Volume 352 — Connecticut Reports

The plaintiff, which owned two nearby parcels of real property in a rural residential zoning district in the town of Kent, filed an application with the defendant planning and zoning commission, seeking a special permit to construct a greenhouse on one of its parcels. The plaintiff had been operating a residential substance abuse treatment program on one of the parcels since before the enactment of the town's zoning regulations in 1965. In 2017, the plaintiff acquired the other parcel, which was being used as a farm. In 2018, in accordance with the zoning regulations then in effect, the plaintiff applied for and was granted a special permit to conduct certain clinical therapies on the farm parcel, including an agricultural therapy program, in connection with its substance abuse treatment program. The town amended the zoning regulations in 2020 to prohibit the operation of, inter alia, privately operated clinics in rural residential districts, and the plaintiff's use of the farm parcel for the previously approved clinical therapies thus became a preexisting, nonconforming use. After a public hearing on the plaintiff's application for a special permit to construct the greenhouse, which had been filed after the 2020 amendments to the town's zoning regulations, the defendant denied the application on the ground that it would be an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. On appeal to the trial court, that court upheld the defendant's decision and dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal. The Appellate Court thereafter reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding, inter alia, that the installation of the greenhouse on the farm parcel was a permissible intensification of a nonconforming use, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the installation of the green- house was a permissible intensification, rather than an impermissible expan- sion, of the plaintiff's nonconforming use of the farm parcel for agricultural therapy, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's administrative appeal. There was substantial evidence in the record to support the defendant's determination that the proposed greenhouse would expand the plaintiff's seasonal, nonconforming use of the farm parcel for agricultural therapy into a year-round use, as the evidence presented at the public hearing established that the proposed greenhouse would allow the plaintiff to extend the agricul- tural program from those seasons during which fruits and vegetables could be grown outdoors into additional seasons during which the plaintiff would otherwise not be able to grow such produce. Although the use of improved and more efficient instrumentalities can be a permissible intensification of a nonconforming use, an extension of a seasonal, nonconforming use into a year-round use, as in the present case, is impermissible because it would not reflect the nature and purpose of the original use and would change the character, nature and kind of use involved. Contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion that the plaintiff's nonconform- ing use of the farm parcel was year-round because the terms of the 2018 special permit allowed certain other clinical therapies, such as equine ther- apy, a ropes course, and a climbing wall, there was no evidence in the record that those other therapies were conducted on a year-round basis, and, even if some of the plaintiff's nonconforming uses of the farm parcel were year-round, each use must be analyzed independently of the others to determine whether any particular use would constitute a permissible intensification or an impermissible expansion of that use. Argued December 5, 2024—officially released May 27, 2025

The plaintiff, who, along with the defendant, was a cotrustee of the dece- dent's trust, appealed to the Superior Court from the decree of the Probate Court, which had granted the defendant's petition to construe the trust and ordered that the trust estate be distributed in equal shares to the decedent's children, including the plaintiff. In his probate appeal, the plaintiff challenged the Probate Court's decree ''in toto'' and urged the Superior Court to overrule the decree, and, under his reasons for the appeal, raised two claims concern- ing discovery in the Probate Court. The defendant thereafter moved for summary judgment, which the Superior Court granted, reasoning that, because the plaintiff's reasons for the appeal were limited to issues regarding discovery in the Probate Court, and because there was no dispute that the plaintiff did not make any discovery request or that the Probate Court did not issue any orders regarding discovery, there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the substance of the plaintiff's appeal. The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court's judgment, claiming that summary judg- ment is not an available or appropriate remedy in a probate appeal and that, even if it is, the Superior Court improperly failed to engage in a de novo consideration of the issue resolved by the Probate Court concerning the proper distribution of the trust estate. Held: The term ''any action'' in the rule of practice (§ 17-44) allowing any party in a civil matter to move for summary judgment includes probate appeals in the Superior Court, and, accordingly, the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that summary judgment was not available in a probate appeal. The genealogy of Practice Book § 17-44, as well as the nature and purpose of the summary judgment procedure, which is to prevent unnecessary trials when it has been established that there is no dispute regarding the material facts, supported the conclusion that a probate appeal is an ''action'' for purposes of § 17-44. Nevertheless, the Superior Court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in the plaintiff's probate appeal, as that court failed to engage in a de novo consideration of the issue resolved by the Probate Court, namely, how the trust estate was to be distributed pursuant to the terms of the trust, and, instead, focused solely on the plaintiff's claims regarding discovery, which were irrelevant in a trial de novo in the Superior Court, where the court must make its own determination on the merits and the parties are entitled to conduct discovery anew. Argued March 6—officially released May 27, 2025

This court recognized in State v. Colton (234 Conn. 683) that, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Kennedy (456 U.S. 667), and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. Wallach (979 F.2d 912), the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution bars a retrial if the prosecutor had engaged in impropriety with the intent to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed was imminent in the absence of the impropriety. The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal with this court from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the murder charge against him. The defendant previously had been convicted of, among other crimes, murder, but this court reversed his murder conviction and ordered a new trial on the ground that the prosecutor, during the defendant's earlier criminal trial, had improperly commented on the defendant's silence occurring after he had been informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), in violation of Doyle v. Ohio (426 U.S. 610). On appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that double jeopardy protections barred a retrial on the murder charge insofar as the prosecutor, in commenting on the defendant's post-Miranda silence, had intended to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed was imminent in the absence of the Doyle violation. Held: The trial court correctly determined that the defendant failed to establish that the prosecutor, in commenting on the defendant's post-Miranda silence, had intended to prevent an acquittal that the prosecutor believed was likely to occur but for the prosecutor's improper comments, and, accordingly, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendant did not waive his double jeopardy claim by failing to move for a mistrial despite his awareness of the prosecutor's Doyle violation, as defense counsel moved for a new trial after the jury verdict on the ground that that prosecutor had violated the defendant's rights under Doyle, and the fact that the defense moved for a new trial rather than a mistrial did not change the fact that the reason for doing so was because of a claimed constitutional violation by the prosecutor. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to use the defendant's full name or to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. The defendant, in connection with his motion to dismiss, did not present any additional evidence regarding the prosecutor's intent during the defendant's criminal trial, this court previously had concluded that the evidence pre- sented at the defendant's trial was sufficient to sustain his murder conviction, and the transcripts of the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant and closing argument, when assessed objectively, revealed that the prosecu- tor was attempting to secure the defendant's conviction rather than to goad the defense into moving for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor's belief that an acquittal was likely to occur but for the Doyle violation. Moreover, this court declined the state's request to overrule Colton and declined the defendant's request to overrule State v. Michael J. (274 Conn. 321), in which the court concluded that the state constitution did not provide broader double jeopardy protections in this context. Argued January 31—officially released June 3, 2025

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had reversed in part the trial court's rulings on certain of the parties' postdissolution judgment motions, including the plaintiff's motion for modification of child support and alimony based on an allegedly substantial change in the defendant's income. Those rulings led to the issuance of remedial orders concerning the defendant's obligation to pay additional child support and alimony under the parties' separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the dissolution judgment. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that the relevant provisions of the parties' separation agreement unambiguously relieved the defendant of the obligation to pay additional child support and alimony on the amount of his gross income, including his base draw, bonuses, and profit sharing, in excess of $700,000. Held: Contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion, the provisions of the separation agreement relating to the defendant's obligation to pay additional child support and alimony based on bonuses and profit sharing beyond the defen- dant's base salary were ambiguous, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court's judgment was reversed in part and the case was remanded for consideration of extrinsic evidence with respect to the parties' intent concerning those provisions of the separation agreement. Because both parties set forth a plausible construction of the relevant provi- sions of the separation agreement, with both constructions having bases in the language used in the agreement, this court concluded that the agreement was ambiguous, with its meaning presenting a question of fact for the trial court to consider and resolve. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court to resolve the ambigu- ity in the relevant provisions of the separation agreement through a determi- nation of the parties' intent after consideration of all available extrinsic evidence and the circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's evidentiary and legal strategy at trial operated to judicially estop a remand for a factual determination of the parties' intent, as the doctrine of judicial estoppel did not apply insofar as there was no bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's position on appeal was not clearly inconsistent with the position she had taken before the trial court, the trial court did not rely on the plaintiff's position that the relevant provisions of the separation agreement were unambiguous, there was no unfair advantage to the plaintiff, and the defendant did not and will not suffer any prejudice. Argued February 5—officially released June 10, 2025

Convicted of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, criminal posses- sion of a firearm, criminal possession of ammunition, and carrying a pistol without a permit, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction arose from an incident in which he shot and killed a third-party bystander while shooting at another individual who had shot at the defendant first. With respect to the first degree manslaughter charge, the state alleged that the defendant, under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, had recklessly engaged in conduct that created a grave risk of death to the victim and had caused the victim's death while he was using a firearm. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court, which had instructed the jury on the defense of self-defense with respect to the charge of murder, of which the defendant was found not guilty, had improperly declined the defendant's request to instruct the jury on that defense with respect to the charge of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The defendant also claimed that his conviction of both criminal possession of a firearm and criminal possession of ammunition violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Held: The trial court's failure to provide the jury with a self-defense instruction for the charge of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm violated the defendant's constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense, and, accordingly, this court reversed the judgment of conviction as to that charge and ordered a new trial on that charge only. Upon reviewing the rationale for justification defenses and the relevant case law from Connecticut and other states, this court concluded that, when the evidence so warrants, a trial court must instruct the jury on self-defense in connection with a reckless manslaughter charge, regardless of whether the victim is a bystander or the alleged aggressor. In the present case, the evidence reasonably supported a self-defense instruc- tion on the charge of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, and the court therefore was required to provide such an instruction to the jury. The state agreed that the trial court had properly instructed the jury on self-defense in connection with the murder charge, and, in light of the evidence that it was another individual who initiated the exchange of gunfire with the defendant, it was for the jury to determine whether the defendant actually and reasonably believed that the nature of the threat and degree of force were necessary to protect himself. The trial court's failure to provide a self-defense instruction for the man- slaughter charge was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the sole issue in the case was whether the defendant's actions were justified. Moreover, although the trial court had instructed the jury on self-defense in connection with the murder charge, the jury found the defendant not guilty of murder and did not consider whether he acted in self-defense in connection with that charge, the trial court did not properly inform the jury how it should consider self-defense as to the manslaughter charge, and this court could not assume that the jury, in determining whether the defendant was guilty of manslaughter, would necessarily have referred to the definition of self-defense that the court provided in connection with the murder charge. The defendant's conviction of both criminal possession of a firearm and criminal possession of ammunition under the same statutory provision ((Rev. to 2017) § 53a-217 (a)) violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, and, accordingly, this court vacated the defendant's conviction of criminal possession of ammunition. Although the text of § 53a-217 (a) was ambiguous with respect to the issue, the statute's legislative history suggested that the legislature did not intend to treat the criminal possession of a firearm and criminal possession of ammunition as two separate crimes when both the firearm and the ammuni- tion in the firearm are used during a single incident. Furthermore, because the legislature expressed no clear intention to fix separate penalties for criminal possession of a firearm and criminal posses- sion of ammunition, this court applied the rule of lenity to avoid turning a single transaction into multiple offenses and, thus, concluded that the defendant could be convicted of only one crime under § 53a-217 when he possessed the firearm and ammunition in one place and at one time. (One justice concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued October 28, 2024—officially released June 10, 2025

The plaintiff in error filed a writ of error, challenging his summary conviction of three counts of criminal contempt for certain conduct in which he had engaged during the trial on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, specifi- cally, repeatedly interrupting and directing racial slurs and other profanities at the court. He claimed that the trial court had deprived him of his right to due process by failing to postpone the proceeding at which he was convicted of and sentenced for summary criminal contempt and by failing to order that the contempt proceeding be held before a different judge. Held: The plaintiff in error could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had violated his right to due process by failing to defer the contempt proceeding pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 1-17) setting forth various grounds for deferring a summary criminal contempt proceeding and by failing to order that the proceeding be held before a different judge. The trial court's summary contempt proceeding substantially complied with the requirements of the rule of practice (§ 1-16) governing the procedure that a trial court must follow before holding an individual in summary criminal contempt, the record having established that the plaintiff in error had been warned about his behavior prior to the court's findings of contempt and that, prior to sentencing, the court had appointed counsel to represent the plaintiff in error, provided counsel with an opportunity to speak privately with him, and allowed both counsel and the plaintiff in error to be heard regarding the matter. The trial court was not required to defer the summary contempt proceeding pursuant to Practice Book § 1-17, as the behavior of the plaintiff in error obstructed the orderly administration of justice, the court, with only minimal delay, imposed summary criminal contempt upon the plaintiff in error's commission of contumacious acts, and the plaintiff in error failed to present significant evidence demonstrating that the trial judge had become person- ally embroiled with the plaintiff in error. Moreover, despite the plaintiff in error's repeated personal attacks on the trial court, the court did not become so personally embroiled in an ongoing controversy with the plaintiff in error that recusal was necessary to safeguard the plaintiff in error's due process rights. Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiff in error's claim that the trial court should have deferred the contempt proceeding because of his alleged medical issues and incompetency, which both the plaintiff in error and his counsel had conveyed to the trial court, as that court rejected the plaintiff in error's incompetency claim on the basis of its own observations of his behavior during the proceedings, and as counsel had failed to ask the trial court for a competency evaluation. Argued March 5—officially released June 17, 2025

Convicted of the crime of felony murder and attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, among other crimes, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which another individual, C, shot the murder victim, D, while D and the defendant were engaged in a scuffle that occurred after the defendant had attempted to rob R. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the state, in order to secure the defendant's conviction of felony murder, was required to demonstrate that C had been an accessory to the defendant's predicate crime of attempted robbery. Held: The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the felony murder statute (§ 53a-54c) required the state to establish that C was an accessory to the defendant's attempted robbery of R, as felony murder is substantively dis- tinct from other forms of vicarious criminal liability, such as accessorial liability, and the plain language of § 53a-54c does not require the state to establish accessorial liability. The state presented sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant's conviction of felony murder, as the jury reasonably could have found, based on the evidence presented, that C had actively participated in the defendant's attempt to rob R and that C had shot and killed D in the course of and in furtherance of the predicate crime of attempt to commit robbery. This court having concluded that the state was not required to establish that C was an accessory to the defendant's attempted robbery of R as a prerequisite to the defendant's conviction of felony murder, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had improperly failed to instruct the jury that the state had the burden of establishing that C was an accessory. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court had violated his right of confrontation by admitting certain video- recorded interviews of R that had been conducted by the police, as defense counsel affirmatively waived this claim by stating to the trial court that he did not object to the admission of the video-recorded interviews and by expressly agreeing that those interviews were admissible under State v. Whelan (200 Conn. 743). This court declined the defendant's request to overrule or modify its holding in State v. Newsome (238 Conn. 588) that a reliable out-of-court statement 352 Conn. 183 JUNE, 2025 3 State v. Hinton may serve as the sole evidentiary basis for a conviction but that evidentiary sufficiency under such circumstances must be determined on a case-by- case basis. Having declined to overrule of modify Newsome, this court applied the holding of that case in rejecting the defendant's claim that the video-recorded interviews of R, in the absence of other corroborative evidence, were insuffi- cient to establish the defendant's intent to commit attempted robbery. This court concluded that R's statements to the police during the video- recorded interviews were reliable for purposes of Newsome, and, in any event, those statements did not constitute the only evidence on which the jury could have relied in finding that the defendant had the specific intent to commit attempted robbery. Argued March 10—officially released June 24, 2025

Convicted of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. At trial, the defendant admitted that he had stabbed the victim during a fight inside the victim's apartment but claimed that he had acted in self-defense. On appeal, the defendant con- tended that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to disprove his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Held: The state presented sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of disproving the defendant's claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, as the jury reasonably could have found, on the basis of the evidence presented, that the defendant either did not actually believe that the victim was using or was about to use deadly physical force against him or that, even if the defendant held that belief, his belief was not objectively reasonable. The state introduced evidence that contradicted the defense's theory that the defendant had entered the victim's apartment unarmed and at the victim's invitation and that the defendant had inadvertently stabbed the victim only after the victim kicked and attacked the defendant with a knife, and the jury reasonably could have found instead that the defendant had unlawfully entered the victim's apartment in possession of a knife and that he was the only person in possession of a knife during the ensuing tussle. Argued April 16—officially released July 1, 2025

Convicted of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The trial court had precluded the state from using, in its case-in-chief, a statement given by the defendant to the police on the ground that, although the defendant had given the statement voluntarily, it had been obtained in violation of his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) and Edwards v. Arizona (451 U.S. 477). The court nevertheless permitted the state to use the statement to impeach the defendant's trial testimony in accordance with State v. Reid (193 Conn. 646), in which this court, relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. New York (401 U.S. 222), held that the Connecticut constitution permits the state to impeach a criminal defendant's trial testi- mony with a voluntary statement that was obtained in violation of Miranda. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that this court should overrule Reid and conclude that article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution precluded the state from using his statement to impeach his trial testi- mony. Held: Guided by the relevant factors set forth in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 672) for construing the Connecticut constitution, as well as stare decisis considerations, this court declined the defendant's request to overrule Reid and concluded that the state's use of the defendant's statement for impeach- ment purposes did not violate the state constitution. The defendant did not provide inescapable reasons that would compel this court to overrule Reid, insofar as the overwhelming weight of authority from other states aligned with Connecticut's existing view of the Harris impeachment exception, the defendant failed to establish that the rights of criminal defendants are not adequately protected by the policy articulated in Harris and Reid, which balances the valuable aid that the impeachment process affords the jury in assessing a defendant's credibility with the deter- rent effect on proscribed police conduct that results when a defendant's statement to the police is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case- in-chief, and extending the rule of Harris and Reid to impeachment evidence would impair the truth seeking process of a criminal trial. The trial court did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by admitting certain photographs that the police had taken of the defendant at the time they interrogated him, as the photographs had an independent source in the standard police procedure of photographing arrestees and were obtained for reasons unrelated to unlawful police conduct, and, accord- ingly, the photographs were not fruits of the unlawfully obtained statement by the defendant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to present the testimony of a witness who had been disclosed only three days prior to the start of evidence, as the record established that the prosecutor did not believe that he needed the witness' testimony when his initial witness list was prepared, the defendant did not demonstrate any prejudice from the delayed disclosure, and the relevant rule of practice (§ 40-13 (c)) embraces a presumption against precluding a witness' testimony as a sanction for delayed disclosure when the party calling the witness did not in good faith intend to call the witness at the time the party provided its initial witness list. (One justice concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued November 6, 2024—officially released July 1, 2025

Convicted of murder and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence two recorded police interviews of C, the state's key witness, as prior inconsistent statements under State v. Whelan (200 Conn. 743) and the corresponding provision (§ 8-5 (1)) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence on the ground that C's trial testimony was not inconsistent with the statements he had made during those interviews. Held: The trial court abused its discretion in admitting C's two recorded police interviews under Whelan and § 8-5 (1) of the Code of Evidence because, although C was an uncooperative witness, the state failed to sufficiently demonstrate that C refused to testify or that his trial testimony was otherwise inconsistent with the statements he had made during the interviews. Although a witness' denial of recollection can constitute an inconsistency, the record must be clear regarding what the witness does not recall in order for a court to adequately determine whether an inconsistency between trial testimony and a prior statement exists, and, in the present case, C testified ambiguously about his lack of recollection, and the prosecutor failed to probe C as to what he did and did not recall and did not attempt to refresh C's recollection to lay a proper foundation to demonstrate that C's testimony was inconsistent with his statements to the police. Moreover, even if a refusal to testify about a particular subject could consti- tute an inconsistency with a prior statement in some circumstances, the prosecutor failed to lay a proper foundation to demonstrate that C refused to testify, and the prosecutor should have taken additional steps to encourage or prompt C to respond to her questions or have enlisted the trial court's assistance in doing so. The trial court's error in admitting the two interviews was not harmless, because, other than C in the improperly admitted interviews, no one else identified the defendant as the shooter or as the person in the video surveil- This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Mullins and Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Ecker, Dannehy and Bright. Although Justice McDonald was not present at oral argument, he has read the briefs and appendices and listened to a recording of oral argument prior to participating in this decision. lance footage of the crime scene, and there was no other physical evidence that otherwise connected the defendant to the murder. This court clarified that a witness' prior inconsistent statement admitted under Whelan and § 8-5 of the Code of Evidence can include not only a statement that is expressly made by the witness but also a statement that is adopted by the witness if such adoption is unequivocal, positive, and definite in nature, so as to meet the definition of ''[s]tatement'' set forth in § 8-1 (1) of the Code of Evidence, which defines that term for purposes of the rule against hearsay and its exceptions. The trial court improperly delegated to the jury the responsibility of determining which statements of C's father, made during C's second inter- view with the police, were adopted by C and would therefore have been potentially admissible under Whelan as adopted prior inconsistent state- ments, rather than deciding the issue of admissibility on its own and exclud- ing from the jury's consideration any statements that it determined were inadmissible. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to introduce into evidence certain photographs and a video from the defen- dant's social media accounts, as the challenged evidence, viewed in context with other evidence in the record, was clearly probative of the defendant's identify as the individual who shot the victim, and there was no merit to the defendant's claim that the challenged evidence was too tenuous for purposes of § 4-3 of the Code of Evidence. Argued March 6—officially released July 1, 2025

Convicted, after a trial to a three judge panel, of murder and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, the defendant appealed to this court. The trial court had suppressed certain statements the defendant made to the police during a station house interrogation, including the defendant's confes- sion that he had killed the victim, on the ground that those statements were not voluntarily made. The trial court, however, declined to suppress certain other statements the defendant had made after the station house interroga- tion ended and while he was in the hospital, including another confession that he had killed the victim, on the ground that those statements were spontaneous and freely made. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that he was deprived of his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and against self-incrimination because, although the trial court had properly suppressed his station house statements, the prosecutor improperly relied on those statements in securing his murder conviction. The defendant also claimed that the admission into evidence of his hospital statements violated his constitutional right to due process because those statements were a product of the station house interrogation and confession. Held: The defendant's unpreserved claim that the prosecutor and the trial court had improperly relied on his station house statements in securing his murder conviction and in finding the defendant guilty, respectively, failed under the first prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as the record was inadequate for this court's review of that claim. The defendant's claim was premised on the argument that, to develop their own opinions, three experts who testified at trial, two for the state and one for the defendant, relied in part on an investigative report prepared by the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) that referred to the suppressed station house confession, but the defendant failed to demonstrate that the state's experts knew of or had reviewed the OCME report in reaching the conclusions about which they respectively testified, and the defendant also failed to demonstrate, with respect to all three experts, that the references to the station house confession contained in the OCME report affected or influenced their respective findings and testimony. Even if the trial court improperly admitted into evidence the statements that the defendant had made while he was in the hospital, any error was harmless, as those statements did not materially impact the court or the result of the trial because the court did not rely on them in reaching its conclusions, and, thus, the court would have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in the absence of those statements. (Three justices concurring in one opinion) Argued March 10—officially released July 8, 2025

Convicted of murder, attempt to commit murder, burglary in the first degree, and arson in the first degree in connection with the stabbing death of the victim and assault of the victim's son, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed that the trial court had improperly denied his request to charge the jury on manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser included offense of murder and had improperly admitted a report concerning the victim's autopsy that was prepared by a medical examiner who did not testify at the defendant's trial. Held: The trial court correctly determined that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree, the defendant having failed to demonstrate that he satisfied either the third or the fourth prong of the test set forth in State v. Whistnant (179 Conn. 576) for determining whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction. The defendant did not present sufficient evidence at trial to justify a convic- tion of manslaughter in the first degree, and the evidence presented with respect to the element that differentiates manslaughter from murder, namely, whether the defendant acted recklessly with extreme indifference to human life or whether he acted intentionally, was not sufficiently in dispute to permit the jury to find the defendant not guilty of murder but guilty of first degree manslaughter. Specifically, the state presented overwhelming evidence that the defendant had intended to kill the victim, and there was no evidence that would have supported a conclusion that the defendant had acted recklessly in causing the victim's death. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court had improperly admitted into evidence an autopsy report that was prepared by a medical examiner who performed the autopsy but who did not testify at the defendant's trial, in violation of the defendant's constitu- tional right to confrontation. Because defense counsel made a strategic decision at trial not to object to the admission of the autopsy report, autopsy photographs, and the testimony of another medical examiner who observed the autopsy and testified about the autopsy on the basis of her own opinions, defense counsel waived the defendant's confrontation clause claim, and the defendant's claim on appeal therefore failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as modified by In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773). Argued April 17—officially released July 15, 2025

Convicted of murder, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal posses- sion of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed that the trial court had deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense by declining to instruct the jury on the adequacy of the police investigation into the victim's murder. He also claimed that the trial court had violated his right to due process under the state constitution by admitting into evidence an out-of-court identification of him by B, an eyewitness to the shooting, and his constitutional right to confrontation by admitting certain testimony of a medical examiner, N, who did not personally perform the victim's autopsy. Held: There was no merit to the defendant's claim that he was deprived of his right to present a defense when the trial court declined to instruct the jury that it could consider inadequacies in the investigation of the victim's murder by the police. To the extent that the defendant's investigative inadequacy claim was prem- ised on the contention that the investigation by the officers responding to the crime scene resulted in certain lapses, this court declined to review that portion of the defendant's claim because defense counsel did not raise it in the trial court. Moreover, as to the portion of the defendant's investigative inadequacy claim regarding the failure of the police to investigate another individual as an alternative suspect and to perform a victimology, there was no evidence in the record to support these contentions. The trial court did not violate the defendant's state constitutional right to due process by denying the defendant's motion to preclude B's out-of-court identification of the defendant. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the identification procedure employed by the police was suggestive and that the resulting identification was unreliable on the ground that, one week before a police officer adminis- tered the photographic array, another police officer had allegedly pressured B to identify someone or face possible prosecution for the victim's murder, as B provided uncontroverted testimony at trial that the officer administering the photographic array reassured her that it was fine if she did not identify anyone from the array and that she did not select the defendant's photograph due to coercion or the potential threat of prosecution. Furthermore, the failure of the police officer administering the identification procedure to instruct B, in accordance with the statute (§ 54-1p) mandating certain procedures for lineups and photographic arrays, that the investiga- tion would continue regardless of whether B identified someone did not render the identification procedure suggestive, as the other required instruc- tions, including warnings that the perpetrator was not necessarily among those pictured in the array and that B should not feel obligated to identify someone, were provided, there was no evidence that B actually believed that the investigation would not continue if she failed to identify a suspect, and the array otherwise constituted a properly conducted, double-blind sequential identification procedure. The trial court did not violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation by allowing N to testify regarding the victim's injuries and cause of death, even though N did not personally perform the victim's autopsy. To the extent that the defendant's claim was based on his contention that a certain autopsy photograph admitted into evidence communicated the apparent conclusions of W, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy and that N's testimony interpreting that photograph violated his right to confront W, the confrontation clause bars only the introduction of hearsay, and this court concluded that the autopsy photograph itself was not hearsay and that N's testimony about the victim's wounds as depicted in the photograph was based solely on her review and interpretation of the photograph rather than on the findings and conclusions W included in the autopsy report. Moreover, even if some of N's other testimony regarding the autopsy and the victim's injuries constituted improperly admitted testimonial hearsay, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the improperly admitted evidence could not have affected the verdict because there was no dispute regarding the cause of the victim's death and the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Argued April 16—officially released July 15, 2025

Convicted of murder and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. After the jury foreperson announced that the jury had reached a verdict and the jurors collectively confirmed their guilty verdict, defense counsel asked that the jurors be polled individually. The first five jurors of the twelve person jury confirmed the verdict, but the sixth juror, S.C., expressed equivocation and disagreement with the guilty verdict. At that point, the court stopped polling the jurors and excused the jurors in order to consult with counsel. The court ultimately directed the jurors to resume delibera- tions, and, subsequently, the jurors returned a unanimous guilty verdict. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial following the court's decision to stop polling the jurors and to direct them to resume deliberations after polling S.C. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial, as the record revealed that there was no impermissible coer- cion of S.C. The circumstances of this case were not indicative of potential coercion beyond the pressure inherent in the ordinary process of reaching a unani- mous jury verdict, and, without other evidence indicating coercion, such as misconduct or other negative reaction by the other jurors to S.C.'s dissent, the fact that S.C. expressed equivocation or disagreement with the verdict relatively early in the poll, took a break to relieve tensions, and then returned to deliberate with her fellow jurors without incident demonstrated that S.C. had not abandoned her honest conviction in ultimately voting to find the defendant guilty. Moreover, on the basis of the circumstances before it, and after soliciting input from counsel, the trial court opted for a minimal and neutral course of action in order to allow the deliberation process to continue, and, although it would have been within the court's discretion to give a Chip Smith charge, encouraging jurors to reach a unanimous verdict, it was not necessary to do so. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the final verdict violated the constitutional requirement that a jury verdict be both unanimous and free from coercion on the ground that there was an unaccept- able risk that S.C. had been coerced into assenting to a guilty verdict, as the alleged constitutional violation did not occur or deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and, therefore, the defendant's claim failed under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as modified by In re Yasiel R. (317 Conn. 773). There was no evidence in the record indicating that S.C.'s decision with respect to the jury's verdict was the product of coercion, the trial court's decision to direct the jurors to resume the deliberation process after S.C. had indicated her equivocation or disagreement with the verdict did not coerce S.C. into reaching a guilty verdict, and a Chip Smith charge was not required to address juror coercion. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court had violated the applicable rule of practice (§ 42-31) when it discontinued the jury poll following S.C.'s equivocation or disagreement with the verdict, as that claim was not of constitutional magnitude, and, therefore, it failed under the second prong of Golding. Argued May 14—officially released July 22, 2025

The defendant appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed his conviction of numerous crimes, including first degree robbery, in connection with his role in an armed robbery of a restaurant. The perpetrators of the robbery had fled the restaurant, but the police apprehended the defendant shortly thereafter and detained him in a nearby parking lot. An officer then transported B, a restaurant employee who had witnessed the robbery, to the parking lot, where she identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress B's identification of the defendant, reasoning that the one-on-one showup identification procedure the police used to obtain the identification was not unnecessarily suggestive and that, even if it was, B's identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the Appellate Court, in upholding the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, incorrectly had concluded that the showup procedure the police used to obtain the identification was not unnecessarily suggestive. Held: Even if this court assumed that the challenged showup procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, the trial court correctly concluded that B's identifi- cation of the defendant was reliable under all of the relevant circumstances, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. Upon review of the record and consideration of the totality of the circum- stances, this court concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that B's identification of the defendant was reliable. B had the opportunity to view the defendant and his accomplice while they were in the restaurant, B was attentive, insofar as she was able to provide This case originally was argued before a panel of this court consisting of former Chief Justice Robinson and Justices McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy. Thereafter, former Chief Justice Robinson and Justice Alexander were removed from the panel, and the case was reargued before a panel consisting of Chief Justice Mullins, Justices McDon- ald, D'Auria, Ecker and Dannehy, and Judges Clark and Westbrook. a detailed description of the perpetrators and the robbery, the description that B initially provided of the defendant to the police, before she was brought to identify him, was accurate and matched his general appearance, B demonstrated great certainty when she identified the defendant and did so without any hesitation, and only a short amount of time had elapsed between the commission of the robbery and B's identification of the defendant. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that the reliability of B's identifi- cation was undermined by the application of certain estimator variables, which are factors that stem from conditions over which the criminal justice system has no control and generally arise out of the circumstances under which the eyewitness viewed the perpetrator during the commission of the crime, and which this court identified in State v. Harris (330 Conn. 91) as additional considerations for evaluating the reliability of an identification under the state constitution. There was, at best, conflicting evidence regarding whether B was high from smoking marijuana when she identified the defendant, although there was evidence that B was scared, being scared, in and of itself, does not render an identification unreliable, and the evidence did not support the defendant's contention that B was so focused on a gun handled by the perpetrators during the robbery that her identification was rendered unreliable. Moreover, although the police did not employ a double-blind, sequential identification procedure, the challenged showup procedure occurred within eighty-six minutes of the robbery, and social science has demonstrated that there is no greater likelihood of misidentification when a showup rather than a lineup procedure is employed, so long as the showup identification occurs less than two hours after the witness viewed the perpetrator. (Three justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued November 15, 2023, and January 29, 2025— officially released July 22, 2025

Convicted of murder, home invasion, and burglary in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court had improperly declined to instruct the jury on his third-party culpability defense. Held: The state presented sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of establishing the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as it was reasonable and logical for the jury to infer that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crimes of which he was convicted on the basis of certain video surveillance footage and forensic evidence presented at trial, as well as certain contradic- tory statements that he had made during his interviews with the police. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, it was of no consequence that the jury could have construed the evidence consistently with a casual visit to the victim's home, as he had claimed during one of his interviews with the police, because the jury was not barred from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and was not required to draw only those inferences consistent with innocence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on the defendant's third-party culpability defense, which was premised on his argument that a certain DNA profile found on a bloody hammer found near the victim's body directly connected an unknown male to the crimes. Although a bloody hammer found near the victim's body was the likely the murder weapon and therefore had a close and proximate relationship to the murder, the video surveillance footage, the results of the police investiga- tion, and the quotidian nature of the hammer led this court to conclude that the totality of the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to permit a reasonable juror to infer that a third party was responsible for the vic- tim's murder. There was no merit to the defendant's claim that certain of the prosecutor's remarks made during closing and rebuttal arguments were improper and deprived him of a fair trial. With respect to the prosecutor's comments regarding DNA evidence found on the defendant's jeans and ''in'' the victim's fingernails, and a comment regarding the victim's fight or struggle with the defendant, the prosecutor did not mischaracterize the facts in evidence or encourage the jury to make unreasonable factual inferences, as those comments were rooted in the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom. With respect to the prosecutor's comment during rebuttal argument charac- terizing defense counsel's theory of the case as ''deceptive,'' the prosecutor did not disparage defense counsel personally or his institutional role in the proceedings but, rather, criticized defense counsel's theory of the case on the ground that it was ''deficient,'' ''dismissive,'' and ''deceptive'' because it did not account for the evidence of the defendant's guilt, particularly the video surveillance footage and DNA evidence, and the prosecutor's comment was in direct response to defense counsel's closing argument, in which he described the state's case as ''deficient, dismissive, [and] deceptive'' in the first instance. Argued May 12—officially released July 22, 2025

Convicted of murder, robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed that the trial court had improperly admitted testimony from two witnesses, S and J, about certain statements that R, the defendant's accomplice, had made to them under the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule set forth in the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 8-6 (4)). Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of S and J about R's statements, which inculpated both R and the defendant, under § 8-6 (4) of the Code of Evidence, as R's statements to S and J were against R's penal interest and were sufficiently trustworthy. The defendant conceded that the challenged statements were against R's penal interest, and those statements were trustworthy insofar as R made them voluntarily, in close temporal proximity to the crimes, and to people with whom R had a trusting relationship, namely, a romantic partner, S, and a close family member, J. Moreover, R's statements were corroborated by the evidence presented at trial, and, although there were some discrepancies between R's statements to J and the evidence presented at trial, this court concluded that those inconsistencies, on balance, did not undermine the trustworthiness of the statements to J. Furthermore, although defendant claimed that R's statements were not trust- worthy because R had engaged in blame shifting by attempting to minimize his participation in the homicide, R's statements to S and J nevertheless exposed him to the risk of criminal liability for the same type of crimes with which the defendant was charged, and, therefore, fully and equally implicated both R and the defendant. Argued May 15—officially released July 22, 2025

The defendants, three members and managers of C Co., a Delaware limited liability company, appealed from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, a former member and manager of C Co., on his breach of contract claim. The plaintiff had alleged that the defendants breached their contractual duties under a duty of care provision in C Co.'s operating agreement by, inter alia, removing the plaintiff as a member of C Co. and by maintaining an allegedly unnecessary $3 million capital reserve fund. The first sentence of the duty of care provision required managers to exercise their best judgment in carrying out C Co.'s operations and in performing their other duties under the agreement, whereas the second sentence provided that a manager would not incur any liability in performing his duties, unless any act or omission on the part of the manager was the result of gross negligence or wilful misconduct, or unless the man- ager did not act in good faith. On appeal, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had incorrectly interpreted the second sentence of the duty of care provision as imposing affirmative duties on the defendants, instead of as an exculpatory provision, and had improperly instructed the jury in accordance with that flawed interpretation. Held: The trial court incorrectly construed the second sentence of the duty of care provision as imposing affirmative contractual duties on the defendants, and, because this court could not say that the court's instructions fairly presented the plaintiff's breach of contract claim to the jury in such a way that injustice was not done to the defendants, this court reversed the trial court's judgment, remanded the case for a new trial, and vacated the court's posttrial awards of attorney's fees, costs, and interest. The second sentence of the duty of care provision was a quintessential exculpatory provision under Delaware law that did not create obligations or duties but, rather, served as a limitation on liability, as it was clearly aimed at eliminating the availability of damages as a remedy for a manager's breach of duty, unless the breach was the result of the manager's gross negligence, wilful misconduct, or failure to act in good faith. The trial court improperly instructed the jury on the defendants' duties under the operating agreement when it stated that the exculpatory provision prohibited the managers of C Co. from taking actions that are in bad faith or that constitute gross negligence or wilful misconduct, and that the plaintiff's allegations were based on the defendants having had either a bad faith 352 Conn. 597 JULY, 2025 3 Clinton v. Aspinwall purpose or no good faith basis for their actions, as the references to the defendants' allegedly bad faith purposes and the prohibition on actions constituting gross negligence or wilful misconduct came directly from lan- guage in the exculpatory provision, which did not give rise to any contractual duties on the part of the defendants. Moreover, the trial court compounded its error by repeatedly instructing the jury that the defendants asserted as special defenses that they had complied with the terms of the operating agreement in general, and with the exculpatory provision in particular, and that they had acted in good faith and without gross negligence or wilful misconduct, as those instructions improperly suggested that such actions were elements of the plaintiff's breach of contract claim and required the defendants to disprove those so- called elements. The trial court's instructional error was further exacerbated by its additional instruction on the jury's role in interpreting the provisions of the operating agreement, because, instead of conducting its own pretrial analysis of the relevant provisions to determine whether they were ambiguous and whether extrinsic evidence should be considered in their interpretation, the court improperly delegated those functions to the jury. The trial court's instructional errors were harmful insofar as they allowed the jury to find the defendants liable for acting in bad faith or with gross negligence or wilful misconduct, even though the defendants did not owe those duties to the plaintiff, imposed on the defendants the burden of disprov- ing what the court had misdescribed as elements of the plaintiff's breach of contract claim, and allowed the jury to decide whether the relevant provisions of the operating agreement were ambiguous and whether to consider extrinsic evidence, which likely influenced the jury in reaching a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, a certified public accountant, about the propri- ety of the $3 million capital reserve fund. The expert's areas of special skill or knowledge were directly related to the matters at issue, the testimony regarding the capital reserve fund was a subject that was not within the common knowledge of the average person, the expert appropriately relied on the operating agreement to ascertain the purpose of the capital reserve fund, and, notwithstanding the defendants' claim to the contrary, this court was unaware of any authority that required the expert to base his opinion on a particular formula or standard of care in order for his testimony to be admissible under the provision of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 7-2) governing the admissibility of expert testimony. (One justice concurring separately) Argued February 5—officially released July 29, 2025 4 JULY, 2025 352 Conn. 597 Clinton v. Aspinwall

Pursuant to statute (§ 9-329a (b) (3)), when a candidate who claims to be aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with a primary election files a complaint in the Superior Court, the court must hold a hearing, and, ''if [the court] finds any error in the ruling of the election official,'' it may ''order a new primary if [it] finds that but for the error . . . the result of [the] primary might have been different and [it] is unable to determine the result of such primary.'' The intervening defendants, a slate of candidates seeking to appear on the ballot for a primary election for the Democratic Town Committee for the seventh voting district of the city of Hartford, appealed from the decision of the trial court, which denied their motion for a new primary election on the ground that the court lacked authority to order a new primary. Previously, certain Hartford election officials had certified the intervening defendants' slate for the primary, as well as a competing slate consisting of the plaintiffs. A prior court determined that the intervening defendants were not qualified for the primary and canceled the primary. Thereafter, this court upheld the prior court's determination that the intervening defendants were not qualified for the primary and also concluded that the plaintiffs were not qualified. On appeal from the denial of the motion for a new primary election in the present case, the intervening defendants claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had incorrectly determined that it lacked authority to order a new primary election under § 9-329a (b) (3). Held: The trial court correctly concluded that it lacked authority under § 9-329a (b) (3) to order a new primary election under the circumstances of this case. The remedy afforded by § 9-329a (b) (3) for an error in an election official's ruling, namely, a new primary, contemplates a contested primary election that has been held or will be held, but, when the intervening defendants moved for a new primary in this case, the scheduled primary had been canceled, and neither slate was deemed to have qualified for the primary, thereby leaving no remaining qualified candidates. Insofar as there were no qualified candidates remaining for the requested primary, the statute (§ 9-421) governing when primaries are not to be held for town committee members dictated that no primary would be held under these circumstances, and any vacancies were to be filled in accordance with the local party rules. 0 Conn. 639 ,0 3 Airey v. Feliciano Consequently, the intervening defendants were unable to establish that, but for erroneous decision of Hartford election officials to certify both slates of candidates, the result of the canceled primary might have been different. There was no merit to the intervening defendants' claim that the trial court's failure to order a new primary violated the fundamental rights of the Demo- cratic voters in the seventh voting district of Hartford, as the candidates, having failed to qualify for the primary, bore responsibility for the lack of a primary rather than the court. This court declined the intervening defendants' invitation to overrule or narrow the imputed knowledge doctrine, which affords standing to candi- dates aggrieved by rulings of election officials. The trial court properly applied the law when it concluded that both slates of candidates had standing pursuant to the imputed knowledge doctrine, and neither cogent reasons nor inescapable logic compelled this court to overrule its precedent on the doctrine or to abandon the doctrine altogether. Argued June 16—officially July 29, 2025

Convicted of murder and various firearm offenses in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. During an interview with the police, the defendant confessed to shooting the victim and discussed in detail his prior struggle with homelessness and certain issues that he had with his stepmother and the victim, who was his next- door neighbor. The defendant expressed his belief that his stepmother had been scheming to prevent him from holding a job, finding housing, and maintaining relationships, and that she and the victim had been conspiring against him. At trial, the defendant asserted the defense of extreme emotional disturbance with respect to the murder charge, which the jury rejected. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that multiple instances of impropriety during the prosecutors' closing and rebuttal arguments deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial. Held: The prosecutors committed impropriety during closing and rebuttal argu- ments by repeatedly misstating the law on the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense, and, because that impropriety deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial, this court reversed the defendant's murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge. With respect to the prosecutors' comments during closing and rebuttal arguments that the defendant's state of mind ''[did not] matter'' with respect to whether he actually believed the circumstances regarding his stepmother, the extreme emotional disturbance defense embraces a standard that is subjective as to the defendant's belief and that requires a jury, in determining the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse for the disturbance, to consider the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Consequently, the defendant's subjective state of mind was an important component to his extreme emotional disturbance defense, and any argument by the prosecutors to the contrary was a clear misstatement of the law. With respect to one of the prosecutor's comments during rebuttal argument that the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense was unreason- able and inapplicable because the defendant's stepmother, and not the vic- tim, was the source of the defendant's purported disturbance, and that the jury should consider whether targeting the victim, as opposed to his stepmother, was a reasonable reaction to the disturbance the defendant had allegedly experienced, those comments incorrectly suggested that there must be a logical nexus between the disturbance and the murder victim, and that the jury must consider whether it was reasonable for the defendant to have killed the specific victim as a result of the disturbance, when, instead, the extreme emotional disturbance defense asks whether there was a reason- able explanation or excuse for the disturbance itself rather than the criminal act or the choice of victim. The use of hypotheticals by one of the prosecutors during rebuttal argument in claiming that the defendant's situation, as he believed it to be, was not a reasonable excuse or explanation for his actions was improper. The introduction of the hypotheticals incorrectly framed the reasonableness inquiry of the extreme emotion disturbance defense, the hypotheticals misled the jury as to the analysis it was required to undertake, each hypothetical provided limited factual information, which tended to cause the jury to consider the hypothetical in a vacuum rather than in the appropriate context, and the fact that the misleading use of hypotheticals occurred during rebuttal argument was significant because the defense never had an opportunity to correct the misconceptions the prosecutor created. There was a reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict on the murder charge would have been different in the absence of the impropriety. The defense did not invite the impropriety, the impropriety was central to a critical issue in the case, namely, the defendant's state of mind, and the prosecutors' misstatements of the law regarding the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense was inexcusable such that defense counsel's failure to object more strenuously during the trial did not significantly undermine the defendant's due process claim. Moreover, although the improper comments did not occur throughout the trial but only during closing and rebuttal arguments, most of the improper comments occurred during rebuttal argument, which was particularly trou- bling insofar as defense counsel had no opportunity to respond, and whatever curative instructions the trial court did provide, even when considered with the court's accurate instruction on the extreme emotional disturbance defense, did not eliminate the prejudicial impact of the impropriety in light of the challenging legal concepts involved in an evaluation of such a defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the entirety of the defendant's statement to the police without redacting those portions in which the defendant used homophobic slurs. The entire interview was relevant to the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance defense insofar as it gave the jury context to determine whether he had satisfied the first element of that defense, namely, whether he had committed the murder under the influence of an extreme emotional dis- turbance. Furthermore, although the use of slurs is inherently prejudicial and can incite strong feelings in jurors, the admission of the slurs was not more prejudicial than probative because the defendant's choice of language and how frequently he used each slur aided the jurors in determining if he was suffering from extreme emotional disturbance or whether the disturbance was contrived, particularly in light of the trial court's instruction that the derogatory language in the defendant's statement was being offered for the limited purpose of demonstrating the defendant's emotional state and that the jurors were not to punish the defendant for using such language. (Two justices concurring in part and dissenting in part in one opinion) Argued April 14—officially released July 29, 2025

The plaintiff, a substance abuse treatment facility, appealed from the judg- ment of the trial court, which had dismissed the plaintiff's administrative appeal from the decision of the named defendant, the Department of Public Health. The department previously had approved the application of the defendant B Co. for a certificate of need, pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 19a-639 (a)), to establish a competing substance abuse facility in the same town in which the plaintiff is located. Prior to the public hearing on B Co.'s application, the plaintiff was granted intervenor status. Thereafter, B Co. and the department entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which B Co.'s application was approved subject to certain conditions. In dismissing the plaintiff's administrative appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to appeal because it was not aggrieved by the department's decision. On the granting of certifi- cation, the plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment of dismissal. Held: The trial court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal, as the plaintiff was not statutorily or classically aggrieved by the department's decision to approve B Co.'s application for a certificate of need. Generally, an allegation that governmental action will result in competition that is detrimental to a complainant's business is insufficient to qualify the complainant as aggrieved for purposes of standing in the administrative context, and there was no indication that the language in § 19a-639 (a) created an exception to this general rule. Specifically, although § 19a-639 requires consideration of a proposed health care facility's impact on other state health care facilities, it does so in the interest of ensuring that the public's general need for health care is met and does not contain language manifesting a legislative intent to protect market competitors from any financial impact that may result from the issuance of a certificate of need, and, accordingly, the plaintiff was no more aggrieved than any other member of the public by the department's approval of B Co.'s application. Moreover, the plaintiff's status as an intervenor in the proceedings before the department, coupled with the settlement negotiations and ultimate agree- ment between B Co. and the department that led to the approval of the 352 Conn. 697 AUGUST, 2025 3 High Watch Recovery Center, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health certificate of need, did not support the plaintiff's claim that it was classically aggrieved by the department's decision to grant the application for a certifi- cate of need, as the plaintiff failed to articulate a specific, personal and legal interest in the department's decision. Argued May 12—officially released August 5, 2025

The plaintiff attorney sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, their alleged theft of his identity and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.), in connection with their use of the plaintiff's name and attorney registration number to defraud certain individuals. The trial court rendered a default judgment for the plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages in the amount of $150,000 on his identity theft claim and $300,000 in punitive damages on his CUTPA claim, as well as attorney's fees and costs. On appeal, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court had improperly failed to award the plaintiff treble damages pursuant to the statute (§ 52-571h (b)) governing actions for damages resulting from identity theft but that the plaintiff could not recover both punitive damages under CUTPA and treble damages under § 52-571h (b) because such an award would violate the principle that a plaintiff is entitled to recover only once for losses sustained in connection with the same transaction, occurrence or event. Accordingly, the Appellate Court remanded the case for vacatur of those awards and with direction to award the plaintiff treble damages in the amount of $450,000 for identity theft. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the Appellate Court had incorrectly determined that he could not recover both punitive damages under CUTPA and treble damages under § 52-571h (b). Held: The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to treble damages under § 52-571h (b) but incorrectly concluded that he could not also recover punitive damages under CUTPA, and, accordingly, this court reversed in part the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case to that court with direction to reinstate the trial court's punitive dam- ages award under CUTPA. Section 52-571h (b) requires that a plaintiff who proves identity theft be awarded ''the greater of one thousand dollars or treble damages,'' and, because the trial court found that the plaintiff had suffered damages in connection with his identity theft claim in the amount of $150,000, the Appellate Court correctly determined that the plaintiff was entitled to recover three times that amount, or $450,000. Damages are duplicative in violation of the rule precluding double recovery, however, not simply because their availability arises out of the same transac- tion, occurrence or event, but because they redress the same legal harm, and the law may provide a plaintiff multiple, cumulative remedies to redress different types of harm, even if precipitated by a single incident. Unlike treble damages under § 52-571h (b), punitive damages under CUTPA are not intended to compensate a plaintiff for his losses but, rather, to punish wrongdoers and to deter wrongdoing in commerce, nothing in CUTPA or in § 52-571h (b), which expressly allows a trial court to award a successful plaintiff ''other remedies provided by law,'' indicates that the remedies pro- vided under those statutes are intended to be exclusive or in lieu of any other remedies, and, whereas § 52-571h (b) requires the trial court to award treble damages to a prevailing plaintiff, the award of punitive damages under CUTPA is left to a court's discretion. Argued April 10—officially released August 5, 2025

Pursuant to statute (§ 4-160 (a)), ''the Claims Commissioner . . . may autho- rize suit against the state on any claim which . . . presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable,'' and ''[t]he state may file an opposition . . . based solely on jurisdictional grounds . . . or . . . judicial, quasi-judicial or legislative immunity.'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 4-160 (h)), ''[i]n each action authorized by the Claims Commissioner . . . the state waives its immunity from liability and from suit . . . and waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosy- nary or governmental nature of the activity complained of, and . . . the rights and liability of the state . . . shall be coextensive with and shall equal the rights and liability of private persons in like circumstances.'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, the Department of Children and Families (DCF), for, inter alia, the death of T, the plaintiff's four year old daughter, who wandered unattended and drowned in a pond. Prior to the drowning incident, the Probate Court had removed the plaintiff and T's biological mother as guardians and vested temporary custody of T in T's maternal relatives, A and L. To assist it in determining whether to grant a full transfer of guardianship to A and L, the Probate Court commis- sioned DCF to conduct a study of the home of A and L and to generate a report of its findings. DCF submitted the report to the Probate Court, but, before that court could hold a hearing to determine whether to transfer guardianship, T died. The plaintiff, as the administrator of T's estate, there- after sought and was granted permission by the claims commissioner to bring an action against the state. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the negligence of DCF personnel in investigating T's living situation and in advising the Probate Court that A and L's home was a suitable placement for T was a proximate cause of T's death. Specifically, the plaintiff included allegations in his complaint of negligence that related both to DCF's recom- mendations to the Probate Court regarding T's best interest and to DCF's alleged failure to properly execute various independent duties to protect T from abuse and neglect. DCF filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because DCF is entitled to In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim's identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity for its activities integral to the judicial process, such as conducting a court-ordered investigation and issu- ing court-ordered recommendations. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that DCF was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity while functioning as an arm of the Probate Court, that the claims commissioner cannot waive such immunity, and that the plaintiff's allegations were insuffi- cient to overcome DCF's immunity. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's dismissal of his action, claiming, inter alia, that, when the claims commissioner allows a private party to bring an action against a state agency, such as DCF, the state waives not only its sovereign immunity, but other common-law immunities, such as quasi-judicial immunity. Held: The trial court correctly concluded that the claims commissioner's waiver of sovereign immunity under § 4-160 does not bar the state from raising a jurisdictional claim of absolute quasi-judicial immunity, but this court reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings insofar as some of the plaintiff's allegations may have exceeded the scope of that immunity. The plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that the legislature clearly evinced an intent, through § 4-160, to abolish common-law judicial or quasi-judicial immunity for purposes of that statute, as the text of § 4- 160 allows the state to assert any defenses and immunities available to a private defendant and expressly permits the state to preserve the right to assert a common-law immunity, such as quasi-judicial immunity, even though the claims commissioner has waived the state's sovereign immunity. Moreover, the principle that courts are to narrowly interpret statutes in derogation of the common law militated against construing the waiver con- templated by § 4-160 to include not only sovereign immunity, but other common-law immunities, this court would not lightly assume that the legisla- ture had chosen to infringe on the traditional immunities fashioned by the judiciary to safeguard the essential character and function of the judicial branch of government, and the legislative history of § 4-160 supported a construction of that statute that did not contemplate the waiver of quasi- judicial immunity. This court concluded that the language in § 4-160 (h) (1) providing that the state ''waives all defenses which might arise from the eleemosynary or governmental nature of the activity complained of'' does not apply to the judicial or quasi-judicial immunity referenced in § 4-160 (a) and (d) (1), and, instead, the ''all defenses'' language was strictly construed to apply only to defenses such as governmental immunity, the public duty doctrine, and related eleemosynary defenses. This court agreed with the plaintiff that, although certain acts that DCF personnel performed at the direction of the Probate Court were shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity as a matter of law, the trial court should not have dismissed the plaintiff's action in its entirety insofar as at least some of the allegedly negligent conduct at issue may not have been undertaken by DCF personnel as an arm of the Probate Court and may have involved the performance of legal duties independent of those carried out at the direction of that court. With respect to most of the plaintiff's allegations, the nature of the claim was not sufficiently clear and the record was not sufficiently developed for this court to determine whether absolute quasi-judicial immunity applied, and, accordingly, the case was remanded so that, with respect to those particular allegations, the trial court could make those determinations in the first instance once an adequate record is established and could decide whether to hold additional hearings on DCF's motion to dismiss to enable the establishment of the necessary jurisdictional facts, or to defer those factual determinations until trial. Argued January 30—officially released August 5, 2025

Convicted of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim, the defendant's former girlfriend, the defendant appealed to this court. Prior to trial, the trial court denied in part the defendant's motion to introduce third-party culpability evidence relating to the victim's neighbor, A. The trial court specifically excluded a video that A had sent to the victim and related text messages, a voicemail that A had left for his girlfriend after the police interviewed him about the victim's murder, evidence of A's prior misconduct, and evidence of a decline in A's mental health in the weeks following the victim's murder. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding the foregoing evidence and that its exclu- sion violated his constitutional rights to due process, to present a complete defense, and to confrontation. Held: Even if this court assumed that the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence, any error was evidentiary rather than constitutional in nature, and the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. Any claimed error in the exclusion of the proffered evidence did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional rights because, even though the excluded evidence concerned A's relationship with the victim and his behavior follow- ing the murder, it was not central to the defendant's third-party culpability defense, and the defendant nevertheless was able to present to the jury substantial evidence and argument in support of that defense. Moreover, this court had a fair assurance that the trial court's exclusion of the proffered evidence did not affect the jury's verdict given the overall strength of the state's case and the weakness of the defendant's third-party culpability defense, and the fact that most of the evidence supporting the defendant's third-party culpability defense was admitted and considered by the jury. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor asked a police detective during redirect examination whether defense attorneys generally have an opportunity to review evidence and to request that it be sent to the state forensic science laboratory for testing and whether he had received such a request from defense counsel in this particular case. Although the defendant claimed that the prosecutor had improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense and that this impropriety denied him of a fair trial, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor's questions were prejudicial in light of the entire trial, as they did not suggest that the defense was obligated to submit evidence to the state forensic science laboratory for testing, and the trial court, in its initial, curative, and final instructions to the jury, made clear that the state had the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Argued December 2, 2024—officially released August 12, 2025

Convicted of murder and carrying a pistol without a permit in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed that the trial court had improperly admitted the testimony of a lay witness, M, concerning his identification of the defendant in a photograph that was taken from surveillance video footage captured around the time of the victim's murder. The defendant also claimed that the trial court had improperly denied in part his motion to suppress certain cell site location information that the police had acquired after obtaining a search warrant for records relating to the defendant's cell phone. Held: Application of the factors articulated in State v. Gore (342 Conn. 129) for assessing whether a witness is more likely than the fact finder to correctly identify an individual depicted in a surveillance video or photograph led this court to conclude that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it allowed M to testify regarding his identification of the defendant from the photograph. Although M had encountered the defendant only once prior to identifying him from the photograph forty-three days after that encounter, the trial court appropriately considered the nature of the encounter in determining that M had more than a minimal degree of familiarity with the defendant, as M's focus during the encounter was heavily on the defendant, M had the opportunity to observe the defendant's gait and posture, M was able to view the defendant's face directly, the encounter took place during the daytime, and the defendant's face was unobstructed. Moreover, the photograph from which M identified the defendant was taken from surveillance footage captured just four days after M had seen and spoken with the defendant, and, thus, M would have been familiar with the defendant's facial features and other characteristics as they appeared in the photograph. Furthermore, there was evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that the defendant's appearance had changed in the six years between the murder and the trial, and the quality of the photograph from which M identified the defendant also favored the admissibility of M's testimony. In addition, the trial court provided two cautionary instructions to the jury following the admission of M's testimony regarding his identification of the defendant, clarifying that it was ultimately the jury's role to determine whether the defendant was the individual who appeared in the photograph and the surveillance video footage from which the photograph was taken. The trial court properly denied in part the defendant's motion to suppress the cell site location information (CSLI) that the police had acquired after obtaining the search warrant. The facts alleged in the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant, together with the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom, established probable cause to believe that the location of the defendant's cell phone around the time of the murder would provide evidence of the defendant's participation or lack of participation therein and that this evi- dence would be revealed in the CSLI requested by the police. Moreover, the trial court properly found that there was probable cause to obtain CSLI for the three days leading up to the murder, the day of the murder, and the day after the murder, as such information would have assisted in securing the defendant's conviction by connecting the defendant's cell phone with his known movements, by providing evidence of his presence at the crime scene and his flight therefrom, and by providing evidence of any attempt to evade detection or consciousness of guilt. The trial court, however, should not have permitted the scope of the warrant to extend beyond the day after the murder because it was less probable that the CSLI for any day after the murder would have revealed evidence relevant to the crime or assisted in the defendant's apprehension or convic- tion, but such error was of no consequence because the state introduced at the defendant's trial CSLI for only the day of the murder and the day after the murder. (Two justices concurring separately in one opinion) Argued May 16—officially released August 12, 2025