now,
¶44mother f**ker.” Edwards testified that the appellant “had an evil
¶45look in his eyes.” The appellant then shot Grier twice in the chest,
¶46and Grier collapsed to the ground. Edwards and S. T. both testified
¶47that Grier had nothing in his hands when the appellant shot him.
¶48 Camryn testified that, while she was upstairs in her room, she
¶49heard her mother shout: “Don’t do that. Sean, don’t do that.” Then
¶50 3 she heard two gunshots. Camryn ran downstairs to the kitchen. She
¶51saw Grier lying on the ground just outside the kitchen door. The
¶52appellant was nearby, holding a gun. When Camryn asked the
¶53appellant why he had shot her father, he responded: “Get out of my
¶54face.” The appellant left the house and did not return. S. T. called
¶55911 while Camryn and Edwards tried to help Grier. Camryn
¶56testified that she saw nothing in her father’s hands or on the ground
¶57around him that could be used as a weapon.
¶58 The police who responded to the scene saw nothing that could
¶59be used as a weapon on or near Grier’s body. The police recovered
¶60two .40 caliber casings from the residence. The medical examiner
¶61testified that two .40 caliber projectiles pierced Grier’s chest,
¶62causing massive heart and lung injuries that were not survivable.
¶63He ruled the manner of Grier’s death a homicide.
¶64 Two days after the shooting, the appellant, who had fled to New
¶65York, approached a transit officer at a train station in Brooklyn. He
¶66told the officer that he wanted to turn himself in because he had
¶67done something “really, really bad.” The transit officer testified that
¶68 4 the appellant told her that he had shot his stepfather during an
¶69argument and wanted to turn himself in. After detaining the
¶70appellant, the New York authorities searched his backpack and
¶71found an unfired bullet but no gun.
¶72 The appellant testified in his defense at trial. He said that he
¶73was awakened from a nap by the argument between his mother and
¶74Grier. When he emerged from his bedroom, he had some of his
¶75belongings, including his gun, in his hands. The appellant testified
¶76that Grier approached him with a large grill fork in his hand,
¶77verbally abused him, and then stabbed him in the chest with the
¶78fork. He claimed that he shot Grier in self-defense. He testified that
¶79he got treatment for his wound in New York, but the defense offered
¶80no corroborating evidence of the claimed injury.
¶81 On behalf of the defense, a clinical social worker testified that
¶82the appellant shot Grier while suffering from “battered person
¶83syndrome.” The appellant also presented several lay witnesses,
¶84including his mother, who testified that Grier had repeatedly
¶85verbally and physically abused the appellant since 2003, shortly
¶86 5 after Grier had married his mother. In rebuttal, the State offered
¶87the testimony of a psychiatrist who opined that the appellant – who
¶88was an adult at the time of the crime and was physically and
¶89financially capable of leaving the family home – had “an absence of
¶90behavior or psychiatric illness that would be consistent with
¶91battered person syndrome.” For example, the appellant showed no
¶92signs of remorse or “learned helplessness;” moreover, he was
¶93sometimes the aggressor in family disputes. The psychiatrist
¶94testified that the appellant had “a great deal of dislike” for Grier and
¶95that it was possible the shooting had been motivated by revenge.
¶96 1. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving
¶97the jury an instruction concerning the time available for
¶98deliberations, which he characterizes as “unduly coercive,” and that
¶99the trial court should have granted a mistrial after defense counsel
¶100objected to the instruction. For the following reasons, we disagree.
¶101 The trial transcript shows that, following the charge of the
¶102court and just before the jury retired to deliberate, the judge told the
¶103jurors the following:
¶104 6 Folks, as I told you, submitting an important case to both sides at 4:10 on a Friday afternoon before a holiday week is not ideal, but it’s still an important case to both sides. My experience is that jury deliberations take a while. That’s why we have 12 people. They see it differently. So the intent is to get it right, not go fast. Ordinarily, we would keep you until you reach a verdict. That may or may not be possible today. And then that creates another problem because it’s my understanding that there’s at least some jurors that may not be available on Monday. See, most of the time I just have you come back the next day. We can no longer open the courtroom on [the weekend] – the building is so huge, there’s no way to get the infrastructure in to make it work anymore. There may come a time, if you deliberate into the evening, that you want something to eat. In that regard there, the county authorizes us – how is it we word it? They authorize us to get food from Papa Johns in Lawrenceville. .... My point in mentioning that to you is on a Friday, when I have to order food for jurors, it really takes about an hour to an hour and 15 minutes to get it here. So if you decide you want me or you need me to order food for you, build that into your request. After the jury left the courtroom, defense counsel moved for a
¶105mistrial, arguing that the court’s instruction suggested that the jury
¶106should expedite their deliberations and reach a verdict that evening.
¶107The judge responded that the jury could return on Monday, so long
¶108as they had sufficient jurors available that day. Although one juror
¶109might be out of town, the judge explained, they still had an 7 alternate. The judge then told counsel: “So my intent is I want to
¶110keep them [until] they get a verdict. I have never given a capital case
¶111to a jury at 4:10 in the afternoon and had them reach a verdict that
¶112night. It’s never happened.” The jury, however, returned its verdict
¶113that night at 10:56 p.m.
¶114 The appellant argued that the court’s instructions coerced the
¶115jurors into disregarding their obligations as jurors in favor of
¶116reaching a verdict quickly. Relying in part on cases involving the
¶117propriety of Allen 2 charges, the appellant argued that the court’s
¶118instructions were a form of “verdict urging” involving a “time fuse”
¶119charge, one that implied a deadline for returning a verdict. The
¶120State, on the other hand, contended that the court’s instructions did
¶121not urge the jury to reach a verdict quickly; rather, they were merely
¶122administrative guidance concerning scheduling matters. As
¶123 2 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (17 SCt 154, 41 LE 528) (1896).
¶124“The central inquiry in reviewing an Allen charge is whether the instruction is coercive so as to cause a juror to abandon an honest conviction for reasons other than those based upon the trial or the arguments of other jurors.” Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 888 (6) (725 SE2d 305) (2012). In this case, the jury had not yet begun to deliberate. The circumstances did not involve a dead-locked jury or one that had been deliberating for an unusually long period of time. 8 explained below, we agree with the State.3
¶125 Viewed in context, the trial judge’s remarks about scheduling
¶126the jury’s deliberations were simply ordinary efforts to manage the
¶127business of a trial. Over the course of the trial, the judge kept the
¶128jury informed about various expected delays and breaks in the
¶129proceedings due to unrelated court matters, Veterans Day, and
¶130Thanksgiving. The judge told the jury at one point: “I’ll try to keep
¶131things going, you know, keep us on track. . . . We’re not in the go-
¶132fast business; we’re in the get-it-right business.” On the evening of
¶133the day before the case went to the jury, the judge informed the jury
¶134that deliberations might be continued into the following week. The
¶135judge noted: “Sometimes juries deliberate for days. Sometimes they
¶136deliberate [for] a short time. There’s no prediction. I just don’t want
¶137there to be any exigency tied to your time. That’s all I try to avoid,
¶138so that you can give things your undivided attention.”
¶139 3 Moreover, even if a claim that a trial judge encouraged a jury to move
¶140deliberations along (outside the Allen-charge context and without anything more) is the kind of jury-coercion claim that could in theory warrant a mistrial (a point that we do not decide today), we conclude that the appellant has not shown that any such claim prevails here. 9 With respect to such administrative or trial management
¶141instructions, “a broad discretion is vested in the judge below, and
¶142that that discretion will not be controlled by this court unless it is
¶143manifestly abused.” Watkins v. State, 278 Ga. 414, 415 (603 SE2d
¶144222) (2004) (citation and punctuation omitted). The judge’s
¶145discretion in controlling the conduct of a trial necessarily includes
¶146the power to determine the length of time the jury will be allowed to
¶147deliberate on a given day. See also Emerson v. State, 315 Ga. App.
¶148105, 112 (2) (726 SE2d 600) (2012) (The trial court did not abuse its
¶149discretion in instructing the jurors that they would have to arrange
¶150for childcare during the course of deliberations if the deliberations
¶151extended past regular working hours. The charge merely set out the
¶152trial court’s time schedule for conducting deliberations so that the
¶153jury could plan ahead.); Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. 763, 768 (4),
¶154769 (256 SE2d 63) (1979) (The trial court did not abuse its discretion
¶155in retaining the jury in deliberations from 6:30 p.m. until 4 a.m. the
¶156following morning.). See also OCGA § 15-1-3 (4) (“Every court has
¶157power . . . [t]o control, in the furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
¶158 10 officers and all other persons connected with a judicial proceeding
¶159before it, in every matter appertaining thereto[.]”).
¶160 Given the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s remarks
¶161about submitting the case on a Friday afternoon, ordering dinner,
¶162and possibly continuing into the following week cannot be
¶163understood as urging the jury to reach a verdict quickly or setting a
¶164deadline for returning a verdict. Rather, the court’s statements
¶165constituted administrative guidance for the jury concerning how
¶166long they would likely be deliberating that evening and in the
¶167coming days, guidance that clearly fell within the wide discretion
¶168afforded trial judges in managing their courtrooms. Consequently,
¶169the appellant has shown no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
¶170ruling denying the appellant’s motion for a mistrial on this ground.
¶171See, e.g., Watkins, 278 Ga. at 415; Emerson v. State, 315 Ga. App. at
¶172112 (2); Simpkins v. State, 149 Ga. App. at768 (4).
¶173 2. The appellant asserts that he was denied constitutionally
¶174effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to
¶175questions posed by the prosecutor on cross-examination that elicited 11 improper evidence of the appellant’s bad character, in violation of
¶176OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) and (b). He argues that his convictions must be
¶177reversed because trial counsel’s deficient performance resulted in
¶178the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence. In addition, the
¶179appellant argues that trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial.
¶180For the following reasons, we disagree.
¶181 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
¶182show that his counsel’s performance was professionally deficient
¶183and that such deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the
¶184defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (III) (B) (104
¶185SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Wesley v. State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (3)
¶186(689 SE2d 280) (2010). To prove deficient performance, the appellant
¶187must show that his attorney “performed at trial in an objectively
¶188unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light
¶189of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344
¶190(3) (745 SE2d 637) (2013); see also Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687-688
¶191(III). To prove prejudice, the appellant must establish a reasonable
¶192probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient performance,
¶193 12 the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S.
¶194at 695 (III) (B). If the appellant fails to establish either the “deficient
¶195performance” or the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland test, this
¶196Court is not required to examine the other prong. See Green v. State,
¶197291 Ga. 579, 580 (2) (731 SE2d 359) (2012).
¶198 The trial transcript shows that the prosecutor questioned the
¶199appellant about his troubled relationship with S. T.’s mother,
¶200Melissa Glasper, and that the appellant admitted that he and
¶201Glasper had argued. When asked if he had ever struck Glasper, the
¶202appellant denied that he had. When the prosecutor asked if he had
¶203been arrested for striking her, the appellant replied: “No. I got
¶204arrested for when she cheated on me. And we were cheating on each
¶205other.” When asked again, the appellant admitted that he had been
¶206arrested for family violence. At that point, the trial court stopped
¶207the cross-examination and excused the jury from the courtroom.
¶208 Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked the prosecutor
¶209why evidence of the appellant’s arrest was admissible. The
¶210prosecutor explained that she was attempting to rebut the
¶211 13 appellant’s portrait of himself “as the victim of violence by all of
¶212these people.” The prosecutor acknowledged, however, that she had
¶213not asked to admit the evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). When
¶214the court questioned defense counsel about his lack of an objection
¶215to this testimony, counsel explained that he assumed the prosecutor
¶216was going to follow up as to why it was admissible. The trial court
¶217asked the parties to contemplate whether a mistrial was in order
¶218and took a five-minute recess. After the recess, the court concluded
¶219that the State had elicited improper character evidence and asked
¶220defense counsel what remedy he preferred. Defense counsel
¶221responded,
¶222 I ask that you give a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard what they heard. This is inappropriate evidence under the rules, whatever legal admonishment you want, but with all due respect, we’ve conferred, and my client wants to proceed with this jury. We will not request, your Honor, the mistrial.
¶223With respect to his decision not to object, trial counsel added: “[W]e
¶224knew what we were doing, respectfully.”
¶225 Upon the jury’s return, the trial court gave the following
¶226 14 curative instruction:
¶227 Ladies and gentlemen, there was an objection – actually, I specifically asked you to step out. There was no objection. It was on my own volition. I find that the State’s inquiry concerning past arrest of the defendant to be improper. Has absolutely nothing to do with this trial, not in accordance with the evidence rules that we’re all bound to follow. So I must instruct you to disregard it in its entirety. It has no bearing in this case.
¶228The trial court asked trial counsel if he desired any additional
¶229instruction, and counsel responded that the court’s instruction was
¶230satisfactory.
¶231 At the hearing on appellant’s motion for a new trial, trial
¶232counsel explained that his decision not to object to evidence of the
¶233appellant’s prior misdemeanor arrest for striking his girlfriend was
¶234a strategic decision. Counsel explained that he believed the evidence
¶235may have been admitted later pursuant to Rule 703 as something
¶236the State’s expert had considered when evaluating the appellant’s
¶237“battered person syndrome” defense. Moreover, counsel preferred
¶238having this incident before the jury because it would show that “the
¶239best they’ve got of him being aggressive is pushing a girlfriend.”
¶240 15 Counsel said he was far more concerned about the serious matter of
¶241the appellant perpetrating a home invasion and aggravated assault
¶242with a firearm just twelve hours before the shooting, and counsel
¶243had successfully kept that out of evidence. Additionally, when asked
¶244why he wanted a curative instruction if he wanted the misdemeanor
¶245arrest in evidence, trial counsel explained that if he chose not to
¶246accept the court’s offer for a curative instruction, he would draw
¶247attention to the matter and “educate the State” on his strategy. Trial
¶248counsel added: “We wanted this jury. We picked a good jury.”
¶249 The appellant argues that trial counsel’s strategy was not
¶250reasonable under the circumstances because evidence of the
¶251misdemeanor family violence convictions would not have been
¶252admissible under OCGA § 24-7-703.4 However, assuming without
¶253deciding that trial counsel’s strategy was unreasonable and that
¶254 4 OCGA § 24-7-703 provides:
¶255 Such facts or data [reasonably relied upon by an expert] that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
¶256 16 counsel was deficient for failing to object to the evidence or to move
¶257for a mistrial, the admission of the evidence did not prejudice the
¶258appellant’s defense. First, “the trial court’s prompt curative
¶259instruction negated any prejudice by telling the jury to disregard the
¶260reference, an instruction that we presume the jury followed.” Lynn
¶261v. State, 310 Ga. 608, 612 (3) (852 SE2d 843) (2020). Additionally,
¶262the challenged testimony was fleeting, with the jury only hearing
¶263that the appellant had been arrested – not convicted – for family
¶264violence and that the appellant had denied striking his girlfriend.
¶265See Rashad v. State, 318 Ga. 199, 210 (3) (b) (897 SE2d 760) (2024)
¶266(pretermitting whether a witness’s reference to the defendant’s prior
¶267time in jail violated Rule 404 (b), testimony was fleeting and
¶268undetailed and “likely had little prejudicial effect on the jury”).
¶269Moreover, no prejudice from the admission of this evidence has been
¶270shown given the other, compelling evidence of the appellant’s guilt.
¶271In this case, the appellant’s family members testified that the
¶272appellant shot Grier, who was unarmed, after hearing Grier verbally
¶273abuse the appellant and the appellant’s mother. Other than the
¶274 17 appellant’s own self-serving testimony, there was no evidence of a
¶275weapon or an injury to the appellant’s body that would substantiate
¶276his claim of self-defense. Further, the appellant’s “battered person
¶277syndrome” defense had been undermined by testimony from the
¶278State’s expert, who opined that the appellant did not display
¶279behaviors consistent with the defense. The appellant also fled to
¶280New York where he admitted to a transit officer that he had “done
¶281something really, really bad” when he shot his stepfather. The
¶282appellant’s own mother testified that the appellant looked “evil”
¶283during the shooting, and that Grier did not deserve to die over a
¶284mere argument. Given the overwhelming evidence of the appellant’s
¶285guilt, there is no reasonable probability that the trial’s outcome
¶286would have been different absent the admission of appellant’s
¶287testimony. See Clements v. State, 317 Ga. 772, 798 (7) (c) (896 SE2d
¶288549) (2023) (“Even if [the witness’s] testimony was improper
¶289character evidence that should have been excluded under OCGA §
¶29024-4-404 (a), the admission of this testimony did not prejudice [the]
¶291defense given the other compelling evidence detailed above[.]”).
¶292 18 Further, because there was little if any prejudice from the admission
¶293of the evidence, particularly in light of the trial court’s instructions,
¶294the appellant cannot show that the trial court would have abused its
¶295discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial under these
¶296circumstances, had the appellant made such a motion. See Thrift v.
¶297State, 310 Ga. 499, 503 (4) (852 SE2d 560) (2020) (The trial court did
¶298not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial based on
¶299the admission of allegedly improper character evidence where the
¶300evidence had negligible impact on the outcome of the trial.).
¶301 Because the requisite prejudice has not been shown, the trial
¶302court properly found that the appellant failed to carry his burden
¶303under Strickland and, therefore, properly denied the motion for a
¶304new trial on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. See Green,
¶305291 Ga. at 580 (2).
¶306 3. The appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial due
¶307to the cumulative prejudicial impact of the trial court’s errors. A
¶308cumulative error analysis, however, requires an appellant to show
¶309that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial[.]”
¶310 19 Flood v. State, 311 Ga. 800, 808 (2) (d) (860 SE2d 731) (2021)
¶311(citation and punctuation omitted). Here, there is no basis for
¶312evaluating the cumulative effect of alleged errors because the
¶313appellant has not shown that at least two errors occurred. See id. at
¶314808-809 (2) (d).
¶315 Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
¶316 20