633
Argued and submitted July 15, pretrial order reversed and remanded
September 8, 2022
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RONALD DEAN MARTIN,
Defendant-Respondent.
Malheur County Circuit Court
18CR20788; A176646
517 P3d 372
The Court of Appeals previously reversed two of the convictions in this case,
holding that it was error to admit the evidence of defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) when the state failed to establish chain of custody. State v. Martin,
307 Or App 396, 404,
477 P3d 452 (2020) (Martin I). On remand, the trial court
concluded that the law of the case precluded the state from seeking to admit evidence of the BAC results at the retrial. The state assigns error to that decision.
Held: The Court of Appeals concluded that the law of the case did not prevent
the state from attempting to introduce the BAC results during the retrial. In
Martin I, the court determined that the medical records alone were insufficient to
establish chain of custody.
307 Or App at 404. That legal determination applied
to the facts as developed in the trial court at that time and neither precluded
nor even addressed whether additional evidence bearing on that issue may be
introduced. Additionally, the court in Martin I did not place any limitation on
the state’s ability following remand to prove chain of custody. Therefore, the trial
court erred in determining that the state’s ability to introduce the evidence was
barred by the law of the case.
Pretrial order reversed and remanded.
Lung S. Hung, Judge.
Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Andy Simrin argued the cause for respondent. Also on
the brief was Andy Simrin PC.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Pretrial order reversed and remanded.
634 State v. Martin
KAMINS, J.
The state appeals from a pretrial order granting
defendant’s motion in limine precluding the admission of evidence of defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC). Defendant
was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants
(Count 1), ORS 813.010, reckless driving (Count 2), ORS
811.140, criminal mischief in the second degree (Count 3),
ORS 164.354, and failure to use safety belts (Count 4), ORS
811.210. After he was convicted of Counts 1, 2, and 4, we
reversed and remanded the convictions for Counts 1 and 2.
In this appeal, the state assigns error to the trial court’s
conclusion on remand that the law of the case precluded the
state from seeking to admit evidence of the BAC results at
the retrial. We agree with the state and reverse and remand
to the trial court for further proceedings.
This is the second time this case has come before us,
and the issue now is whether our prior decision precluded
the introduction of the BAC results on remand. In the first
trial, the state moved in limine to admit defendant’s medical
records, which included the BAC results. State v. Martin, 307
Or App 396, 399,
477 P3d 452 (2020) (Martin I). Defendant
objected on a variety of different bases, including that the
state could not establish chain of custody.
Id. at 399-400.
The motion in limine hearing addressed other issues in the
motion, and chain of custody was not discussed.
Id. at 400.
The trial court ultimately admitted the BAC results without
requiring evidence of chain of custody.
Id.
On appeal, we reversed. Id. at 405. We held that
the medical records on their own were insufficient to establish chain of custody and, therefore, it was error to admit
the BAC results.
Id. at 404. The state requested that we
issue a limited remand solely for the trial court to conduct a
hearing to allow the state to lay an appropriate foundation.
Id. at 405. We declined to do so, and instead, “reverse[d] and
remand[ed] the judgment for the trial court to determine
the appropriate nature of the proceedings on remand.” Id.;
see State v. Hoffman,
321 Or App 330, 339-40,
515 P3d 912
(2022) (recounting the history of Martin I).
On remand, defendant filed a motion in limine to
exclude the BAC results altogether, arguing that, under
Cite as 321 Or App 633 (2022) 635
the law of the case, Martin I precluded introduction of those
records. The trial court granted defendant’s motion in limine
excluding the BAC results, concluding that, because we previously held that the state did not meet its burden to demonstrate chain of custody, “the law of the case does not permit
the [state] another opportunity to prove chain of custody.”
The state contends that the law of the case does
not preclude a party from laying the proper foundation for
a piece of evidence after an appellate court reverses and
remands on the basis that the evidence lacked foundation.
According to the state, the law of the case was limited to
the determination in Martin I that the BAC results were
not admissible without testimony tracing the results back to
defendant’s blood.
Defendant responds that our disposition granted
the trial court broad discretion to determine the appropriate nature of the proceedings on remand and that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the law
of the case prevented the state from relitigating chain of
custody. Additionally, defendant argues that the trial court’s
conclusion is consistent with our decision in State v. Custer,
146 Or App 487, 494,
934 P2d 455 (1997) (Custer II) (holding
that it was error to permit the state to relitigate a motion
to suppress once this court instructed that the evidence
be suppressed). Finally, defendant contends that allowing
the state to prove chain of custody after remand would be
antithetical to the purposes served by the law of the case
doctrine.
We review a trial court’s conclusions as to law of the
case for legal error. See OEA v. Oregon Taxpayers United,
253 Or App 288, 299-300,
291 P3d 202 (2012) (determining that we review a trial court’s conclusions with respect
to preclusion, including law of the case, for errors of law);
Espinoza v. Evergreen Helicopters, Inc.,
359 Or 63, 117,
376
P3d 960 (2016) (“Because whether a trial court applied the
correct substantive standard to guide its decision is a question of law, we review that issue for legal error.”).
The law of the case doctrine “precludes relitigation
or reconsideration of a point of law decided at an earlier stage
636 State v. Martin
of the same case. The rationale is that a court should adhere
to a previous ruling on an identical matter[.]” Koch v. So. Pac.
Transp. Co., 274 Or 499, 512,
547 P2d 589 (1976) (emphasis
in original). It is “applicable only to former decisions made
in the same cause, and upon the same state of facts.” Huszar
v. Certified Realty Co.,
272 Or 517, 522,
538 P2d 57 (1975)
(emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted).
The doctrine, which is prudential in nature, furthers the
interests of consistency in judicial decision-making, finality
of matters once litigated, and preservation of the credibility
of the court. See Poet v. Thompson,
208 Or App 442, 450-51,
144 P3d 1067 (2006) (explaining the policies underlying law
of the case).
We conclude that law of the case did not preclude the
state from attempting to introduce the BAC results during
the retrial. In Martin I, we determined that the medical
records “alone” were insufficient to establish chain of custody. Martin I, 307 Or App at 404. Because “on [that] record,
the court could not determine that there was a reasonable
probability that the test results traced back to defendant’s
blood,” we reversed.
Id. That legal determination applied to
the facts as developed in the trial court at that time and
neither precludes nor even addresses whether additional
evidence bearing on that issue may be introduced. See State
v. Langley,
331 Or 430, 443 n 9,
16 P3d 489 (2000) (“[T]he
doctrine of the law of the case is inapplicable in light of new
facts or evidence bearing on the legal issue in question.”);
State ex rel Orbanco Real Estate Serv. v. Allen,
301 Or 104,
110,
720 P2d 365 (1986) (“To invoke the law of the case doctrine the facts and issues in the second proceeding must be
the same as in the first.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); Huszar,
272 Or at 523 (“Thus, although a former ruling by this court in a case is binding as the law of the case
insofar as the facts and issues are the same, the parties may
be authorized to amend and produce further evidence, and
if that was done, then our (former decision) was no longer
final.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
The legal issue that was presented and that we
decided in Martin I related to the sufficiency of the state’s
foundation for the BAC results. We held that the records
containing the BAC results were not self-authenticating;
Cite as 321 Or App 633 (2022) 637
that is, they could not be admitted without additional evidence of chain of custody. Martin I,
307 Or App at 404. We
did not place any limitation on the state’s ability following
remand to prove chain of custody. The trial court therefore
erred in determining that the state’s ability to introduce the
evidence was barred by law of the case.
That conclusion is consistent with the prudential
nature of the law of the case doctrine. State v. Poston, 309
Or App 377, 383,
482 P3d 778 (2021). A contrary result
would freeze in time any appellate decision relating to the
admissibility of evidence, regardless of further developments in the evidentiary record on remand. For example, if
an appellate court determined that a defendant had failed
to demonstrate the relevance of some piece of evidence, that
defendant on remand would be precluded from attempting
to lay a foundation that established the evidence’s relevance.
Cf. Langley,
331 Or at 443 & n 9 (observing that the Supreme
Court’s prior ruling as to the admissibility of the state’s
exhibits would not have been binding as law of the case if
the defendant had introduced new evidence on remand that
demonstrated that the exhibits were in fact not admissible).1
Defendant’s reliance on Custer II to support departing from the long-established parameters of law of the case
is misplaced. In Custer I, we determined that the inventory search of the defendant’s vehicle constituted an illegal search and instructed that the evidence be suppressed.
State v. Custer, 126 Or App 431, 436,
868 P2d 1363 (1994)
(Custer I). On remand, the state sought to introduce evidence to demonstrate that the search of the vehicle was in
fact legal, and the trial court allowed it, again denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress. Custer II,
146 Or App at 491-
92. We once again reversed, reasoning that our prior legal
determination that the search was illegal and instruction
that the evidence should have been suppressed was law of
the case.
Id. at 493-94. In contrast, the holding of Martin I
did not include a legal determination that the BAC evidence
was per se inadmissible, nor did we instruct that the trial
1
To the extent that defendant is advocating that the doctrine of the law of
the case should apply differently to parties seeking to admit evidence than those
seeking to exclude it, we find no support for such a distinction.
638 State v. Martin
court exclude it. Rather, we concluded that the foundation for
the evidence was insufficient and declined to offer limiting
instructions as to its introduction on remand. Martin I, 307
Or App at 404-05.2 Accordingly, the law of the case did not
preclude the admission of the evidence on remand and the
trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion in limine.
Pretrial order reversed and remanded.
2
The parties also raise arguments regarding the meaning of our instruction in Martin I. In Martin I we reversed and remanded the judgment “for the
trial court to determine the appropriate nature of the proceedings on remand.”
Martin I, 307 Or App at 405. Nothing about that instruction, or anything else in
our opinion in Martin I, is inconsistent with our use of “reversed and remanded.”
See State v. Plueard,
297 Or App 592, 595,
443 P3d 1195 (2019) (explaining that,
generally, reversing and remanding a case sends it back to the trial court as
though the original proceeding did not occur, unless something indicates that the
remand is partial).
