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State v. Traynham
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICKEY TRAYNHAM
(SC 20883)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of murder, robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit
robbery in the first degree, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal
possession of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim,
the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant claimed that the trial
court had improperly admitted testimony from two witnesses, S and J, about
certain statements that R, the defendant’s accomplice, had made to them
under the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule set
forth in the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 8-6 (4)). Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of S
and J about R’s statements, which inculpated both R and the defendant,
under § 8-6 (4) of the Code of Evidence, as R’s statements to S and J were
against R’s penal interest and were sufficiently trustworthy.
The defendant conceded that the challenged statements were against R’s
penal interest, and those statements were trustworthy insofar as R made
them voluntarily, in close temporal proximity to the crimes, and to people
with whom R had a trusting relationship, namely, a romantic partner, S,
and a close family member, J.
Moreover, R’s statements were corroborated by the evidence presented at
trial, and, although there were some discrepancies between R’s statements
to J and the evidence presented at trial, this court concluded that those
inconsistencies, on balance, did not undermine the trustworthiness of the
statements to J.
Furthermore, although defendant claimed that R’s statements were not trustworthy because R had engaged in blame shifting by attempting to minimize
his participation in the homicide, R’s statements to S and J nevertheless
exposed him to the risk of criminal liability for the same type of crimes
with which the defendant was charged, and, therefore, fully and equally
implicated both R and the defendant.
Argued May 15—officially released July 22, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of felony murder, murder, robbery in the
first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first
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State v. Traynham
degree, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal
possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of New Haven, where the charges
of felony murder, murder, robbery in the first degree,
and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree
were tried to the jury before Vitale, J.; verdict of guilty;
thereafter, the charges of carrying a pistol without a
permit and criminal possession of a firearm were tried
to the court, Vitale, J.; finding of guilty; subsequently,
the court vacated the felony murder conviction and
rendered judgment of guilty of murder, robbery in the
first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first
degree, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal
possession of a firearm, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Chad L. Edgar, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,
on the brief, were John Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, Seth
Garbarsky, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and
Gregory Borrelli, senior assistant state’s attorney,
for the appellee (state).
Opinion
MULLINS, C. J. The defendant, Rickey Traynham, in
collaboration with his accomplice, Jordan Rudel, conspired to rob the victim, Rondell Atkinson. After telling
the victim that they would pay him for a ride in his
vehicle, the defendant and Rudel forced the victim to
drive to a park in Woodbridge. Upon arriving at the
park, the defendant and Rudel ordered the victim out
of the car and took his wallet, watch, and cell phone.
Both men then brandished firearms and each shot the
victim, fatally wounding him. After the shooting, Rudel
confided in two people about what he and the defendant
had done to the victim: Adrianna Santiago, his then
girlfriend and the mother of his children; and Monique
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State v. Traynham
Jackson, his father’s longtime girlfriend. In the present
case, the trial court permitted the state to introduce
Rudel’s statements to Santiago and Jackson into evidence against the defendant as dual inculpatory statements under the statement against penal interest
exception to the hearsay rule.1
The sole issue in this direct appeal2 is whether the
trial court improperly allowed the testimony from Santiago and Jackson as dual inculpatory statements under
the statement against penal interest exception to the
hearsay rule. Because Rudel’s statements were indisputably against his penal interest and were sufficiently
trustworthy, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could
have found, and procedural history are relevant to the
defendant’s claim. On June 7, 2021, the night he was
killed, the victim was working as an unofficial rideshare
driver—providing rides for hire without working through
a rideshare company, such as Uber or Lyft. At some
point that night, the defendant and Rudel made plans
to hire the victim as a rideshare driver and then rob
him. When the victim picked them up, Rudel and the
defendant instructed him to drive to a park in Woodbridge. Once there, the defendant and Rudel robbed
the victim of his belongings and killed him.
1
After a trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 (a) and 53a-54a (a), robbery in the first degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the
first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-48 (a) and § 53a-134 (a)
(2). The felony murder conviction was vacated at sentencing as violative
of double jeopardy. The state also charged the defendant with carrying a
pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 29-
35 (a) and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2021) § 53a-217 (a) (1). Following a bench trial, the court found
the defendant guilty of those firearms charges as well. The court imposed
a total effective sentence of eighty years of incarceration.
2
See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).
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State v. Traynham
On June 8, 2021, a passerby found the body of the
victim at the Pease Road playground in Woodbridge.
The victim had been shot multiple times. Once the
police arrived, they located seven spent shell casings
near the victim’s body. The victim did not have any
identification or other personal belongings on his person. The victim’s vehicle also was missing.
After the murder, also on June 8, 2021, Rudel called
Santiago. At that time, Santiago was on vacation in
Florida, so he used the FaceTime feature to show her
the driver’s license of a man. Rudel then told Santiago
to search for the man’s name on the Internet. Santiago
searched the Internet for the man’s name and discovered that he was the victim of a homicide. When Santiago asked Rudel what he had done, he said he would
not discuss it over the phone and hung up.
On or around June 14, 2021, Santiago returned home
from Florida. She met Rudel in Waterbury, and they sat
in her vehicle and spoke for approximately two hours.
Rudel explained that he and the defendant, known to
Santiago as ‘‘Slikk,’’ had created a plan to rob the victim.
On the evening of the murder, the victim picked up
Rudel from Santiago’s house and took him to the defendant’s house on Fountain Street in New Haven. When
the defendant entered the back seat, he put a gun to
the victim’s head and ordered him to drive to a park
in Woodbridge.
According to Santiago, Rudel told her the following
additional details about the murder. Once they arrived
at the park, Rudel and the defendant forced the victim
to get out of the vehicle and to start walking. They told
the victim to disconnect his iCloud account, to erase
his passwords, and to turn off the Find My Phone function on his cell phone. They then took the cell phone.
At that point, the victim started praying, which annoyed
Rudel. Rudel told the victim to ‘‘shut up’’ and then
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State v. Traynham
shot him in the leg. The victim fell to the ground. The
defendant then became concerned, saying that he did
not want to go to jail and that the victim had seen their
faces and knew where they lived. Consequently, the
defendant walked over to the victim and shot him four
to five times. They then took the victim’s wallet and
cell phone and left the park in the victim’s vehicle. Their
plan had been to rob the victim and to leave him in the
park, but when Rudel shot the victim in the leg, it
‘‘mess[ed] [their] plans up.’’
Approximately five days after the murder, on June 12,
2021, Rudel went to see Jackson, his father’s longtime
girlfriend, with whom he had a close relationship.
According to Jackson, Rudel told her the following
about the murder. He said that ‘‘he fucked up . . . .’’
He then showed her a driver’s license belonging to
someone with the last name of Atkinson. Jackson recognized the name as being associated with a murder that
she had seen in the news. Rudel then explained to her
that he and one or two other people planned to rob a
rideshare driver whom he knew from previous rides.
Rudel said that he had the rideshare driver pick him
up down the street from where Santiago lived, then he
and the rideshare driver picked up the other men. Rudel
did not identify the other men. Rudel said that they
went to a park in Woodbridge. Rudel told Jackson that,
after the men arrived at the park, he shot the driver in
the leg once or twice. He then told her that the other
men then became concerned that the victim had seen
their faces, so they ‘‘finished him off.’’ Rudel told Jackson that they then put the victim’s body in the vehicle
and submerged the vehicle in the water.
Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine in
which it sought, in pertinent part, to admit into evidence
Rudel’s statement to Jackson. The state asserted that
Rudel was unavailable to testify because he planned to
invoke his fifth amendment right against self-incrimina-
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State v. Traynham
tion and that the statement was admissible under Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-6 (4) because it was
against his penal interest and was trustworthy. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to suppress, which
the trial court treated as a motion in limine, in which
he argued that all of Rudel’s statements, including those
to Jackson and Santiago, should be suppressed. Although
the defendant conceded that the statements were not
testimonial and were against Rudel’s penal interest, he
claimed that they should be suppressed because they
were not trustworthy or corroborated.
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress. In ruling on the state’s motion and the defendant’s
motion, the court noted that the defendant had conceded that the statements were not testimonial. Thus,
the court explained, the admissibility of these statements was governed solely by the rules of evidence and
did not implicate the confrontation clause.3 Accordingly, the trial court analyzed the admission of the statements under the hearsay exception for statements
against penal interest. See Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6 (4).
The trial court explained that the statements were
against Rudel’s penal interest, and, ‘‘after considering
the totality of the circumstances,’’ the court ‘‘conclude[d] that the statements made by Rudel to Jackson
and Santiago [were] admissible under the Connecticut
Code of Evidence [§] 8-6 (4) . . . .’’ As a result, at trial,
Santiago and Jackson testified about the events relayed
to them by Rudel. Rudel continued to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination and, therefore, did not
testify at trial.
We begin with the standard of review and relevant
legal principles. ‘‘The law regarding out-of-court state-
3
Notwithstanding the trial court’s statement that the defendant conceded
that his confrontation rights were not implicated, the court, in an abundance
of caution, nevertheless determined that admitting Rudel’s statements into
evidence did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights. The defendant
does not renew any constitutional claim on appeal.
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State v. Traynham
ments admitted for the truth therein is well settled. An
out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of
the matter asserted is hearsay. . . . As a general rule,
such hearsay statements are inadmissible unless they
fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
. . . Section 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence carves out an exception to the hearsay rule for
an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable
declarant if the statement was trustworthy and, at the
time of its making, so far tended to subject the declarant
to criminal liability that a reasonable person in the
declarant’s position would not have made the statement
unless the person believed it to be true.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Graham, 344 Conn. 825, 835,
282 A.3d 435 (2022). ‘‘[W]hen
viewing this issue through an evidentiary lens, we examine whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 836–37.
In the present case, the state offered Rudel’s statements as dual inculpatory statements. ‘‘A dual inculpatory statement is a statement that inculpates both the
declarant and a third party, in this case the defendant.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Camacho,
282 Conn. 328, 359,
924 A.2d 99, cert. denied,
552 U.S.
956,
128 S. Ct. 388,
169 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2007). ‘‘We evaluate
dual inculpatory statements using the same criteria that
we use for statements against penal interest.’’ Id.
Admission of a hearsay statement against penal interest pursuant to § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut Code of
Evidence ‘‘is subject to a binary inquiry: (1) whether
[the] statement . . . was against [the declarant’s]
penal interest and, if so, (2) whether the statement was
sufficiently trustworthy.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Bonds, 172 Conn. App. 108, 117,
158
A.3d 826, cert. denied,
326 Conn. 907,
163 A.3d 1206
(2017); see also, e.g., State v. Pierre, 277 Conn. 42, 67,
890 A.2d 474, cert. denied,
547 U.S. 1197,
126 S. Ct.
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State v. Traynham
2873, 165 L. Ed. 2d 904 (2006). Dual inculpatory statements, such as those inculpating both the declarant
and the defendant, are admissible if the circumstances
demonstrate that the statements are trustworthy. See,
e.g., State v. Camacho, supra, 282 Conn. 361–63. Because
the defendant concedes that Rudel’s statements were
against his penal interest, only the second part of this
inquiry, whether the statements were sufficiently trustworthy, is at issue in this appeal.
When assessing the trustworthiness of such statements, our Code of Evidence directs trial courts to
consider the following factors: ‘‘(A) the time the statement was made and the person to whom the statement
was made, (B) the existence of corroborating evidence
in the case, and (C) the extent to which the statement
was against the declarant’s penal interest.’’ Conn. Code
Evid. § 8-6 (4). ‘‘[N]o single factor . . . is necessarily
conclusive. . . . Thus, it is not necessary that the trial
court find that all of the factors support the trustworthiness of the statement. The trial court should consider
all of the factors and determine whether the totality of
the circumstances supports the trustworthiness of the
statement.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Lopez, 254 Conn. 309, 316,
757 A.2d
542 (2000); see also State v. Patel,
342 Conn. 445, 450,
477,
270 A.3d 627 (finding that there was no abuse
of discretion when trial court admitted into evidence
codefendant’s dual inculpatory statement to jailhouse
informant), cert. denied, U.S. , 143 S. Ct. 216,
214
L. Ed. 2d 86 (2022). We consider each of these factors
in turn.
Rudel made the statements to Jackson and Santiago
in close temporal proximity to the crimes. Rudel spoke
to Jackson approximately five days after the crimes
and to Santiago the day after the crimes and then again
approximately one week later. As this court has explained,
‘‘[i]n general, declarations made soon after the crime
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State v. Traynham
suggest more reliability than those made after a lapse
of time [when] a declarant has a more ample opportunity for reflection and contrivance.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Camacho, supra,282 Conn.
361; see also State v.
Pierre, supra, 277 Conn. 70–72
(statements against penal interest made within ‘‘couple
of weeks’’ of homicide were trustworthy); State v.
Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 370–71,
844 A.2d 191 (2004)
(dual inculpatory statement made within five months
of homicide was trustworthy). Therefore, in the present
case, the timing of the statements, just days after the
murder, supports their trustworthiness.
In addition, the persons to whom the statements were
made also support their trustworthiness. ‘‘[W]e note
that the declarant’s making the contested statements
of his own volition, to people with whom he had a
trusting relationship . . . is further indication of the
reliability of the statements.’’ State v. Camacho, supra,282 Conn. 361. As the trial court found, Rudel, on his
own initiative, made the statements to ‘‘a close family
member and a romantic partner.’’ The evidence at trial
demonstrated that Jackson was the longtime girlfriend
of Rudel’s father and that Rudel would often visit her
and talk to her about what was going on in his life.4
Specifically, the court found that, when Rudel made his
statement to Jackson, Rudel went to Jackson’s home
of his own volition, unannounced, and told her, ‘‘listen,
I need to talk, and I think I really [fucked] up.’’ Additionally, Santiago is the mother of Rudel’s children and was
his girlfriend at the time of the crimes. This bespeaks
of a trusting relationship. See, e.g., State v. Pierre, supra,
4
The defendant asserts that the statement to Jackson may be less trustworthy because Jackson overstated her relationship with Rudel and had known
him for only a short time before he told her about the murder. We disagree.
The trial court’s finding that Rudel and Jackson had a close familial relationship is supported by the evidence, and we cannot conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in finding that this factor supported the trustworthiness of Rudel’s statement to Jackson.
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State v. Traynham
277 Conn. 69–70 (finding implication of reliability when
declarant ‘‘made the statements on his own initiative,
to an individual who was a friend and someone he
routinely socialized with, and not in the coercive atmosphere of official interrogation’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); State v. Rivera, supra, 268 Conn.
369–70 (that statement was made, ‘‘upon [witness’] own
initiative, to a close family member, and not in the
coercive atmosphere of official interrogation,’’ was
strongly indicative of statement’s reliability (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Further, we are unpersuaded by the defendant’s argument that this factor ignores the possibility that Rudel
may have been motivated to minimize his role in the
crimes when speaking to a family member. As the defendant acknowledges, his argument is not supported by
the case law. See State v. Graham, supra,344 Conn.
843 (‘‘It is well settled that statements made to friends
and close associates ‘are significantly more trustworthy
than statements obtained by government agents for the
purpose of creating evidence that would be useful at a
future trial. . . . In short, neither facing arrest nor
being under arrest when making his statements to [the
witness], [the declarant] lacked the obvious incentive
to shift blame or [to] curry favor with the police.’ ’’).
Moreover, a review of Rudel’s statements in the present
case demonstrates that Rudel admitted to his role in
the planning and commission of the robbery and to
being the first person to shoot the victim. Accordingly,
we agree with the trial court that this factor supports the
court’s decision to admit the statements into evidence.
Turning to the second factor, whether there was corroborating evidence in the case, we conclude that this
factor also supports the trial court’s decision to admit
Rudel’s statements into evidence. Rudel admitted that
he and the defendant planned to rob a rideshare driver
but that their plan went awry and resulted in murder.
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State v. Traynham
The evidence at trial established that the victim was
a rideshare driver and was found without any of his
personal belongings, including his wallet and cell
phone. Significantly, while making his statements to
Santiago and Jackson shortly after the murder, Rudel
showed them both a driver’s license belonging to the
victim. Rudel also told both Santiago and Jackson that
he and another individual took the victim to a park in
Woodbridge, consistent with the location of where the
victim’s body was found.
In addition to the foregoing, Rudel’s statements about
the shooting itself were corroborated by the facts established at trial. Rudel told Santiago and Jackson that
both he and the other participant had guns and that
they both shot the victim. Indeed, Rudel said that he
shot the victim once or twice in the leg and that the
other participant shot the victim four or five times.
These details are consistent with the forensic evidence
presented at trial. The police recovered seven shell casings at the scene, and the testing revealed that two of
the casings were fired from one firearm and five of the
casings were fired from another firearm. Furthermore,
the police found two guns in the car belonging to the
defendant’s girlfriend, and the ballistics testing demonstrated that they were consistent with the guns used
during the crimes. The medical examiner’s testimony
also corroborated Rudel’s statements to Santiago and
Jackson that Rudel fired one or two shots into the
victim’s leg. Thus, the existence of the other five casings
at the scene not attributable to Rudel also corroborates
Rudel’s statement to Santiago that the defendant fired
multiple shots.
The defendant asserts that the trustworthiness of
Rudel’s statements was undermined by the ‘‘material
differences’’ between his statement to Jackson and the
evidence presented at trial. Specifically, the defendant
asserts that the evidence did not corroborate what
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State v. Traynham
Rudel told Jackson, namely, that there were multiple
participants in the crimes other than himself, that they
put the victim’s body in the trunk of the car, and that
they then submerged the car in water. Although there
were some discrepancies between Rudel’s statement
to Jackson and the other evidence presented at trial, we
cannot conclude that such discrepancies demonstrate
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Rudel’s statements to Jackson and Santiago into evidence.
Indeed, the trial court addressed the discrepancies
and concluded that they did not undermine the reliability of Rudel’s statement to Jackson. Specifically, with
respect to Rudel’s statement that there were multiple
participants in the crimes, the court concluded that, ‘‘at
the crucial time the events actually unfolded in the park
in Woodbridge, according to what [Jackson] indicated,
[Jackson] recalls that Rudel . . . describes just ‘the
other guy that he was with,’ which is a singular term,
meaning used in the singular; and ‘whoever the other
guy is, had a gun as well,’ again, singular; and maintained
that both Rudel and ‘the other guy fired their weapons,’
although the other guy was unnamed.’’ Thus, the court
concluded that, when the murder occurred, Rudel told
Jackson about only himself and one other man.
With respect to Jackson’s testimony that Rudel told
her that they had placed the victim’s body in the trunk
of the victim’s car and submerged the car in water,
the trial court acknowledged that this portion of the
statement was inconsistent with the evidence. As the
court noted, however, ‘‘[t]he fact that some of [Rudel’s]
statements may contradict [with], or differ from, each
other or other evidence is not fatal to their admission.’’
The court pointed out that the ‘‘alleged inconsistencies
pale in comparison to the myriad details of the crime[s]
that Rudel shared with [Jackson] and [Santiago] that
overlap and that could only be known to a participant
in the crime[s].’’ In particular, the court highlighted the
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State v. Traynham
following consistencies: ‘‘[T]he name and license of [the
victim], the town [in which] the robbery occurred, [that]
the location was a park, [that there were] multiple shots
at the crime scene . . . [including] the shot to the [victim’s] leg, and the fact that [the victim] was [a rideshare] driver.’’
We agree with the trial court that the inconsistencies,
on balance, did not undermine the trustworthiness of
Rudel’s statement to Jackson and, accordingly, conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing Jackson’s testimony. It was within the court’s
discretion to weigh those inconsistencies against the
other evidence, and we find nothing untoward in its
weighing or analysis. See, e.g., State v. Patel, 194 Conn.
App. 245, 275,
221 A.3d 45 (2019) (‘‘It was within the
trial court’s discretion to evaluate the consistencies and
inconsistencies to conclude that, on balance, the second
factor weighed in favor of a determination that the
statements are reliable. Indeed, the trial court noted
the inconsistencies identified by the defendant and
found that they ‘pale[d] in comparison to the myriad
details of the crime that could only be known to a
participant in the crime.’ ’’), aff’d, 342 Conn. 445,
270
A.3d 627, cert. denied, U.S. ,
143 S. Ct. 216,
214
L. Ed. 2d 86 (2022). In the present case, the trial court
explained that, in conformance with Patel, it had ‘‘evaluated the foregoing consistencies and inconsistencies
and conclude[d] . . . that, on balance, the statements
to . . . Jackson are reliable and admissible under [§]
8-6 (4) [of the Connecticut Code of Evidence].’’ Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion as to the second
factor in view of the myriad of corroborating evidence
presented at trial.
We now turn to the third factor, namely, the extent
to which Rudel’s statements were against his penal
interest. Although the defendant concedes that Rudel’s
statements were against his penal interest, he asserts
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State v. Traynham
that the third factor does not support the trustworthiness of Rudel’s statements because Rudel engaged in
blame shifting. Specifically, the defendant asserts that
Rudel attempted to minimize his participation in the
homicide by stating that the defendant was the one who
shot the victim five times and that these shots were the
ones that killed the victim. We disagree.
As this court explained in State v. Graham, supra,344 Conn. 825, ‘‘[t]he essential characteristic as to what
is against penal interest is the exposure to risk of punishment for a crime.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 837. In Graham, the declarant ‘‘admitted his
participation in a robbery that gave rise to a homicide
and exposed himself to the possibility of a charge of
felony murder’’ while also stating that it was the defendant who shot and killed the victim. Id. This court
concluded that, although the declarant’s statement was
intended to distance the declarant from the murder or to
minimize his participation in the crimes, the declarant’s
‘‘statement was indeed inculpatory, as it exposed him
to potential criminal liability for the same types of
crimes with which the defendant was charged. A difference in degree of inculpation, rather than in kind, does
not affect the conclusion that it is still an inculpatory
statement.’’ Id., 838. In the present case, Rudel’s statements to both Santiago and Jackson exposed him to
the risk of punishment for several crimes. He inculpated
himself in the crimes by stating that he had helped to
plan and had participated in the robbery of the victim,
thus exposing himself to a charge of felony murder. He
also told them that he had shot the victim in the leg
once or twice.
In State v. Rivera, supra,268 Conn. 351, this court
addressed a similar factual situation. In Rivera, the
declarant had ‘‘admitted his participation in a burglary
that had given rise to a homicide, and thus exposed
himself to the possibility of a charge of felony murder.
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As the trial court correctly noted, even if [the declarant’s] statement had attempted to minimize his participation in the homicide, the minimization would have
been limited to ‘one type of murder versus another
type of murder.’ The statement further implicated [the
declarant] as a principal in the crime of burglary, and
[as] an accomplice in the crimes of arson and tampering
with evidence. Therefore, [the declarant’s] statement
exposed him to potential liability for the same types of
crimes with which the defendant has been charged and,
accordingly, the statement fully and equally implicated
both [the declarant] and the defendant.’’ (Footnote
omitted.) Id., 368.5
Similarly, in the present case, Rudel’s statements simply put forth a difference in degree of inculpation, not
a difference in kind. Indeed, like in Rivera, even if
Rudel’s statement that he shot the victim only in the
leg was an attempt to minimize his participation in
the homicide, that minimization does not affect the
conclusion that his statements to Jackson and Santiago
were inculpatory. Attributing the final gun shots to the
defendant simply means that Rudel was guilty of ‘‘one
type of murder versus another type of murder.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Put differently, the
statements exposed Rudel to potential liability for the
same types of crimes, i.e., felony murder and robbery,
with which the defendant has been charged. Thus,
5
In his brief, the defendant asserts that ‘‘felony murder charges present
unique challenges in the context of dual inculpatory statements by an accomplice whose statement engages in blame shifting’’ by inculpating himself in
the underlying felony while exculpating himself in the murder. Citing to the
concurring opinion in State v. Graham, supra,344 Conn. 858 (Ecker, J.,
concurring), the defendant asserts that ‘‘an overturning of Rivera for the
purpose of this appeal would be welcome . . . .’’ He does not, however,
expressly ask us to do so or provide briefing in that regard, and, at oral
argument, the defendant’s appellate counsel conceded that he was not asking
this court to overrule Rivera or Graham. Accordingly, we do not address
this issue.
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State v. Traynham
because Rudel’s statements fully and equally implicated
both himself and the defendant, we cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
that this factor supported a finding that the statements
were trustworthy.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
