Volume 350 — Connecticut Reports

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment revoking his probation. He claimed that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's conclusion that it lacked authority under the statute (§ 18-98d) governing presentence confinement credit to direct the commissioner of correction to apply such credit to his sentence. Held: The issue of whether the trial court has authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence was resolved in the companion case of State v. Hurdle (350 Conn. 770), in which this court held that trial courts do have authority to direct the commissioner to apply such credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus. Insofar as the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's incorrect determination that it had no such authority, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment in part, and the case was remanded so that the trial court could exercise its discretion to direct the commissioner to apply presentence confinement credit to the defendant's sentence. Argued April 25—officially released December 10, 2024

The plaintiff, individually and as administratrix of the estate of the decedent, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which had dismissed the plaintiff's medical malpractice action against the state defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In dismissing the action, the trial court specifi- cally concluded that the claims commissioner's waiver of the state's sover- eign immunity pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 4-160 (b)) was not valid because the purported waiver occurred after the expiration of a one year extension of time that the General Assembly had granted to the commis- sioner to dispose of the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff contended that the trial court had incorrectly concluded that the commissioner's waiver was not valid. Held: This court concluded that the present case was controlled by its recent decision in Lynch v. State (348 Conn. 478), in which this court held that, unlike the more typical claim that the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint do not fall within the scope of the claims commissioner's waiver of sovereign immunity, a challenge to the commissioner's decision to waive sovereign immunity and to grant permission to sue the state is not reviewable by a court, and such a challenge should be raised before the claims commissioner, if at all. In the present case, the defendants' challenge in the trial court to the plain- tiff's claims did not concern whether those claims fell within the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity granted by the claims commissioner, as they undisputably did, but, rather, concerned whether the commissioner had the authority to grant a waiver of sovereign immunity after the expiration of the one year extension granted by the legislature. The defendants failed to raise their claim regarding the authority of the claims commissioner to waive sovereign immunity before the commissioner in the first instance, once the commissioner authorized suit, the defendants waived all defenses to the claims commissioner's decision, and that decision was insulated from collateral attack. The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. Accordingly, the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Argued September 16—officially released December 17, 2024

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board. The board had upheld an award of statutory (§ 31-307 (a)) total incapacity benefits to the plaintiff in connection with injuries that he sustained during the course of his employment with the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that he was not eligible for total incapacity benefits because his total incapacity did not occur until after his voluntary retirement and because he did not intend to return to the workforce. Held: This court concluded that, under the plain and unambiguous language of § 31-307 (a), a claimant who sustains a compensable workplace injury under the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits, regardless of whether the claimant's total incapacity occurs before or after his or her voluntary retirement from employment. Accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case to that court so that it could consider the defendant's alternative claim on appeal, which the Appellate Court did not reach in its decision. Argued September 23—officially released December 24, 2024

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board. The board had upheld an award of statutory (§ 31-307 (a)) total incapacity benefits to the plaintiff in connection with injuries that he sustained during the course of his employment with the defendant police department. The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that he was not eligible for total incapacity benefits because his total incapacity did not occur until after his voluntary retirement and because he did not intend to return to the workforce. Held: The issue of whether a claimant is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits when the total incapacity occurred after the claimant's voluntary retirement from employment was resolved in the companion case of Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation (350 Conn. 844), in which this court held that a claimant who sustains a compensable workplace injury under the Workers' Compen- sation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits under § 31-307 (a) even when the total incapacity occurs after his or her voluntary retirement. Insofar as the Appellate Court did not reach the defendants' two alternative claims in its decision, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case to that court so that it could consider those claims on remand. Argued September 23—officially released December 24, 2024

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court. The plaintiff had sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the defendant workers' compensation insurance carrier was legally obligated to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in connection with a claim filed by the plaintiff's employee. In granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the defendant did not effectively cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy that it had issued to the plaintiff because the purportedly conflicting notices the defendant had provided to the plaintiff prior to cancellation, including a notice that the plaintiff had failed to cooperate in connection with certain of the defendant's requests and a separate cancellation notice, did not consti- tute an unambiguous and unequivocal notice of cancellation. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding, inter alia, that the defendant effectively cancelled the policy prior to the employee's purport- edly compensable injuries by virtue of the defendant's compliance with the statute (§ 31-348) governing the reporting of risks by workers' compensation insurance companies and the cancellation of workers' compensation insur- ance policies. The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that the cancellation notice effectively cancelled the policy. Held: This court concluded that, although insurers must strictly comply with the requirements of § 31-348 when seeking to cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy, compliance with that statute does not supplant an insurer's obligations under otherwise applicable principles of contract law as they relate to the insurer and the insured, including the principle that a notice cancelling an insurance policy must be definite, certain, and unambiguous. The Appellate Court incorrectly limited its analysis to whether there was a definite and certain notice of cancellation filed with the chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission pursuant to § 31-348; rather, when a court considers whether a notice of cancellation of a workers' compensation insurance policy is sufficiently definite and certain, it must consider all relevant communications between the parties. In the present case, the defendant's notice of cancellation of the policy was not objectively definite and certain, as the conflicting noncooperation and The listing of justices reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument. cancellation notices provided indefinite and ambigous information concern- ing the status of the plaintiff's insurance converage, what was required to maintain that coverage, and what the consequences would be for not meeting the deadline to comply with the defendant's requests. Accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case to that court with direction to affirm the trial court's judgment. Argued September 27—officially released December 24, 2024