Volume 350 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiff filed the present action with this court pursuant to statute (§ 9- 323), challenging the decision of the defendant secretary of the state to reject the plaintiff's registration as a write-in candidate in connection with the November, 2024 election for the office of United States representative for the Third Congressional District of Connecticut on the ground that it was untimely filed in violation of the statute ((Supp. 2024) § 9-373a) governing the registration of write-in candidates. The plaintiff sought an order directing the defendant to accept her registration, claiming that her filing was untimely because she had followed certain purportedly erroneous guidance from the defendant's office that reflected the filing deadline contained in an outdated version of § 9-373a, rather than the deadline set forth in the current version of § 9-373a. Held: This case was not moot because, even though it was not heard until after election day and the statutory filing deadline had passed, practical relief was still available, insofar as allowing the plaintiff to register as a write-in candidate would, at the very least, have the effect of validating those write- in votes that may already have been cast for her, and, in the event that there was a sufficient number of write-in votes to cast serious doubt on the election's reliability, a new election could serve as a potential remedy. The plaintiff was aggrieved by ''a ruling of an election official'' for purposes of establishing this court's jurisdiction under § 9-323 when the defendant declined to accept the plaintiff's untimely registration form, there having been a colorable claim that the plaintiff's untimely filing was the result of erroneous information communicated by the defendant's office. This court assumed without deciding that Connecticut courts have the authority to exercise their equitable powers to excuse a candidate's failure to comply with a mandatory filing deadline, such as the one set forth in § 9-373a, when such a failure to comply has been caused by the action of an election official. Nevertheless, the plaintiff failed to prove that she was entitled to relief under the doctrine of equitable estoppel because, although the defendant erroneously quoted an outdated version of § 9-373a in a cover letter that she provided to the plaintiff, both the cover letter and the write-in candidate registration form itself clearly and unambiguously provided the correct deadline, and the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in resolving the apparent discrepancy between the quote from the outdated version of the statute and correct deadline that was prominently stated in the cover letter and on the registration form. Heard November 7—officially released November 18, 2024

The defendant appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed his conviction, following a guilty plea, of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the Appellate Court had incorrectly upheld the trial court's conclusion that it lacked authority under the statute (§ 18-98d) governing presentence confinement credit to direct the commissioner of correction to apply such credit to the defendant's sentence. Held: This court concluded that § 18-98d does not confer exclusive authority on the commissioner to calculate and apply presentence confinement credit and that a trial court has discretionary authority to include on a judgment mittimus an order directing the commissioner to apply presentence confine- ment credit, in accordance with § 18-98d (a) (1), to a sentence that the court has imposed. This court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court insofar as that court upheld the trial court's conclusion that it did not have discretion to direct the commissioner to apply certain presentence confinement credit to the defendant's sentence and ordered the Appellate Court to remand the case to the trial court so that it could exercise its discretion, in the first instance, with respect to the presentence confinement credit issue. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the defendant's plea agreement did not include an agreement that he would receive presentence confinement credit for the time that he was incarcerated and serving sentences in connec- tion with two criminal cases unrelated to the present case, as the record contained no evidence that would support such a finding. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the plea agreement was void on the ground that there was no meeting of the minds on the issue of presentence confinement credit, because, although the record supported the conclusion that the defendant subjectively believed that he would receive This case originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Alexander, and Dannehy. Thereafter, Chief Justice Robinson retired from this court and did not participate in the consideration of this case. The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. such credit under that agreement, that subjective belief was wholly unrea- sonable. Argued April 25—officially released December 10, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment revoking his probation. He claimed that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's conclusion that it lacked authority under the statute (§ 18-98d) governing presentence confinement credit to direct the commissioner of correction to apply such credit to his sentence. Held: The issue of whether the trial court has authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence was resolved in the companion case of State v. Hurdle (350 Conn. 770), in which this court held that trial courts do have authority to direct the commissioner to apply such credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus. Insofar as the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's incorrect determination that it had no such authority, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment in part, and the case was remanded so that the trial court could exercise its discretion to direct the commissioner to apply presentence confinement credit to the defendant's sentence. Argued April 25—officially released December 10, 2024

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which dis- missed his motion to correct an illegal sentence for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had incorrectly con- cluded that it lacked authority under the statute (§ 18-98d) governing presen- tence confinement credit to direct the commissioner of correction to apply such credit to his sentence. Held: The issue of whether the trial court has authority to direct the commissioner to apply presentence confinement credit to a sentence was resolved in the companion case of State v. Hurdle (350 Conn. 770), in which this court held that trial courts do have authority to direct the commissioner to apply such credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus. The trial court improperly dismissed the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, as the court had jurisdiction over that motion under the applicable rule of practice (§ 43-22) because the motion raised a colorable claim that the defendant's plea agreement required that he receive a certain number of days of presentence confinement credit, and there was no indica- tion in the record that, as part of the plea agreement, the defendant waived his right to the reduction in his sentence mandated by § 18-98d. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded so that the trial court could consider the merits of the defendant's motion to correct. Argued April 25—officially released December 10, 2024

The plaintiff, individually and as administratrix of the estate of the decedent, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which had dismissed the plaintiff's medical malpractice action against the state defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In dismissing the action, the trial court specifi- cally concluded that the claims commissioner's waiver of the state's sover- eign immunity pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 4-160 (b)) was not valid because the purported waiver occurred after the expiration of a one year extension of time that the General Assembly had granted to the commis- sioner to dispose of the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff contended that the trial court had incorrectly concluded that the commissioner's waiver was not valid. Held: This court concluded that the present case was controlled by its recent decision in Lynch v. State (348 Conn. 478), in which this court held that, unlike the more typical claim that the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint do not fall within the scope of the claims commissioner's waiver of sovereign immunity, a challenge to the commissioner's decision to waive sovereign immunity and to grant permission to sue the state is not reviewable by a court, and such a challenge should be raised before the claims commissioner, if at all. In the present case, the defendants' challenge in the trial court to the plain- tiff's claims did not concern whether those claims fell within the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity granted by the claims commissioner, as they undisputably did, but, rather, concerned whether the commissioner had the authority to grant a waiver of sovereign immunity after the expiration of the one year extension granted by the legislature. The defendants failed to raise their claim regarding the authority of the claims commissioner to waive sovereign immunity before the commissioner in the first instance, once the commissioner authorized suit, the defendants waived all defenses to the claims commissioner's decision, and that decision was insulated from collateral attack. The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. Accordingly, the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Argued September 16—officially released December 17, 2024

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board. The board had upheld an award of statutory (§ 31-307 (a)) total incapacity benefits to the plaintiff in connection with injuries that he sustained during the course of his employment with the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that he was not eligible for total incapacity benefits because his total incapacity did not occur until after his voluntary retirement and because he did not intend to return to the workforce. Held: This court concluded that, under the plain and unambiguous language of § 31-307 (a), a claimant who sustains a compensable workplace injury under the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits, regardless of whether the claimant's total incapacity occurs before or after his or her voluntary retirement from employment. Accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case to that court so that it could consider the defendant's alternative claim on appeal, which the Appellate Court did not reach in its decision. Argued September 23—officially released December 24, 2024

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board. The board had upheld an award of statutory (§ 31-307 (a)) total incapacity benefits to the plaintiff in connection with injuries that he sustained during the course of his employment with the defendant police department. The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that he was not eligible for total incapacity benefits because his total incapacity did not occur until after his voluntary retirement and because he did not intend to return to the workforce. Held: The issue of whether a claimant is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits when the total incapacity occurred after the claimant's voluntary retirement from employment was resolved in the companion case of Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation (350 Conn. 844), in which this court held that a claimant who sustains a compensable workplace injury under the Workers' Compen- sation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits under § 31-307 (a) even when the total incapacity occurs after his or her voluntary retirement. Insofar as the Appellate Court did not reach the defendants' two alternative claims in its decision, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case to that court so that it could consider those claims on remand. Argued September 23—officially released December 24, 2024

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court. The plaintiff had sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the defendant workers' compensation insurance carrier was legally obligated to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in connection with a claim filed by the plaintiff's employee. In granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the defendant did not effectively cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy that it had issued to the plaintiff because the purportedly conflicting notices the defendant had provided to the plaintiff prior to cancellation, including a notice that the plaintiff had failed to cooperate in connection with certain of the defendant's requests and a separate cancellation notice, did not consti- tute an unambiguous and unequivocal notice of cancellation. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding, inter alia, that the defendant effectively cancelled the policy prior to the employee's purport- edly compensable injuries by virtue of the defendant's compliance with the statute (§ 31-348) governing the reporting of risks by workers' compensation insurance companies and the cancellation of workers' compensation insur- ance policies. The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that the cancellation notice effectively cancelled the policy. Held: This court concluded that, although insurers must strictly comply with the requirements of § 31-348 when seeking to cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy, compliance with that statute does not supplant an insurer's obligations under otherwise applicable principles of contract law as they relate to the insurer and the insured, including the principle that a notice cancelling an insurance policy must be definite, certain, and unambiguous. The Appellate Court incorrectly limited its analysis to whether there was a definite and certain notice of cancellation filed with the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission pursuant to § 31-348; rather, when a court considers whether a notice of cancellation of a workers' compensation insurance policy is sufficiently definite and certain, it must consider all relevant communications between the parties. In the present case, the defendant's notice of cancellation of the policy was not objectively definite and certain, as the conflicting noncooperation and The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. cancellation notices provided indefinite and ambigous information concern- ing the status of the plaintiff's insurance converage, what was required to maintain that coverage, and what the consequences would be for not meeting the deadline to comply with the defendant's requests. Accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case to that court with direction to affirm the trial court's judgment. Argued September 27—officially released December 24, 2024