State v. Kragt

                                      577

     Argued and submitted March 5; decision of Court of Appeals affirmed,
judgment of circuit court vacated, and case remanded to circuit court for further
 proceedings consistent with Court of Appeals decision in State v. Kragt, 

, 

 (2020), September 30, 2021


                   STATE OF OREGON,
                   Respondent on Review,
                              v.
                  RANDALL JAY KRAGT,
                    Petitioner on Review.
           (CC CR99474) (CA A168649) (SC S067872)
                                 

    Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of first-degree sodomy. At sentencing, defendant argued that, under ORS 144.103(1), the trial court should only
impose one post-prison supervision (PPS) term for all three counts, as opposed to
a PPS term for each count. The trial court disagreed, and sentenced defendant
to a PPS term for each count. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Under ORS
144.103(1), a trial court must impose a PPS term for each qualifying offense.
    The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit
court is vacated, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Kragt, 

, 

 (2020).




    En Banc
    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
   Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General,
Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
   Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public
Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the
briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the brief was Ernest
G. Lannet, Chief Defender.

______________
   * On appeal from Yamhill County Circuit Court, John L. Collins, Judge. 

, 

 (2020).
578                                           State v. Kragt

   GARRETT, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The
judgment of the circuit court is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Kragt,

, 

 (2020).
Cite as 

 (2021)                                                  579

           GARRETT, J.
         Oregon’s criminal sentencing guidelines establish
rules regarding the length of post-prison supervision (PPS).
However, ORS 144.103(1) sets forth special PPS rules for
certain sex offenses. The question in this case is whether,
when sentencing a person convicted of multiple qualifying
sex offenses, ORS 144.103(1) requires a trial court to impose
a separate term of PPS for each count or whether that statute, instead, requires the trial court to impose a single term
of PPS that covers all counts. The Court of Appeals, relying
on its own precedent, held that the statute requires a separate term for each count. State v. Kragt, 

,

 (2020) (Kragt II). For the reasons that follow,
we agree and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
As did the Court of Appeals, we vacate the judgment of the
circuit court based on a different sentencing issue than the
one presented on review, and we remand to the circuit court
for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals
decision in Kragt II.1
                          I. BACKGROUND
         After defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of
first-degree sodomy (Counts 1, 3, and 5), the trial court sentenced him as follows: for Count 1, 60 months in prison; for
Count 3, 100 months in prison, concurrent with Count 1; and,
for Count 5, 100 months in prison, consecutive to Count 3.
For all three counts, the court initially imposed a single
PPS term of 240 months, minus the time defendant served
in prison. As a result, defendant was effectively sentenced
to 200 months in prison and, assuming he served the full
term, 40 additional months of PPS.
         After defendant was released from prison, the
trial court amended the part of the judgment of conviction
that had imposed a single PPS term.2 Defendant appealed,
    1
      The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the judgment based on a different sentencing issue than the one presented on review. Kragt II¸ 

. Our ultimate disposition incorporates the Court of Appeals’ disposition
on that different sentencing issue.
    2
      According to defendant, that occurred because the Board of Parole and
Post-Prison Supervision “contacted the trial court to request an amended judgment.” The record contains no other information in that regard.
580                                                        State v. Kragt

arguing that the trial court had erred by amending the judgment without notice and a hearing. The Court of Appeals
agreed with that argument and reversed. State v. Kragt,

, 

 (2018) (Kragt I).
        On remand, defendant argued that ORS 144.103(1)
required the trial court to impose a single PPS term for all
three counts, as the court had done initially, before amending
the judgment. The trial court disagreed and entered a judgment that imposed three PPS terms: 180 months for Count 1,
140 months for Count 3, and 140 months for Count 5.3
         Defendant appealed again, arguing that ORS
144.103(1) requires a single term of PPS regardless of the
number of counts. In a per curiam opinion, the Court of
Appeals rejected that argument, relying on its decisions in
Norris v. Board of Parole, 

, 

 (2010),
rev den, 

 (2011), and Delavega v. Board of Parole,

, 

 (2008). Kragt II, 

. Defendant petitioned for review, which we allowed.
                       II. APPLICABLE LAW
        Before November 1, 1989, convicted defendants
were sentenced under the “parole matrix system.” State
ex rel Engweiler v. Cook, 

, 

(2006). However, in 1987, “the Oregon legislature authorized the Oregon Criminal Justice Council to develop a set
of mandatory felony sentencing guidelines that would establish presumptive sentences for all felonies.” State v. Davis,

, 

 (1993) (footnote omitted). “At
the same time, the legislature created the State Sentencing
Guidelines Board (the Board) to serve as the administrative body that would adopt the guidelines in the form of
    3
      As the Court of Appeals explained, the trial court imposed determinate
PPS terms for each crime. Kragt II, 

. The trial court determined defendant’s PPS terms for each offense by subtracting the prison term to
which defendant had been sentenced for that offense from the maximum indeterminate sentence for the violation. See 

 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court had erred by imposing determinate terms of PPS.
Kragt II, 

. The court explained that “ORS 144.103 requires
the imposition of an indeterminate term of PPS, to be computed by the Board of
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision once the amount of time a defendant actually
spent incarcerated is known[.]” 

. Neither party sought review of that
issue; accordingly, this opinion does not address that issue, and our ultimate
disposition incorporates the Court of Appeals’ disposition of it.
Cite as 

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administrative rules.” 

 (footnote omitted). “In May 1989,
the Board completed that task and, in July, the legislature
expressly approved the guidelines.” Id. at 486-87. The guidelines became effective November 1, 1989. Id. at 487.
          The sentencing guidelines are administrative rules
that set forth presumptive sentences for most felony convictions based on the offender’s criminal history and the seriousness of the offense. Id. at 486-87. The guidelines accomplish that “by creating a grid for establishing the sentence
in light of the offender’s criminal history and the seriousness of the offense. The vertical axis of the grid is the Crime
Seriousness Scale, which classifies the crime of conviction
according to its seriousness in relation to other crimes.
OAR 213-004-0001(1).” Engweiler, 

. The Crime
Seriousness Scale sets forth 11 numerical crime categories,
with crime category 1 representing the least serious crimes
and crime category 11 representing the most serious crimes.
OAR 213-004-0002(1); OAR ch 213, app 1.4 “The horizontal
axis of the grid is the Criminal History Scale, which classifies the offender’s personal criminal history.” Engweiler, 

. “Each block on the grid provides the presumptive
sentencing range for offenders whose crime and criminal
history places them in that block.” 

          Despite being administrative rules, the sentencing
guidelines are approved by the legislature and have “the
authority of statutory law.” State v. Langdon, 

,

 (2000); see also State v. Carlton, 

,

 (2017) (noting that the legislature acts “both
directly and by approving the Sentencing Guidelines”). And,
importantly, “unless otherwise specifically provided by law,”
a court has a “duty” to impose a sentence in accordance with
the sentencing guidelines. ORS 137.010(1). Thus, the legislature and the electorate can supersede the sentencing guidelines by enacting other provisions.
          For most felony convictions, the sentencing guidelines provide that the duration of PPS is one year, two years,
    4
      Several of the administrative rules and statutes discussed in this section of
the opinion have been amended since defendant committed his crimes. See, e.g.,
ORS 137.010; OAR 213-004-0002; OAR 213-005-0002. However, those amendments do not affect the analysis of the issue on review. In this opinion, unless
otherwise noted, we refer to the current versions of those rules and statutes.
582                                                            State v. Kragt

or three years, as determined by the crime seriousness
category of “the most serious current crime of conviction.”
OAR 213-005-0002(2)(a). However, ORS 144.103, enacted
in 1991, provides special PPS rules for certain sex offenses.
Subsection (1) of that statute provides:
        “Except as otherwise provided in ORS 137.765 and subsection (2) of this section, any person sentenced to a term
    of imprisonment for violating or attempting to violate
    [ORS 163.365 (second-degree rape), 163.375 (first-degree
    rape), 163.395 (second-degree sodomy), 163.405 (first-degree sodomy), 163.408 (second-degree unlawful sexual
    penetration), 163.411 (first-degree unlawful sexual penetration), 163.425 (second-degree sexual abuse) or 163.427
    (first-degree sexual abuse)] shall serve a term of active
    post-prison supervision that continues until the term of the
    post-prison supervision, when added to the term of imprisonment served, equals the maximum statutory indeterminate sentence for the violation.” 5

Thus, the duration of PPS for a qualifying offense under
ORS 144.103(1) is different than for most crimes under OAR
213-005-0002. Generally, the maximum term of PPS under
the latter is three years.6 But under ORS 144.103(1), an
offender could have a PPS term that is longer. For example, second-degree sodomy has a crime seriousness ranking of 8. OAR 213-017-0004(8). Second-degree sodomy is a
Class B felony, ORS 163.395(2), and, as such, has a maximum indeterminate sentence of 120 months in prison, ORS
161.605(2). For a defendant convicted of one count of second-degree sodomy, a Measure 11 crime, the minimum sentence

    5
       ORS 144.103(1) has been amended since defendant committed his underlying crimes. See Or Laws 2013, ch 708, § 31. However, defendant does not contend
that that amendment affects our analysis. Accordingly, we cite the current version of ORS 144.103(1).
    Relatedly, the record does not clearly indicate when defendant committed
each of the underlying crimes. However, because both parties have proceeded on
the assumption that ORS 144.103(1) applies to all defendant’s convictions, we do
so as well.
    6
       The maximum PPS term may be less than three years, if a three-year PPS
term, when added to the prison term, exceeds the statutory maximum indeterminate sentence for the crime of conviction. OAR 213-005-0002(4). In that situation, the trial court reduces “the duration of post-prison supervision to the extent
necessary to conform the total sentence length to the statutory maximum.”
Id.
Cite as 

 (2021)                                                    583

is 75 months. ORS 137.700(2)(N).7 In the absence of ORS
144.103(1), assuming that a trial court had sentenced the
defendant to 75 months, then, under OAR 213-005-0002,
the defendant’s PPS term would be a determinate term of
36 months. See OAR 213-005-0002(2)(a) (explaining that,
when the “most serious current crime of conviction” is a
crime seriousness category 8, the PPS term is three years).
However, ORS 144.103(1) would require the trial court to
impose a longer PPS term—an indeterminate PPS term
equal to the “maximum statutory indeterminate sentence,”
i.e., 120 months, minus “the term of imprisonment served.”
Thus, assuming that the defendant served an incarceration
term of 75 months, the PPS term would be 45 months under
ORS 144.103(1).
         As the foregoing example illustrates, ORS 144.103(1)
can increase the length of PPS that a defendant must serve.
As discussed in more detail below, the legislature enacted
that statute for the purpose of reducing recidivism among
sex offenders.
                           III.    DISCUSSION
         The issue before this court is whether the trial court
erred in imposing separate terms of PPS for each of defendant’s counts of conviction for first-degree sodomy, with
defendant arguing that ORS 144.103(1) requires a single
term of PPS regardless of the number of counts. The interpretative question is potentially a significant one for defendant. Under defendant’s interpretation of ORS 144.103(1),
he would be required to serve a single PPS term of only 40
months. Defendant reaches that conclusion by subtracting the total time that he served for all three offenses (200
months) from the maximum indeterminate sentence for
first-degree sodomy (240 months).8 In contrast, under the
    7
       Because second-degree sodomy is a Measure 11 crime, a defendant’s minimum sentence is established by ORS 137.700, not the sentencing guidelines grid.
    8
       We note that defendant’s interpretation assumes that the phrase “imprisonment served” in ORS 144.103(1) refers to the total incarceration time served for
multiple offenses. However, that question is not presented in this case. When the
trial court imposes a PPS term under ORS 144.103(1), the amount of time that a
defendant will, in fact, serve is unclear. That is because a defendant who receives
“good time” credit may not serve the full incarceration term. In accordance with
ORS 144.103(1), the trial court imposes an indeterminate PPS term that is the
584                                                            State v. Kragt

state’s interpretation, defendant would serve three separate
PPS terms concurrently, which would result in serving a
total of 180 months of PPS. The state counters that the trial
court’s sentence was correct: For Count 1, defendant’s PPS
term is 180 months (the maximum indeterminate sentence
of 240 months minus the 60 months of imprisonment on
that count); and, for each of Counts 3 and 5, the term is 140
months (the maximum of 240 months, minus 100 months of
imprisonment).9
         As noted, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court correctly imposed separate terms of PPS for each
count, relying on its previous decisions in Delavega and
Norris. In Delavega, the Court of Appeals construed OAR
213-005-0002(2)(b)(C) (2000) and ORS 144.103(1) in the context of a defendant who had received consecutive sentences
for sex offenses covered by the statute. The court concluded
that the text of both provisions makes clear that a term of
PPS is required “for each violation of the statutes listed in
ORS 144.103.” 

. The court began with OAR
213-005-0002(2)(b)(C) (2000), which at the time provided:
       “Notwithstanding section 2(a) of this rule, the following
    periods of post-prison supervision shall apply:
        “…
        “(C) For an offender sentenced for sexual offenses subject to ORS 144.103, the period shall be the maximum statutory indeterminate sentence for that violation less the term
    of imprisonment served.”
(Emphasis added.) The court explained that the use of the
singular nouns “sentence” and “violation” in OAR 213-005-
0002(2)(b)(C) (2000) was “significant” because those terms

difference between the maximum indeterminate sentence for the offense and
the time of imprisonment served. Later, when a defendant is released, the board
determines the PPS expiration date based on the length of the indeterminate
sentence and the term of imprisonment that the defendant served. In this case,
we are reviewing the trial court’s sentence, not a calculation by the board, and
we do not address what the result of the board’s calculation should be in this case.
    9
      As just noted as to defendant ‘s argument, the state similarly assumes
that “imprisonment served” refers to the time served for each offense. Again, the
meaning of “imprisonment served” is not before this court, and nothing in this
opinion should be construed as expressing any view about the meaning of that
term.
Cite as 

 (2021)                                 585

   “refer back to the plural phrase ‘sexual offenses subject
   to ORS 144.103’ and indicate that an offender sentenced
   for any one of the several sexual offenses listed in ORS
   144.103 must serve a term of post-prison supervision for
   that one offense equal to the maximum statutory indeterminate sentence prescribed for the offense minus the
   term of imprisonment that the offender has served on that
   offense.”

. The court then turned to ORS 144.103(1),
focusing on the phrase “indeterminate sentence for the violation” and concluded that that statute, “like OAR 213-005-
0002(2)(b)(C), establishes that an offender must serve a term
of post-prison supervision equal to the maximum statutory
indeterminate sentence minus the term of imprisonment
served for each violation.” 

 Finally, the court considered
the petitioner’s argument based on OAR 213-012-0020(4)(a),
which provides that, when a defendant is sentenced to consecutive sentences and one or more includes a prison term,
the supervision term is the “presumptive post-prison supervision term imposed for the primary offense.” 

. The
petitioner had argued that that language contemplates a
single PPS term, but the court rejected that argument, citing State v. Vedder, 

, 

(2006), rev den, 

 (2007), which held that OAR
213-012-0020 had been impliedly repealed by ORS 144.103.
Id. Based on Vedder, the court reasoned that OAR 213-012-
0020 did not apply to the petitioner because he had been
convicted of sex crimes listed in ORS 144.103. Id.
          As noted, Delavega dealt with consecutive sentences. Shortly thereafter, in Norris, the Court of Appeals
considered the same issue in the context of concurrent sentences. The court concluded that the “principle underlying
[its] decision in Delavega—that the PPS terms on individual
convictions must be calculated separately with respect to
each conviction—applies with equal force [to concurrent sentences].” Norris, 

. “Accordingly, where ORS
144.103(1) applies, an offender’s term of post-prison supervision is calculated by reference to the maximum indeterminate sentence applicable to each crime of conviction[,] minus
the amount of time the offender was actually incarcerated
on that crime.” 

 (emphases in original).
586                                                 State v. Kragt

         In sum, the Court of Appeals has construed OAR
213-005-0002(2)(b)(C) and ORS 144.103(1) as requiring a
PPS term to be calculated and imposed for each crime of
conviction. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument here that the trial court had erred in imposing multiple PPS terms for each of his offenses. Kragt II,

.
        On review, defendant argues that the Court of
Appeals misconstrued the relevant provisions in Delavega
and Norris. That argument raises a question of statutory
interpretation that we resolve by considering the text, context, and any helpful legislative history. State v. Gaines, 

, 

 (2009).
A.    Text
          We begin with the text. ORS 144.103(1) provides:
        “Except as otherwise provided in ORS 137.765 and subsection (2) of this section, any person sentenced to a term
     of imprisonment for violating or attempting to violate
     ORS 163.365, 163.375, 163.395, 163.405, 163.408, 163.411,
     163.425 or 163.427 shall serve a term of active post-prison
     supervision that continues until the term of the post-prison
     supervision, when added to the term of imprisonment
     served, equals the maximum statutory indeterminate sentence for the violation.”
ORS 144.103(1) makes clear that it applies to “any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for violating or
attempting to violate [one of the eight sex offense statutes
listed in the subsection].” It also makes clear that such a
person shall serve “a term of active post-prison supervision
that continues until the term of the post-prison supervision,
when added to the term of imprisonment served, equals the
maximum statutory indeterminate sentence for the violation.” In other words, the length of a PPS term is the time
that remains after the duration of “the term of imprisonment served” is subtracted from the “maximum statutory
indeterminate sentence for the violation.” The text does not
expressly address how many PPS terms a defendant should
receive if sentenced for multiple qualifying offenses. By providing for service of “a term” of PPS to be calculated by reference to the “maximum statutory indeterminate sentence for
Cite as 

 (2021)                                                     587

the violation,” however, the text seems to contemplate that
the sentence for each “violation” will include a PPS term.
(Emphasis added.)
         Defendant urges a different reading, arguing that
the text, by referring to “any person,” contemplates that a
term of PPS will attach to an offender, not a count of conviction. That is, the subject of the sentence is the “person,”
not the offense. The state responds that the legislature used
the phrase “any person” simply to show that ORS 144.103(1)
applies to any offender who commits certain sex crimes.10
Thus, the fact that the subject of ORS 144.103(1) is “any person” does not mean that the legislature intended to limit the
number of PPS terms imposed in a judgment.
         The state’s interpretation is more persuasive. Defendant is correct that, as a grammatical matter, the “person”
is the subject of subsection (1), but that sheds little light on
the question whether a trial court should impose a term of
PPS on each count. The more natural reading of the text
is that the legislature intended for “any person” to simply
describe the category of offenders eligible for the PPS term
set forth in the remainder of the text, namely, any person
who is “sentenced to a term of imprisonment for violating
or attempting to violate ORS 163.365, 163.375, 163.395,
163.405, 163.408, 163.411, 163.425 or 163.427.”
        In sum, the text, though not definitive, strongly
suggests that a PPS term will attach to any “violation.”
B.    Context
         Context includes “other provisions of the same or
related statutes, the pre-existing statutory framework
within which the statute was enacted, and prior opinions of
this court interpreting the relevant statutory wording.” Ogle
v. Nooth, 

, 

 (2014). Here, both
parties rely on the 1989 version of sentencing guidelines to
support their positions. The 1989 version of the sentencing
    10
       In support of that reading, the state cites several 1989 sentencing statutes, namely, ORS 137.071 (1989), ORS 137.122(2) (1989), ORS 137.123(2) and (3)
(1989), where the subject of the statutes was either “the person” or the “defendant”
who committed the crimes. The state contends that, even though the “person,” as
opposed to the offense, is grammatically the subject of those statutes, they nonetheless contemplate the imposition of a separate sentence for each offense.
588                                                           State v. Kragt

guidelines predated the enactment of ORS 144.103(1) in
1991 and is therefore relevant context. Moreover, as noted,
the sentencing guidelines are the default sentencing framework unless ORS 144.103(1) “specifically” provides otherwise. ORS 137.010(1).
         However, we pause to note that the parties’ arguments regarding the meaning of the sentencing guidelines
raise questions about how those rules would apply in circumstances not squarely presented in this case, which is
governed by ORS 144.103(1). Nonetheless, the parties agree,
as do we, that the 1989 guidelines are relevant for present
purposes only as context for understanding what the legislature likely intended when it enacted ORS 144.103(1) two
years later, and we limit our focus accordingly. Moreover,
that inquiry is guided by what the guidelines and their
explanatory comments say on their face, as the legislature
did not have the benefit of any appellate decision interpreting them when it enacted ORS 144.103(1) in 1991.
         With the question so framed, the state advances a
more plausible account of how the 1991 Legislative Assembly
likely would have understood the sentencing guidelines
to operate. First, as general context, the state points to
rules that reinforce a general notion that each “conviction”
receives its own “sentence,” including a term of PPS. For
example, former OAR 253-13-001(1) (1989), renumbered as
OAR 213-013-0001 (1996), sets forth the requirements for
the sentencing report that is required for each case resulting in at least one felony conviction. See Oregon Sentencing
Guidelines Implementation Manual 67 (1989) (explaining
that a sentencing report is required for “each case resulting
in at least one felony conviction under the guidelines system”).11 That rule then specifies that the sentencing report
should contain a description of the term of PPS “imposed for
each crime of conviction”:
       “(3) The sentencing report shall provide the following
    information about the sentence imposed for each crime of
    conviction:
    11
       The Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual (guidelines
manual) “contains the official commentary to the guidelines and provides important legislative history to aid our interpretation of the relevant guidelines provisions.” State v. Lykins, 

, 

 (2015).
Cite as 

 (2021)                                      589

      “(a) a description of the sentence imposed, including:
      “(A) the prison term of incarceration and the term of
   post-prison supervision[.]”
(Emphases added.) Similarly, former OAR 253-13-010(3)(a)
(1989), renumbered as OAR 213-013-0010 (1996), sets forth
the requirements for a presentencing report and, in part,
provides that each report shall include:
       “(3) A proposed grid block classification for each crime
   of conviction and the presumptive sentence for each crime
   of conviction.
      “(a) If the proposed grid block classification is a grid
   block above the dispositional line, the presentence report
   shall state the presumptive prison term range and the presumptive duration of post-prison supervision.”
(Emphases added.) By providing that the various reports
shall state either the PPS term “imposed for each crime of
conviction” or the presumptive PPS term for each crime of
conviction, the sentencing guidelines suggest that a PPS
term is imposed for each crime of conviction.
         More directly on point, the state relies on a different rule, former OAR 253-12-040(1) (1989), renumbered as
OAR 213-012-0040 (1996), which states in part that, “[i]f the
offender has been sentenced to multiple terms of post-prison
supervision, the terms of post-prison supervision shall be
served as a single term.” (Emphasis added.) The state also
points to the following statement in the guidelines manual:
       “Whenever an offender is serving more than one term of
   post-prison supervision at a single time, the terms shall be
   treated as a single term of supervision. Consequently, the
   maximum sanction for supervision violations is limited by
   [former] OAR 253-11-004. This limitation on the maximum
   revocation sanction applies regardless of how many terms
   of post-prison supervision are being served by the offender.
   This limitation even applies when the separate terms of post-prison supervision have been imposed in separate cases.”
Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual 118
(1989) (emphasis added). According to the state, the quoted
language shows that, at the time when the legislature
enacted ORS 144.103(1) in 1991, it would have understood
590                                                           State v. Kragt

the sentencing guidelines to allow for multiple PPS terms
(to be served as a single term). Moreover, because the commentary states that former OAR 253-12-040(1) (1989) “even
applies” when a defendant has received multiple PPS terms
in “separate cases,” it follows that the rule also anticipates
situations where a defendant receives separate terms of PPS
in a single case.
         The state is correct that former OAR 253-12-040(1)
(1989) expressly contemplates situations in which an offender
will be serving “multiple terms of post-prison supervision,”
providing that they should be served as a “single term.”
Defendant rejoins that that rule does not authorize the imposition of multiple terms; it only addresses situations where
they exist. That may be a correct literal reading, but the
distinction is not a particularly salient one when evaluating
the rule as context for the statutory construction question
now before us. The important point is that, if the legislature,
in enacting ORS 144.103(1) in 1991, would have understood
that multiple PPS terms could exist for an offender, then that
context supports rather than undercuts the natural reading
of the statutory language, discussed above.12
        To be sure, defendant identifies other contextual
provisions that create ambiguity. First, defendant points
to former OAR 253-05-002 (1989), renumbered as OAR 213-
005-0002 (1996), which, in part, provides:
       “(2) The duration of the post-prison supervision shall
    be determined by the crime seriousness category of the
    most serious current crime of conviction:
        “…
       “(3) The term of post-prison supervision shall begin
    upon completion of the offender’s prison term …. …
       “(4) The term of post-prison supervision, when added
    to the prison term, shall not exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the crime of conviction. When the total
    12
       Defendant also hypothesizes that the wording in former OAR 253-12-
040(1) (1989) is meant to address only situations in which offenders are serving
multiple PPS terms imposed in different cases or when a trial court erroneously
imposes multiple PPS terms in a single case. However, that suggestion is difficult
to square with the italicized part of the explanatory comment in the guidelines
manual quoted above, which clearly implies that “separate cases” are just one
category of situations in which separate terms can be imposed.
Cite as 

 (2021)                                    591

   duration of any sentence (prison incarceration and post-prison supervision) exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the sentencing judge shall first reduce the duration
   of post-prison supervision to the extent necessary to conform the total sentence length to the statutory maximum.”
Defendant argues, not implausibly, that subsection (2)
calls for a trial court in a multi-count case to impose a single PPS term calculated by reference to the most serious
count. But the state has a response that is not implausible,
either: The state argues that the rule as a whole is consistent with the idea encapsulated in former OAR 253-12-040
(1989)—namely, that a term of PPS is imposed on each count
of conviction, though an offender serves a single term. In
the state’s view, that is why subsection (2) of former OAR
253-05-002 (1989) refers to the “duration” of PPS while the
other subsections refer to a “term” of PPS. For example, subsection (4) provides that “[t]he term of post-prison supervision, when added to the prison term, shall not exceed the
statutory maximum indeterminate sentence for the crime
of conviction”—wording that, as the state points out, once
again seems to associate a “term” of PPS with every “crime
of conviction.”
         Defendant also relies on former OAR 253-12-020
(1989), renumbered as OAR 213-012-0020 (1996), which pertains to consecutive sentences and provides, in part:
       “(1) When the sentencing judge imposes multiple sentences consecutively, the consecutive sentences shall consist of an incarceration term and a supervision term.
      “…
      “(3) The supervision term of consecutive sentences
   shall be:
       “(a) The presumptive post-prison supervision term
   imposed for the primary offense if the sentence for any
   offense includes a prison term[.]”
As defendant emphasizes, subsection (1), too, makes repeated
reference to “an incarceration term” and “a supervision
term” in the singular. And the fact that the word “each”
does not appear between “shall” and “consist” could indicate
that a single “supervision term” exists for the consecutive
592                                                            State v. Kragt

sentences. Defendant further reasons that, consistent with
what subsection (1) seems to say, paragraph (3)(a) contemplates a single PPS term in a case where an offender receives
consecutive sentences, any of which includes a term of
incarceration. The guidelines manual confirms that understanding by explaining that, under paragraph (3)(a), the
PPS term for the consecutive sentences is a “single term.”
Oregon Sentencing Guidelines Implementation Manual 115
(1989) (explaining that, in a hypothetical example of three
separate burglary convictions, “the supervision part of the
consecutive sentences is a single term of post-prison supervision” (emphasis added)).
         At oral argument, the state argued that former OAR
253-12-020(3)(a) (1989) provides directions to the Board of
Parole and Post-Prison Supervision (board), not trial courts,
for calculating the duration of PPS and for setting the PPS
expiration date when a defendant is released from prison.
The state concedes that paragraph (3)(a) directs the board to
require a defendant to serve only a single term of PPS based
on the primary offense, but it argues that the rule does not
address how many terms are to be imposed.
         We note that, even assuming (without deciding) that
defendant is correct that paragraph (3)(a) of former OAR
253-12-020 (1989) is directed to what the trial court does
at sentencing rather than to what the board does later, that
rule is still limited by its terms to consecutive sentences.
Thus, defendant’s interpretation, if correct, does not necessarily mean that the legislature would have understood
multiple PPS terms to be precluded in other contexts.13

    13
       Although the parties have not discussed the point, a possible reason why
the drafters of the guidelines could have approached the question of PPS terms
differently for consecutive sentences has to do with resource limitations. See Or
Laws 1987, ch 619, § 2 (“In developing the sentencing guidelines the [Oregon
Criminal Justice Council] shall take into consideration factors relevant to [the]
establishment of appropriate sentences, including … the effective capacity of
state and local correctional facilities and other sentencing sanctions available.”).
To account for that resource issue, the drafters of the guidelines made clear in
former OAR 253-02-001(1) (1989), renumbered as OAR 213-002-0001 (1996), that
resources were a driving consideration behind the guidelines: “The primary
objectives of sentencing are to punish each offender appropriately, and to insure
the security of the people in person and property, within the limits of correctional
resources provided by the Legislative Assembly, local governments and the people.”
(Emphasis added.)
Cite as 

 (2021)                                593

         At bottom, both parties can point to wording in the
sentencing guidelines that supports their respective positions. As noted, we decline to resolve ultimate questions
regarding the meaning of the various guidelines rules that
the parties have cited, beyond what is necessary to infer
how the legislature likely understood them when it enacted
ORS 144.103(1) in 1991. The provisions that the state cites
are consistent with and reinforce the general notion that
each count of conviction receives its own sentence, including
its own term of PPS. Defendant has identified other provisions that plausibly may be read in a manner that is in tension with that general notion, but the state has put forward
contrary interpretations of those rules that are also plausible. On balance, particularly in light of former OAR 253-
12-040(1) (1989) and the wording in the guidelines manual
explaining that provision, we conclude that the legislature
likely would have understood in 1991 that multiple terms of
PPS could be imposed by a sentencing court in a single case.
That conclusion supports the natural reading of the text of
ORS 144.103(1), as discussed above.
C. Legislative History
        Both parties contend that the legislative history of
ORS 144.103(1) demonstrates an intention that the number of PPS terms imposed under that statute would be consistent with what the guidelines otherwise required. As
explained below, we have found little helpful evidence in that
regard.
         The legislative history shows that the 1991 Legislative Assembly enacted ORS 144.103(1) to increase the
length of PPS. Both parties rely on the testimony of a proponent, Jim McIntyre, who explained that ORS 144.103(1)
“extend[ed] the maximum period of time [a sex offender] can
currently be held on probation and under [post-prison] supervision.” Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2543, Feb 19,
1991, Tape 25, Side B (statement by Jim McIntyre). His testimony included an additional indication that ORS 144.103(1)
was not intended to affect the application and term setting of the maximum statutory times under the sentencing
guidelines:
594                                               State v. Kragt

      “[McIntyre]: The are a number of statutory enactments that are triggered … anytime any criminal defendant is sentenced. This merely addresses one section of
   those statutes. There are statutes and administrative rules
   that govern the overall application and term setting of maximum statutory times that will not be affected.”
Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Corrections, HB 2543, Feb 19, 1991,
Tape 25, Side B (statement by Jim McIntyre) (emphasis
added). The foregoing could be interpreted as suggesting
that ORS 144.103(1) would not affect the “statutes and
administrative rules that govern the overall application and
term setting of maximum statutory times,” including the
sentencing guideline rules that set forth the number of PPS
terms a trial court imposed. See 

         Notably, however, in making that statement, McIntyre
did not explain which statutes and administrative rules
governed the application and term setting of maximum statutory times and, in turn, did not specify which rules would
remain unchanged. It therefore is far from clear that he
had the view that former OAR 253-05-002 (1989) and former OAR 253-12-020 (1989) would be unaffected by the 1991
legislation. Indeed, because ORS 144.103(1) clearly affected
the length of the PPS terms set forth in former OAR 253-
05-002(2) (1989), McIntyre could not have meant that former OAR 253-05-002 (1989) would be entirely unaffected.
As such, his testimony is of little assistance in resolving the
interpretative question before us, and the legislative history
does not otherwise indicate one way or the other whether
the number of PPS terms that a defendant would receive
under ORS 144.103(1) would be the same as those imposed
under the sentencing guidelines.
D. Maxims of Statutory Construction
         When the legislature’s intent is not clear from the
text, context, and legislative history, this court may resort
to maxims of statutory construction to resolve the uncertainty. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 

, 

 (1993). In this case, defendant relies on
the maxim of avoiding an interpretation that will “lead to
an absurd result that is inconsistent with the apparent
Cite as 

 (2021)                                                  595

policy of the legislation as a whole.” See State v. Vasquez-Rubio, 

, 

 (1996) (describing
maxim). Specifically, defendant contends that interpreting
ORS 144.103(1) to require a trial court to impose separate
PPS terms will result in longer PPS terms for offenders who
receive relatively shorter prison sentences. He also contends
that it will work to the disadvantage of offenders who earn
good-time credits and thus ultimately serve less time than
the full term imposed.
         We do not necessarily disagree that construing ORS
144.103(1) to require a term of PPS for each count may lead,
in some cases, to results that are arguably anomalous or
inconsistent with policies underlying the sentencing guidelines. See Norris, 

 (holding that statute
requires a term of PPS for each conviction, notwithstanding
“anomaly” that “petitioner is actually in a worse position by
virtue of having committed the least serious of his offenses
(which yielded the longer terms of PPS) than he would have
been if he had, instead, committed four acts of first-degree
sexual abuse”). On the other hand, the state argues that
defendant’s interpretation of the statute would have its own
anomalous consequences.14 However, the “absurd results
canon is best applied sparingly—only when the statute is
truly ambiguous and the result is truly absurd.” LandWatch
Lane County v. Lane County, 

, 

(2019) (emphasis in original). In this case, where the text
strongly supports one reading, where the context supports
that reading, and where the legislative history adds no
ambiguity, we conclude that resorting to the absurd-results
maxim is not appropriate. See Vasquez-Rubio, 

(“When the legislative intent is clear from an inquiry into
text and context, or from resort to legislative history, however, it would be inappropriate to apply the absurd-result
maxim.”). Defendant’s policy arguments are more appropriately directed at the legislature.
    14
       For example, the state points out that, under defendant’s interpretation
of ORS 144.103(1), a person who is convicted of two counts of first-degree rape,
receives consecutive ten-year sentences on the two counts, and serves the full 20
years of incarceration could not be required to serve any PPS at all, because the
total period of incarceration would equal the statutory maximum indeterminate
sentence of 240 months. The state argues that such a result would contravene the
legislative intent to lengthen the periods of PPS for sex offenders.
596                                           State v. Kragt

E. Summary of Text, Context, and Legislative History
         Our consideration of the text, context, and legislative history leads us to conclude that a trial court must
impose a PPS term for each violation of the statutes listed
in ORS 144.103(1). Accordingly, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the trial court did not err in imposing a PPS
term for each offense.
         Because this decision addresses only the statutory
question posed by ORS 144.103(1), we do not definitively
resolve when and whether multiple PPS terms are appropriate under the sentencing guidelines. However, as ORS
137.010(1) makes clear, the legislature has authority to set
forth sentencing requirements that differ from those set
forth in the sentencing guidelines. Here, for the reasons
discussed above, ORS 144.103(1) specifically provides that
a trial court shall impose a PPS term for each violation of
the offenses listed in that subsection. Thus, to the extent
that such a construction is inconsistent with the sentencing
guidelines, ORS 144.103(1) controls when applicable.
         The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
The judgment of the circuit court is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Kragt,

, 

 (2020).