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State v. Bolton
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN BOLTON
(SC 20856)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm in connection
with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court.
After the jury foreperson announced that the jury had reached a verdict
and the jurors collectively confirmed their guilty verdict, defense counsel
asked that the jurors be polled individually. The first five jurors of the
twelve person jury confirmed the verdict, but the sixth juror, S.C., expressed
equivocation and disagreement with the guilty verdict. At that point, the
court stopped polling the jurors and excused the jurors in order to consult
with counsel. The court ultimately directed the jurors to resume deliberations, and, subsequently, the jurors returned a unanimous guilty verdict.
The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion
when it denied his motion for a mistrial following the court’s decision to
stop polling the jurors and to direct them to resume deliberations after
polling S.C. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for a mistrial, as the record revealed that there was no impermissible coercion of S.C.
The circumstances of this case were not indicative of potential coercion
beyond the pressure inherent in the ordinary process of reaching a unanimous jury verdict, and, without other evidence indicating coercion, such as
misconduct or other negative reaction by the other jurors to S.C.’s dissent,
the fact that S.C. expressed equivocation or disagreement with the verdict
relatively early in the poll, took a break to relieve tensions, and then returned
to deliberate with her fellow jurors without incident demonstrated that S.C.
had not abandoned her honest conviction in ultimately voting to find the
defendant guilty.
Moreover, on the basis of the circumstances before it, and after soliciting
input from counsel, the trial court opted for a minimal and neutral course
of action in order to allow the deliberation process to continue, and, although
it would have been within the court’s discretion to give a Chip Smith charge,
encouraging jurors to reach a unanimous verdict, it was not necessary to
do so.
The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the final
verdict violated the constitutional requirement that a jury verdict be both
unanimous and free from coercion on the ground that there was an unacceptable risk that S.C. had been coerced into assenting to a guilty verdict, as
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State v. Bolton
the alleged constitutional violation did not occur or deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, and, therefore, the defendant’s claim failed under the third
prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as modified by In re Yasiel R.
(317 Conn. 773).
There was no evidence in the record indicating that S.C.’s decision with
respect to the jury’s verdict was the product of coercion, the trial court’s
decision to direct the jurors to resume the deliberation process after S.C.
had indicated her equivocation or disagreement with the verdict did not
coerce S.C. into reaching a guilty verdict, and a Chip Smith charge was not
required to address juror coercion.
This court declined to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that the
trial court had violated the applicable rule of practice (§ 42-31) when it
discontinued the jury poll following S.C.’s equivocation or disagreement
with the verdict, as that claim was not of constitutional magnitude, and,
therefore, it failed under the second prong of Golding.
Argued May 14—officially released July 22, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury before Gustafson,
J.; verdict of guilty; thereafter the court, Gustafson,
J., denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial and
rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from
which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Shanna P. Hugle, deputy assistant public defender,
for the appellant (defendant).
Rajan M. Doering and Michael H. Coudert, certified
legal interns, with whom were Ronald G. Weller, senior
assistant state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Sharmese
L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Danielle O’Connell,
assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ALEXANDER, J. The principal issue in this appeal
requires us to consider how a trial court should exercise
its discretion when addressing, pursuant to Practice
Book § 42-31, a juror’s equivocation during a jury poll.
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State v. Bolton
The defendant, John Bolton, raises three claims on
appeal from the judgment of conviction of murder in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and criminal
possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2019) § 53a-217 (a) (1). First, he claims that the
trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a mistrial following its decision to stop polling the jury when a juror reported her disagreement
with the verdict. Second, he claims that the trial court’s
response to the juror’s equivocation resulted in a coerced
verdict. Third, he claims that the trial court failed to
comply with Practice Book § 42-31 when it stopped
polling the jury. We disagree with each of the defendant’s claims and affirm the judgment of conviction.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. On January 8, 2019, the defendant
shot and killed the victim, Carl Spence, in Hartford,
after an argument over illegal narcotics sales. The state
charged the defendant with murder and criminal possession of a firearm.
The defendant elected a jury trial. After five days of
evidence, the jury began its deliberations late in the
afternoon of March 1, 2023. At 12:41 p.m. on March 2,
after approximately four and one-half hours of deliberation over two days, the jury informed the trial court
that it had reached a verdict. The jury returned to the
courtroom, and the foreperson announced that the jury
had found the defendant guilty of murder and criminal
possession of a firearm. The court clerk asked the jury to
confirm the verdict, and, collectively, the jurors responded
in the affirmative. Defense counsel requested that the jury
be polled. During the jury poll, the first five jurors stood
and individually affirmed the verdict. When the sixth juror,
S.C.,1 was asked to stand, she rose but did not speak. The
1
‘‘In accordance with our usual practice, we identify jurors by [their
initials] in order to protect their privacy interests.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Holmes, 334 Conn. 202, 207 n.6,
221 A.3d 407 (2019).
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State v. Bolton
court clerk asked S.C. whether she found the defendant
guilty or not guilty of murder. S.C. initially did not respond
but then asked: ‘‘I can’t change my mind, right?’’ The trial
court responded: ‘‘[Y]ou’re having a question? So, you’re
not prepared to say ‘guilty’ at this point?’’ S.C. replied:
‘‘No.’’ The court then sent the jury back to the jury room
without further instruction, telling the jurors that it needed
‘‘to take up a question with the lawyers.’’
After the jury exited the courtroom, the court stated:
‘‘[S]o, at this point, I think, it was clear that one of the
jurors has thoughts about saying publicly ‘guilty’ in court
at this point. So, unless I hear different from the lawyers,
my thinking would be to instruct the jury to continue
deliberating the case.’’ Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that S.C. would now face ‘‘undue pressure’’
in deliberations. The court took that motion ‘‘under advisement’’ and called a brief recess to make sure it was ‘‘not
missing anything.’’ Approximately ten minutes later, upon
reconvening, the court conveyed the clerk’s report that
S.C. did not want to return to the jury room with the other
jurors and that she had been provided with her own room.
After conferring with the parties further, the court noted
that the jury was ‘‘not deliberating right now’’ and that it
intended to release the jury for lunch and to have it resume
deliberations afterward. Defense counsel then suggested
that the court speak with S.C. separately but withdrew
that request immediately. Defense counsel agreed with
the court’s reluctance to speak separately with S.C. and
that the jurors ‘‘need to communicate . . . with notes.’’
The jurors then reentered the courtroom. The court
explained the polling procedure and observed that one of
the jurors had indicated that she could not answer the
clerk’s question. The court continued: ‘‘[B]efore I send you
to lunch . . . the threshold question . . . I need to
resolve is—is that juror having . . . second thoughts
about her decision on [guilt] or innocence or is it a matter
of not being able to say something publicly? In other
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State v. Bolton
words, say the word ‘guilty’ in public or is it a question
about the verdict itself that you don’t want to . . . end
your deliberation on that issue—on that question of guilt
or innocence?’’ S.C. responded: ‘‘Both.’’
The trial court then stated, ‘‘at this point, it’s clear we do
not have a unanimous verdict in this case,’’ and informed
the jurors that they would continue their deliberations
after a one hour lunch break. The court instructed the
jurors to refer to the written copy of the jury instructions that they had previously received, a portion of
which related to the deliberation process.2 After the jury
exited, defense counsel again moved for a mistrial because
S.C. had said that her problem was with the guilty verdict itself, and not merely with the act of announcing
the verdict in open court. The court denied the motion,
explaining: ‘‘I think it’s clear we’ve got a situation [in
which] eleven people have returned a verdict of guilty.3
One person is [having] second thoughts and wants to
continue deliberating. That’s the process. . . . [S]o,
we’ll let the process play out, and we’ll see what the afternoon brings.’’
2
The jury instructions regarding the deliberation process provided in
relevant part: ‘‘Each of you has taken an oath to deliver a true verdict
according to the evidence. That is the strength of the jury system. Each of
you takes into the deliberation room your individual experience and wisdom.
Your task is to pool that experience and wisdom. You do that by giving
your views and listening to the views of others. There must necessarily be
discussion, argument, and give-and-take within the scope of your oath. That
is the way in which a unanimous verdict is reached.
‘‘In the jury room, you should talk with each other about the case. Each
of you must make your own conscientious decision, but only after . . . you
have considered all the evidence, discussed it fully with the others, and
listened to the views of your fellow jurors. You should consider whether
your views are fair and reasonable, and try your best to decide the case
according to the law. Do not hesitate to reexamine your own views and to
change your mind if you are persuaded that you should do so but do not
surrender your honest opinion solely because your opinion is different from
the other jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.’’
3
Because the jury poll was not completed, it is unclear how the trial court
determined that eleven jurors had returned a verdict of guilty.
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State v. Bolton
Following the lunch break, the jury deliberated for
approximately two more hours. At 4:30 p.m., the jury
sent a note to the court asking whether a guilty vote
would need to be stated out loud or if it could be written
down and given to the court clerk. The court had the
jury reenter the courtroom, explained that each juror
would have to answer out loud, and sent the jurors
back to the jury room to determine whether they wanted
to continue deliberating until the end of the day or to
resume the following morning. At 4:50 p.m., the jury
sent a note indicating that it had reached a verdict. The
jury returned to the courtroom and delivered a verdict
of guilty on both counts. The defendant again asked
for a jury poll, and, in that second poll, all twelve jurors,
including S.C. individually, affirmed that their vote was
guilty on both counts. The court accepted and recorded
the verdict. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment in
accordance with the verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of thirty years of imprisonment. This direct
appeal followed. See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).
I
The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a
mistrial. The defendant contends that the totality of the
circumstances did not support the court’s decision and
that returning the jury to deliberate substantially and
irreparably prejudiced his case because S.C. was coerced
into returning a guilty verdict. We disagree.
‘‘[Although] the remedy of a mistrial is permitted
under the rules of practice,4 it is not favored. [A] mistrial
should be granted only as a result of some occurrence
upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to
the court that because of it a party cannot have a fair
trial . . . and the whole proceedings are vitiated. . . .
If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic
4
See Practice Book § 42-43.
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State v. Bolton
remedy of a mistrial should be avoided. . . . On
appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not to declare
a mistrial. The trial judge is the arbiter of the many
circumstances [that] may arise during the trial in which
his function is to [ensure] a fair and just outcome. . . .
The trial court is better positioned than we are to evaluate in the first instance whether a certain occurrence
is prejudicial to the defendant and, if so, what remedy
is necessary to cure that prejudice. . . . The decision
whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court.’’ (Footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 702,
911 A.2d 1055 (2006); see also State v. Henderson,
348
Conn. 648, 666–67,
309 A.3d 1208 (2024). It is the defendant’s burden to establish the prejudice necessary to
warrant a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Gore, 342 Conn.
129, 169,
269 A.3d 1 (2022).
‘‘The purpose of a jury poll is to test the uncoerced
unanimity of the verdict by requiring each juror to
answer for himself, thus creating individual responsibility, eliminating any uncertainty as to the verdict
announced by the foreman.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) United States v. Gambino, 951 F.2d 498, 502
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. D’Amico v. United
States, 504 U.S. 918,
112 S. Ct. 1962,
118 L. Ed. 2d 563
(1992); see also United States v. Singer, 345 F. Supp.
2d 230, 233 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d,
241 Fed. Appx. 727
(2d Cir. 2007). ‘‘[T]he right to poll the jury, although
not constitutional, is nonetheless a substantial right
. . . that enables the court to ascertain with certainty
that a unanimous verdict has in fact been recorded and
that no juror has been coerced or induced to agree to
a verdict to which he [or she] has not fully assented.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Pare, 253 Conn. 611, 631–32,
755 A.2d 180 (2000).
Jury polling in criminal trials is governed by Practice
Book § 42-31, which provides: ‘‘After a verdict has been
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State v. Bolton
returned and before the jury has been discharged, the
jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon
the judicial authority’s own motion. The poll shall be
conducted by the clerk of the court by asking each
juror individually whether the verdict announced is
such juror’s verdict. If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed to retire
for further deliberations or it may be discharged.’’
(Emphasis added.)
Connecticut’s appellate courts have had few opportunities to consider a trial court’s response to a lack of
unanimity revealed by a jury poll in a criminal trial. In
State v. Gullette, 3 Conn. Cir. 153, 209 A.2d 259 (App.
Div. 1964), after the trial court gave the jury a Chip
Smith charge,5 the first nine jurors announced a guilty
verdict. Id., 155. The tenth juror stated that her verdict
was ‘‘[n]ot guilty,’’ and that she ‘‘was the last one that
held out.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The
trial court repeated the Chip Smith charge to the jury
and then sent the jury back to the jury room to continue
its deliberations. Id., 156–57. Four minutes later, the
jury returned and announced a unanimous guilty verdict, which each juror confirmed after being polled
again. Id., 157. The trial court denied the defendant’s
motion to set the verdict aside. Id., 163. The reviewing
court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
assessment that ‘‘what seemed originally to have been
5
First articulated in State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376 (1881), ‘‘[a] Chip Smith
[charge] reminds the jurors that they must act unanimously, while also
encouraging a deadlocked jury to reach unanimity. . . . A similar jury
instruction, known as an Allen charge, is utilized in the federal courts.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. O’Neil, 261
Conn. 49, 51 n.2,
801 A.2d 730 (2002); see Allen v. United States,
164 U.S.
492, 501,
17 S. Ct. 154,
41 L. Ed. 528 (1896); see also State v. Feliciano,
256
Conn. 429, 439, 443,
778 A.2d 812 (2001) (reaffirming ‘‘fundamental logic
underlying the Chip Smith charge,’’ which ‘‘makes clear the necessity, on
the one hand, of unanimity among the jurors in any verdict, and on the
other hand the duty of careful consideration by each juror of the views and
opinions of each of his fellow jurors’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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State v. Bolton
a dissent by one juror was, in fact, only confusion on
her part, caused by an unfamiliar procedure,’’ as confirmed by the jury’s quick return. Id., 165. The court
further concluded that the record did not support a
claim of coercion and that reinstructing the jury on the
Chip Smith charge did not prejudice the defendant,
especially given the lack of any exception to the original
charge. Id., 164–65.
This court has considered jury polling in several civil
cases applying Practice Book § 16-32, which is almost
identical to Practice Book § 42-31, and has held that
polling in civil cases serves the same purpose of ensuring jury unanimity and lack of coercion. See Wiseman
v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 102–104,
989 A.2d 1027
(2010). We find instructive Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn.
274,
294 A.2d 67 (1972), in which this court stated that,
during a jury poll, a ‘‘[n]eutral inquiry by the trial judge
as to the meaning of a juror’s response is not erroneous,’’ and clarified that, ‘‘[o]nly when such inquiry is
coercive or seeks explanations, motives or information
about occurrences in the jury room should it be found
objectionable.’’ Id., 280. In Tough, this court concluded
that the trial court was correct not to send the jury
back for further deliberations when its questioning of
a dissenting juror revealed that she had simply been
confused by the polling procedure. Id., 277–78, 280.
Similarly, in Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298
Conn. 371,
3 A.3d 892 (2010), this court upheld the trial
court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial following what
appeared to be a juror’s expression of disagreement
with the verdict during the jury poll. Id., 388. Deferring
to the trial court’s ‘‘opportunity to observe the demeanor
of [the juror] during the entire trial, especially during
the return of the verdict and the polling process, and
. . . presen[ce] when [the juror] made the statements
at issue,’’ this court concluded that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it conducted a neutral
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State v. Bolton
inquiry into whether the juror disagreed with the verdict
or was confused by the procedure. Id., 397. Because the
juror’s ‘‘final answer’’ with respect to the verdict controls;
id., 398; see also Josephson v. Meyers,
180 Conn. 302,
309,
429 A.2d 877 (1980); State v. Gullette, supra, 3
Conn. Cir. 166; the trial court in Hurley had correctly
determined that the confused juror’s final answer was
operative and accepted the verdict as unanimous. See
Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., supra, 398.
In contrast to Hurley, in State v. Bell, 13 Conn. App.
420,
537 A.2d 496 (1988), the Appellate Court held that
the trial court had used an erroneous polling procedure.
Id., 428, 430. In Bell, a juror responded to a poll as to
her verdict by asking, ‘‘ ‘[d]o I have to answer that as
a guilty or can I say something?’ ’’ Id., 428 n.4. The trial
court answered that all she could say was whether the
guilty verdict was her verdict. Id. When polled a second
time, the juror responded, ‘‘ ‘I can’t say.’ ’’ Id. The trial
court attempted three additional times to obtain the
juror’s verdict, and only after the fifth request did the
juror state that the defendant was guilty. Id., 428–29
and n.4. The Appellate Court held that the trial court
should have either directed the jury to retire for further
deliberations or discharged the jury and declared a mistrial. Id., 432. The Appellate Court determined that the
juror’s response of ‘‘ ‘I can’t say’ ’’ should have signaled
to the trial court that the juror still had questions about
the defendant’s guilt and, after the court continued to
ask for her verdict, that her responses indicated doubt,
rather than confusion. Id., 431–32. The Appellate Court
concluded that a new trial was required because the
juror’s final answer of ‘‘ ‘guilty’ ’’ had been ‘‘conduced
by the trial court during the polling process.’’ Id., 432.
Taken together, our state’s cases are consistent with
an approach used by numerous federal and state courts6
6
See United States v. Coulter, 57 F.4th 1168, 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 2627,
216 L. Ed. 2d 1218 (2023); United States v.
Williams, 819 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Gambino,
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State v. Bolton
in assessing whether a trial court’s response to a dissenting juror during a poll has resulted in a verdict
that is the product of impermissible coercion or merely
reflects ‘‘[t]he persuasive impetus inherent in the
requirement of [jury] unanimity . . . .’’ Harris v.
United States, 622 A.2d 697, 701 (D.C. 1992), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1129,
114 S. Ct. 1097,
127 L. Ed. 2d
410 (1994). This case law is instructive because these
jurisdictions follow rules modeled after an American
Bar Association model rule or rule 31 (d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure,7 both of which are substantively identical to Practice Book § 42-31.
For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
has held that the reviewing court must assume the perspective of the jurors and make two inquiries to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by
the trial court under the unique facts and circumstances
of the particular case. See Harris v. United States, supra,
supra, 951 F.2d 501–502; United States v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172, 176–77 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966,
109 S. Ct. 492,
102 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1988),
and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966,
109 S. Ct. 492,
102 L. Ed. 2d 529 (1988);
Browne v. State, 215 Md. App. 51, 73,
79 A.3d 410 (2013); State v. Ware,
498
N.W.2d 454, 458–59 (Minn. 1993); State v. Frederick,
783 S.W.2d 469, 472
(Mo. App. 1990); State v. Pyatt, 300 Mont. 25, 29,
1 P.2d 953 (2000); State
v. Milton, 178 N.J. 421, 437–38,
840 A.2d 835 (2004); State v. Holloway,
106
N.M. 161, 164,
740 P.2d 711 (App.), cert. denied,
106 N.M. 405,
744 P.2d
180 (1987).
7
Standard 15-5.6 of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice provides:
‘‘When a verdict has been returned and before the jury has dispersed, the
jury should be polled at the request of any party or upon the court’s own
motion. The poll should be conducted by the court or clerk of court asking
each juror individually whether the verdict announced is his or her verdict.
If upon the poll there is not unanimous concurrence, the jury may be directed
to retire for further deliberations or may be discharged.’’ A.B.A., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury (3d Ed. 1996) standard
15-5.6.
Rule 31 (d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: ‘‘After
a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, the court must on a
party’s request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually. If the poll
reveals a lack of unanimity, the court may direct the jury to deliberate
further or may declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.’’
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State v. Bolton
622 A.2d 701. ‘‘The first inquiry is into the inherent
coercive potential of the situation before the court. The
second inquiry requires an examination of the actions
of the trial judge in order to determine whether these
actions exacerbated, alleviated or were neutral with
respect to coercive potential. Then the two factors should
be viewed together to assess the possibility of actual
coercion on any juror or jurors.’’ Id., 701–702.
It follows, therefore, that the trial court must proceed
carefully and cautiously in order to minimize the coercive potential when it takes action pursuant to its
authority under Practice Book § 42-31. Depending on
the circumstances before it, the court may choose to
canvass the dissenting juror, to dismiss the jury and
declare a mistrial, or to issue a Chip Smith charge or
other instruction before returning the jury to its deliberations; it may also simply return the jury to deliberate
without additional instruction. See id., 701. ‘‘Such actions
by the court are perfectly acceptable in appropriate
circumstances when carried out with care. Indeed, they
are part of the normal functioning of the jury system.
To release a ‘hung’ jury [when] a true deadlock does
not exist constitutes an unnecessary and undesirable
waste of resources, and the trial court has the right and
duty to urge a jury to work diligently to reach a fair
and freely arrived at verdict, if possible. What is impermissible is a situation [in which] the outcome is the result
of coercion, i.e., [when] as a consequence of developments during jury deliberation or trial court action or
inaction, one or more jurors feel forced to change their
votes from what they individually in fact believe, and
thus the verdict is not freely and fairly given.’’ Id. Impermissible coercion occurs ‘‘when jurors surrender their
honest opinions for the mere purpose of returning a
verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted) United
States v. Williams, 819 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 2016).
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State v. Bolton
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that no
impermissible coercion occurred in the present case.
First, the trial court terminated the jury poll as soon
as S.C., the sixth juror polled, noted her disagreement
with the verdict. Particularly when the disagreement
occurs early in the polling process, terminating a poll
immediately ‘‘avoids revealing the number and identity
of any dissenting jurors, reducing the poll’s coercive
effect.’’ United States v. Banks, 982 F.3d 1098, 1104
(7th Cir. 2020); see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 791
F.3d 889, 898–99 (8th Cir. 2015); Leake v. United States,
77 A.3d 971, 976–77 (D.C. 2013); cf. United States v.
Williams, supra,819 F.3d 1032 (completion of entire
poll after first juror dissented resulted in ‘‘pressure on
[the first juror] as the publicly known lone dissenter’’);
Crowder v. United States, 383 A.2d 336, 343 and n.14
(D.C. 1978) (‘‘inevitable increase in potential coerciveness’’ occurs when twelfth juror dissents because
numerical division of jury and identity of lone dissenter
are revealed in open court).8 Here, the polling stopped
after six jurors had announced their verdict, and,
although S.C.’s identity as a dissenter was known, the
exact division of the jury was never revealed.9
The defendant also argues that S.C.’s choice to be
in a separate room prior to resuming deliberations is
evidence of a high degree of isolation and that ‘‘the
pressure inside the jury room was more than she could
bear.’’ Because S.C. was never questioned individually
about her decision to separate herself from the other
8
Continuing to poll the jury after one juror states his or her dissent is
not coercive per se. See, e.g., United States v. Carraway, 108 F.3d 745, 751
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 891,
118 S. Ct. 228,
139 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1997).
9
Although the trial court, in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial,
surmised, ‘‘I think it’s clear we’ve got a situation [in which] eleven people
have returned a verdict of guilty’’ and that ‘‘[o]ne person is [having] second
thoughts and wants to continue deliberating,’’ it did not do so in the presence
of the jury. Thus, because S.C. was not aware of the court’s supposition, it
could not have pressured her.
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jurors, it would be speculative to ascribe any motives
to her choice.10 Indeed, S.C.’s choice to take a respite
from the deliberation process could well have been
beneficial after the first poll,11 as such breaks help to
relieve any tensions that may arise when a jury must
renew deliberations following dissent in a poll. A break
followed by a substantial amount of additional deliberation time may, in fact, indicate a lack of coercion. See,
e.g., Leake v. United States, supra, 77 A.3d 979.
The circumstances of the present case, known to the
trial court when it denied the defendant’s motion for a
mistrial, therefore, are not indicative of potential coercion beyond the pressure inherent in the ordinary process of reaching a unanimous jury verdict. Without
other evidence indicating coercion, for example, misconduct or other negative reaction to S.C.’s dissent by
the other jurors, the fact that S.C. expressed disagreement or equivocation regarding the verdict relatively
early in the poll, took a break to relieve tensions, and
then returned to deliberate with her fellow jurors without incident demonstrates that S.C. had not abandoned
her honest conviction in ultimately voting to find the
defendant guilty. See Smith v. United States, supra, 542
A.2d 824.
10
Speaking publicly in open court may be an intimidating experience for
a layperson under even the best of circumstances, let alone during the
difficult task of announcing a verdict in a serious criminal case, and S.C.
acknowledged her reluctance to state the verdict in public when asked by
the court.
11
Even if we assume that S.C.’s decision to isolate herself reflected a
higher potential that she felt coerced by the circumstances, courts have
nevertheless held that trial courts do not abuse their discretion by resuming
jury deliberations after a juror has openly attempted to leave or otherwise
separated herself from the jury. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 419 A.2d
353, 356–57 (D.C. 1980) (there was no abuse of discretion when trial court
individually reminded juror of her obligations after she attempted to leave,
delivered deadlocked jury instruction, and then dismissed jury for day to
resume deliberations next morning after receiving note revealing that juror
who wished to leave was lone holdout).
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Next, we review the trial court’s actions in response
to the situation to determine ‘‘whether these actions
exacerbated, alleviated or were neutral with respect to
coercive potential.’’ Harris v. United States, supra, 622
A.2d 701. The greater the potential for coercion, the
greater the need for the trial court to mitigate that risk.
Coley v. United States, 196 A.3d 414, 421 (D.C. 2018).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions
in Leake v. United States, supra, 77 A.3d 971, and Green
v. United States, 740 A.2d 21 (D.C. 1999), inform our
analysis regarding whether a trial court’s actions, following a jury poll, affected the coercive potential. These
cases are also consistent with this court’s emphasis on
neutrality in Hurley and Tough. See Hurley v. Heart
Physicians, P.C., supra,298 Conn. 394, 397; Tough v.
Ives, supra, 162 Conn. 277–78, 280.
In Leake, after a juror dissented from a jury poll
following two days of deliberations, the trial court
immediately stopped the polling. Leake v. United States,
supra, 77 A.3d 973–74. After conferring with counsel,
who agreed that a deadlocked jury instruction was
unnecessary, the trial court stated: ‘‘I’m going to ask
you to resume your deliberations and let me know when
you’ve reached a verdict or if you have any more questions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 974. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals viewed this language as neutral because it did not direct the jury to
reach a unanimous verdict or impliedly encourage or
pressure a known dissenter to agree with the majority.
Id., 978 and n.5. Similarly, in Green, the court held that
the trial court took an ‘‘essentially neutral course of
action’’; Green v. United States, supra, 740 A.2d 30;
when it instructed the jury: ‘‘[I]n the polling of the jury
. . . it became apparent that you had not actually
reached a unanimous verdict . . . . For this reason,
I’m going to be asking you to return to the jury room
for further consideration of your [verdict] . . . . If you
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are unanimous, your foreperson should send me a note
so indicating and I will poll you again. If you are not
unanimous, I will ask that you resume your deliberations and see if you can reach a unanimous verdict.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 25. Such instructions stand in stark contrast to the individualized pressure applied to the juror in Bell, in which the trial court’s
actions exacerbated the coercive atmosphere through
repeated questioning of the dissenting juror. See State
v. Bell, supra,13 Conn. App. 428 and n.4, 430.
In the present case, the trial court stopped the polling
of the jury immediately after S.C.’s dissent and excused
the jury from the courtroom in order to discuss the
matter with counsel. The defendant contends that this
procedure was an abuse of discretion because the court
gave no instructions to the jury upon this first excusal.
We disagree. The trial court took a neutral course of
action that allowed it, outside the presence of the jury,
to consider all of the relevant circumstances and to
solicit input from counsel as to how to proceed. When
the jury returned to the courtroom, the court canvassed
S.C. The canvass was neutral in tone and content. It was
fashioned to help the court determine the appropriate
procedure to follow and elicited only whether S.C.’s
equivocation was related to the procedure, namely,
speaking out loud in court, or to the verdict itself. The
canvass was well within the court’s discretion. The
question was framed as a binary choice: was S.C.
uncomfortable stating the verdict out loud or was she
having second thoughts? There was no inquiry into her
reasons, motivations, or any other internal processes
that would reveal what took place in the jury room.
See Tough v. Ives, supra,162 Conn. 280. Upon learning
that S.C. was concerned with both the substance of the
verdict and the need to state the verdict aloud, the court
advised the jury to consult the jury instructions in its
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possession and to return to deliberations after the
lunch break.
The defendant contends that this course of action
ignored S.C.’s isolation and that the trial court failed
to consider the totality of the circumstances in exercising its discretion. He further contends that the court
should have given a Chip Smith charge to help the jury
‘‘assess the evidence and the opinions of the other jurors
with an open mind.’’ We are not persuaded. Although
it would have been within the court’s discretion to give
a Chip Smith charge,12 it was not necessary to do so.13
12
The model criminal jury instructions on the Judicial Branch website
provide the following Chip Smith charge: ‘‘The instructions that I shall give
you now are only to provide you with additional information so that you
may return to your deliberations and see whether you can arrive at a verdict.
‘‘Along these lines, I would like to state the following to you. The verdict
to which each of you agrees must express your own conclusion and not
merely the acquiescence in the conclusion of your fellow jurors. Yet, in
order to bring your minds to a unanimous result, you should consider the
question you have to decide not only carefully but also with due regard and
deference to the opinions of each other.
‘‘In conferring together, you ought to pay proper respect to each other’s
opinions and listen with an open mind to each other’s arguments. If the
much greater number of you reach a certain conclusion, dissenting jurors
should consider whether their opinion is a reasonable one when the evidence
does not lend itself to a similar result in the minds of so many of you who
are equally honest and equally intelligent, who have heard the same evidence
with an equal desire to arrive at the truth and under the sanctions of the
same oath.
‘‘But please remember this. Do not ever change your mind just because
other jurors see things differently or to get the case over with. As I told
you before, in the end, your vote must be exactly that—your own vote. As
important as it is for you to reach a unanimous agreement, it is just as
important that you do so honestly and in good conscience.
‘‘What I have said to you is not intended to rush you into agreeing on a
verdict. Take as much time as you need to discuss the matter. There is no
need to hurry.’’ Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 2.10-4, available at
https://www.jud.ct.gov//JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf (last visited July 15, 2025).
13
Because antideadlock instructions may create additional coercion in a
postpoll environment, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has adopted
a middle ground instruction, known as a Crowder charge, that may be given
when a jury poll reveals a lack of unanimity. Callaham v. United States,
268 A.3d 833, 844 (D.C. 2022). The Crowder charge provides: ‘‘It is your
duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view
to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual
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On the basis of the circumstances before it, and after
soliciting input from counsel, the trial court opted for
a minimal and neutral course of action in order to allow
the deliberation process to continue. Because the trial
court was ‘‘in the best position to observe the demeanor
of the jurors’’; State v. Tirado, 194 Conn. 89, 95–96,
478
A.2d 606 (1984); we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s
motion for a mistrial.
II
The defendant raises a second, unpreserved claim,
pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,
567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,
317
Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015),14 and the plain
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so only
after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. In
the course of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own
views and change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not
surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence
solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose
of returning a verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crowder v.
United States, supra, 383 A.2d 342 n.11. The Crowder charge is intended to
‘‘allay’’ the fear that a ‘‘lone recalcitrant juror will conclude that the trial
judge is requiring further deliberations in order to eliminate his dissent.’’
Id. It differs from the Chip Smith charge insofar as it does not specifically
ask the dissenting juror to consider why the majority of the jurors have a
different view of the case. The Crowder charge is not intended for routine
use but, rather, for use only in cases in which ‘‘there is a particularly high
likelihood of juror coercion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Green v.
United States, supra, 740 A.2d 29. The Crowder charge is very similar to
the deliberation process charge the trial court initially gave the jury and
later reminded the jury of when it instructed it to resume deliberations after
the first poll failed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
14
Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional
error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim
is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of the fundamental right;
(3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the
state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional
violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of any one of these
conditions, the defendant’s claim will fail.’’ (Emphasis in original, footnote
omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see In re Yasiel
R.,
supra,317 Conn. 781 (modifying third prong of Golding).
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error doctrine. He claims that the final verdict violated
15
the constitutional requirement that a jury’s verdict be
both unanimous and free from coercion because there
was an unacceptable risk that S.C. had been coerced
into assenting to a guilty verdict. The defendant relies
on United States v. Pleva, 66 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1933),
and argues that undue pressure forced S.C. to ‘‘abandon
her conscientiously held belief’’ and to acquiesce in the
guilty verdict. He further argues that this pressure was
the result of the trial court’s failure to address S.C.’s
isolation directly and to provide adequate guidance in
the form of a Chip Smith charge when sending the jury
back to deliberate a second time. We agree with the
state’s argument that this claim fails under the third
prong of Golding because the alleged constitutional
violation did not occur or deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.
We understand the defendant’s claim to have two
separate predicates. The first is premised on the claim
that the trial court’s instructions to the jury upon
resumption of deliberations were not adequate to
address juror coercion because they did not include a
Chip Smith charge. The second is that S.C.’s personal
circumstances had, in fact, resulted in her being coerced
into assenting to a guilty verdict. We address each in
turn.
Our resolution of the defendant’s instructional claim
is governed by the following legal principles. ‘‘It is well
settled that jury instructions are to be reviewed in their
entirety. . . . When the challenge to a jury instruction
is of constitutional magnitude, the standard of review
15
The plain error doctrine ‘‘is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate
courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved, are
of such monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our system of
justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Blaine, 334 Conn. 298, 305,
221
A.3d 798 (2019); see Practice Book § 60-5.
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is whether it is reasonably possible that the jury [was]
misled. . . . In determining whether it was . . . reasonably possible that the jury was misled by the trial
court’s instructions, the charge to the jury is not to
be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering
possible inaccuracies of statement . . . . Individual
instructions also are not to be judged in artificial isolation . . . . Instead, [t]he test to be applied . . . is
whether the charge . . . as a whole, presents the case
to the jury so that no injustice will result. . . . Whether
a jury [was] coerced by statements of the trial judge is
to be determined by an examination of the record. . . .
The question is whether in the context and under the
circumstances in which the statements were made, the
jury [was], actually, or even probably, misled or coerced.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Mitchell, 170 Conn. App. 317, 323,
154 A.3d 528,
cert. denied 325 Conn. 902,
157 A.3d 1146 (2017).
Since State v. O’Neil, 261 Conn. 49,
801 A.2d 730
(2002), this court has concluded that the Chip Smith
charge is not coercive and is an acceptable method of
facilitating the deliberation process when faced with a
deadlocked jury. Id., 73. Nevertheless, this instruction
is not required every time a jury indicates that it is
unable to reach an agreement, and some authorities
have stated that deadlocked jury instructions are themselves coercive when delivered in response to a jury
poll breakdown. See, e.g., Green v. United States, supra,
740 A.2d 31. We agree with the state that the Appellate
Court’s decision in State v. Mitchell, supra,170 Conn.
App. 317, provides guidance in this context.
In Mitchell, the Appellate Court determined that,
because the trial court’s jury instruction to continue
deliberating did not include language potentially coercing the jurors to reach a unanimous verdict, the cautionary language of the Chip Smith charge was not required.
Id., 325–26. In fact, this court has never held that lan-
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guage to be mandatory but, rather, has stated that ‘‘a
defendant is entitled only to a jury unfettered by an
order to decide and not to an instruction that a jury
may hang.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Smith, 222 Conn. 1, 22,
608 A.2d 63, cert. denied,
506
U.S. 942,
113 S. Ct. 383,
121 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1992).
We conclude, therefore, that, when the trial court
instructed the jurors to continue the deliberation process, it did not preclude the possibility that disagreement might occur. The court merely restated the requirement that any decision they reach must be unanimous,
which is not coercive. The court’s original instructions,
which it directed the jurors to review, included the
following instructions: ‘‘You should take as much time
as you feel is necessary to [deliberate]’’; ‘‘[e]ach of you
has taken an oath to deliver a true verdict according
to the evidence’’; ‘‘[y]our task is to pool [your] experience and wisdom . . . by giving your views and listening to the views of others’’; ‘‘[e]ach of you must
make your own conscientious decision’’; and ‘‘do not
surrender your honest opinion solely because your
opinion is different from the other jurors or for the
mere purpose of returning a verdict.’’
We also disagree with the defendant’s claim that S.C.’s
verdict was the product of coercive circumstances.
There is no evidence that S.C. faced undue pressure of
the kind present in United States v. Pleva, supra,66
F.2d 529. In Pleva, a juror made it known on the record
that he was having a medical issue with his bladder.
Id., 531–32. The court called in a physician to examine
the juror, and he stated, on the record, that the juror
was ‘‘going to be in for a lot of misery’’ due to his
symptoms. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 532.
After the jury delivered a guilty verdict, the juror ‘‘made
known in open court that he agreed [to the verdict] only
because he felt unable physically to maintain longer
the position he thought was right . . . .’’ Id., 533.
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By contrast, the record in the present case indicates
that S.C. was comfortable communicating with the trial
court on multiple occasions, including an email
exchange prior to trial regarding her travel plans. She
also was willing to express her second thoughts about
the verdict during the first jury poll, and she removed
herself from the jury room during the recess following
that poll. Thereafter, the jury deliberated for an additional two hours after being sent back to the jury room,
following approximately four and one-half hours of
deliberation spanning two days. Other courts have found
that similar lengths of additional deliberation are a
strong indication that jurors do not ‘‘feel coerced into
immediately returning a verdict.’’ United States v. Thomas,
supra,791 F.3d 898; see
id. (additional two hours of
deliberation following Allen charge16 indicates lack of
coercion); United States v. McDonald, 825 F. Supp.
2d 472, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (one hour of additional
deliberation following supplemental instruction was
significant amount of time suggesting lack of coercion
because jury had deliberated for less than four hours
in total before returning initial, nonunanimous verdict),
aff’d, 759 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2014). But see United States
v. Banks, supra,982 F.3d 1105 (twenty-nine minutes of
additional deliberation following supplemental instruction that lacked language reminding jurors ‘‘not [to]
surrender their honest beliefs’’ suggested coercion). During the second jury poll, when S.C. had another opportunity to voice concerns, she announced her verdict and
affirmed it. S.C. never indicated that any coercion or
intimidation had taken place, and there is no evidence
in the record to support such an inference.
We conclude that the trial court’s instruction to continue deliberations did not coerce S.C. into reaching a
guilty verdict and that no additional jury instruction
was required. For these reasons, we conclude that the
16
See footnote 5 of this opinion.
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defendant has failed to satisfy the third prong of Golding and cannot prevail on this unpreserved claim.17
III
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court
violated Practice Book § 42-31 when it discontinued the
jury poll following S.C.’s disagreement with the verdict.
We decline to reach this claim because it is not preserved for appellate review.
‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of
practice generally limit [an appellate] court’s review to
issues that are distinctly raised at trial, and [o]nly in
[the] most exceptional circumstances can and will [an
appellate] court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the
trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe
v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 643,
224 A.3d 147 (2020). The defendant’s claim was not
distinctly raised because he did not ask the trial court
to complete the jury poll at that time and did not argue
in his motion for a mistrial that an incomplete poll
violated the rules of practice.
Moreover, this claim is not subject to Golding review.
Although the right to a jury poll under the rules of
practice is ‘‘a corollary to the defendant’s right to a
unanimous verdict,’’ it is ‘‘not of constitutional dimension . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Pare, supra,253 Conn. 623. Because the defendant’s
claim is not of constitutional magnitude, it fails to satisfy
the second prong of Golding. See, e.g., State v. Samuel
17
We also conclude that the defendant is not entitled to relief under the
plain error doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Blaine, 334 Conn. 298, 305,
221 A.3d
798 (2019) (‘‘plain error review is reserved for only the most egregious
errors’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also State v. Stephens, 301
Conn. 791, 797,
22 A.3d 1262 (2011) (concluding that defendant’s claims,
which failed under the third prong of Golding were ‘‘not entitled to the
extraordinary relief available under the plain error doctrine’’).
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U., 348 Conn. 304, 317,
303 A.3d 1175 (2023). Accordingly, we decline to review the defendant’s unpreserved
claim concerning the trial court’s decision not to complete the jury poll after S.C. indicated her dissent from
the verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
