594 May 15, 2024 No. 319
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL WALKER,
aka Christopher M. Walker,
Defendant-Appellant.
Linn County Circuit Court
21CR24839, 20CR29998; A177990 (Control), A177991
Michael B. Wynhausen, Judge.
Argued and submitted October 3, 2023.
Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor
General and Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney General.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
PAGÁN, J.
Affirmed.
Cite as 332 Or App 594 (2024) 595
PAGÁN, J.
In this appeal, defendant challenges his conviction
for witness tampering in violation of ORS 162.285 (Count
2).1 Raising one assignment of error,2 defendant contends
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) because the record does not support a finding that he attempted to induce a witness to
“unlawfully” withhold testimony under ORS 162.285(1)(a).
Specifically, defendant argues that he did nothing more than
encourage a voluntary witness to absent herself from trial
and that, without evidence of a subpoena or belief that one
is impending, such conduct is not criminal. For the reasons
discussed below, we conclude that the trial court did not err
in denying defendant’s MJOA because ORS 162.285(1)(a) is
not limited to witnesses who have been subpoenaed or witnesses a defendant believes will be subpoenaed, and the evidence in the record was sufficient to find that defendant was
attempting to induce a witness to disobey a legal obligation
to testify. Affirmed.
We review the denial of an MJOA by “review[ing] the
facts in the light most favorable to the state and draw[ing]
all reasonable inferences in the state’s favor to determine
‘whether any rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable
inferences and credibility choices, could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
State v. Peirce, 296 Or App 829, 830,
440 P3d 98 (2019) (quoting State v. Lupoli,
348 Or 346, 366,
234 P3d 117 (2010)).
“Where a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal involves a question of statutory interpretation, we
review that interpretation for legal error.” State v. Ritter,
280 Or App 281, 285-86,
380 P3d 1160 (2016).
FACTS
Defendant was arrested for domestic violence
and resisting arrest. While in jail awaiting trial, defendant called the complainant, R. He told her that the state
had made a plea offer of 24 months in prison on a charge
1
Defendant was also convicted of one count of resisting arrest, ORS 162.315
(Count 1). He does not challenge that conviction.
2
Defendant originally raised two assignments of error, but the second
assignment was rendered moot by the trial court entering an amended judgment.
596 State v. Walker
of strangulation in exchange for dismissing a charge of
attempted assault. Defendant asked R to pay his bail and
said that his case would likely go to trial. He also told R,
“with no witnesses no case,” that he would lose at trial “if
certain people show up to testify,” and that “there better
not be any testimony against me.” For that conduct, a grand
jury charged defendant with tampering with a witness in
violation of ORS 162.285.
Defendant testified in his own defense. On crossexamination, he acknowledged making the statements
in the recorded telephone call. He said that he knew the
state “was going to call” R as a witness and that his references to witnesses were about R’s daughter. He said that R
had “stated on the record in court she’s not going to testify
against me.” Ultimately, defendant was convicted of resisting arrest and tampering with a witness.
ANALYSIS
ORS 162.285 criminalizes witness tampering in
two ways: first, by inducing or attempting to induce a person who may be called as a witness “to offer false testimony
or unlawfully withhold any testimony” (ORS 162.285(1)(a));
second, by inducing or attempting to induce a witness “to
be absent” from a hearing “to which the person has been
legally summoned” (ORS 162.285(1)(b)).3 In this case, the
state elected to proceed under paragraph (1)(a), alleging that
defendant induced R to provide false testimony or “unlawfully” withhold testimony.
Defendant does not dispute that the evidence permits a finding that he believed that R may be called as a voluntary witness and that he attempted to induce her to withhold testimony. However, defendant contends that he did
not attempt to induce R to unlawfully withhold testimony.
3
ORS 162.285 provides, in part:
“(1) A person commits the crime of tampering with a witness if:
“(a) The person knowingly induces or attempts to induce a witness or a
person the person believes may be called as a witness in any official proceeding to offer false testimony or unlawfully withhold any testimony; or
“(b) The person knowingly induces or attempts to induce a witness to
be absent from any official proceeding to which the person has been legally
summoned.”
Cite as 332 Or App 594 (2024) 597
Specifically, we understand defendant’s argument to be that
under ORS 162.285(1)(a), the term “unlawfully withhold
any testimony” means that the defendant’s conduct targets
a witness that either (1) has been subpoenaed or (2) that
the defendant believes will be subpoenaed, and not simply
called as a voluntary witness. Based on that interpretation,
defendant contends that the evidence here was insufficient
to find that defendant induced R to unlawfully withhold testimony because the state did not present evidence that R
was subpoenaed for any hearing or that defendant believed
R would be subpoenaed.
We begin by noting that this case is similar to State
v. Bryan, 221 Or App 455, 463,
190 P3d 470 (2008), rev den,
347 Or 290 (2009), where we held that the term “witness” in
ORS 162.285(1)(a) is not limited to “a person who either has
already testified or has been subpoenaed to give testimony.”
However, defendant’s argument that ORS 162.285(1)(a)
requires evidence that the witness was subpoenaed or evidence that the defendant believed the witness would be
subpoenaed—is sufficiently different to warrant additional
analysis of ORS 162.285(1)(a).
The interpretation of ORS 162.285(1)(a) is, in part,
a question of legislative intent, which requires consideration
of the statute’s text, context, and if useful to the analysis,
its legislative history, and canons of construction. State v.
Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72,
206 P3d 1042 (2009). “In the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, we assume that the
legislature intended to give those words their ‘plain, natural, and ordinary meaning,’ ” relying on dictionaries that
were in use at the time the statute was enacted. State v.
Ziska/Garza,
355 Or 799, 804-05,
334 P3d 964 (2014).
ORS 162.285(1)(a) provides that a person commits
the crime of witness tampering if the person “knowingly
induces or attempts to induce a witness or a person the person believes may be called as a witness … to offer false
testimony or unlawfully withhold any testimony.” Read
in context, “unlawfully” modifies the phrase “withhold
any testimony,” indicating that the legislature intended
to exempt behavior such as advising a witness to exert a
lawful privilege. See State v. Bailey, 346 Or 551, 557, 213
598 State v. Walker
P3d 1240 (2009) (holding that the word “unlawfully” in
ORS 162.285(1)(a) “conveys the legislature’s intention not
to criminalize attempts to induce a person to exercise a
lawful right or privilege not to testify”). Indeed, commentary from the legislative history states that it is not a violation of the law to persuade a witness to “lawfully refuse
to testify on grounds of personal privilege or to induce a
witness to avoid process by leaving the jurisdiction of the
court.” Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission
Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report
§ 203, 202 (July 1970). The commentary further explains
that such conduct, “if engaged in by an attorney, may raise
certain ethical questions, but should not be subject to criminal liability.” Id. Consequently, the question of whether
a defendant unlawfully induces a witness to “unlawfully
withhold any testimony” turns on whether the defendant is
inducing the witness to violate a legal obligation to testify.
Importantly, the “unlawfully withhold any testimony” element does not depend on whether the witness has
been served with a subpoena. The legislature drafted ORS
162.285 after it considered tampering statutes from the New
York Penal Code and the Model Penal Code.4 Commentary
to Criminal Law Revision Commission Proposed Oregon
Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report § 203, 202 (July
1970). The New York provision, former New York Penal Code
§ 215.10, provided that a person commits the crime of witness tampering when the person, “knowing that a person
is or is about to be called as a witness in an action or proceeding, … wrongfully induces or attempts to induce such
person [to avoid appearing or testifying].” The Model Penal
Code provision, § 241.6, prohibited tampering with a witness by a person who “believe[es] that an official proceeding
or investigation is pending or is about to be instituted[.]”
4
Early drafts of the of the 1971 Criminal Law Revision (of which ORS
162.285 was a part) show that the Criminal Code Revision Commission looked
at witness tampering statutes from three different sources: the New York Penal
Code, the Michigan Penal Code, and the Model Penal Code. Oregon Criminal Law
Revision Commission, Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Preliminary Draft No 2,
Article 24, § 7, 38-39 (Dec 1969). However, by the time the Commission adopted
the final draft of the revised criminal code, it stated that the Oregon provision
was derived only from two sources: New York Revised Penal Law § 215.10 and
Model Penal Code § 241.6. Commentary to Criminal Law Revision Commission
Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, Final Draft and Report § 203, 202 (July 1970).
Cite as 332 Or App 594 (2024) 599
It is significant to our analysis that the above
statutes contain a more focused description of the possible
timing of the testimony being tampered with than ORS
162.285(1)(a). In particular, by providing that witness tampering occurs when a defendant “knowing that a person is
or is about to be called as a witness in a … proceeding”
the New York statute clearly excludes from the definition
of witness tampering all circumstances where a proceeding is only a future possibility. Former New York Penal code
§ 215.10 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Model Penal Code
provision, § 241.6, by stating that a person commits witness
tampering when they “believe[e] that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or is about to be instituted,”
excludes circumstances where the defendant does not know
or believe that an official proceeding is pending.
The fact that ORS 162.285(1)(a) does not contain
any of the narrow wording of the New York and Model Penal
Code statutes “suggests that the legislature intended that
the Oregon statute apply more broadly.” Bailey, 346 Or at
564. It also suggests that the legislature was primarily concerned with criminalizing a defendant’s intention to interfere with official factfinding processes, rather than what
the person with whom the defendant interfered “might be
called upon to do.” State v. Ortiz-Saldana,
288 Or App 230,
234,
406 P3d 61 (2017). Consistent with those inferences, we
have previously held that ORS 162.285(1)(a) criminalizes a
person’s attempt to induce a witness to withhold testimony
before an official proceeding has commenced, and, in particular, before any subpoena may have been issued. See Bailey,
346 Or at 564 (holding that when “ORS 162.285(1)(a) defines
witness tampering in terms of tampering with a person who
the defendant ‘believes may be called as a witness in any
official proceeding,’ it includes tampering that occurs at a
time when no official proceeding is pending”).
The “unlawfully withhold any testimony” element
also does not necessarily turn on whether the defendant
believes the witness will be subpoenaed. Again, the question
is whether the defendant is attempting to induce a person to
disobey a legal obligation to testify. That can occur regardless of whether the defendant believes a subpoena will issue.
600 State v. Walker
For example, evidence that a defendant tells a witness not
to testify “no matter what” may convince a factfinder that
the defendant attempted to induce non-compliance with any
potential future subpoena. By contrast, a factfinder may
rationally find that evidence a defendant said “please do not
testify unless you receive a subpoena” does not run afoul
of the statute if the factfinder concludes that the defendant
was not inducing the witness to defy a subpoena. In this
case, a reasonable factfinder could find that defendant was
attempting to have the witness withhold testimony under
any circumstance, regardless of whether defendant believed
the witness was or would be subpoenaed.
Lastly, even if we agreed with defendant’s contention that ORS 162.285(1)(a) requires evidence that the
defendant believed the witness would be subpoenaed, the
record was sufficient for a factfinder to infer that defendant
believed R would be subpoenaed. Defendant told R over the
phone, that “there better not be any testimony against me”
and testified that he knew the state “was going to call” her
as a witness. It was rational for the factfinder to infer that
if defendant had believed R would not be subpoenaed, there
would be no reason for him to tell her to withhold testimony.
Affirmed.
