Volume 349 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose on a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant after he defaulted on a promissory note secured by the mortgage. The mortgage agreement included a provision authoriz- ing the plaintiff to purchase force placed insurance coverage for the property if the defendant failed to maintain adequate coverage. The defendant filed an answer and a counterclaim, and asserted various special defenses, including unclean hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which were predicated on allega- tions relating to the plaintiff's purchase of force placed flood insurance from A Co., an insurance provider. The defendant did not challenge the plaintiff's right to purchase the force placed insurance but alleged that the plaintiff was involved in an undisclosed kickback scheme with A Co., pursuant to which the plaintiff used A Co. as its exclusive force placed insurance provider, and, in exchange, A Co. provided the plaintiff with certain rebates, including free or below cost mortgage services. The defendant claimed that, instead of passing those rebates on to him, the plaintiff charged him more than the cost of purchasing the force placed coverage, contrary to both the provisions of the mortgage agree- ment and certain representations the plaintiff had made to him. The defendant's answer also included numerous allegations concerning the plaintiff's nationwide kickback scheme with A Co. and its impact on borrowers generally. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the special defenses and the counterclaim, which the trial court granted in part. In connection with its decision to strike the special defenses of unclean hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the trial court reasoned that the allegations concerning the kickback scheme were broad and related to borrowers generally instead of to the defendant specifically, and, therefore, the allegations did not arise from the making, validity, or enforcement of the specific mortgage at issue. The trial court subsequently granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability and rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the defendant appealed. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the regulatory approval of the premium rate for the flood insurance at issue rendered the defendant's special defenses moot under the federal filed rate doctrine, pursuant to which any rate that is approved by the governing regulatory agency is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers. Held: 1. The filed rate doctrine, as applied by the federal courts, did not implicate this court's subject matter jurisdiction, and, accordingly, this court denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal: Although one of the rationales for the filed rate doctrine, namely, that courts should not undermine agency rate-making authority by upsetting approved insurance rates, is connected to the principle of nonjusticiabil- ity, the fact that that term sounds jurisdictional did not necessarily render the filed rate doctrine a jurisdictional one, and the nonjusticiability rationale simply reflects the deference owed to agency expertise and the reluctance of courts to second-guess such determinations. Moreover, nothing inherent in the nonjusticiability rationale for the filed rate doctrine implicates the principles underlying the mootness doctrine, there was no support in the case law for the proposition that the applica- tion of the filed rate doctrine renders an action moot, and this court agreed with the majority of federal courts that have concluded that the filed rate doctrine does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction but, rather, constitutes a defense on the merits that relates to whether a party has failed to state a legally cognizable claim. To the extent that the plaintiff argued that the present appeal had been rendered moot because the defendant could not prevail as a matter of law in light of certain federal court judgments dismissing actions brought by the defendant against the plaintiff and A Co., among other parties, on the basis of the filed rate doctrine, that argument related to the merits of the present appeal and not to this court's jurisdiction, and this court's acceptance of the plaintiff's argument would invite parties to interject mootness claims whenever there is a basis to challenge the legal suffi- ciency of a claim or defense. In view of its determination that the filed rate doctrine does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, this court did not need to determine whether to adopt that doctrine as a matter of state law. 2. The trial court improperly struck the defendant's special defenses of unclean hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judg- ment and remanded the case for further proceedings: To survive a motion to strike, a special defense to a foreclosure action must relate to the making, validity or enforcement of the note or the mortgage and otherwise be legally sufficient. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the defendant's answer included allegations that related to his specific mortgage, and the broader allega- tions therein relating to the plaintiff's global conduct and borrowers generally were necessary to provide context for the allegations that were specific to the defendant's mortgage. Specifically, the defendant alleged that, pursuant to the mortgage agree- ment, the plaintiff purchased from A Co. force placed insurance for his property, the plaintiff failed to disclose that it had a financial arrangement with A Co. in exchange for an exclusive relationship, the plaintiff repre- sented to the defendant that it would charge him only for the cost of the insurance but did not pass on to the defendant the rebates it received from A Co., resulting in the defendant being charged more than the cost of the force placed insurance, the plaintiff's representations to the defendant were false and made to induce him to act to his detriment, which he did, and the plaintiff's false representations undermined the validity of the mortgage. Moreover, those allegations were sufficiently related to the making, valid- ity or enforcement of the mortgage, insofar as the plaintiff's alleged conduct involving the alleged kickback scheme was directly related to its enforcement of the provision of the mortgage agreement authorizing the plaintiff to purchase force placed insurance, and the alleged effect of the plaintiff's conduct in enforcing that provision, that it wrongfully increased the defendant's overall debt, provided a sufficient nexus to the foreclosure action. Furthermore, this court has defined the term ''enforcement'' to encom- pass a mortgagee's conduct during postdefault loan modification negotia- tions if the alleged misconduct substantially increases the overall debt or impedes a mortgagor from curing the default, and, construing the allegations in the present case in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency, this court concluded that the defendant sufficiently alleged that the plaintiff's misconduct in carrying out the kickback scheme increased the defendant's overall debt beyond that which was necessary to protect the plaintiff's interest in the property. In addition, the defendant's answer also alleged that the plaintiff's con- duct related to the validity of the mortgage, as it could be inferred from the defendant's answer that he was claiming that, because the plaintiff entered into the mortgage agreement with the kickback scheme in place and made certain representations to the defendant that he would be charged only for the cost of the force placed insurance, the mortgage agreement was invalid. There was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that the defendant's breach of the underlying loan contract barred him from relying on the unclean hands doctrine, as a mortgagor who has defaulted on a mortgage is not precluded from asserting the special defense of unclean hands, and the defendant sufficiently alleged that the plaintiff had engaged in wilful conduct that was not equitable, fair or honest. The special defense of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was otherwise legally sufficient, insofar as the defendant properly pleaded that the plaintiff's alleged misrepresentations and kick- back scheme caused him to pay more than he was obligated to pay and more than the plaintiff was entitled to charge, thus interfering with his right to receive the benefits of the mortgage agreement by increasing his overall debt. Argued November 14, 2023—officially released April 30, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 16-262e (c)), the owner or landlord of a multiunit residential dwelling ''shall be liable for the costs of all [utility services] furnished . . . to the building, except for any service furnished to any dwelling unit of the building on an individually metered or billed basis for the exclusive use of the occupants of that dwelling unit . . . .'' The plaintiff landlord, N Co., sought a declaratory ruling from the defendant, the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), that it may use ratio utility billing (RUB) in recouping its costs for utility services from tenants in two multiunit residential buildings that did not have individual meters for each unit but, rather, had only a master meter. Under the RUB methodology, N Co. would bill its tenants for monthly utility charges on the basis of what it had determined to be their proportionate share of utility usage for the month, which could be calculated by N Co. on the basis of each unit's square footage and the number of bedrooms and occupants, among other factors. In its final decision, PURA con- cluded that RUB violates the plain meaning of § 16-262e (c) because that provision expressly prohibits charging a tenant for utility services the tenant did not exclusively use. Nevertheless, PURA explained that N Co. could use the ''building in'' methodology instead and build the estimated cost of utilities into the fixed rent charged to tenants each month. N Co. filed an administrative appeal from PURA's decision, and the trial court remanded the case to PURA for further consideration of whether PURA's decision that RUB violates § 16-262e (c) conflicts with its conclusion that the ''building in'' approach does not similarly violate the statute. PURA issued a supplemental decision in which it reaffirmed its prior ruling. N Co. appealed from PURA's supplemental decision to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal and rendered judgment thereon. Thereafter, N Co. appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held that the trial court did not err in upholding PURA's determination that § 16-262e (c) prohibits N Co.'s proposed use of RUB to recoup building wide utility costs by billing tenants for their estimated, proportionate share of the total cost of the utilities: Pursuant to § 16-262e (c), a property owner or landlord of a multiunit dwelling is ''liable'' for the utility costs, but a tenant may be liable for the utility cost when he or she is serviced on an individually metered or billed basis for his or her exclusive use of the utility. Because the language of the statute and the dictionary definitions of ''liable'' did not specify to whom a tenant would have to be liable, the utility company or the landlord, to violate the statute, and because § 16- 262e (c) does expressly allow, under certain circumstances, for the allocation of estimated costs for units without individual meters, this court concluded that § 16-262e (c) was ambiguous with respect to that issue. Accordingly, this court looked to the legislative history of that provision, which demonstrated that the provision was promulgated to provide con- sumer protections to tenants in multiunit residential buildings with a master meter, and, because this court was required to interpret the statutory provision broadly to achieve its remedial purpose, it construed ''liable'' to mean that the tenant may not be held liable to anyone for the cost of a utility that he or she has not exclusively used. Moreover, states that have legislation that explicitly authorizes the use of RUB also have statutes that provide numerous protections for tenants, whereas Connecticut, in contrast, lacks any such explicit provisions permitting the use of RUB or defining the protections for tenants in such situations. In the present case, under the RUB methodology, a tenant's monthly utility bill represents the tenant's estimated, proportionate share of the total utility consumption, which N Co. would calculate based on factors that it would select in its sole discretion, and, therefore, N Co.'s use of the RUB methodology would violate § 16-262e (c) insofar as it would render a tenant liable to N Co. for the costs of utilities that were not individually metered or that the tenant did not exclusively use. Furthermore, N Co. could not prevail on its claim that, if § 16-262e (c) prohibits landlords from utilizing the RUB methodology, then it also must prohibit the ''building in'' approach deemed acceptable by PURA, as the ''building in'' approach, which allows a landlord whose multiunit building operates with a master meter to build the estimated, annual utility costs into the monthly rent for each unit, is entirely consistent with standard practices regarding the setting of rent and is governed by title 47a of the General Statutes, which does not prohibit such a practice. In addition, the ''building in'' approach also is more consistent with the remedial statutory scheme than the RUB method, as it allows for tenants to have consistent and predictable payments each month and places the risk that the tenants may use more utilities than anticipated each month on the landlord. (Three justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued October 18, 2023—officially released May 7, 2024

The plaintiffs, M and S, candidates for state legislative offices in the 2014 general election, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the State Elections Enforcement Commission, which assessed fines against the plaintiffs upon determining that they had violated certain state statutes and regulations governing campaign financing and the Citizens' Election Program (program) (§ 9-700 et seq.). The plaintiffs' respective campaign committees had each applied for and received public funding grants through the program. During the 2014 election cycle, the plaintiffs' campaign committees published certain communications and advertisements that made various references to the record and policies of D, then the governor, who was running for reelection at that time. The communications both touted the plaintiffs' respective accomplishments and positions and referred to their opposi- tion to the agenda advanced by D and D's Democratic allies, including tax hikes and increased spending. One of the communications high- lighted votes taken by S's opponent in the 2014 election, C, when C was serving as a state representative. C filed a complaint with the commission, alleging that the communications were impermissible cam- paign expenditures under the program. C relied on an advisory opinion previously issued by the commission, in which it interpreted the statutes (§§ 9-601b and 9-607 (g)) defining the term ''expenditure'' and governing the permissibility of campaign expenditures, as well as the state regula- tions (§§ 9-706-1 and 9-706-2) implementing the program, and concluded that, in the absence of a statutory exception to the definition of ''expendi- ture,'' funds in a candidate committee's account may not be used to make a communication that is not directly related to the candidate's own electoral race and that also promotes the defeat of or attacks a candidate who is not a direct opponent of the candidate sponsoring the communication but who is running in a different race. After a hearing, the commission found that the plaintiffs had violated the applicable statutes and regulations by using their candidate committee funds to pay for communications that criticized D in the course of promoting their opposition to D's policies. On appeal to the trial court, the plaintiffs claimed that the statutes and regulations imposing expenditure limita- tions as a condition of receiving public funding violated their rights under the first amendment to the United States constitution by restricting their ability to speak about other, nonopposing candidates. The trial court agreed with the commission's conclusion that the plaintiffs had violated the applicable statutes and regulations, insofar as the communi- cations constituted the functional equivalent of express advocacy for the defeat of D in his reelection bid, and the trial court further concluded that the program constituted a valid, alternative route by which the plaintiffs voluntarily had elected to exercise their first amendment rights and that the program's conditions did not abridge those rights. Accord- ingly, the trial court rendered judgment upholding the commission's decision, from which the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the commission's enforcement of the applicable statutes and regulations to preclude publicly funded candidates from using their candidate committee funds to pay for campaign communica- tions, which, as a rhetorical device, invoke the name of a candidate in a different electoral race to refer more broadly to the policies or political party associated with that candidate, violated their first amendment rights. Held that the commission's enforcement of the applicable statutes and regulations in accordance with its advisory opinion imposed an unconsti- tutional condition in violation of the first amendment to the extent that it penalized the plaintiffs for mentioning D's name in a manner that was not the functional equivalent of speech squarely directed at D's reelection campaign, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to sustain the plaintiffs' adminis- trative appeal: Following an examination of the United States Supreme Court's decisions considering the constitutionality of various campaign finance reform laws under the first amendment and a discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, pursuant to which the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his or her constitutionally protected freedom of speech, even if that person is not otherwise entitled to such a benefit, this court observed that, although laws that burden political speech, including expenditure limitations, ordinarily are subject to strict scrutiny, candidates who voluntarily accept public campaign funding also accept reasonable terms and conditions attendant to such programs that otherwise may abridge their free speech rights. Nevertheless, the fact that a candidate voluntarily participates in a gov- ernment program is not dispositive of the first amendment issue, when, as in the present case, the program restrictions at issue are not generalized expenditure limits but, rather, directly govern the specific content of a publicly financed candidate's communications, and, because public campaign financing laws that restrict political expression operate to burden a candidate's core first amendment speech, the court must look beyond voluntariness and apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the restrictions are narrowly tailored to achieve the traditional goals of public campaign financing, namely, promoting participation in the campaign financing program, reducing fundraising burdens and the corrupting effects of contributions and the pursuit of contributions on government decision making, facilitating candidate communications with the elector- ate, and protecting the fiscal integrity of the program. Prohibiting publicly funded candidates from engaging in campaign speech concerning other electoral races survives strict scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to protect the public fisc by enforcing the limitations of the program, and limitations on campaign speech that refer to a candidate in another race are narrowly tailored to achieve that compel- ling state interest only when the speech at issue is unquestionably the functional equivalent of express advocacy or campaign speech concern- ing the candidate involved in the other race, rather than a rhetorical device intended to communicate where the speaker stands on the issues. Moreover, this court recognized that candidates must be able to commu- nicate where they stand on issues in relation to other candidates and public officials, and invoking prominent political figures by name will sometimes provide the most meaningful and effective way for a candidate to explain to voters their political ideals, policy commitments, and the values they hope to bring to the office they seek, even if some of those political figures may happen to be candidates elsewhere on the ballot in a particular election, and the rhetorical value of being able to categorize oneself in relation to other political candidates is especially great in state legislative races. Nonetheless, the commission could apply the standard articulated in its advisory opinion to preclude publicly funded candidates from using committee funds to promote the defeat of or to attack a candidate who is not a direct opponent of the candidate sponsoring the communication but who is engaged in a different electoral race, as that standard was not, on its face, an unconstitutional condition in violation of the first amendment, to the extent that it ensured that public funds are spent only on qualifying campaigns without exceeding the amount of the grant allotted per race, but, if that standard is applied in a way that muzzles a publicly funded candidate's political speech beyond that necessary to prevent the funding of campaign speech with respect to a clearly identi- fied candidate running in a different electoral race, it is a content based restriction that is an unconstitutional condition in violation of the first amendment. In determining whether campaign communications by a publicly funded candidate who uses the name of a candidate engaged in a different electoral race as a rhetorical device to refer to a set of policies opposed or supported by the publicly funded candidate constitutes impermissible electoral communications, rather than a constitutionally protected mes- sage in direct furtherance of the publicly funded candidate's own cam- paign for office, this court relied on the opinion announcing the judgment of the United States Supreme Court in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (551 U.S. 449), which held that a court should find that a campaign communication is the functional equivalent of express advocacy of election or defeat of a candidate, rather than permissible discussion of issues and candidates who are intimately tied to public issues, only if the communication is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific can- didate. Furthermore, the functional equivalent of express advocacy standard is objective and focuses on the substance of the communication rather than on its effect or considerations of the speaker's intent to affect the election, and, although the distinction between permissible discussion of issues and candidates, on the one hand, and prohibited advocacy of election or defeat of candidates, on the other, may often dissolve in practical application, the functional equivalency standard gives the bene- fit of the doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech, such that, when the first amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker rather than the censor. With respect to the communications and advertisements at issue, this court concluded that they were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy with respect to D's reelection, insofar as they could not reason- ably be construed as anything more than a rhetorical device intended to communicate the merits of the plaintiffs' candidacies as bulwarks against the policies endorsed by D and his Democratic allies. Three of the communications at issue revealed nothing that rendered them the functional equivalent of express advocacy with respect to D's reelection, as they lacked any express references thereto, did not suggest that a vote for C would be tantamount to a vote for D or Democratic Party policies, and did not indicate in any way that D was running for reelection in 2014 or that support for the plaintiffs would be integral to defeating the candidacy of D or any other Democrat seeking office, and, instead, those communications highlighted the plaintiffs' role as a legislative check and balance against policies endorsed by D and his Democratic allies, such that the communications did not convey a differ- ent meaning in 2014, when D was running for reelection as an incumbent, than they would have conveyed during the 2012 or 2016 midterm election cycles, when D was simply serving as the governor. Although the remaining two communications presented a closer question, insofar as they either used words somewhat evocative of an ongoing negative campaign against D, such as promoting a new direction and imploring voters to ''change course'' and stop D's agenda, or expressly referred to D's campaign for governor, this court could not concluded that those communications were the functional equivalent of express advocacy with respect to D's reelection because they reasonably might be understood as urging electoral resistance to the leadership and initia- tives of D and his Democratic allies, and, to the extent that the references to ''change'' and a ''campaign'' could be understood to be the functional equivalent of express advocacy, the tie went to the speakers, that is, the plaintiffs. Argued September 13, 2023—officially released May 21, 2024

The plaintiff bank sought to recover damages from the defendants, A and his daughter, C, for, inter alia, their allegedly tortious interference with a business expectancy in connection with the plaintiff's efforts to collect an approximately $243 million foreign judgment that it had obtained against S Co., which the plaintiff claimed was a shell company controlled by A. The plaintiff previously had brought an action in which it sought to pierce S Co.'s corporate veil and to hold A jointly and severally liable for the foreign judgment. While that case was pending, the plaintiff commenced the present action, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants had attempted to interfere with a Norwegian court's order requiring the sale of S Co.'s shares in a Norwegian software company, N Co., to partially satisfy the foreign judgment. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, beginning in 2016, the defendants had utilized various tactics to disrupt, delay, and otherwise interfere with the court-ordered sale of S. Co.'s shares in N Co., including having A's father, E, file numerous appeals challenging the Norwegian court's order and unlawfully request that the plaintiff's execution lien on the shares be removed from Nor- way's central securities depository to disrupt the sales process. The plaintiff also alleged that A had installed family members and close associates on N Co.'s board of directors to facilitate a plan to deplete N Co.'s assets and that A had submitted a fraudulent bid to purchase N Co. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that A had forged a document purporting to grant C an irrevocable right of first refusal to purchase N Co., that C then invoked that purported right in an attempt to disrupt or halt the sale, and that A had directed C to file actions in a federal district court and in a Norwegian court in an attempt to enforce the fraudulent right of first refusal and to enjoin the sale of N Co. The plaintiff asserted that the defendants' conduct depressed both the indicative bids to purchase and the final sale price of S Co.'s shares in N Co. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the present action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the litigation privilege because they were based on communi- cations made and actions taken in prior judicial proceedings. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the defendants filed an interlocu- tory appeal with the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's decision and remanded with direction to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. After the parties filed their briefs in the present appeal, this court issued its decision in Deutsche Bank AG v. Sebastian Holdings, Inc. (346 Conn. 564), concluding that the trial court in the plaintiff's prior action properly had declined to pierce S Co.'s corporate veil and to hold A jointly and severally liable for the foreign judgment. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim, raised for the first time during oral argument before this court, that the plaintiff's appeal was rendered moot by virtue of this court's decision in Sebastian Hold- ings, Inc.: Although the defendants conceded in their supplemental brief that they had confused the concept of mootness, which implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction, with the distinct and separate doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not properly pleaded, they nonetheless claimed that this court should decide the appeal on that alternative ground. Even if this court had jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal to decide an unpleaded and unadjudicated claim of collateral estoppel, the defen- dants did not adequately explain how any of the trial court's findings in Sebastian Holdings, Inc., which concerned A's conduct prior to Novem- ber 1, 2008, were preclusive of any issue in the present case, which concerned the defendants' alleged conspiracy beginning in 2016, and, therefore, this court declined to consider the matter further. 2. The Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the plaintiff's claims against the defendants were barred by the litigation privilege, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded with direction to affirm the trial court's denial of the defen- dants' motion to dismiss: Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, this court concluded that many of the tactics A allegedly used to disrupt, delay, and otherwise interfere with the sale of N Co., including stacking N Co.'s board of directors with family members and associates, submitting a disingenuous bid to acquire N Co., coordinating with E to have the plaintiff's execution lien deregistered, and forging and backdating the document purporting to grant C a right of first refusal, occurred outside of the context of any judicial proceeding and, therefore, were not covered by the litigation privilege. Moreover, all of the plaintiff's allegations that related to litigation con- cerned legal challenges advanced by either E or C, and it did not appear from the plaintiff's complaint that the defendants were parties to or otherwise participated in E's legal challenges in such a capacity as to warrant application of the privilege. With respect to the legal challenges advanced by C, the plaintiff alleged in its complaint that A set the stage for C's litigation by forging the right of first refusal document and by directing C to file the actions in federal District Court and in the Norwegian court, the litigation privilege does not apply to such extrajudicial misconduct, and the plaintiff's complaint did not allege that A was a party to or participated in C's actions in a manner that would entitle him to absolute immunity from claims aris- ing therefrom. Furthermore, although it was a closer question as to whether the litigation privilege applied to the actions C commenced in the federal District Court and the Norwegian court, this court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, affording C absolute immunity was unwar- ranted because the plaintiff was not a party to C's actions, the plaintiff's claims were not premised on any statement made in those actions but, rather, on conduct that occurred outside of the actions, namely, the alleged conspiracy to interfere with the sale of N Co. and to drive down the sale price of S Co.'s shares in N Co., the allegedly fraudulent conduct did not commence during those actions, and C's actions were not the sole basis for or even central to the plaintiff's claims against the defen- dants but, rather, constituted but one facet of a broader extrajudicial con- spiracy. Argued November 14, 2023—officially released May 28, 2024

The named defendant, E, an employee of the plaintiff, the Department of Public Health, filed a complaint with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the plaintiff retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure that she had made and that allegedly was protected by statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 4-61dd). E's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals who are appointed to be a municipal director or acting director of health. The department had received an appointment letter from the then director of health of Hartford, requesting approval of W as Hartford's acting director of health. Both the letter and W's resume represented that W held a master's degree in public health, which is one of two alternative statutory ((Rev. to 2015) § 19a-200 (a)) prerequisites for the appointment to the position of municipal director of health. E reviewed the request, including W's resume, and she drafted a letter approving the appointment without first verifying that W actually possessed a master's degree in public health. The Commissioner of Public Health ultimately signed the approval letter. E subsequently learned that W did not possess a master's degree in public health, and, after she notified her supervisor, B, W was removed from the acting director position. Shortly thereafter, E again failed to verify the credentials of an individual who had been appointed to serve as another municipality's acting director of health. When B learned of the repeated error, E received a letter of reprimand. E subse- quently received another letter of reprimand and multiple, unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was ultimately demoted. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, E filed grievances challenging the fore- going, adverse personnel actions but did not raise a whistleblower retali- ation claim in connection with those grievances. All of the grievances were denied. E then filed the present whistleblower retaliation claim with the commission pursuant to § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A). E's claim was based on the same personnel actions that formed the basis of her grievances. In E's amended complaint filed with the commission, E alleged, inter alia, that her statement to B that W did not possess a master's degree in public health constituted a report of a violation of § 19a-200 (a). E further alleged that this information constituted a protected whis- tleblower disclosure under § 4-61dd, in response to which the depart- ment retaliated against her. A hearing was held before a human rights referee, who concluded that E had made a protected whistleblower disclosure under § 4-61dd and that the department had retaliated against her in response to that disclosure. The department appealed the referee's decision to the trial court, which sustained the department's appeal and rendered judgment thereon, concluding that the commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate E's whistleblower complaint, that E had not made a protected whistleblower disclosure under § 4- 61dd, and that E had failed to establish a causal connection between any alleged whistleblower disclosure and the alleged retaliation. There- after, the commission appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the commission had jurisdiction but nevertheless affirmed the trial court's judgment on the merits in favor of the department. On the granting of certification, the commission appealed to this court. Held: 1. The commission had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate E's whis- tleblower retaliation claim: It was undisputed that § 4-61dd contains a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, and the department could not prevail on its claim that, because E had filed grievances challenging the same adverse personnel actions that formed the basis of E's retaliation claim before the commission, her claim before the commission fell outside of the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 4-61dd. Specifically, the statutory scheme contemplates that a state employee may pursue both a grievance alleging a violation of an applicable collec- tive bargaining agreement that does not involve a whistleblower claim, as well as a whistleblower retaliation claim alleging retaliatory animus stemming from the same factual circumstances that formed the basis for an alternative remedy, and the filing of a grievance under § 4-61dd (e) (3) on a ground other than whistleblower retaliation was not a basis for precluding the filing of a whistleblower retaliation complaint with the commission pursuant to § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A). In the present case, E's grievances, which she asserted under § 4-61dd (e) (3), did not raise a claim of whistleblower retaliation, and E was, therefore, not barred from filing a complaint with the commission alleging whistleblower retaliation pursuant to § 4-61dd (e) (2) (A). Accordingly, the commission had the authority to adjudicate the type of controversy before it, namely, a whistleblower retaliation claim. Moreover, this court concluded that the proper vehicle for addressing allegedly duplicative claims under § 4-61dd is a special defense raising an election of remedies claim rather than a challenge based on subject matter jurisdiction. 2. The department could not prevail on its claim that the commission had waived or abandoned certain issues by failing to raise or brief them before this court or the Appellate Court: An appellant can raise on appeal to this court only those issues set forth in the petition for certification, except when the issues are further limited by this court's order granting certification. In the present case, the commission's petition for certification focused on the broad claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly had determined that E's disclosure was not a protected disclosure under § 4-61dd, but the commission limited its briefing on the merits to the narrower issue on which this court granted certification, and the interests of justice weighed heavily in favor of not penalizing the commission for this court's certification of a more narrowly tailored issue than the issue on which the commission had sought certification. Moreover, there was no merit to the department's claim that the commis- sion had abandoned the one issue that it did address before this court by failing to raise or brief that issue in the Appellate Court, which did not decide that issue, as the department conflated the distinction between arguments and claims. Specifically, the argument concerning whether E was required to prove an actual violation of state law or a reasonable, good faith belief of such a violation was ''subsumed within or intertwined with'' the broader legal claim of whether her disclosure was a whistleblower disclosure within the meaning of § 4-61dd, and the department never argued that the broader claim was not abandoned in its response to the commission's petition for certification. 3. This court declined to address the department's claim that E's disclosure concerned misconduct in municipal government to which § 4-61dd does not apply because, even if § 4-61dd does not apply to misconduct in municipal government, the misconduct that E reported was that the department, a state agency, made an error in approving W for the position of Hartford's acting director of health: Although W may have misrepresented his credentials on his resume, which would have amounted to misconduct at the municipal level, E reported wrongdoing by the state, namely, the department's deficient review process of an appointee's credentials, the department's erroneous approval of W, and E's own failure, as a state employee, to verify that W possessed the degree he claimed to have had. 4. The broad language, legislative history and remedial purpose of § 4-61dd compelled the conclusion that a government employee, such as E, is entitled to whistleblower protection under that statute for reporting his or her own error: The references in § 4-61dd to ''[a]ny person'' who discloses covered information involving ''any matter involving . . . violation of state laws . . . mismanagement . . . or danger to the public safety'' were con- strued broadly to effectuate the statute's remedial purpose of rooting out government misconduct. Moreover, it was unlikely that the legislature would have wanted employ- ees disciplined merely for the act of bringing their own wrongdoings to light, as that would discourage disclosure and undermine the statu- tory goals. Furthermore, the legislative history indicated that the legislature has consistently extended the reach of § 4-61dd since its enactment and has never imposed limitations on the statute's coverage that would suggest an intention to exclude from the purview of that statute employees who report their own misconduct. Accordingly, E and her disclosure came within the ambit of the broad statutory language, and her disclosure was protected under § 4-61dd despite her involvement in the actions giving rise to it, as her disclosure exposed the fact that the department's error may have led to a violation of § 19a-200 and brought to light the purportedly deficient review process that led to the error in approving W's appointment. 5. This court concluded that E had failed to prove that the department's adverse personnel actions were caused by E's reporting of her errors rather than the errors themselves: This court declined to apply the rebuttable presumption set forth in § 4- 61dd (e) (4) that an adverse personnel action is presumed to be in retaliation for a whistleblower disclosure if that disclosure was made within two years of the adverse personnel action. Specifically, although the rebuttable presumption enumerated in § 4- 61dd (e) (4) applies to ''any proceeding'' under § 4-61dd (e) (2) or (3), this court concluded that the word ''any'' was ambiguous, and extratextual sources supported the conclusion that ''any proceeding'' should not include instances of an employee's self-reporting. If this court were to apply the presumption under the circumstances of this case, the policy goal of the legislation would have been undermined because it generally would discourage an employer from taking correc- tive and deterrent action against an employee insofar as the employer would always be subject to an automatic presumption of retaliation, and employers would be encouraged either not to take corrective action or to wait two years before doing so. Moreover, because state agencies often take corrective action within two years of learning of malfeasance, concluding that temporal proximity, without more, is probative of retaliatory intent would allow a self- reporting employee to automatically satisfy his or her burden under the first step of the burden shifting analysis recognized in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792) without submitting evidence of retalia- tory animus. In the present case, E failed to produce any evidence of a retaliatory motive other than temporal proximity, there was no evidence that sup- ported a conclusion that the department took the adverse personnel actions in retaliation for E's disclosure rather than for her underlying misconduct, and, although the human rights referee observed that the department had told E that she ''was [being] punished for the . . . inci- dent'' involving W, this, alone, did not establish retaliatory motive, as it was E's failure to confirm W's credentials and the potentially improper approval of W's appointment that, in combination with additional instances of deficient work performance, led to the adverse personnel actions. Furthermore, even if this court had concluded that the rebuttable pre- sumption applied and that E established a prima facie case, the depart- ment would have rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that three union grievances led to a determination that the same adverse employ- ment actions E challenged before the commission were taken for just cause, the evidence that the human rights referee credited supported the department's nonretaliatory justifications, including evidence that E exhibited poor work quality both before and after her disclosure, and E's first written reprimand was issued nearly one month after the disclo- sure, and then only after E again submitted another approval letter to the commissioner for his signature without first confirming the facts reported in connection with that approval. Argued September 14, 2023—officially released June 11, 2024

The plaintiffs, which owned real property in the borough of Fenwick, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant planning and zoning commission approving certain amendments to Fenwick's zoning regulations. Fenwick is located entirely within the town of Old Saybrook and is an exclusively residential, largely seasonal community of sixty-seven summer residences and fourteen year-round households. The commission had adopted the amendments in July, 2019, and notice of the commission's decision was published in The Middletown Press (Press) a few days later. The Press is an online and print publication, and the print version is available for purchase at nine retailers, several of which are in the part of Old Saybrook that serves as the primary commercial area for Fenwick residents. None of Fenwick's year-round households subscribe to any version of the Press, but viewers may access the legal notices section of the Press' website for free and without a subscription. The plaintiffs filed their appeal with the trial court in October, 2019. They claimed, inter alia, that the commission had unlaw- fully adopted the amendments by failing to publish notice of its decision ''in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in the municipality'' of Fenwick, in violation of the statute (§ 8-3 (d)) governing the adoption of and amendment to zoning regulations. The commission moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal, claiming that it was untimely because it had not been filed within fifteen days of the publication of the notice, as required by the statute (§ 8-8 (b)) governing appeals from decisions of zoning commissions. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the appeal was timely filed under the savings provision of § 8-8 (r) because the commission had not published notice of its decision in a newspaper having a ''substantial circulation'' in Fenwick, as required by § 8-3 (d). The plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment with respect to their sole remaining claim, namely, that the commission had unlawfully adopted an amendment concerning short- term rentals by failing to publish notice of that amendment in a newspa- per having a substantial circulation in Fenwick. The trial court followed its analysis in connection with its denial of the motion to dismiss and concluded that the commission's failure to publish the amendment in a newspaper having a substantial circulation in Fenwick rendered it ineffective as a matter of law under § 8-3 (d). Accordingly, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the commission, on the granting of certifi- cation, appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court concluded that the mean- ing of the term ''substantial circulation'' was plain and unambiguous and that it was quantitative in nature, insofar as it is informed by the number of subscriptions or copies sold and is focused primarily on the extent of the publication's dissemination. Emphasizing that none of Fenwick's households subscribed to the Press, and discounting the online availability of the Press, the Appellate Court concluded that the Press did not have a ''substantial circulation'' in Fenwick for purposes of § 8-3 (d). On the granting of certification, the commission appealed to this court. Held that the commission properly published notice of its decision in ''a newspaper having a substantial circulation in the municipality'' of Fen- wick for purposes of § 8-3 (d), and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, remanded the case, and ordered reversal of the trial court's judgment and dismissal of the plaintiffs' zoning appeal: It was undisputed that Fenwick was the relevant municipality and that the Press was a newspaper for purposes of § 8-3 (d), but the parties disagreed as to whether the Press had a ''substantial circulation'' in Fenwick, and, because the statutory scheme did not define that term, this court consulted various dictionary definitions for insight into its meaning and concluded that the term was ambiguous, insofar as the lack of any guidance as to how to measure the requisite circulation gave rise to multiple, reasonable interpretations. Moreover, there was no legislative history shedding light on the meaning of the term ''substantial circulation,'' and, even though numerous Con- necticut statutes require publication of notice in a newspaper having a substantial circulation, there was scant case law concerning the meaning of that term, the only Connecticut case on point was of minimal guidance because it was decided before the print journalism industry had been drastically reshaped by the Internet, and case law from other states also was of little help in the age of the Internet. Nonetheless, this court's case law revealed that the purpose of the statu- tory newspaper notice requirement was to provide constructive notice that would inform as much of the population as possible of contemplated zoning actions and that failure to give proper notice constitutes a jurisdic- tional defect that renders the action of the commission null and void. Although the legislature's use of different terms within the same statute generally suggests that the legislature intended the terms to have different meanings, that principle does not apply when its application would con- stitute a failure to give meaning to the statute in its entirety and in its overall context, and, thus, to inform its construction of § 8-3 (d), this court looked to the long established legal term of art, ''newspaper of general circulation,'' which is used by the majority of others states and appears in numerous Connecticut statutes, including § 8-3 (g) (1), and determined that the meanings of the terms ''general circulation'' and ''substantial circulation'' had to be harmonized for the statutory scheme to have coherency. The phrase ''newspaper of general circulation'' has qualitative character- istics, insofar as it must contain news and information of interest to the general public and be available to the public within a certain geographic area, as well as quantitative aspects, and, although this court acknowl- edged that the number of subscribers or the ratio of subscribers to the population may furnish relevant evidence of a newspaper's availability and coverage of matters of local interest, it rejected a rigidly mathemati- cal inquiry that focuses only on subscriber numbers in favor of an inquiry that considers the type of news covered by the publication and its general availability in the municipality. Consequently, this court adopted an availability centered test for determining whether a newspaper has a substantial or general circulation in a municipality, pursuant to which the court first must determine whether the newspaper contains general news content of local interest to the applicable community, and then considers the availability of the newspaper to the community, as demonstrated by where and how the newspaper is distributed, the frequency of distribution, the existence of any cost barriers to access, whether the newspaper is consistently used for such notices and for how long, and whether residents are aware of that newspaper's use for the publication of legal notices. In the present case, there was no claim that the local news content in the Press was not of general interest to Fenwick residents, the Press was accessible and readily available insofar as it was sold at several locations in the commercial area of Old Saybrook serving Fenwick resi- dents, the Press was accessible online, with the public notice section available at no charge to the viewer, and deference to the commission's decision to publish notice in the Press was further warranted by virtue of the fact that the borough's various governing bodies, including its board of warden and burgesses, as well as its historic district commission, had used that publication for notice purposes for decades, especially when residents of most of Fenwick's households had previously served on those governing bodies. Accordingly, this court concluded that the Press was a newspaper of substantial circulation in Fenwick within the contemplation of § 8-3 (d), and, because the commission complied with the statutory publication requirement, the plaintiffs no longer benefited from the savings provision in § 8-8 (r), and dismissal of their zoning appeal, which was filed more than fifteen days after the date that notice of the commission's decision was published, was required. Argued December 11, 2023—officially released June 18, 2024

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the third degree and risk of injury to a child in connection with his alleged sexual abuse of the complainant, C, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that he was entitled to the disclosure of the content of certain handwritten journals authored by C because they purportedly consti- tuted a ''statement'' under the relevant rules of practice (§§ 40-13A and 40-15 (1)) and that his rights under Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) were violated as a result of the procedures the prosecutors employed to review the journals for exculpatory information. C revealed the exis- tence of the journals for the first time at trial, testifying that she created them in connection with the therapy she was receiving after the abuse and that they concerned her relationship with the defendant and the abuse he had inflicted, among other things. C admitted to defense coun- sel on recross-examination that she had reviewed a few pages in one of her journals before testifying and that the journals were ''the best record'' of the abuse. At that point, defense counsel requested the jour- nals ''as discovery . . . .'' Following an in camera meeting with defense counsel and the prosecutors, the trial court summarized the discussions that had occurred in chambers and ordered the prosecutors to review the journals for C's statements about the sexual abuse allegations and for any exculpatory material, and to disclose such material to the defense. The court stated that, if the prosecutors were uncertain as to In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person's identity may be ascertained. This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins and Ecker. Thereafter, Justice Dannehy and Chief Judge Bright were added to the panel and have read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision. 0 Conn. 300 ,0 3 State v. Andres C. whether parts of the journals were exculpatory, the court would review those portions and make a determination. The prosecutors and defense counsel agreed with the court's summary. Thereafter, the prosecutors enlisted the assistance of a Spanish-speaking investigator employed by the state's attorney's office to help review the journals because they had been written in Spanish. The prosecutors explained to the trial court that the investigator had been instructed as to what is ''exculpatory'' and then represented to the court, on the basis of the investigator's review, that the journals contained no material subject to disclosure under Brady. The prosecutors nevertheless turned over four pages from the journals, out of an abundance of caution, for the trial court to review to determine whether any or all of those pages should be disclosed to the defense. Those four pages were translated, after which the trial court determined that one of those four pages should be disclosed, as the content of that page concerned C's allegedly delayed disclosure of the abuse, which was at issue. On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that the defendant had waived his claim that he was entitled to the journals under Practice Book §§ 40- 13A and 40-15 (1) insofar as defense counsel had agreed to the trial court's summary of the procedure that had been discussed in chambers, and the court rejected the defendant's claim that the prosecutors were constitutionally required to personally review the journals and could not delegate that review to an investigator. The defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, challenging the Appellate Court's conclusions and urging this court to adopt a prophylactic rule under the United States constitution requiring a prosecutor to personally review any material that first comes to light during trial for, inter alia, exculpatory information. The state asserted, with respect to the defen- dant's claim under §§ 40-13A and 40-15 (1), that this court should affirm the Appellate Court's judgment on the alternative ground that C's jour- nals were not subject to discovery because C purportedly did not adopt or approve the journals as her ''statement'' for purposes of those rules of practice. Held: 1. This court agreed with the state's alternative ground for affirmance, namely, that C's journals were not subject to disclosure under Practice Book §§ 40-13A and 40-15 (1) because they did not constitute a statement that was adopted or approved by C, and, therefore, this court did not address whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that the defendant had waived his claim concerning disclosure pursuant to those rules of practice: a. The state's alternative ground for affirmance was reviewable, even though the state did not raise its claim in the Appellate Court or seek permission to raise it in this court pursuant to the relevant rule of practice (§ 84-11 (b)): 4 ,0 0 Conn. 300 State v. Andres C. It was appropriate to review the state's alternative claim for affirmance under the circumstances of this case because the state could raise the same claim on remand if this court were to grant the defendant's requested relief of remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether the journals constituted a statement and because reviewing the claim would promote judicial economy, as the claim presented a pure question of law, the record was adequate for review, and both parties had briefed the issue. b. The journals did not constitute a disclosable ''statement'' under Prac- tice Book §§ 40-13A and 40-15 (1) because C did not adopt or approve the journals as her statement: Practice Book § 40-13A requires the disclosure of all ''statements'' con- cerning the charged offense that are within the possession of the prose- cuting authority or its agents, Practice Book § 40-15 (1) defines ''statement'' as a written statement that the witness signs or otherwise adopts or approves, and, because there was no indication that C signed her journals, the issue with which this court was presented was whether C otherwise adopted or approved those journals. For a statement to be adopted or approved, there must be some indication that the witness has vouched for or intends to be accountable for the content of the statement, and, unlike statements given to law enforce- ment officers or government agents, diaries or similar personal writings typically are not created with the intent of fully and accurately describing the author's recollection of the events in question and with the under- standing that the author may be held accountable in court for the veracity of the statements contained therein. In the present case, there was no indication in the record that C vouched for or intended to be held accountable for the content of her journals such that she adopted or approved of it, as she did not embrace the content of her journals as her statement of the abuse, there was no evidence that she expected the content of the journals to be communi- cated or transmitted to anyone else, and her acknowledgment that the journals were ''the best record'' of the abuse was merely an affirmative answer to a question posed by defense counsel. Moreover, C did not maintain the journals with the primary purpose of accurately memorializing her recollection of the abuse but, instead, testified that the journals had been maintained as part of a therapeutic exercise undertaken at the direction of a mental health professional, and C also testified that some portions of the journals were not meant to be factual but, rather, consisted of hypotheticals and counterfactuals describing events that had never occurred. Furthermore, although C suggested that some portions of the journals contained her recollection of the abuse and that those portions were 0 Conn. 300 ,0 5 State v. Andres C. ''the best record'' thereof, that did not mean that she was knowingly adopting the journals as a formal statement or that she knew or reason- ably should have known from the circumstances surrounding defense counsel's questioning of her that she could be held accountable in court for any omissions or inaccuracies in the journals or that they could be used for cross-examination and impeachment purposes. Rather, C reasonably could have believed that her journals were ''the best record'' of what had happened, even if she would have been unwilling to stand by them in court because they omitted facts or contained inaccu- racies or fabrications. In addition, although C agreed to provide her journals to the prosecutors for review, she did so at the trial court's request, and nothing suggested that she did so with the intent to provide information about the sexual abuse or with the knowledge that she could be held accountable for the completeness and factual accuracy of the content of the journals. 2. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the Brady review of C's journals by a nonlawyer member of the state's attorney's office was constitutionally adequate, and this court declined the defendant's request to adopt a prophylactic rule under the federal constitution requiring a prosecutor to personally review for exculpatory and impeachment information any material that first comes to light during trial: The limited case law concerning whether a prosecutor may delegate his or her duty to review material for information that must be disclosed pursuant to Brady suggested that such delegation is not constitutionally prohibited and that a prosecutor does not have a constitutional obligation to personally review the material to determine whether disclosure is required. The defendant's claim for a prophylactic rule, however, was premised on the fact that, because the existence of C's journals was not disclosed until trial, the prosecutors were uniquely qualified to determine whether the journals contained exculpatory or impeachment evidence and, there- fore, had a duty to personally review the journals rather than enlisting the assistance of staff, and, although this court agreed with the defendant that familiarity with a witness' testimony is necessary to make a determi- nation as to whether particular evidence is subject to disclosure under Brady, it concluded that a prophylactic rule was not necessary because it perceived no significant risk that, in the absence of such a rule, the constitution would be violated. This court determined that the defendant's proposed rule was unneces- sary and unwarranted because there already was a sufficient safeguard, specifically that, when potentially exculpatory information comes to light during trial, a defendant or counsel may request production of the information and make a preliminary showing that the specific informa- 6 ,0 0 Conn. 300 State v. Andres C. tion in question contains material, favorable evidence, and, if the prosecu- tor reviews the information and claims that it contains no evidence subject to disclosure under Brady, the defense can request an in camera review of the information by the trial court. Moreover, the defendant's proposed rule improperly assumes that only the prosecutor handling the trial will have the requisite familiarity with the proceedings, ignores the fact that experienced individuals other than the trial prosecutor may possess that familiarity, and could cause extraor- dinary delays in the trial depending on the volume of the information at issue, and there was no reason to believe that the proposed rule was necessary on the ground that the risk of a constitutional violation is sufficiently great that simple case-by-case enforcement is inadequate, the defendant having pointed to no evidence that prosecutors or courts are experiencing difficulty determining in particular cases whether an individual other than the trial prosecutor is qualified to conduct a review for Brady material. Furthermore, although the defendant claims that this court cannot have confidence that the investigator who conducted the Brady review in the present case was properly instructed about Brady's requirements, the defendant did not expressly raise a freestanding claim that this particular delegation of Brady review was improper because the investigator was not adequately trained to conduct a review for Brady material or was not sufficiently familiar with the facts of the case. Nonetheless, this court emphasized a prosecutor's unique obligations in the judicial system, as well as the prosecutor's ultimate responsibility for complying with Brady and ensuring in the first instance that the principles of justice that underlie Brady are fully served, and indicated that it is the better practice for prosecutors to personally review the information at issue, or at least to seek assistance from other attorneys or qualified staff who have received comprehensive training in the requirements of Brady review and who are sufficiently knowledgeable about the case at hand to appreciate the import of the information under review. (One justice concurring separately; one justice concurring and dissenting; one justice dissenting) Argued January 11, 2023—officially released June 18, 2024

Convicted of felony murder, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. On the night of the victim's murder, the defendant, armed with a .22 caliber revolver with black duct tape wrapped around its grip, was parked at a restaurant with H in H's car. When the defendant saw the victim walking nearby, he instructed H to follow the victim in the car. At some point, the defendant exited the car to pursue the victim on foot. After confronting the victim, the defendant decided to rob him, but, when the victim resisted, the defendant shot the victim five times. At trial, the state's case rested almost entirely on the testimony of H and B, who were both facing charges for their involvement in another homicide and had entered into cooperation agreements with the state. The defendant had allegedly confessed his involvement in the victim's murder to B, who was the defendant's close friend. Prior to trial, the defense moved to preclude the state from introducing the cooperation agreements during its direct examination of H and B. The trial court granted the motion but ruled that the prosecutor would be permitted to use leading questions to flesh out the terms of the agreements. The defense also moved for a pretrial hearing regarding the reliability of H's and B's proposed trial testimony pursuant to the statute (§ 54-86p) governing the reliability and admissibility of jailhouse informant testi- mony. Following a hearing, at which H and B testified, the trial court, over defense counsel's objection, granted the state's motion to open the hearing for the purpose of introducing five exhibits relating to evidence that the parties had referenced during their arguments at the hearing. Thereafter, the trial court found that H's and B's proposed trial testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial. In reaching its decision, the trial court relied on, inter alia, its credibility assessment of H's and B's testimony in another criminal case. At trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from H and B on direct examination regarding their coopera- tion agreements, including their obligation to tell the truth under the terms of those agreements. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to question H and B during direct examination regarding the specific terms of their coopera- tion agreements with the state: The defendant waived this claim, as defense counsel expressly agreed that the state could use leading questions during direct examination to flesh out the terms of the cooperation agreements and H's and B's understanding of them, and, even if the claim was not waived, it still would have failed because defense counsel informed the trial court, prior to the start of the trial, that he intended to cross-examine H and B about their expectations under the cooperation agreements, and, therefore, it was within the trial court's discretion to permit the prosecutor to use the agreements to rehabilitate H and B in advance, during direct examination. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor had impermissibly vouched for H's and B's credibility by introducing the truthfulness provisions of their cooperation agreements, eliciting testi- mony from H and B that their attorneys were present in the courtroom, and referencing their prior testimony in other criminal cases on behalf of the state: This court, relying on State v. Calhoun (346 Conn. 288) and State v. Flores (344 Conn. 713), concluded that the introduction of the truthfulness provisions of H's and B's cooperation agreements did not constitute improper vouching because they did not refer to facts not in evidence, explicitly or implicitly indicate that the state had verified the accuracy of their testimony, or offer the prosecutor's personal opinion regarding the truthfulness of their testimony, and those provisions merely stated that the witnesses had an obligation to testify truthfully and explained the consequences for a breach of that obligation. It was unnecessary for this court to decide whether the prosecutor's questions relating to H's and B's testimony in other cases and their attorneys' presence in the courtroom were improper because, even if they were, they did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, as defense counsel did not raise any objection to these questions or ask the trial court to take any curative measures, and, accordingly, it could be inferred that defense counsel did not regard the questions as seriously prejudicial when they were posed to H and B. Moreover, the alleged improprieties were infrequent, as the challenged questions comprised only a small portion of the prosecutor's lengthy examination of both witnesses, this court did not perceive the questions as blatantly egregious or inexcusable, and, although H's and B's testimony was central to the state's case, the state presented evidence that corrobo- rated their testimony, including cell site data and analysis placing the defendant near the crime scene close to the time that the victim was shot and a .22 caliber revolver with black duct tape wrapped around its grip, which the defendant had given to his then girlfriend for safe keeping after the victim's murder. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in opening the reliability hearing to allow the state to introduce evidence that the parties had referenced during the hearing or in determining that H's and B's proposed trial testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial under § 54-86p: With respect to the trial court's opening of the reliability hearing, the defendant failed to identify any resulting prejudice, as the court found that the state had inadvertently failed to introduce the evidence refer- enced at the hearing and that the defendant was aware of that evidence, and as the court properly could have considered most, if not all, of the evidence under § 54-86p, even if it had not been admitted at the hearing. With respect to the trial court's reliability determination, the trial court conducted a careful review of the record of the hearing, the legal argu- ments advanced by both parties, and the statutory factors enumerated in § 54-86p (a) in concluding that H's and B's proposed testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial. Moreover, although the trial court erroneously included its own assess- ment of H's and B's testimony in another case in determining that their proposed testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial in the present case, that error was harmless because it was clear that the court would have found H's and B's testimony sufficiently reliable utiliz- ing only permissible statutory factors under § 54-86p, as its prior credibil- ity assessment was one of many factors that it considered in determining that the testimony was sufficiently reliable, there was nothing in the record to suggest that it was a dispositive factor or that the court's decision might have been different in its absence, and defense counsel had ample opportunity to impeach H's and B's credibility at trial and thoroughly availed himself of that opportunity through cross-examina- tion and during closing argument. This court instructed trial courts to rely on objective criteria, to which all parties would have access through the discovery process, in considering information disclosed pursuant to statute (§ 54-86o (a) (5)) for purposes of making a prima facie reliability determination under § 54-86p (a). 4. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress a recording of a phone conversation he had had with his then girlfriend, D, while he was being held in pretrial detention on unrelated charges and to suppress the .22 caliber revolver seized by the police as a fruit of the information acquired from the recording violated his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution: The defendant failed to demonstrate that he maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in the content of his phone conversation with D, as he stipulated that, at the time of his admission to the correctional facility, he was notified and signed a waiver acknowledging that all nonprivileged calls were subject to recording and monitoring, there were signs posted near the phone area at the correctional facility, and a recorded message played throughout his call with D, reminding him that his call was subject to recording and monitoring, and nothing about the defendant's actions in placing a call under these conditions indicated an intent to preserve the contents of the call as private. Moreover, in the absence of such an expectation of privacy, the defendant was not entitled to suppression of the recording of the phone conversa- tion or the .22 caliber revolver. Argued October 27, 2023—officially released June 25, 2024

The plaintiff, who previously had been convicted of murder, among other crimes, sought to recover damages from the defendants, his former attorney and his law firm, for, inter alia, their alleged legal malpractice and fraud while representing him in connection with a federal civil rights action and a separate, state habeas action. In his unsuccessful habeas action, the plaintiff alleged that the attorney who had represented him at his murder trial provided ineffective assistance of counsel. In the present malpractice action, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the defendants had failed to prosecute his habeas petition fully and properly. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims relating to the habeas action, concluding that those claims sounded in legal malpractice and were not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiff's underlying criminal conviction had not been invalidated either on appeal or in a postconviction proceeding. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, asserting that the trial court had improperly dismissed his legal malpractice claim. The plaintiff also contended that the Appellate Court had improperly dismissed his fraud claim because it was distinct from any claim of legal malpractice. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim, but it reversed with respect to the fraud claim, reason- ing that the fraud claim was distinct from the legal malpractice claim because the former did not challenge the validity of the plaintiff's under- lying conviction. The plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that, as a matter of form, the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this court having concluded that appellate or postconviction relief from the plaintiff's underlying conviction was a necessary element of his claim for malpractice against his former attorneys and that the plaintiff's failure to plead or prove that he had obtained such relief meant that his malpractice claim was insufficient as a matter of law rather than subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction: This court disagreed with the holding in Taylor v. Wallace (184 Conn. App. 43), on which the Appellate Court relied in the present case, that a criminally convicted plaintiff's failure to obtain appellate or postconvic- tion relief from his conviction prior to commencing a criminal malprac- tice action, that is, a legal malpractice action against an attorney who previously had represented the criminally convicted plaintiff in a criminal or habeas case, renders the action unripe and presents an issue of justicia- bility that implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, this court determined that, because legal malpractice claims are of the type of claims that courts have the authority to adjudicate, the question was not whether a court is competent to adjudicate the contro- versy between the parties or whether there is a live controversy between the parties but, rather, whether a criminally convicted plaintiff who had not obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction has alleged facts sufficient to state a valid cause of action for criminal mal- practice, and whether that requirement has been met is a matter concern- ing sufficiency of the pleadings. In determining the necessary elements of a criminal malpractice claim, this court observed that the adjudication of causation and harm in a criminal malpractice action ordinarily will necessarily implicate the find- ing of the criminally convicted plaintiff's guilt in the underlying criminal case, and a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the criminal malpractice action would undermine the validity of his criminal conviction. Accordingly, this court joined the majority of other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue and adopted the exoneration rule, and, pursuant to that rule, when proof of a criminal malpractice claim requires a plaintiff to prove that his former attorney's negligence was a proximate cause of his underlying criminal conviction, the claim is insufficient as a matter of law unless the plaintiff has obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his underlying conviction. In adopting the exoneration rule, this court reasoned that such a rule supports the judicial policy against inconsistent judgments arising out of the same transaction, which would occur if a plaintiff whose criminal conviction had not been overturned were to prevail in a criminal malprac- tice action alleging that, in the absence of the attorney's negligence, the plaintiff would not have been convicted. This court also reasoned that there are other mechanisms to obtain redress for the negligence of criminal defense counsel, including the elaborate remedial system embodied in Connecticut's postconviction review laws, which provide comprehensive and robust procedures that are intended to address allegations that a criminal conviction was the result of the ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby ensuring that any wrongs resulting from such ineffective assistance will be identified and addressed. This court made clear that, if a plaintiff's claim in a criminal malpractice action does not require findings that would undermine the validity of the underlying conviction, such a claim would not be barred for lack of exoneration, and, in the present case, the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's fraud claim, which related to the plaintiff's fee dispute with the defendants, could proceed, as that claim did not challenge the validity of the plaintiff's conviction. To prevail on his malpractice claim, however, the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of his harm, namely, the denial of his habeas petition and continued incarcera- tion, the plaintiff necessarily would have had to prove that he would have prevailed in his habeas action if the defendants' negligence had not occurred, and such a claim necessarily challenged the validity of the plaintiff's underlying conviction. Accordingly, because the plaintiff could not establish that he had obtained appellate or postconviction relief from his conviction, he failed to state a cognizable claim of criminal malpractice against the defendants, and, accordingly, the plaintiff's criminal malpractice claim should have been the subject of a motion to strike rather than a motion to dismiss. (One justice concurring separately) Argued September 14, 2023—officially released June 25, 2024

The plaintiff, which develops, manufactures and sells resinous flooring sys- tems, sought to recover damages from the defendant S, a former employee, for breach of a noncompete agreement, breach of the common-law duty of confidentiality, and violations of the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA) (§ 35-50 et seq.), in connection with S's alleged misappropriation of the plaintiff's trade secrets. Several years after hiring S as a chemist, the plaintiff required him to sign a noncompete agreement as a condition of his continued employment. Although S signed the noncompete agreement, he then established his own floor coating busi- ness and resigned from his employment with the plaintiff. S then used the plaintiff's formulas and research to develop his own competing floor coating product, and he assisted several firms, including the plaintiff's competitors, in developing their own products. Thereafter, the plaintiff brought two separate actions against S, including the present one. The plaintiff asserted similar claims in both actions. The trial court in the separate action determined that the noncompete agreement was unen- forceable because there was no consideration and that the claim alleging S's breach of the common-law duty of confidentiality was preempted by CUTSA. The court in the separate action also found that a payment that the plaintiff made to S after his resignation constituted severance pay rather than compensation for his affirmation of the noncompete agreement. Subsequently, the trial court in the present case, applying principles of collateral estoppel, granted S's motion for summary judg- ment and rendered judgment for S on the ground that further consider- ation of the issues was precluded by the court's rulings in the separate action, which involved the same parties and issues. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held that the trial court improperly granted S's motion for summary judg- ment with respect to the plaintiff's breach of the noncompete agreement claim, and, accordingly, this court reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings: In the companion case of Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy (349 Conn. 513), arising out of the appeals taken from the judgment rendered in the plaintiff's separate action against S, this court concluded that the trial court had incorrectly determined that the noncompete agreement was unenforce- able for lack of consideration and that further proceedings were required to determine whether the agreement was supported by adequate consid- 0 Conn. 612 ,0 3 Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy eration, and this court's reversal of the trial court's judgment in the separate action with respect to the breach of the noncompete agreement claim was binding in the present case under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Accordingly, this court concluded that the trial court's judgment in the present case must be reversed and that the case is to be remanded pending a determination on remand in the plaintiff's separate action against S as to whether the noncompete agreement is enforceable and, if so, whether S had breached that agreement. Moreover, with respect to the plaintiff's claims that the noncompete agreement was enforceable because S reaffirmed his promise not to compete and that the trial court improperly rendered judgment for S on the breach of the duty of confidentiality claim on the ground that it was preempted by CUTSA, this court concluded, in the companion case, that the trial court's finding in the plaintiff's separate action that S's severance compensation was not consideration for his affirmation of the non- compete agreement was not clearly erroneous and also upheld that court's ruling that the plaintiff's breach of the duty of confidentiality claim was preempted by CUTSA, and those rulings were binding in the present case. Submitted on briefs September 6, 2023—officially released July 2, 2024

The named plaintiff, a nonprofit association of homeowners in the town of Woodbridge, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the named defendant, the Connecticut Siting Council, which approved the applica- tion of the defendant telecommunications company, C Co., for a certifi- cate of environmental compatibility and public need in connection with its proposed construction of a cell phone tower in the town. The plaintiff had intervened in the administrative proceeding pursuant to statute (§ 22a-19 (a) (1)), seeking to prevent unreasonable impacts to nearby scenic resources and vistas. At the outset of each evidentiary hearing before the council, the council stated that property values were not included among the statutory (§ 16-50p (a) (3) (B)) criteria that are to be considered in a certification proceeding when determining the nature of the probable environmental impact of a proposed facility. C Co. introduced documents and testimony in order to demonstrate that the proposed tower satisfied its service objectives, namely, improving cell coverage in certain portions of the town, but the plaintiff presented conflicting testimony with respect to the placement of the tower and its effect on that coverage. Specifically, the plaintiff's radio frequency consultant concluded that the placement of the proposed tower would not materially improve service in the area and opined that two alternative locations would provide competitive coverage with less impact to resi- dential neighborhoods. The council ultimately found that there was a need for a new tower to provide necessary wireless coverage to an underserved area, and it expressly rejected the plaintiff's contention that certain alternative locations identified by the plaintiff's witness would provide comparable coverage to the site proposed by C Co. The plaintiff appealed from the council's decision to the trial court, which dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal. The trial court concluded that the council's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was reasonable in view of the evidence and applicable law. The trial court also observed that the council had heard and considered evidence from nearby residents regarding their concerns of the proposed tower's impact on property values and that the record was clear that the council had sufficiently considered alternative locations for the tower but con- cluded that the approved site was the most appropriate location. There- after, the plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held: 1. There was no merit to the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly dismissed its administrative appeal on the ground that the council had improperly declined to consider the impact of the proposed tower on private property values: a. The plaintiff had standing, as an intervenor under § 22a-19, to raise the claim that the council was required, pursuant to § 16-50p (a) (3) (B), to consider the impact of the proposed tower on property values: The plaintiff raised a colorable claim that a proposed facility's adverse impact on property values is an unenumerated significant adverse effect that the council must consider in determining the nature of the probable environmental impact of the facility pursuant to § 16-50p (a) (3) (B) because, if the plaintiff's reading of that statute were correct, the council would have been required to consider a proposed facility's impact on property values, and such evidence would, therefore, have been relevant to a determination of whether the construction of the facility constituted conduct that has, or that was reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state for purposes of § 22a- 19 (a) (1). b. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that, pursuant to § 16-50p (a) (3) (B), the council was required, but improperly declined, to consider the proposed tower's impact on private property values: The overarching objective of the certification inquiry under § 16-50p (a) (3) (B) is to discern the probable environmental impact of a proposed facility, to that end, the statute requires that the council consider every significant adverse effect, including, but not limited to, those expressly enumerated in the statute, and, because the legislature therefore contem- plated the possibility that there may be unenumerated significant adverse effects that must be considered by the council, this court concluded that the council is required to consider an unenumerated significant adverse effect when it, like the enumerated effects, is relevant to the probable environmental impact of the facility or to the significant adverse effects enumerated in the statute. Because there was no inherently obvious connection between a facility's adverse impact on property values and the probable environmental impact of the facility or the enumerated significant adverse effects, this court could not conclude that a facility's impact on property values would always be relevant to the council's inquiry pursuant to § 16-50p (a) (3) (B), property values are therefore not an unenumerated significant adverse effect that is required to be considered by the council, and the council's announcement at the start of each hearing that property values are not among the statutory criteria to be considered was facially consis- tent with § 16-50p (a) (3) (B). Accordingly, although the council could have considered the proposed tower's impact on property values if such evidence was relevant to either the tower's probable environmental impact or one of the significant adverse effects enumerated in § 16-50p (a) (3) (B), the plaintiff failed to argue that property values were relevant or to introduce any evidence that would have allowed the council to determine that such evidence was relevant to its decision concerning whether to grant C Co.'s application. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the council's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence, which was based on its assertion that the council had overlooked two alternative locations for the pro- posed tower: The parties presented extensive testimony and documentary evidence about the extent and quality of wireless services that would result from the placement of a tower in each proposed location, including expert testimony from C Co.'s radio frequency engineer that placing a tower at the site proposed by C Co. would provide a greater degree of service and would do a better job of improving capacity at higher frequency ranges, and the council effectively credited that witness' testimony and discredited the testimony of the plaintiff's radio frequency consultant when it expressly concluded that C Co.'s proposed site would offer more coverage than the alternative sites proposed by the plaintiff. Moreover, the council's conclusion that a tower at an alternative site proposed by the plaintiff would provide inadequate coverage logically foreclosed the plaintiff's assertions that the possibility of improving a previously existing police communications tower at another location should have been investigated further and that the State Historic Preser- vation Office may not have ultimately objected to the construction of a tower at the alternative location, and this court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the trial court and the council had overlooked and minimized certain evidence that justified locating the tower at certain alternative locations, as that claim was predicated on a misunderstanding of the nature of the substantial evidence inquiry. Argued December 14, 2023—officially released July 5, 2024

The plaintiff in error, B Co., a law firm that represented E in a civil action to recover underinsured motorist benefits from the defendant in error insurance company, L Co., filed a writ of error, claiming that the trial court had improperly imposed sanctions, which required B Co. to pay all of the costs related to L Co.'s retention of D, an orthopedic surgeon who had been retained and disclosed by L Co. to provide expert testi- mony in E's civil action. L Co. had disclosed in the civil action that D would opine that E's shoulder injury was not related to the underlying motor vehicle accident. During his deposition, however, D indicated that he could change his opinion if he learned certain additional facts. Subsequently, without informing L Co.'s counsel, B Co. scheduled an appointment for D to perform a medical examination on E and filed its own expert disclosure, indicating that E would call D as her own expert witness in the civil action and that D was expected to testify that E's shoulder injury was a direct result of the accident. After D's examination of E, B Co. sent L Co. a copy of D's medical report, in which D opined that E's shoulder injury was causally related to the accident. The trial court thereafter disqualified D from testifying at trial and, due to the purported violation of the rule of practice (§ 13-4) governing expert discovery, ordered B Co. to compensate L Co. for the expenses L Co. had incurred in retaining D for his expert services. Specifically, the trial court concluded that sanctions for the violation of a discovery order or rule were appropriate because Practice Book § 13-4 was clear, that rule was in fact violated, and the sanctions imposed were proportional to the violation at issue. This court transferred the writ of error to the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's order imposing sanctions on B Co. on the ground that § 13-4 did not clearly prohibit ex parte communications between an attorney and an opposing party's disclosed expert witness. On the granting of certification, L Co. appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court had improperly imposed sanctions on B Co. for conducting ex parte commu- nications with an expert witness previously disclosed by L Co. because it was not reasonably clear that Practice Book § 13-4 prohibits a party's attorney from engaging in ex parte communications with another party's disclosed expert witness: The text of Practice Book § 13-4 did not contain an explicit prohibition on ex parte communications with an expert witness disclosed by an opposing party, and, when the judges of the Superior Court, in enacting various rules of practice, have intended to limit a lawyer's ex parte communications, they have explicitly done so. Moreover, not only was Practice Book § 13-4 not explicit with respect to the permissibility of ex parte communications with a disclosed expert witness, but the history of § 13-4 demonstrated that it was not reasonably clear that such communications are prohibited, as, prior to 2009, § 13- 4 expressly limited communications with an opposing party's disclosed expert to interrogatories and formally noticed depositions, whereas the present version of § 13-4 no longer includes that limiting language, and, accordingly, this court could not say that the current rule restricts com- munications with an opposing party's expert witness. Furthermore, comparing how Practice Book § 13-4 deals with disclosed expert witnesses and nontestifying experts further supported the conclu- sion that the rule was not reasonably clear that it prohibited ex parte communications with disclosed experts, as the provision concerning discovery of nontestifying experts' opinions contains express language limiting ex parte communications to two identified scenarios, it was reasonable to presume that, when the drafters included limiting language in one section but omitted it in the other section, they did so intentionally, and the difference in treatment between disclosed expert witnesses and nontestifying experts was reasonable based on their different roles in the litigation process. This court declined L Co.'s invitation to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to clarify that ex parte contact with an opposing party's disclosed expert witness is impermissible, as this court could not conclude that the conduct at issue so implicated the fundamental fairness and integrity of the judicial system as a whole, especially when other jurisdictions permit such ex parte contact and when solutions to such conduct exist under the present law. Argued November 13, 2023—officially released July 11, 2024

The plaintiff organization sought to recover possession of certain commer- cial property occupied by the defendants S, C Co., and G Co. by way of a summary process action. Chabad Lubavitch (Chabad) is a hierarchical religious movement of Hasidic Judaism. D, the founder and former president of the plaintiff, had served the Chabad community in the city of Stamford as the shliach, or ecclesiastical leader, until 2014, when he entered into a written agreement to transfer his responsibilities to S. The 2014 agreement provided that, going forward, S would serve as the shliach for Stamford and assume various responsibilities in connection with that position, but it made no express reference to the plaintiff's property, which served as the central site for various services for the local Chabad community. S thereafter took possession of, and operated C Co. and G Co. out of, the property, and began making regular mortgage payments in connection with its possession of the property. When D and S's relationship deteriorated, S stopped making mortgage payments. D thereafter sent a letter to S, on the plaintiff's letterhead and in his capacity as the plaintiff's authorized representative, ordering him to vacate the property and purporting to remove him from his position as shliach. D and S then entered into an arbitration agreement, pursuant to which they agreed to resolve their various disagreements before a Bais Din, which is a rabbinical tribunal authorized to adjudicate disputes in accordance with Jewish law. D and S signed the arbitration agreement individually and on behalf of their respective institutions. The Bais Din ruled that S would continue to serve as shliach and ordered S to make the mortgage payments but that D would retain ownership of the property for three years, after which the issue of the ownership of the property would be reviewed. The Bais Din subsequently reaffirmed that ruling. When D and S were summoned to return to the Bais Din to adjudicate the ownership issue, D did not comply. Instead, D sought, and was granted, permission from a different rabbinical tribunal to bring the dispute before a civil court. Thereafter, the plaintiff served the defen- dants with a notice to quit, and, when the defendants failed to quit possession of the property, the plaintiff initiated this summary process action. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion but ordered a three month stay of the proceedings to allow the parties to arbitrate before the Bais Din. In reaching its decision, the court found that D had signed the arbitration agreement with the intent of binding the plaintiff and that the parties had intended the issue of ownership of the property to be adjudicated by the Bais Din. Following the stay period, the defen- dants filed a motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. The trial court, without making additional findings that a change in circumstances had rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable, denied the defendants' motion, concluding that the plaintiff was not a party to any arbitration agreement and that the parties could still seek religious remedies in the appropriate forum while the court resolved ownership and landlord-tenant issues. The trial court subsequently ren- dered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed. Held that the trial court erred in failing to enforce the arbitration agreement, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the defendants' motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration: In its initial ruling, the trial court concluded that the parties were bound to arbitrate the issue concerning the ownership of the property before the Bais Din on the basis of its finding that, when D signed the arbitration agreement, he did so in a representative capacity with the intent to bind the plaintiff, and that finding was substantially supported by the record, insofar as D, as the plaintiff's founder and then president, signed the agreement on his own behalf and on behalf of the Chabad institutions, the two rulings of the Bais Din dealt with issues relating to the ownership of the property, the arbitration agreement was signed subsequent to the defendants' taking possession of the property, and D wrote the letter ordering S to vacate the property in D's capacity as the plaintiff's author- ized representative and on the plaintiff's letterhead. The trial court, however, improperly denied the defendants' subsequent motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration, as it had already concluded that the parties were bound to the arbitration agreement, it made no findings that there was a change in circumstances that rendered the parties' arbitration agreement unenforceable, and, accordingly, in the absence of any legal basis for not enforcing the agreement, the trial court erred in declining to stay the proceedings. Moreover, the plaintiff's action fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement, which provided that the parties would submit all of their arguments in the case between them to arbitration, the plaintiff's claim that the defendants were no longer entitled to possess the property for failure to make mortgage payments was clearly such an argument, and, therefore, the plaintiff's action was arbitrable. Argued December 14, 2023—officially released July 12, 2024 July 12, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

Pursuant to statute (§ 12-66a), the following property may be taxed by a municipality provided such property is ''held by or on behalf of a health system, as defined in section 19a-508c,'' even if it is otherwise exempted from taxation: (1) real property that ''is acquired by a health system on or after October 1, 2015, that, at the time of such acquisition, is subject to taxation''; and (2) ''any personal property incident to the rendering of health care services at the real property described in subdivision (1) . . . .'' The plaintiff hospital appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant town's board of assessment appeals. The board had upheld the town assessor's denial of the plaintiff's applications for personal property tax exemptions in connection with the town's 2020 and 2021 grand lists. In those applications, the plaintiff claimed that certain per- sonal property that it used for the provision of outpatient rehabilitation services was exempt from taxation pursuant to the statutory (§ 12-81 (7) or (16)) charitable or hospital tax exemptions. Although the plaintiff, which is owned by B Co., has its principal location in the city of Norwich, the personal property at issue was located at a rehabilitation facility that the plaintiff operated in the town. The sole member of B Co. is H Co., which is a health system, as defined by statute ((Supp. 2024) § 19a- 508c (a) (5)). The plaintiff's rehabilitation facility is located in a suite that it subleased from H Co., and the suite is in a building that H Co. leases from the building's owner. The parties filed separate motions for summary judgment. Although the plaintiff claimed that the personal property at issue was exempt from taxation under § 12-81 (7) or (16), the town claimed that it was taxable pursuant to § 12-66a. The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and disagreed with the town. The court reasoned that, although the plaintiff is part of a health system, the personal property at issue was located at a rehabilitation facility that was leased, rather than owned, and, therefore, the real property at which the personal property at issue was being used had not been ''acquired'' by a health system within the meaning of § 12-66a. Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the town appealed. Held that the personal property owned by the plaintiff and used ''incident to the rendering of health care services'' at the rehabilitation facility, even if otherwise exempt from taxation under § 12-81 (7) or (16), was taxable under § 12-66a, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and for further proceedings: Whether the personal property at issue was taxable turned on whether the suite in which the rehabilitation facility was located had been ''acquired by a health system'' for purposes for § 12-66a, and, because the statutory scheme did not define the word ''acquired,'' this court consulted dictionary definitions and determined that § 12-66a was ambig- uous as to whether real property acquired by a health system excluded leased property from the operation of the statute, insofar as the defini- tions of ''acquire'' refer to possession and control, as well as ownership. Because there were limited extratextual sources regarding the meaning of ''acquired,'' as used in § 12-66a, this court applied the relevant princi- ples of statutory construction and concluded that, if the legislature had intended to cabin the method of acquisition to real property that is purchased, rather than leased, by a health system, it would have conveyed its intent expressly by using more specific language, especially when the legislature has, in the context of other tax exemptions, used specific language to limit the application of a tax exemption to property that is acquired in specific ways. Moreover, the plaintiff's construction of § 12-66a, limiting the statute's application to real property that is acquired by purchase, would invite parties to structure transactions in a way that would frustrate the appar- ent purpose of the statute, which is to shield municipalities from the loss of tax revenue caused by the proliferation of takeovers by larger, tax-exempt health-care systems of smaller hospitals and private medical practices that are otherwise subject to property tax. Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's argument that § 12-66a does not apply to it because it is not a ''health system,'' § 12-66a incorporates the definition of health system from § 19a-508c (a) (5), that definition includes both the parent corporation of one or more hospitals and any hospitals or entities affiliated with the parent through ownership, gover- nance, or membership, the plaintiff was affiliated with H Co., the parent corporation of one or more hospitals by virtue of H Co.'s status as the sole member of the plaintiff's owner, B Co., and a definition of ''health system'' that includes affiliated hospitals and entities furthers the statu- tory purpose by preventing health systems that would otherwise be subject to § 12-66a from rearranging their corporate structure to avoid its application. Argued February 14—officially released July 12, 2024 July 12, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder in 1990, filed a habeas petition, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court's admission of unduly suggestive and unreliable eyewitness identification evidence at his crimi- nal trial violated his due process rights. The petitioner also claimed that advances in the science of eyewitness identification since his conviction highlighted the unreliability of the eyewitness identifications in his own criminal case and called into question the validity of his conviction, which the habeas court interpreted as an actual innocence claim. The habeas court granted in part the motion to dismiss filed by the respon- dent, the Commissioner of Correction, concluding, inter alia, that the petitioner's due process and actual innocence claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The habeas court also concluded that this court's decisions in State v. Guilbert (306 Conn. 218), which held that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is admissible under certain circumstances, and State v. Dickson (322 Conn. 410), which overruled this court's holding regarding first-time, in-court identifications in the petitioner's direct appeal, State v. Tatum (219 Conn. 721), and concluded that such identifications violate procedural due process, did not indicate that those decisions were to be retroactively applied on collateral review. The habeas court then addressed the petitioner's remaining claims and subsequently dismissed in part and denied in part the petitioner's habeas petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim that the decisions in Guilbert and Dickson could be applied retroactively to his due process and actual innocence claims on collateral review, and affirmed the habeas court's judgment. The petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court, which lacked the benefit of this court's newly expanded formulation of the framework set forth in Teague v. Lane (489 U.S. 288) for evaluating whether a new constitutional rule applies retroactively on collateral review, should not have upheld the habeas court's dismissal of the petitioner's due process and actual innocence claims on the ground that Dickson did not apply retroactively to those claims on collateral review: Under the Teague framework, a new rule, such as the new rules articu- lated in Guilbert and Dickson, will not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review under the federal constitution unless the rule is either substantive or a watershed rule of criminal procedure that implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding. In the present case, the petitioner acknowledged that the new rules articulated in Guilbert and Dickson were not substantive but claimed that they were watershed rules of criminal procedure. In light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision to abolish the watershed rule in Edwards v. Vannoy (593 U.S. 255), this court recognized that new procedural rules no longer applied retroactively on collateral review in federal courts but nevertheless clarified that Teague's watershed rule had continued vitality in Connecticut. Moreover, in view of Edwards and the narrow applicability of the water- shed exception, this court adopted a third exception to the Teague rule of nonretroactivity, concluding that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure must be applied retroactively on collateral review if the rule was a result of developments in science that persuaded this court to reevaluate fundamental principles underlying judicial procedures, the rule significantly improves the accuracy of a conviction, and the peti- tioner advocated for the rule in his or her criminal proceedings or in an earlier habeas petition. This court preliminarily observed that its recent holding in State v. Harris (330 Conn. 91) that the Connecticut constitution affords greater protec- tion than the United States constitution with respect to the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony militated in favor of the retroactive application of Guilbert and Dickson on collateral review, and also noted that recent case law has recognized that mistaken eyewitness identifica- tions are the leading cause of wrongful convictions and that the risk of mistake is particularly acute when an identification has been tainted by an unduly suggestive procedure. With respect to the retroactive application of Guilbert to the petitioner's due process and actual innocence claims, this court concluded that, under either Teague's watershed exception or the third exception to nonretroactivity the court recognized in this case, a new rule must be of constitutional dimension in order to be applied retroactively, and the principles articulated in Guilbert could not be applied retroactively because that case articulated an evidentiary rather than a constitu- tional rule. With respect to the retroactive application of Dickson, there was no question that Dickson announced a constitutional rule of criminal proce- dure when the court concluded that any first-time, in-court identification by a witness who would have been unable to reliably identify the defen- dant during a nonsuggestive, out-of-court procedure constitutes a proce- dural due process violation. Furthermore, although the court in Dickson indicated in a footnote that that case should not be applied retroactively on collateral review, that statement was dictum, and this court disagreed with the earlier assertion in the same footnote in Dickson that the rule requiring prescreening of a first-time, in-court identification was merely an incremental change in identification procedures, as the rule articulated in Dickson was central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, such that the rule's absence would create an impermissibly high risk that innocent persons will be wrongfully convicted. This court ultimately determined that the rule set forth in Dickson must apply retroactively on collateral review because the rule was a result of developments in science that persuaded this court to reevaluate the fundamental principles underlying eyewitness identification evidence, the application of the rule significantly improved the accuracy of the petitioner's conviction, and the petitioner raised eyewitness identifica- tion claims in his direct appeal from his criminal conviction. More specifically, there was a heightened risk of a wrongful conviction in the petitioner's case because the state's case against the petitioner was largely based on two cross-racial eyewitness identifications of the petitioner, the two eyewitnesses had previously identified the same per- son as the shooter, who was someone other than the petitioner, and more than one year after the shooting, at a probable cause hearing, both eyewitnesses identified the petitioner, who was the only Black man seated at defense counsel's table. In addition, because Dickson was decided well after the petitioner's conviction, the petitioner did not have the opportunity in his criminal case to raise the specific claim that, in light of this court's decision in Dickson, the identification procedure used to secure his conviction violated his right to due process. Argued October 20, 2023—officially released July 16, 2024

Pursuant to statute (§ 42-150bb), when a consumer contract or lease includes a unilateral attorney's fees provision benefiting the commercial party, a prevailing consumer is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the size of which ''shall be based as far as practicable upon the terms governing the size of the fee for the commercial party.'' The plaintiff landlord brought this summary process action, seeking to gain possession of an apartment occupied by the defendant tenant. After the trial court rendered judgment for the defendant, the defendant filed a motion for attorney's fees pursuant to § 42-150bb, relying on the unilat- eral provision in the party's lease agreement providing that, if the plaintiff prevailed in an action on the lease agreement, the defendant would be responsible for reasonable attorney's fees up to $750. The trial court granted the defendant's motion and awarded him $3500 in attorney's fees. In doing so, the court relied on the equitable purpose of § 42-150bb, that is, to achieve parity between the parties, and reasoned that limiting the defendant's recovery to the maximum amount allowed by the lease agreement would not result in true parity between the parties. On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the trial court's award of attorney's fees, claiming that, under § 42-150bb, the court had the discretion to award the defen- dant only up to $750, which was the maximum amount of attorney's fees that the plaintiff could have recovered pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. Held that, although trial courts, pursuant to § 42-150bb, have discretion to award a prevailing consumer reasonable attorney's fees in excess of the maximum amount that a prevailing commercial party could recover under the terms of the consumer contract or lease when the court determines that it is not practicable to base the award of attorney's fees on those contractual or lease terms, in the present case, the trial court did not make that threshold determination, and, accordingly, this court vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded the case for a new hearing on the defendant's motion for attorney's fees: This court's examination of the phrase ''based . . . upon,'' as used in § 42-150bb, led it to conclude that, when a contract or lease caps a commercial party's recovery of attorney's fees at a specific dollar amount, the trial court's discretion to award a prevailing consumer attorney's fees pursuant to § 42-150bb is subject to the same limit, as long as applying that limit is practicable. This court also determined that the term ''practicable,'' as used in § 42- 150bb, had to be construed with reference to the statute's equitable purpose, and both the statutory language and this court's prior decisions supported the conclusion that the term ''practicable'' means feasible under the circumstances, which are circumstances that achieve equity or fairness. Accordingly, when a unilateral attorney's fees provision that triggers the application of § 42-150bb caps a commercial party's recovery of attor- ney's fees at a specific dollar amount, the court must base a prevailing consumer's award of attorney's fees on the terms governing the amount of the commercial party's fee, unless the consumer demonstrates that doing so would be impracticable under the circumstances, specifically, that such an award would not achieve the equitable purpose of 42-150bb. In cases in which the consumer demonstrates impracticability, the court should exercise its discretion, consistently with established law, to award the prevailing consumer reasonable attorney's fees. In making the threshold practicability determination, a court should consider all relevant circumstances, including the complexity and length of the litigation, the size of the cap and its proportion in relation to the prevailing consumer's reasonable attorney's fees, and the commercial party's fee arrangement. Although the trial court relied on the equitable purpose of § 42-150bb in awarding the defendant reasonable attorney's fees, it did not consider whether it was practicable to base the award of attorney's fees on the contractual terms governing the amount of the plaintiff's fees, and, accordingly, this court directed the trial court to do so on remand in accordance with this court's opinion. Argued February 6—officially released July 18, 2024

Convicted of murder in connection with the disappearance and death of his daughter, E, the defendant appealed to this court. In September, 1995, E's body was discovered in New Britain. E's remains were wrapped in trash bags and sleeping bags, and, although the police were initially unable to identify E, they collected hairs from E's body, as well as a hair and palm prints from the trash bags. At about the same time the police discovered E's body, the defendant told a family member that he was leaving the country imminently to take a job and that E and the defendant's wife, M, had already departed the country. In October, 1995, M's body was found in Massachusetts, and the police were unable to identify her remains at that time. In October or November, 1995, E and M were reported missing, but authorities were unable to locate them. In 2014, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the defendant's home in Ohio, where he was using his new wife's last name, and collected samples of his DNA and hair, as well as his finger and palm prints. DNA tests linked the defendant to, among other things, palm prints on the trash bags used to wrap E's remains. The commonwealth of Massachusetts subsequently charged the defendant with, and he was convicted of, M's murder. Thereafter, the state of Connecticut charged the defendant with murdering E in Connecticut. Before trial, the defen- dant moved to dismiss the case for lack of territorial jurisdiction because the state, which conceded that the actual location of E's murder was unknown, had failed to establish that E was murdered in Connecticut. The trial court, however, applied a permissive presumption, consistent with § 1.03 (4) of the Model Penal Code, that the death of a homicide victim occurred in the state where the body was found and, accordingly, denied the motion to dismiss. The trial court also denied the defendant's request for a jury instruction that the presence of his palm prints on the trash bags could not establish his connection with the crime unless it was demonstrated that the prints could have been impressed only at the time that the crime was perpetrated. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of territorial jurisdiction: The state has territorial jurisdiction to enact criminal laws and to enforce them when the criminal conduct, or the result of the criminal conduct, occurs within its territorial limits, and, to temper the state's burden of proving territorial jurisdiction in murder cases, the common law recog- nizes a permissive presumption, set forth in § 1.03 (4) of the Model Penal Code, that a murder took place where the victim's body was discovered. This court embraced that presumption as a rule of criminal procedure and concluded that the trial court properly applied the presumption in light of the robust public policy supporting it and its widespread use around the country. Specifically, the presumption ensures that the state's interests in enforc- ing its criminal laws and in pursuing justice for its citizens and the victim's family are vindicated, while also providing the defendant with the opportunity to rebut the presumption with evidence establishing that the murder did not occur within the state. Contrary to the defendant's contention that the adoption of the presump- tion set forth in § 1.03 of the Model Penal Code is a question reserved for the legislature and that the legislature did not adopt it when it revised this state's criminal statutes, the presumption survived the enactment of this state's Penal Code because it was a procedural rule, rather than a substantive crime or defense, that existed at common law, and nothing in the Penal Code clearly preempted it. Moreover, the presumption did not violate the defendant's due process rights by shifting to him the burden of disproving an element of a charged offense, as the location of E's death was not an element of the crime of murder, and the presumption applied to the trial court's preliminary determination of where the murder occurred, which was separate from the subsequent determination of whether the defendant committed the murder. 2. The evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the person who murdered E: The state offered an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence from which the jury could have reasonably determined that the defendant had murdered E, as the jury could have inferred that certain fabricated statements by the defendant were designed to conceal the fact that he had murdered E, including those in which he deflected responsibility away from himself for the disappearance of E and M and claimed to have selective memory or amnesia preventing him from remembering where he was and what he was doing around the time the bodies were discovered. Moreover, the jury could have inferred consciousness of guilt because, two months after E's murder, the defendant fled the country for almost four years, when he returned, he assumed the last name of his new wife and began a new life with a new family, and, despite claiming to have loved E, he took no action for twenty years to locate her, which could have led to a reasonable inference that he knew she was not missing because he had murdered her. Furthermore, there was direct physical evidence that tied the defendant to E's body, insofar as the defendant admitted that he owned the sleeping bags used to wrap E's remains, his palm prints were on the trash bags, and his DNA was concordant with DNA from hairs that were discovered on E's body and one of the trash bags. 3. The trial court properly declined to provide the jury with the defendant's proposed instruction that the presence of his palm prints could not establish his connection with the crime unless it was demonstrated that they could have been impressed only at the time that the crime was perpetrated, as such an instruction was not reasonably supported by the evidence adduced at trial: This court has held that such a jury instruction is appropriate only when the fingerprint or palm print constitutes the only or the principal evidence of connection to the crime, and, in the present case, evidence of the defendant's palm prints was not the only evidence that connected him to E's body, as there was an abundance of consciousness of guilt evidence, as well as certain other physical evidence. (One justice concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) Argued March 18—officially released July 19, 2024

The plaintiffs, former residents of a federally subsidized housing complex that was owned and managed by the defendants, appealed from the trial court's denial of their motion for class certification. In their com- plaint, the plaintiffs alleged, among other causes of action, fraud, reck- lessness, negligence, breach of the warranty of habitability, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (42-110a et seq.) in connection with the defendants' alleged failure to maintain the housing complex in a safe and habitable condition and their pattern and practice of delaying inspections, concealing health and safety hazards, and vio- lating federal, state, and local housing laws. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on the ground that their proposed class, which consisted of all persons who resided at the housing complex between 2004 and 2019 who were adversely affected by the defendants' alleged practices, failed to satisfy the predominance and superiority requirements under the rule of practice (§ 9-8 (3)) governing class action certification. The trial court reasoned that the predominance require- ment was not met because the determination of whether each unit in the housing complex was rendered uninhabitable was fact-specific and dependent on individualized factors and that the superiority requirement was not met due to the highly individualized proof required to establish liability. Although the trial court recognized that there could exist a basis for class certification with respect to certain of the plaintiffs' claims for some of the discrete events alleged in the complaint, such as a sewage backup in 2019 that resulted in the tenants' evacuation of the housing complex, the court concluded that the proposed class of all former tenants over a period of many years was too broad. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, as the proposed class of plaintiffs was too broad, and the trial court had no obligation to consider redefining the scope of the class sua sponte: In support of their claims, the plaintiffs primarily relied on evidence concerning the defendants' efforts, beginning in 2015, to delay inspec- tions and to hide housing code violations, inspection reports from 2018 documenting the squalid living conditions at the housing complex, and evidence of the 2019 sewage backup, and, because there was an absence of evidence regarding the allegedly uninhabitable conditions at the hous- ing complex prior to 2015 at the earliest, the vast majority of the proposed class members would need to adduce individualized proof to establish the defendants' liability. Accordingly, there was no evidentiary basis to support the conclusion that common questions of fact or law would be the object of most of the efforts of the litigants and the court, and the proposed class therefore was too broad and failed to satisfy the predominance requirement. Moreover, this court concluded that the predominance inquiry substan- tially encompasses the superiority analysis and that, if the predominance requirement is not satisfied, a class action likely will not be the superior mechanism to resolve the dispute between the parties. Furthermore, a trial court is vested with broad discretion to make class certification decisions, which includes the authority to limit or modify the scope of the class definitions proposed by the plaintiffs, and, although this court urged trial courts to consider redefining the scope of the class sua sponte if the proposed definition of the class is too broad, trial courts have no affirmative obligation to do so, as the burden is on the plaintiff, rather than the court, to propose a narrower, certifiable class. In the present case, the plaintiffs never asked the trial court to redefine the class definition or to create a subclass consisting of plaintiffs who resided at the housing complex between 2018 and 2019, and, in the absence of such a request, the court was not required to rule on that issue. Argued March 25—officially released July 23, 2024