No. 11 April 10, 2025 381
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
v.
SCOTT ANTHONY COTTER,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 23CR15583) (CA A181978) (SC S071405)
En Banc
On petitioner on review’s petition for review filed
November 1, 2024; considered and under advisement
January 7, 2025.
James H. Brewer, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public
Defense Commission, Salem, submitted the petition for
review and the supplemental pro se petition for review for
petitioner on review. Also on the petitions was Ernest G.
Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
appeared for respondent on review. Also appearing were
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
DUNCAN, J.
The petition for review is allowed, and the joint motion
for remand is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in State v. Cotter, 332 Or App 785 (2024) (nonprecedential
memorandum opinion), is vacated. The circuit court’s judgment of conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded to
the circuit court for further proceedings. The supplemental
pro se petition for review is denied.
382 State v. Cotter
Cite as
373 Or 381 (2025) 383
DUNCAN, J.
In this criminal case, defendant’s appellate counsel
filed a petition for review, and this court asked the state
to respond. Thereafter, the parties filed a joint motion to
remand the case to the trial court. For the reasons explained
below, we allow the petition and grant the parties’ motion.1
Defendant was charged with reckless driving and
recklessly endangering another person. ORS 811.140; ORS
163.195. After being unable to secure counsel, defendant
represented himself at trial. Defendant’s arguments at trial
were not responsive to the charges, and a jury convicted him
of both charged crimes.2 In the Court of Appeals, defendant
continued to represent himself, filing a pro se brief in which
he reasserted arguments similar to those he had made in
the trial court.3 The state filed its brief, which construed
defendant’s pro se brief as arguing that the state had failed
to present sufficient evidence at trial to support guilty
verdicts.
Meanwhile, defendant had been charged in a second
criminal case, received appointed counsel, been convicted,
and appealed. In that case, the Court of Appeals appointed
appellate counsel for defendant.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals appointed appellate counsel for defendant in this case. But, by that time,
the briefing had been completed and the case had been submitted to the court for decision. Immediately after being
appointed, defendant’s appellate counsel filed an emergency
motion to withdraw the case from submission and permit
appellate counsel to file a brief. In his motion, appellate
counsel informed the court that he sought to brief two issues:
(1) that defendant had not validly waived his right to counsel
1
Defendant also filed a supplemental pro se petition for review. We deny that
petition without further discussion.
2
At trial, defendant asserted, among other things, that he had been the subject of “hits” intended to put him back on medication, which, at sentencing, he
attributed to “Mormons and also Masons.” He also made numerous references to
celebrities, historical events, botany, and geology, claiming that they were connected to him and his case.
3
Defendant’s arguments on appeal raised similar themes to those he had
raised at trial.
384 State v. Cotter
in the trial court, and (2) that the trial court had erred in
failing to order an evaluation of defendant’s competence.
Two days after appointing counsel, and without
ruling on counsel’s emergency motion, the Court of Appeals
issued a nonprecedential opinion that addressed only defendant’s pro se brief and affirmed defendant’s convictions.
State v. Cotter, 332 Or App 785, 786 (2024) (nonprecedential
memorandum opinion). The court construed defendant’s pro
se brief to have “assign[ed] error to the trial court’s denial
of his motion for a judgment of acquittal,” and the court
rejected that argument on the ground that the evidence was
sufficient to support defendant’s convictions.
Id.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals denied appellate counsel’s emergency motion but invited him to raise
the issues he had identified in that motion in a petition for
reconsideration. Appellate counsel accepted that invitation
and filed a petition for reconsideration raising those issues,
accompanied by a proposed supplemental brief developing
his arguments on those issues in greater detail. The Court
of Appeals denied the petition for reconsideration without
explanation.
Appellate counsel then filed a petition for review in
this court, arguing that the Court of Appeals had abused
its discretion in denying his petition for reconsideration. He
contended that, where an appellate court does not appoint
counsel for a defendant until after a case has been submitted, the court must allow counsel to file supplemental briefing that raises claims of fundamental constitutional error
in the trial court, when those errors likely impaired defendant’s right to counsel on appeal and counsel has requested
an opportunity to provide supplemental briefing immediately upon appointment and before the issuance of the
court’s decision.
This court asked the state to respond to the petition for review. Thereafter, the parties submitted a joint
motion to remand this case to the trial court pursuant to
ORS 138.227, which provides, as relevant here, that parties may file a joint motion in an appellate court to vacate
the judgment from which an appeal was taken and remand
Cite as 373 Or 381 (2025) 385
the matter to the trial court to reconsider the judgment or
any intermediate decision by the trial court.4 The parties’
motion relates to the first issue that appellate counsel had
identified as a basis for the supplemental brief that he had
sought to file in the Court of Appeals, specifically, whether
defendant had validly waived his right to counsel in the trial
court. The parties ask this court to vacate the trial court’s
judgment and remand this case to the trial court because
defendant represented himself at trial without any colloquy about his understanding of the right to counsel or any
indication that he validly chose to waive that right. They
explain that “the record definitively shows that neither the
arraignment judge nor any later judge inquired to determine whether defendant was knowingly and intelligently
waiving his right to counsel at the trial level in this case.”
In addition, they agree that, on remand, “the trial court
should determine from the record that no waiver occurred,
and should allow the case to proceed as it would have if the
original mistake had not occurred, and that defendant is
entitled to a new trial.”
We agree with the parties and grant the joint
motion for remand. In the trial court, defendant appeared
for arraignment without counsel. He told the court that he
was not financially eligible for court-appointed counsel and
that, although he had contacted many lawyers, he had not
found one to retain. In response, the court noted that defendant was “working to hire [his] own attorney” and gave
defendant a waiver of counsel form to fill out “just in case
that’s the direction [defendant] want[ed] to go.”
Defendant signed the waiver form at some point
that same day, and the form was thereafter entered into the
trial court file. The form included a “FINDINGS” section
4
ORS 138.227 provides:
“(1) On joint motion of the parties to an appeal in a criminal case, the
appellate court may vacate the judgment or order from which the appeal was
taken and remand the matter to the trial court to reconsider the judgment or
order, or any intermediate decision by the trial court. On remand, the trial
court shall have jurisdiction to enter a modified judgment or order, or to reenter the vacated judgment or order.
“(2) After entry of a judgment or order under subsection (1) of this section, either party may appeal in the same time and manner as an appeal from
the original judgment or order.”
386 State v. Cotter
for the court to input its findings “regarding the defendant’s
waiver of counsel,” including that “Defendant has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to counsel.” The form also included space for a judge to sign it. As
entered into the trial court file, the form’s findings section
was blank, and the form did not include a judge’s signature.
At defendant’s second appearance, which was before
a different judge, defendant again appeared without counsel.
At the outset of that appearance, the court stated: “[I]t looks
like we do have a waiver of counsel for you submitted on [the
date of the arraignment].” The court then asked defendant
how he wanted to proceed, and defendant responded that he
wanted a jury trial. The court told defendant,
“If you are going to represent yourself for the jury trial,
make sure that you’re prepared to do so.
“…
“Now, it’s not—it’s not my role—it’s not anybody’s role
to represent you. Representing you, providing you legal
advice would be the role of your attorney, and you waived
your right to an attorney at this point.”
(Emphasis added.) The court also told defendant that he
could still “change [his] mind about an attorney,” but that,
if defendant did so, he needed to let the court know “upfront
and early.” Defendant replied, “I am unable to get a lawyer.
And also, I am unable to get a court-appointed lawyer.” In
response, the court directed defendant to apply for court-appointed counsel if he was unable to afford an attorney.
The court otherwise took no action based on the waiver of
counsel form. At no point did the court conduct a colloquy or
otherwise inquire about defendant’s understanding of the
right to counsel or ensure that he wished to waive that right.
The case proceeded to trial, and, as mentioned,
defendant represented himself and was convicted as
charged.
The parties are correct to conclude in their joint
motion that vacating the trial court’s judgment is necessary in this case and that defendant is entitled to a new
trial. A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional
right to counsel at trial under both Article I, section 11, of
Cite as 373 Or 381 (2025) 387
the Oregon Constitution5 and the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.6 Without that right, “[a] trial
court ‘cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.’ ” State v.
Barone,
329 Or 210, 226,
986 P2d 5 (1999), cert den,
528 US
1086 (2000) (quoting Rose v. Clark,
478 US 570, 577-78,
106
S Ct 3101,
92 L Ed 2d 460 (1986)).
Although a defendant may waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se, a waiver of the right to counsel is
valid only if the record shows that it was “knowing and
intentional.” State v. Langley, 351 Or 652, 665,
273 P3d 901
(2012). We have explained:
“[A] trial court may accept a defendant’s proffered waiver
of counsel only if it finds that the defendant knows of his or
her right to counsel and, if indigent, of his or her right to
court-appointed counsel, and that the defendant intentionally relinquishes or abandons that right.”
State v. Meyrick, 313 Or 125, 133,
831 P2d 666 (1992).
“Because courts are reluctant to find that a defendant has
waived fundamental constitutional rights, we will not presume a waiver of the right to counsel from a silent record.”
Langley,
351 Or at 665.
We agree with the parties that the record in this
case does not show that defendant validly waived his right
to counsel. At arraignment, defendant told the court that
he was not financially eligible for court-appointed counsel
and could not find a lawyer to retain. In response, the court
gave defendant a waiver of counsel form to fill out “just in
case,” which defendant did. At the next pretrial hearing,
defendant again told the court that he was unable to obtain
either appointed or retained counsel. In response, the court
told defendant to apply for court-appointed counsel if he
was unable to afford an attorney. The court otherwise took
no action based on the waiver of counsel form. At no point
5
Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in relevant part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to … be heard by
himself and counsel[.]”
6
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].”
388 State v. Cotter
did the court conduct a colloquy or take any other action to
ensure that defendant had validly waived his right to counsel. See Meyrick, 313 Or at 133 (“A colloquy on the record
between the court and the defendant wherein the court, in
some fashion, explains the risks of self-representation” is the
“preferred means” of ensuring a waiver is valid.). Because
the record does not show that defendant validly waived his
right to counsel, we grant the parties’ joint motion.
We further conclude that equitable considerations
require vacatur of the Court of Appeals decision. See State v.
Hemenway, 353 Or 498, 504-06,
302 P3d 413 (2013) (explaining that this court may exercise its equitable powers in favor
of vacatur). The Court of Appeals opinion was based solely
on defendant’s pro se briefing, despite the fact that the Court
of Appeals had appointed appellate counsel and, immediately upon being appointed and before the Court of Appeals
issued its decision, appellate counsel had identified potential trial court errors relating to defendant’s fundamental
constitutional rights—specifically, the right to counsel and
the right to a fair trial—each of which could have impaired
his ability to secure appellate counsel to assist him from
the outset on appeal. Thus, the Court of Appeals decision is
based on incomplete briefing, which itself was attributable
to a trial where, as the parties agree, defendant represented
himself, even though he had not validly waived his right to
counsel.
The petition for review is allowed, and the joint
motion for remand is granted. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in State v. Cotter, 332 Or App 785 (2024) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion), is vacated. The circuit
court’s judgment of conviction is vacated, and the case is
remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. The
supplemental pro se petition for review is denied.