Martinez v. Cain

                                       136

   Argued and submitted May 7, 2019; decision of Court of Appeals reversed,
   judgment of circuit court reversed, and case remanded to circuit court for
                    further proceedings February 21, 2020


                     PEDRO MARTINEZ,
                     Petitioner on Review,
                               v.
                          Brad CAIN,
                       Superintendent,
              Snake River Correctional Institution,
                    Respondent on Review.
           (CC CV160282) (CA A163992) (SC S066253)
                                   

     Petitioner had been convicted and given separate sentences for (among other
things) first-degree robbery and attempted aggravated felony murder based on
the predicate felony of first-degree robbery. He sought post-conviction relief, contending that his counsel had been constitutionally inadequate by failing to argue
that those crimes should be merged. The post-conviction court granted summary
judgment against petitioner, concluding that he had not been prejudiced by his
counsel’s failure to object, because as a matter of law the sentences would not
merge. A majority of the Court of Appeals panel affirmed, with one judge dissenting. On review, the question was whether (if counsel had objected) petitioner’s convictions should have been merged under ORS 161.067(1), a statute that requires
merger of convictions unless “each [criminal] provision requires proof of an element that the other does not.” Held: (1) Felony murder expressly incorporates
other crimes (the predicate felonies) to which additional elements are then added
(among other things, the death of a nonparticipant in the predicate felony); (2) one
of the predicate felonies is first-degree robbery, either completed or attempted;
(3) to avoid merger under ORS 161.067(1), the robbery count had to require proof of
an element that felony murder did not; (4) because both counts against petitioner
rested on the same factual robbery, the state’s proof of (attempted aggravated)
felony murder based on that first-degree robbery—whether it was completed or
attempted—necessarily meant that the state would have proved every element of
first-degree robbery, whether completed or attempted; and (5) because the robbery
count did not require proof of an element that the attempted aggravated felony
murder count did not, the counts should have been merged on proper objection.
    The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings.



    En Banc
    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
______________
   * On appeal from Umatilla County Circuit Court, Eva J. Temple, Judge. 

, 

 (2018).
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   Lindsey Burrows, O’Connor Weber LLC, Portland, argued
the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.
   Doug M. Petrina, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
   Erik M. Blumenthal, Portland, filed the brief for amicus
curiae Oregon Justice Resource Center.
  NELSON, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
138                                              Martinez v. Cain

          NELSON, J.
          The case before us presents an issue of criminal
law in the procedural context of a post-conviction relief proceeding. Petitioner had been convicted and given separate
sentences for (among other things) attempted aggravated
murder and first-degree robbery. He sought post-conviction
relief, contending that his counsel had been constitutionally
inadequate by failing to argue that those crimes should be
merged. The post-conviction court granted summary judgment against petitioner, concluding that he had not been
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object, because as a
matter of law the sentences would not merge. A majority of
the Court of Appeals panel affirmed, with one judge dissenting. Martinez v. Cain, 

, 

 (2018).
          On review, the question before us is whether petitioner’s convictions should have been merged under ORS
161.067(1). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and post-conviction court.
                         I. FACTS
A. Underlying Criminal Conviction
          The underlying historical facts are undisputed for
our purposes, and we take them from the Court of Appeals’
opinion in petitioner’s direct criminal appeal, State v.
Martinez, 

, 

, rev den, 

 (2015). Petitioner had approached the victim, who was
sitting in a car.
   “[Petitioner], who was ‘playing with’ a gun, asked the victim
   for his wallet. The victim refused. [Petitioner] then asked
   the victim to get out of his car, and the victim refused that
   request, too, saying ‘you ain’t getting my wallet and you
   ain’t getting my car.’ [Petitioner] said, ‘Well, then I’m going
   to have to shoot you.’ As the victim tried to drive away,
   [petitioner] did just that, shooting the victim once in the
   arm. The victim testified that his car already was moving
   when [petitioner] fired; the victim believes that it is possible that the car bumped [petitioner’s] hand, causing him
   to lose some control of the gun when he pulled the trigger.
   The victim drove the short distance to his home and called
   9-1-1. He was transported to a hospital. A doctor who treated
   the victim testified that the bullet broke the victim’s arm
   and fragments traveled into the victim’s chest area, coming
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    within an inch of multiple blood vessels. Had the bullet hit
    one of the major arteries, the victim probably would have
    died within 10 minutes if he had not received medical care.”
Id. at 425.
          Petitioner was indicted on several counts, though
the only counts relevant here charged petitioner with first-degree robbery and attempted aggravated felony murder.
Before continuing, we offer a brief description of the crimes
with which petitioner was charged.
          We begin with felony murder. Briefly, a defendant
commits felony murder when he or she either commits or
attempts to commit one of a listed set of felonies (predicate
felonies), and either the defendant or another participant in
the crime causes the death of the victim. See ORS 163.115
(1)(b) (2011).1 One of the predicate felonies for felony murder is first-degree robbery. ORS 163.115(1)(b)(G) (2011) provided, in part:
        “(1) Except as provided in ORS 163.118 and 163.125,
    criminal homicide constitutes murder:
        “…
        “(b) When it is committed by a person, acting either
    alone or with one or more persons, who commits or attempts
    to commit any of the following crimes and in the course of
    and in furtherance of the crime the person is committing
    or attempting to commit, or during the immediate flight
    therefrom, the person, or another participant if there be
    any, causes the death of a person other than one of the
    participants:
        “…
        “(G) Robbery in the first degree as defined in ORS
    164.415[.]”
        As relevant to the superintendent’s argument here,
it is important to note that a defendant may commit felony murder even though the defendant did not complete
the underlying felony. That is, the statute will apply if the
    1
      The legislature has since substantially amended both ORS 163.115, defining felony murder, and ORS 163.095, defining aggravated murder. See Or Laws
2019, ch 635, §§ 1-4. Those changes are not relevant to the analysis of whether
petitioner’s trial counsel may have been constitutionally inadequate at the time
of his trial. Our discussion of those statutes will refer to the versions in effect
when petitioner committed his crimes in 2012.
140                                                     Martinez v. Cain

defendant only attempted to commit a predicate felony. ORS
163.115(1)(b) (2011) (statute applies when person “commits or
attempts to commit” any of the predicate felonies). A defendant attempts to commit a crime when he or she intentionally takes a substantial step toward committing a crime.
See ORS 161.405(1).2
        At the time petitioner committed his crimes, felony murder could become elevated to aggravated murder.
That could occur when the defendant’s conduct not only
met the requirements for felony murder, but the defendant
also personally and intentionally killed the victim. See ORS
163.095(2)(d) (2011), which provided, in part:
       “As used in ORS 163.105 and this section, ‘aggravated
   murder’ means murder as defined in ORS 163.115 which is
   committed under, or accompanied by, any of the following
   circumstances:
       “…
      “[(2)](d) Notwithstanding ORS 163.115(1)(b), the defendant personally and intentionally committed the homicide
   under the circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115(1)(b).”
Throughout this opinion, we will refer to that as “aggravated felony murder,” although the statutes drew no such
terminological distinction.
         As noted, the indictment against petitioner charged
him with first-degree robbery and attempted aggravated
felony murder. The attempted aggravated felony murder
charge relied on the first-degree robbery charge, specifically alleging that petitioner had attempted, personally and
intentionally, to kill the victim while in the course of committing, or attempting to commit, first-degree robbery.3
    2
      ORS 161.405 provides that “[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit
a crime when the person intentionally engages in conduct which constitutes a
substantial step toward commission of the crime.”
    3
      The indictment provided as follows:
        “COUNT 1
        “ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER WITH A FIREARM
        “The said [petitioner], on or about June 11, 2012, in the County of
    Multnomah, State of Oregon, did unlawfully and intentionally commit and
    attempt to commit the crime of Robbery in the First Degree and in the course
    of and in the furtherance of the crime that [petitioner] was committing and
    attempting to commit, [petitioner] personally and intentionally attempted to
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         Petitioner was found guilty on both counts, and the
trial court entered separate convictions for the first-degree
robbery count and the attempted aggravated felony murder
count.
         Petitioner’s trial counsel did not object or argue that
the trial court should have merged the convictions under
ORS 161.067, which governs merger. That statute sets out
when a trial court may enter separate convictions sentences
if a defendant has violated multiple statutory provisions as
part of the same conduct or criminal episode. Specifically,
the relevant subsection of that statute, ORS 161.067(1),
provides:
      “When the same conduct or criminal episode violates
   two or more statutory provisions and each provision
   requires proof of an element that the others do not, there
   are as many separately punishable offenses as there are
   separate statutory violations.”
         As noted, petitioner’s trial counsel failed to argue
that the requirements of the statute had not been satisfied
and, therefore, that the first-degree robbery count should
have been merged into the attempted aggravated murder
count. If ORS 161.067(1) applied and did not require separate
convictions, then petitioner would only have been convicted
on the attempted aggravated felony murder count. The first-degree robbery count would have merged into that count.
         In the absence of any objection, however, the trial
court entered a judgment of conviction showing separate

   cause the death of [the victim], a human being who was not a participant in
   the crime, and during the commission of this felony, the [petitioner] used and
   threatened the use of a firearm, contrary to the statutes in such cases made
   and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon[.]
       “COUNT 2
       “ROBBERY IN THE FIRST DEGREE WITH A FIREARM
       “The said [petitioner], on or about June 11, 2012, in the County of
   Multnomah, State of Oregon, did unlawfully and knowingly, while in the
   course of committing and attempting to commit theft, with the intent of preventing and overcoming resistance to [petitioner’s] taking of property and
   retention of the property immediately after the taking, and being armed with
   a deadly weapon, use and threaten the immediate use of physical force upon
   [the victim], contrary to the statutes in such cases made and provided and
   against the peace and dignity of the State of Oregon[.]
       “The state further alleges that during the commission of this felony the
   [petitioner] used and threatened the use of a firearm.”
142                                                         Martinez v. Cain

convictions for both first-degree robbery and attempted
aggravated felony murder. The court imposed sentences on
each of those counts, making 45 months of the first-degree
robbery sentence run consecutive to the attempted aggravated murder sentence.4
         Petitioner raised the merger issue in the Court of
Appeals, but the court rejected that assignment of error as
unpreserved. See Martinez, 

. The court
otherwise affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentences.
B. Post-Conviction Proceedings
         Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel had been inadequate in (among
other things) failing to object to the trial court’s failure to
merge the guilty verdict on the first-degree robbery count
into the guilty verdict on the attempted aggravated felony
murder count. The superintendent moved for summary judgment. He argued that petitioner had not been prejudiced by
his counsel’s failure to object because the two counts would
not merge as a matter of law. In doing so, he presented two
slightly different arguments under ORS 161.067(1).
         As noted, ORS 161.067(1) requires the trial court to
enter separate convictions if “each provision requires proof
of an element that the others do not.” The superintendent
asserted that aggravated felony murder and first-degree
robbery each had elements that the other did not. Attempted
aggravated felony murder included the element of personally
and intentionally attempting to cause the victim’s death, an
element not found in first-degree robbery. First-degree robbery, on the other hand, had an element not required for
attempted aggravated felony murder: completion of the robbery. That is, a jury could convict a defendant of attempted
aggravated felony murder for having only attempted the
robbery, but it could not convict the defendant of first-degree
robbery unless the robbery had been completed.
         In support, the superintendent also relied on a
footnote in State v. Barrett, 

, 

 (2000).
Applying former ORS 161.062(1)—a statute essentially
    4
      Specifically, the court sentenced petitioner to 120 months for attempted aggravated murder and 90 months for first-degree robbery, with 45 months of the robbery
sentence to run consecutively to the attempted aggravated murder sentence.
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identical to the merger statute at issue here5 —this court
stated in a footnote that the trial court could enter separate
convictions for aggravated felony murder and the underlying predicate felonies:
    “[A] separate conviction could be entered on the robbery
    charge on remand. Robbery and aggravated murder clearly
    are set out in two different statutory provisions, ORS
    164.415 and ORS 163.095. Moreover, in light of our conclusion that the various aggravating circumstances are not
    ‘elements’ for purposes of former ORS 161.062(1) but, rather,
    alternative ways of proving the element of aggravation, the
    statutory provisions penalizing robbery and aggravated
    murder each involve an element that the other does not and
    address separate legislative concerns. Accordingly, for purposes of former ORS 161.062(1), we do not view robbery as a
    lesser-included offense to the aggravated-murder charge.”

 at 37 n 4. Although Barrett did not depend on the distinction between a completed and attempted predicate felony, it
stated, more broadly, that predicate felonies were not themselves elements of aggravated felony murder, but were “alternative ways of proving” a single element of aggravation.
         In response to the superintendent’s argument in the
Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that the statement in
Barrett was dictum. The correct rule, petitioner contended,
was that articulated by this court in State v. Tucker, 

, 

 (1993). In that case, the defendant had
been convicted of (among other things) two counts of aggravated felony murder against each of the two victims, one
based on the underlying felony of robbery, the other based
on the underlying felony of burglary. See 

; 

 at
323 n 1. The trial court had merged the aggravated felony
murder counts together, but it had not merged the underlying robbery and burglary counts into those aggravated
felony murder counts. 

. This court, applying
former ORS 161.062, held that “robbery and burglary were
lesser included offenses of aggravated felony murder.” 

 at

    5
       Former ORS 161.062(1) was repealed by Or Laws 1999, ch 136, § 1. We have
described it as the “not quite identical twin” of ORS 161.067(1). State v. Crotsley,

, 276 n 3, 

 (1989). “Given their shared history, this court
has treated former ORS 161.062 and ORS 161.067 as essentially interchangeable.” State v. Gensitskiy, 

, 

 (2019).
144                                          Martinez v. 

. Therefore, this court held, the trial court had erred in
not merging those counts. 

        The superintendent responded that Tucker had
been overruled by Barrett, and the post-conviction court
ultimately agreed. It granted the superintendent summary
judgment.
         Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed in a split decision. Martinez, 

. As
relevant here, the majority concluded that the footnote
from Barrett controlled: a predicate felony is not an element of aggravated felony murder. 

. The majority also agreed with the superintendent that the requirements of ORS 161.067(1) were not met, because the two
crimes each required proof of an element that the other did
not: attempted aggravated felony murder does not require
proof of a completed first-degree robbery—attempt being
sufficient—while first-degree robbery does require proof of
a completed robbery. 

. Accordingly, the majority
agreed that the post-conviction court had been correct: the
two counts could not merge as a matter of law, so petitioner
was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object. See

.
         Senior Judge Brewer dissented, concluding that the
majority was incorrect in its merger analysis. He argued
that the Barrett footnote was inaccurate and should be
reconsidered. 

. He also would have concluded
that ORS 161.067(1) required merger. The relevant requirement of ORS 161.067(1) was whether each crime required
proof of at least one element that the other did not. 

. The dissent rejected the superintendent’s
contention that felony murder and first-degree robbery had
different elements because felony murder could be proved by
evidence of an attempt to commit first-degree robbery. See

. While it was theoretically possible to prove felony murder by proving an attempt to commit a predicate felony, “where a completed predicate felony is proved, it has no
element that is not subsumed in an attempted aggravated
felony murder conviction based on that completed felony.”

 (footnote omitted). Because the dissent concluded
that first-degree robbery did not require proof of an element
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that attempted aggravated felony murder did not, the trial
court should have merged the first-degree robbery conviction into the attempted aggravated felony murder conviction. Id. at 447-49.
          Petitioner sought review, which we allowed.
                       II. DISCUSSION
A.    Requirements of ORS 161.067(1)
         As noted, the issue here involves whether—
assuming that petitioner’s trial counsel had invoked ORS
161.067(1)—that statute would have prohibited the trial
court from entering separate convictions against petitioner
for both attempted aggravated felony murder and first-degree robbery. Again, the relevant text of that statute
provides:
        “When the same conduct or criminal episode violates
     two or more statutory provisions and each provision
     requires proof of an element that the others do not, there
     are as many separately punishable offenses as there are
     separate statutory violations.”
         Textually, ORS 161.067(1) authorizes separately
punishable offenses when three conditions are met: (1) the
defendant’s actions qualify as the same conduct or criminal
episode; (2) the defendant’s actions violate more than one
separate statutory provision; and (3) each separate statutory provision requires proof of an element that the other
provision(s) do not. See State v. Crotsley, 

, 

 (1989). The parties in this case do not dispute that
the first two requirements are met: petitioner, in a single
criminal episode, violated two or more statutory provisions.
         The only statutory requirement at issue here is the
third: whether each separate statutory provision requires
proof of an element that the others do not. It is not enough
to show that one offense has an element that the other does
not; the other offense also must have an element that the
first does not. See State v. Blake, 

, 

 (2010) (“if one offense contains X elements, and another
offense contains X + 1 elements, the former offense does
not contain an element that is not also found in the latter
146                                                        Martinez v. Cain

offense”). In short, the requirement is met, and the offenses
will not merge, only if each statutory offense at issue has a
unique element not in common with the other offenses.
B.    Robbery Count Did Not Require Element Not Found in
      Aggravated Felony Murder Count
         The primary point of contention in this case turns
on felony murder and its relationship to the predicate crimes
for felony murder. Accordingly, we begin there.
          Felony murder was defined in ORS 163.115(1)(b)
(2011) in a way differently from most other crimes. Ordinarily, a statute defining a crime sets out a series of elements; when the elements are met, the crime has been
proved. The statute defining felony murder varies that by
expressly incorporating other crimes (the predicate felonies)
to which additional elements are then added (the death of a
nonparticipant in the predicate felony, and a particular relationship between that death and the commission of the felony). 

 The list of predicate felonies is lengthy and includes
both the completed and attempted versions.6
         First-degree robbery is one of the predicate offenses
of felony murder, whether it is completed or only attempted.
ORS 163.115(1)(b)(G) (2011). Therefore, felony murder predicated on a first-degree robbery will encompass all the elements of first-degree robbery. That is not only true for a
completed robbery, but also for an attempted robbery. To
prove felony murder based on a completed first-degree robbery, the state definitionally must prove every element of
a completed robbery. To prove felony murder based on an
attempted first-degree robbery, the state definitionally must
prove every element of an attempted robbery. Whether the
robbery was completed or attempted, then, there is no element of the robbery count that would not have to be proved
in the felony murder count.
        In this case, the superintendent does not dispute
that both the attempted aggravated felony murder count
and the first-degree robbery count pleaded the same factual robbery. The robbery alleged in the second count of the
    6
      When Barrett was decided, it calculated over 30 possible predicate felonies.
See 

 n 2 (apparently including the attempt versions of the predicates).
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indictment was the same robbery that served as a predicate
felony for the attempted aggravated felony murder charge in
the first count.
         We emphasize that here, because the outcome would
be different were that not true. If a defendant had been
charged with one crime (e.g., burglary), but also charged
with felony murder based on a different predicate felony (e.g.,
first-degree kidnapping, see ORS 163.115(1)(b)(F) (2011)),
then the two crimes would have different elements, and the
convictions would not merge.
         Here, the state indicted petitioner for robbery and
for attempted aggravated felony murder based on the same
robbery. Both crimes were committed against the same
victim and in the same criminal episode. That single robbery must be either completed or attempted for both counts.
It could not simultaneously be both completed and only
attempted.
        Because the same factual robbery was involved,
the state’s proof of (attempted aggravated) felony murder
based on that first-degree robbery—whether completed or
attempted—necessarily meant that the state would have
proved every element of first-degree robbery, whether completed or attempted. As we just noted, proof of felony murder based on a completed first-degree robbery definitionally
would require proof of every element of a completed robbery,
while proof of felony murder based on an attempted first-degree robbery definitionally would require proof of every
element of an attempted robbery. Regardless whether the
robbery was completed or attempted, there is no element of
that robbery count that would not have been proved in the
felony murder count. Thus, whether the robbery was completed or attempted, all the elements of robbery were necessarily included within the attempted aggravated felony
murder charge.
        Accordingly, we agree with petitioner and reject
superintendent’s argument that the robbery count against
him required proof of an element that the attempted
aggravated felony murder count against him did not.
ORS 161.067(1). Every element of first-degree robbery was
required to be proved as part of the attempted aggravated
148                                         Martinez v. Cain

felony murder count. If the trial court had applied ORS
161.067(1) properly after proper objection, the trial court
would have merged the guilty verdict on the robbery count
into the guilty verdict on the attempted aggravated felony
murder count.
C. Applicability of This Court’s Decision in Barrett
         The Court of Appeals also relied on this court’s decision in Barrett. See 

. Barrett is not based
on the distinction argued for by the superintendent (that the
predicate felony required the extra element of completion,
while felony murder required only the element of attempt
to commit the predicate felony). Instead, Barrett held that
aggravated murder was murder plus a single element of
“aggravation,” adding that the predicate felonies of felony
murder were merely alternative methods of proving that element of aggravation. Barrett thus indicated that a predicate
felony was not itself an element of aggravated felony murder.
If Barrett was correct on that point, then the two crimes
would not overlap in their elements, and petitioner’s predicate felony of first-degree robbery would not merge into the
guilty verdict for attempted aggravated felony murder. We
turn, then, to Barrett.
         The main part of Barrett concerned whether the
trial court should have merged the guilty verdicts on three
counts of aggravated murder, when the defendant had only
killed a single victim. See 

. Interpreting the
nearly identical merger statute, former ORS 161.062(1), this
court held that “defendant’s conduct in intentionally murdering one victim did not violate ‘two or more statutory provisions[.]’ ” 

 (quoting former ORS 161.062(1)). The
different ways in which aggravation could be shown were
not separate elements of the crime of aggravated murder,
but instead alternative ways of proving the single element of
“aggravation.” See 

. Because the different forms
of aggravation were not different elements, there was only
one crime of aggravated murder. 

.
   “The aggravating factors constitute no more than different theories under which murder becomes subject to the
   enhanced penalties for aggravated murder. That defendant’s conduct in intentionally murdering the victim in
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      this case was ‘aggravated’ by ‘any,’ i.e., one or more, act surrounding that conduct does not convert that conduct into
      more than one separately punishable offense.”

        In so concluding, this court had asserted in a footnote that the predicate felonies for felony murder were also
alternative ways to prove the single element of “aggravation”:
         “One of the aggravating circumstances listed in ORS
      163.095 is that the murder was committed during the
      course of one of 12 felonies listed in ORS 163.115(1)(b).”

 n 2. Relying on that, this court later shifted
from the issue of merger of the three counts of aggravated
murder and turned instead to the different issue of whether
the predicate felony should merge into the aggravated felony murder count. The court stated in dictum that the trial
court, on remand, should not merge the predicate felony
of first-degree robbery into the aggravated felony murder
count based on that same robbery:
      “[I]n light of our conclusion that the various aggravating
      circumstances are not ‘elements’ for purposes of former
      ORS 161.062(1) but, rather, alternative ways of proving the
      element of aggravation, the statutory provisions penalizing
      robbery and aggravated murder each involve an element
      that the other does not and address separate legislative
      concerns.”

 at 37 n 4.
         We need not revisit Barrett as a whole to conclude
that it was incorrect in its dictum that the predicate felony
would not merge into aggravated felony murder. The erroneous premise was the assertion in its second footnote that the
predicate felonies of aggravated felony murder were alternative ways to prove “aggravation.” The alternative ways
to prove “aggravation” were listed in ORS 163.095 (2011):
things such as murder for hire (subsection (1)(a) - (b)), the
murder of more than one victim (subsection (1)(d)), or the
murder of a person under the age of 14 (subsection (1)(f)). A
predicate felony was not a method of showing “aggravation,”
but a necessary element of the lesser offense of felony murder
as defined in ORS 163.115(1)(b) (2011). The “aggravating”
150                                         Martinez v. Cain

factor that elevated felony murder into aggravated murder
was that the defendant had “personally and intentionally
committed the homicide.” ORS 163.095(2)(d) (2011).
         For those reasons, we disavow footnotes two and
four of Barrett. The predicate felonies of felony murder are
not alternative ways to prove “aggravation” for aggravated
felony murder. Accordingly, Barrett does not support holding
that ORS 161.067(1) prevents merger of the two counts.
                    III.   CONCLUSION
        For the reasons discussed, we conclude that ORS
161.067(1), properly interpreted and applied, would have
required merger of petitioner’s guilty verdicts on first-degree
robbery and attempted aggravated felony murder.
         We emphasize again that our holding today only
addresses the legal question of how ORS 161.067(1) should
be interpreted in the context of a charge of felony murder.
This case does not offer any opportunity for us to consider
the underlying question in petitioner’s post-conviction case
whether counsel was, in fact, constitutionally inadequate for
failing to object to petitioner’s sentences. We hold only that
the post-conviction court erred in granting summary judgment for the superintendent based on the holding that, as
a matter of law, the offenses would not merge regardless of
objection.
        The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case
is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.