Volume 4 — District of Columbia Reports

Petition for freedom. Verdict for the petitioner. Motion for new trial, on the ground that a sale within three years after importation into the county of Washington does not, per se, give a right to freedom, but is only evidence of importation for sale; and it was agreed that if the Court should be of that opinion, a new trial should be granted ; and the counsel referred to the case of Negro William Jordan v. Sawyer, in this Court, in Washington, at April term, 1823, [2…

Action on the case, for enticing away and receiving the plaintiff’s slave, named-Williamson, in Virginia and bringing him into the District of Columbia. The 1st count was for enticing Williamson from the service of the plaintiff, knowing him to be the plaintiff’s slave.

This was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace in the county of Alexandria, in an action of detinue brought by James Duff against William Maynadier, for nine silver spoons and a soup-ladle. the appellant, contended, that a justice of the peace has not jurisdiction in Retinue. .In Virginia the jurisdiction- was given by an Act passed in December, 1806, since the separation of Alexandria county from that State.

Assumpsit, by the payees, against one of the makers of a joint- and several promissory note, dated at Michillimackinaek, on the 31st July, 1819, for $6,497.17, and payable at St. Louis, in the Territory of Missouri, to the plaintiffs or order. Upon the return of the writ, this nóte was produced as the cause of action. The declaration had two counts upon the note, but did not state that it was payable at St. Louis, or dated at Michillimackinaek, or elsewhere.

<p>Upon an informal bond given by a marshal, payable to the President of the United States and his successors, instead of to the United States, the Court held the defendant to bail upon a certificate of defalcation from the treasury department.</p>

This was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace who non-prossed the appellant in an action for $25, for the use and occupation of certain premises for five years, at five dollars a year, under a sealed lease from the plaintiff to the defendant.

Bill for injunction to stay proceedings on a judgment at law upon a bond including compound interest, which was alleged to be usurious. cited Connecticut v. Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. Ca. 14, and Leíais v. Bacon, 3 Hen. & Munf. 89. alleged that the question of usury had been settled in the action at law and could not be litigated again in a court of equity, and cited Broion v. Brent, 1 Hen. & Munf. 4; Peirce v. Rotoe, Adams’s Vermont, Rep. 179; Hastings v. Wiswall, 8 Mass.

The case agreed, states that “ Samuel Robertson, a native of the State of Maryland, a purser in the navy of the United States, and as such, purser for several years before his death, stationed and domiciled at Norfolk, in the State of Virginia, died in the year 182 , at Bedford, in Pennsylvania, insolvent, and indebted to the plaintiffs residing in the District of Columbia, on simple contract entered into there, which debt still remains due and unpaid; and also died,…

Assumpsit for the price of a blind horse sold by the plaintiff' to the defendant. prayed the Court to instruct the jury, “ that if they should believe from the evidence that the horse sold to the defendant was affected before, or at the time of the sale, with a latent disease in his eyes, materially impairing the value of the horse, of which he afterwards went blind ; and which ordinary skill and attention could not discover, and that the same was known to the plaintiff,…

Replevin for the plaintiff’s goods taken in execution by the defendant, as marshal of the District of Columbia, at the suit of Thomas Carberry v. John Wells, Jr., moved the Court for a return of property, on the ground that it was in the custody of the law under a fieri facias against Wells at the suit of Thomas Car-berry, and cited Cromwell v. Owens, 7 Har. & Johns. 55, 60, 61; Meany v. Head, 1 Mason, 322; Pritchard v. Stephens, 6 T. R. 522; Thompson v. Button, 14 Johnson,…

<p>Qumre, whether a person who subscribed for stock in the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, without paying a dollar a share at the time of subscribing, and who has never been required to pay any of the instalments called for by the companycan be considered as a stockholder, so as to disqualify him to serve upon an inquisition to condemn land for the canal' ? It is not necessary that an inquisition, taken under the charter of that company, should contain the names of such jurors as were summoned but not sworn. The land condemned is sufficiently described by reference, in the inquisition, to the description of it in the warrant.</p>

Assumpsit by the indorsee against his immediate indorser of a draft by T. B. Pottinger on John E. Dorsey, at Baltimore, to the order of Thomas Mustin, indorsed by him to-the defendant and by the defendant to the plaintiff for $300, at sixty days from September 13th, 1828.' 1 • The defendant’s residence was' notoriously at Georgetown, D. C., where there was a post-office, distant three,miles from the post-office in Washington, D. C. The notary who protested the draft at…

Ejectment for lot No. 7, in the square No. 320, in the city of Washington. The plaintiffs claimed as heirs or devisees of Philip Helirigle. The defendant claimed under a tax-sale. prayed the Court to instruct the jury, that the defendant gained no title under the collector’s sale given by him in evidence. and the Court being about to deliver the following opinion, in which the judges were unanimous, the parties came to a compromise.

■This w'as a motion, by Mr. J. Dunlop, to set aside an inquisition condemning land in Washington for the use of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, under the fifteenth section of its charter of January —, 1824, granted by Virginia, and confirmed by Pennsylvania, Maryland, and the United Slates.

Ejectment, for the western moiety of lot No. 2, in the square No. 348, in the city of Washington. It was agreed that the plaintiffs need not trace their title farther back than to the commissioners of the city of Washington. The plaintiffs claimed title by a deed from those commissioners to John Murdoch, December 19, 1801; from Murdoch to Walter Smith, April 5, 1805; and from.

Motion, by Mr. Wallack, for the plaintiffs, for judgment against the defendant, Patrick Dulany, for the amount of the instalment called for by the company, on his shares, upon ten days’ notice, under the 5th section of the charter of 27th of January, 1824. referred to the following authorities, as to mistake of fact or law.

Allegations were filed by C. McClean, a creditor, against Thomas Plumsell, a petitioner for the benefit of the “ Act for the relief of insolvent debtors within the District of Columbia,” upon which he was found guilty. prayed that the debtor might be committed to close custody, although he was out upon a prison-bounds bond.

This case was submitted by the parties to Cranch, C. J. (Thruston, J. absent, and Morsell, J.' being an inhabitant of, and owning real estate in, Georgetown, declined giving an opinion.)

Trover, by the assignee of a bill of lading given by the defendant as master of the brig Numa, for sundry bags of money consigned to the owners of the brig. The facts appeared to be, that J. & J. Harper, owners of the brig Numa, Ebenezer Bacon, master, shipped a cargo at Alexandria on board the brig, consigned to S. D. Harper, their supercargo.

Indictment for biting off’ the ear of John Taylor, with intent to disfigure him. Verdict, guilty. The defendant was called, and not appearing, his recognizance was forfeited at the present term. moved the Court to strike out the forfeiture, and permit him to move in arrest of judgment. The Court (Thruston, J., absent,) was of that opinion, and overruled the motion. The defendant having personally appeared, his counsel, Mr. Heiuitt, was permitted to move in arrest of judgment.

Bill in equity by the assignee of the cargo Against the supercargo, who claimed to retain for a balance due to him by the assignors.

<p>. Bill by a secret part-owner against a supercargo, to account for one eighth of the cargo of the brig Sea Horse.</p>

Trespass quare clausum fregil. Upon the general issue the defendant, by his counsel, Mr. Redin, offered evidence to show a condemnation of the land for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and a deed from Mrs. Mayfield to the Canal Company, and that the defendant entered under their authority. objected that it was res inter alios acta, but showed no title in the plaintiff. The defendant cannot justify under the general issue. 2 Saund.

<p>Indictment, for a nuisance in keeping a public gaming-house from April 10, to June 10, 1829.</p>

The defendant was convicted upon an indictment for keeping a faro-table at a place occupied as a tavern, contrary to the Maryland Act of 1797, c. 110. moved in arrest of judgment, and contended that the verdict does not authorize the Court to give judgment for the penalty ; but only creates a' cause ■ of action in favor of any one who will sue upon that verdict for the penalty.

Indictment for a common nuisance in keeping a common gambling-house for playing at the unlawful game called faro.

<p>In replevin, the defendant, (a constable who had seized the goods of the plaintiff in execution as the goods of Harrington,) was permitted to testify for himself, upon being indemnified by the plaintiff in the execution.</p>

The warrants were all issued on the 6th of October,, 1830. The first was for keeping the faro-table on the 7lh of September, 1830. The second for keeping it on the 8th of September.

50 for taxes upon a pew in St. John’s Church owned by the appellant, who was not a member of the Episcopal Church, and who had taken an assignment of the pew in payment of a debt due to him by Mr. W. Lee. denied, 1st. Thai the vestry was competent to sue; and 2d. That there was no personal obligation upon the appellant to pay; the only remedy being a sale of the pew. cited the Act of Maryland, 1798, c. 24, §§ 2, 32, and 33; the Proceedings of the State Convention in 1816 and…

Indictment FOR bigamy, under the Maryland Act of 1706, c. 8, which enacted and declared the British Statute of 1 Jac. 1, c. 11, against bigamy, to be in force in the then Province of Maryland. offered parol evidence, (the testimony of the mother of the first wife,) that the prisoner was married to her daughter (Elizabeth Hunt) in Philadelphia by a minister of the Methodist Church; and cited Archbold, 358; 1 Hale, 692.; and The King v. The Inhabitants of Brampton, 10 East,…

This was a motion to set aside an inquisition condemning land of Mr. Mason, in Georgetown, District of Columbia, for the use of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.

Replevin for goods and chattels taken in execution by the defendant, the marshal of the District of Columbia, at the suit of J. P. Van Ness v. J. Gales, Jr., on a judgment rendered May 28, 1828. The execution was delivered to the marshal, and by him levied upon the property, then in the possession of the said Gales, on the 26th of June, 1829. The plaintiff claimed the goods under a deed of trust from H. T. Weightman and the said Gales, dated June 4, 1829, to the plaintiff.

Scire facias against bail in detinue. The scire facias stated that the plaintiff in November, 1828, by the judgment of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for the county of Alexandria, “ recovered against William Herbert, a negro woman named Caroline, of the value of $300, if she' could be had; but if not, then the value aforesaid of her the said Caroline, together with her” (the plaintiff’s) “damages amounting to $75, as by a jury assessed, also $66.75, which to…

<p>Appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace for harbormaster’s fees in the port of Alexandria, D. C.</p>

This was an action of covenant, by the assignee of the lessor against the assignee of the lessee; The defendant pleaded that he was not assignee of the lessee. , The plaintiff offered parol evidence of possession by the defendant, and his payment of rent to the plaintiff, as evidence of an assignment. 2 Phil. Ev. 88, 89; Derisley et al. v. Custance, 4 T. R. 75. contends that the assignment can only be proved by deed, and the deed must be produced.

Motion to rule the defendant to special bail, on the affidavit of Briscoe, one of the firm of Clarke & Briscoe, at the bottom of an account. “That the above account is just and true as stated, and that no part thereof has been paid, except what is credited.” The following cases were referred to: Smith v. Watson, (1 Cranch, C. C. 311); Jolly v. Rankin, (1 Cranch, C. C. 372); Bartleman v. Smarr, at December, 1810, (2 Cranch, C. C. 16); Traverse v. Hight, (2 Cranch, C. C. 41);…

Bill for an injunction to stay the sale of lot No. 46, in Georgetown, under four writs of fi.fd. issued by order of the president of the Bank of Columbia,- returnable to the October Buies, 1822. . The bill states that' on the 1st of February, 1822, Bunnell and Bobinson sold and conveyed to Clement Smith part of lot No. 46, in Old Georgetown, for $3,850.

GoRSLine owed King, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company owed Gorsline. King issued his attachment, which was served on the canal company on the 20th of August, 1830.

. This suit was commenced on the 14th of July, 1829, by a treasury warrant issued under the hand and seal of S. Pleasonton, “ Agent of the Treasury,” under the second section of the Act of Congress of the 15th of May, 1820, [3 Stat. at Large, 592,] entitled “ An Act providing for the better organization of the Treasury Department; ” directed to the marshal of the District of Columbia, and commanding him to proceed immediately to levy and collect the sum of $11,769.13, by…

Conrad Schwarz was indicted for obstructing a public highway. contended that it was only a private way for the accommodation of those who purchased lots of General Forrest.

This was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace given against the appellant upon a promissory note to the appellee, upon a wager that Andrew Jackson would not have the electoral vote of Kentucky for the office of President of the United States. contended that the consideration was illegal, and cited Bland v. Collett, 4 Camp. 158, note ; Lansing's case, 8 Johns. 454; Bunn v. Biker, 4 Johns. 426 ; Vischer v. Yeales, 11 Johns. 23; Atherfold v. Beard, 2 T. R. 615…

<p>Slaves removed, by their owner from Maryland, or Georgetown in the District of Columbia, to Virginia, and kept therein one whole year, are entitled to freedom under the law of Virginia, unless the owner took the oath prescribed by that law within the time thereby limited; but after the lapse of twenty-five or thirty years, the jury may presume that such oath was taken as prescribed, and within the limited time.</p> <p>Slaves carried by the owner from Virginia to Maryland, with intent to reside therein, are entitled to freedom.</p> <p>If slaves be removed by their owner from Virginia to the county of Washington, D. C., and there sold within three years after such removal, the jury may infer that they were imported for sale, and if so, they are entitled to freedom.</p>

SciRE facias ; nul tiel record, and issue made up under the general authority given to the clerk by the attorneys of this Court, to make up their issues. W. Emack was surety for costs. suggested the death of Mr. Emack, and demanded new security for costs. The Court suggested, that perhaps Mr. Emaek’s administrator had assets. Mr. Redin said that the defendant was entitled to security not dependent upon assets.

In slander, the defendant demurred to the whole declaration, which consisted of one count only, containing three distinct charges. 1st. That the plaintiff was a rogue, thief, and murderer. 2d. That he was a rogue; and 8d. That as keeper of the Georgetown penitentiary he suffered a negro-buyer to escape for a bribe.

Petition for freedom;, under the will of Peter Dejean. objected, at thé trial, that there was no evidence that the petitioner was “ under the age of forty-five years,” when his title to freedom accrued. If he was over forty-five, he is not entitled to his freedom.

The petitioner claimed her freedom under the will of Mary Brooke, who directed that she should be free in'the year 1840. contended that she is now free, as her hire for the intermediate time is bequeathed to a particular legatee; and that the intention of the testatrix is to govern the case. If she is now free, who can compel her to serve till her time of freedom shall arrive ? But the petitioner never was the property of Mary Brooke.

Joseph Lafontaine was indicted for an assault and battery upon Edward Cowen. moved the Court for a rule on the Attorney of the United States to show cause why the indictment should not be quashed, on the ground that the defendant was the domestic servant of the Baron Stackelberg, charge d’affaires of his majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, and that the Supreme Court of the United States alone has jurisdiction of proceedings against foreign ministers and their domestics.

This cause was brought before the Court, upon a case stated as follows: “ In the years 1813 to 1819, inclusive, John C. Baum was indebted to the Corporation of Georgetown, for the taxes charged on lots 55 and 56, in the account A, amounting to $84.45, which taxes still Temain due and unpaid, and there is no personal property of the said Baum wherewith to satisfy or pay the same.

Bill in equity to set up a lost deed of trust not recorded in due time. The complainant was the trustee named in two deeds of trust made on the 17th of August, 1814, one by John Hollingshead and Adam King, and the other by John Hollingshead, to secure a debt of $8,112.50 due by the latter to the Bank of Columbia. The widow of Hollingshead had duly relinquished her dower, by acknowledging the deeds, but they were mislaid until the time for recording them had expired.

This was a petition by Plumsell for the benefit of the insolvent act for the District of Columbia ; to which, objections were filed by Holtzman, a creditor, before CRanch, C. J., on the 6th of July last, and by him postponed, to take the opinion of this Court, whether a conviction upon allegations filed upon a former petition, when the petitioner was committed in execution in favor of another creditor who has since been paid, is a bar to his present application, when…

This cause originated in a petition by the executor of Edward Jones to the Orphans’ Court, for leave to settle a second account, and to be allowed a credit for the loss upon certain stock sold for $75.96 less than its appraised value.

<p>Indictment for perjury.</p> <p>requested that the prisoner might plead without being arraigned. But the Court ordered him to be arraigned, and he pleaded without going into the criminal bar, or dock.</p>

Petition for freedom. prayed the Court to instruct the jury, that if the petitioner was brought here from Virginia by her lawful owner, and afterward ran away, and her owner sold her running, supposing her to be then in Virginia; the running away in fraud of the law will prevent the slave from the benefit of the provision in her favor.

Trespass and pound-breach. contended that it was no justification of the pound-breach; and cited Bradby on Distress, 287; Cotsworth v. Bettison, 1 Salk. 247; Lindon v. Hooper, Cowp. 414; 1 Rol. Ab. 674, 1. 5; Co. Lit. 47 b, and Latrobe’s Justice, 135. Mr. Marbury, in reply. If the distress be unlawful, the owner may take them out of pound if it be not locked, only latched, so as no violence be used. Com. Dig. Tit. Distress, D. 2, p. 500.

The defendant was yesterday brought before the. Court by the marshal for contempt. ' He had been standing near the stove, in the court-room, in conversation with a man named Childs, concerning a suit which some negroes had brought for their freedom against Emerson, when the latter said to him, in the hearing of the crier and bailiffs, “ you are a liar ; ” to which Childs replied, “ you are a damned liar.” The crier commanded silence.

Indictment for perjury, upon the insolvent’s oath that he would “ deliver up, convey, and transfer all his property,” &c., but he did not deliver up a promissory note which he had obtained after having made oath to his schedule, and before his oath made before the judge.

Mr. Marbury moved for a commission to take the deposition of a witness residing within one hundred miles of this place, but out of this district, and relies upon the Maryland law of 1773, c. 7, § 7, which authorizes the court to issue such a commission when there are material and competent witnesses “residing or living out of this province,” and contended that a witness, residing out of this district, was residing out of this province, within the meaning and spirit of the…

<p>A notice cannot lawfully be served on Sunday.</p>

Bill in equity, claiming interest on the plaintiff’s share of his father’s estate in the hands of the defendant under a deed of trust, by which the defendant was directed to invest the estate in productive stocks; the plaintiff having, at full age, given a receipt for $1,048.74, as his share of the estate.

objected to the clerk’s bill of fees in a chancery attachment, in which he charged continuances at the rules, after the cause was set for hearing as to the resident defendants, and common order of publication as to the absent defendants, and before the order of publication was executed. The cause as to the resident defendants was transferred to the court-docket; but as to the absent defendants it remained at the rules.

The defendant having been discharged this morning under the insolvent act of the District of Columbia, Mr. R. S. Coxe, offered to appear for him without special bail. said that they were non-resident creditors, and not bound by the defendant’s discharge, inasmuch as he was not confined at their instance, at the time of his discharge.

Judgment was rendered in this case against Fenton at the last term. now moved to exonerate the bail of Fenton, on the ground of his discharge under the insolvent act of this district, in January, 1832. The plaintiff was a non-resident creditor of Fenton at the time of his discharge, and the debtor was not then confined at his instance.

Assumpsit, by the plaintiff, late marshal of the District of Columbia, (for $187.73 for his poundage fees,) against Jeremiah Hoffman, survivor of William Hoffman, for whose use'a judgment had been recovered in the names of George and John Hoffman, against John Cox, who was arrested by the marshal (Ring-gold) upon a ca. sa., and released upon a prison-bounds bond, and afterwards discharged under the insolvent act of the District of Columbia.

This was a suit, docketed by consent, to recover from the defendant a balance of $5,035.68, stated by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department to be due from him, as a purser in the navy, to the United States.

Assumpsit upon the following special agreement in writing: “ Georgetown, May 14th, 1830.

Replevin. The defendant, Scott, -makes cognizance as bailiff of W. S. Moore, and justifies the taking as a distress for $250 rent due under the following grant of an annuity or rent, namely : “ This indenture, made this eleventh day of June, in the year one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, between Jonathan Scholfield and Eleanor his wife, of the town of Alexandria, and District of Columbia, of the one part, and William S. Moore of the same town, of the other part,…

The indictment against Hall contained two counts. 1st. That he did falsely make, forge, and counterfeit, and did cause and procure, &c., and did willingly aid and assist in falsely making, forging, &c., a certain paper, partly printed and partly written, commonly called a bank-note, and purporting to be a note of the President, Directors, and Company of the Bank of the United States, and to be signed by Nicholas Biddle, president of the said bank, and by W. M’llvaine,…

The declaration charged that the defendants, not charging them as partners, made. their promissory note, their own proper hand being thereto signed, and thereby, one day after date thereof, promised to pay to the plaintiff, or order,” $74.93 for value received by them.

This was an appeal from the judgment of Robert Clarke, Esq. a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, who had rendered judgments in favor of the corporation upon five separate warrants, for the penalty of ten dollars in each ease, for using a brickkiln without license for five successive weeks. The warrants were all issued on the 9th of August, 1831.

<p>It is not actionable to say of a white man, that he is “ a yellow negro,” 11 a villain and a liar; ” although the plaintiff had previously intermarried with a white woman, which marriage would have been unlawful, if he had been a negro or mulatto; there being no colloquium respecting the marriage', nor any marriage .averred.</p> <p>íTeither the Constitution of Maryland, nor any statute of that State, or of the United States, deprives a colored person, merely as such, of any civil rights of a citizen.</p> <p>Mere words of disgrace, unless written and published, are not actionable.</p>

<p>The marshal of the District of Columbia is not entitled to poundage, upon the arrest of a debtor on a ca. sa. in Alexandria county, who has been discharged from such arrest, by order of the plaintiff, without payment.</p>

This was a suit for freedom. The plaintiffs claimed their freedom under the law of Maryland of 1796, c. 67, (or the act of 1783,) by being imported from Virginia into Maryland by a Mr. Childs, a citizen and resident of Maryland, who gave no list of them to be recorded, &c. contended that this was a penal law of Maryland, which this Court, sitting in this county, could not enforce.

Bill in equity, stating that William T. Swann, in October, 1819, proposed to borrow of the defendant, $2,300, at ten per cent, per annum, which proposition was acceded to by the defendant; and it was agreed that $1,000 of it should be secured bya ground rent of $152 per annum upon, two lots of land, &c., and that the residue should be secured by a bond, with sureties; the rent and interest to be paid half-yearly, with leave to W. T. Swann to redeem the ground rent on payment…

15, § 18, which is in force in Washington county. contended that there was no limit to the right of appeal; and that the right of appeal is not governed by the Maryland law in force in Washington county.

Attachment on warrant, under the Maryland Act of 1795, c. 56, of the joint and separate effects of the defendants, for a joint debt; laid in the hands of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company as garnishees. one of the defendants, offered bail and an appearance for him, to discharge his separate effects. for bail for one would discharge the joint as well as separate property attached.

Petition for freedom. Evidence was offered to the following effect. The petitioners were brought in from Virginia on the 6th of January, 1828. The defendant, then owner of the petitioners, came to Washington on the 3d of November, 1826, with intent to remove and settle there, and had some of his household furniture in one of the houses called the seven buildings, in that city; and some of his family, namely, two daughters, and some of his servants resided there.

Lewis Johnson was indorser of a note of H. Langley, discounted by the Patriotic Bank, which he could not get renewed because another note of Langley, upon which $>57 were due, was lying under protest in the same bank, indorsed by the defendant, Wilson, in blank; he, therefore, paid the balance due on that note, took it up, and took the following receipt, indorsed thereon : “Balance 56.27. Received the above amount of fifty-six dollars of Lewis Johnson, October IS, 1829.

<p>A marshal of the Southern Judicial District in the Territory of Florida could not lawfully enter on the duties of his office before he had given bond and taken the oath required by the twenty-seventh section of the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789.</p> <p>It is not a compliance with the requirement of that act, to give a bond to Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, and his successors in office, not executed by two good and sufficient sureties, inhabitants and freeholders of the district of which he was appointed marshal, and not approved by the judge of that district; and not purporting to be for the faithful performance of the duties of his office by himself and his deputies, and not correctly describing the office to which he had been appointed.</p> <p>The President of the United States had no authority from the United States to take a bond from a marshal payable to himself and successors, as President.</p> <p>The judge of the district was the only person designated by the Act of Congress to take the bond and judge of the security, and ho could only take it in the name of the United States. »</p> <p>If the marshal was never qualified to enter upon the duties of the office, ho could not violate those duties, and his sureties were not liable for any money which the officers of the government might have put into his hands before he was authorized to receive it.</p>

<p>A conviction and sentence of an individual, not a member of Congress, by the House of Representatives of the United States, for a breach of privilege by assault and battery upon a member of the House, for, or on account of words by him spoken in the House of Representatives, in debate, are not a bar to a criminal prosecution by indictment for the assault and battery.</p>

The defendant, having been arrested upon three writs of ca. sa. at the suit of the United States, returnable on the first day of the present term, was brought into Court on that day, upon the motion of 4.he Attorney of the United States for this District, and by him prayed in commitment.

Debt against a surety in a guardian’s bond. The condition of the bond was that the guardian should faithfully account with the Orphans’ Court as directed by law; and should “also deliver up the said property to the order of the said court, or the directions of law,” &c. The declaration averred two breaches of the condition of the bond: 1.

The policy recited that whereas the assured had paid the premium for insurance of $3,000, on a stock of groceries in a certain house therein particularly described “ from loss or damage by fire whilst the said stock of groceries shall be and remain in the building aforesaid.” “ Now know all men by these presents, that in consideration thereof, the capital stock,” &c., “ of the said corporation shall be subject to pay to” the assured, &e., “any loss or damage which shall or…

Assumpsit, on the defendant’s letter ’of guaranty dated in Washington, D. C., June 27th, 1827, in these words : “ I hereby engage to guarantee the payment of his (Mr. Andrew Smilh’s) paper payable at the Branch Bank here, not exceeding $5,000, at such dates as he may find expedient.” On the 1st of October, 1828, Mr. Coxe, the plaintiff’s counsel, wrote a letter to Mr. Bradley, informing him that the note of Mr. Smith, dated April 3d, 1828, at six months, for $3,344.57, would…

Indictment for perjury committed on the trial of John Ryan, at the last term of this Court, by testifying that Evelina Ridgway, a witness in that cause, was a common drunkard. offered the record of this Court to show that there was such a prosecution against Ryan; and, as evidence of the record, produced the docket entries and minutes of the Court. objected that the docket entries and minutes are not the record, and cited Archbold, Cr. L. 318; Queen v. Scott, 6 Mod. 168.

The defendant was tried, upon two indictments, by the same jury- The first indictment was for forging a certificate of freedom under the seal of this Court. Upon the trial, Mr. Key (United States Attorney) offered to show to the jury, the prisoner’s signature, written in the presence of the marshal, and to allow them to compare it with the handwriting of the forged certificate, and cited 4 Starkie on Ev. 570. But the Court (nem. con.) rejected the evidence.

Ti-ib plaintiff’s cause of action was for work and labor done under a contract made by a commissioner, (duly authorized to contract,) under the private seal of the commissioner, but in the name of the' corporation ; by which the plaintiff bound himself to do certain work at certain prices, and to receive payment in the stock of the corporation; but it contained no obligation on the part of the corporation to pay in stock.

The defendant was convicted on the 2d count of the indictment, for “ feloniously ” uttering as true, a forged “ check, on the Bank of Maryland, which is as follows: that is to say, “ No. Bank of Maryland. “ Pay to Wm. C. Campbell or bearer, the sum of one hundred dollars and cents. “ $100, dollars, cents.

Indictment for obtaining money by false pretences. • It appeared that the false pretences were made in Baltimore, where the acceptances obtained thereby were made and paid, although the defendant obtained money upop them by getting them discounted in Washington county, D. C. moved the Court to instruct the jury that there was no evidence to sustain the indictment.

This was a bill in equity, brought by the United Stales against the debtors of the.

Petition for freedom. The petitioner was owned by Mr. Mills, in Alexandria, D. C., who removed to Maryland to reside, and settle there, and took the petitioner with him. She ran away and returned to Alexandria. While there, her owner in Maryland, sold her (£ contended that the sale within three years after the removal gave her a right to freedom, under the third section of the Maryland Act of 1796, c. 67.

Indictment for forging a certificate of freedom. Upon the trial, a witness, Mr. Keller, stated that he was acquainted with the handwriting of the prisoner. That about three years ago he and the witness wrote in the same office. When he first saw the paper, if the prisoner’s name had not been mentioned, be would not have said, at once, that it was his writing. If the prisoner’s name had been mentioned, he would have thought it might be his, but he could not have sworn to it.

Indictment for using contemptuous and threatening language 'to the mayor of Alexandria, (who is, ex officio, a justice of the peace,) in the exercise of his official duties, on the day of , in the year 1833. The defendant demurred generally, and in proper person stated his objections to the indictment. 1st. That no day or month is mentioned. 2d. That it was not stated that the mayor was in the exercise of his judicial functions. 1.

moved the Court (Morsell, J., absent,) for an attachment of contempt against John H. Pleasants, who resides in Richmond, in Virginia, for not obeying a summons to attend as a witness on behalf of the United States, before the-grand jury of Alexandria county, in the District of Columbia, immediately. - Thomas Woodward, deputy-marshal of the District of Columbia, made affidavit that he served the annexed summons on J. H. Pleasants, in the city of Richmond, in Virginia.

This was a bill in equity to compel the execution of a trust to sell land of Mary Resler, after her death to pay her personal debt to the plaintiffs under a deed of trust in fee made by her to the defendant John Hooff and others.

Trespass against the collector of corporation taxes, for entering the plaintiff’s banking house and carrying away goods. Justification, as collector, &c. referred to Act of Virginia, 1779; Acts of Congress, 25 February, 1804, [2 Stat. at Large, 255,] and 13 May, 1826 [4 Stat. at Large, 162]; Town Revenue Law of 1835, and for appointment of assessors and collectors.

The return of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring up 'a colored boy, was, that he was bound as apprentice to Mr. English, by the Orphans’ Court of Alexandria county, to learn the business of a house-servant. The evidence of this binding was a copy of the record of the Orphans’ Court, in these words: — Orphans’ Court, Alexandria county, October term, 1832.

Indictment for assault and battery, “ upon a person unknown,” (not to the jurors unknown.) moved in arrest of judgment, that the indictment was too uncertain.

Ti-ie first count in the indictment was for simple assault and battery. The second count was for an assault with intent to kill Basil S. Hurdle. Upon the first count the jury found the defendant guilty, and amerced him $500. Upon the second count they found him “ guilty, by an attempt to kill Basil S. Hurdle.” moved in arrest of judgment, 1. Because the verdict on the second count is too vague, and 2. Because the name of a prosecutor was not written on the indictment.

This was a common indictment for stealing forty-three cents, and one silver coin of the value of twelve and a half cents.

<p>Quosre, whether, in an indictment under the Penitentiary Act, for forging a 11 paper writing,” it must not be averred to have been done “ to the prejudice of the right ” of some person; and whether upon an indictment for a felony, judgment may be rendered as for a misdemeanor; and whether, if the facts stated in the indictment do not amount to felony, the word “ feloniously ” may not be rejected as surplusage and judgment given as for a misdemeanor ?</p>

Memorandum. A special session of the Circuit Court, in Washington county, for the trial of criminal causes, was holden on the 2d of September, 1833, by virtue of the following order, made at the last term, on the 29th of May, 1833. “ Ordered, that a special session for the trial of criminal causes, be held on the first Monday of September next, and that the marshal summon the usual number of grand and petit jurors; ” and of the following clause of the 5th section of the…

The indictment had two counts : 1. For keeping a disorderly house. 2. For keeping a bawdy house. The Court (Morsell, J., contrd,) decided'that the general reputation of the house .could not be given in evidence by the Attorney of the United States..

<p>The dying declarations of the deceased, made in contemplation of death, may be given in evidence.</p> <p>A new trial was granted, after conviction of murder, upon newly-discovered evidence, and the venue was changed.</p>

This was an appeal from the Orphans’ Court for the county of Washington, which had decided that the judgment of a justice of the peace is entitled to priority of payment, and is upon a par with the judgments of a court of record.

<p>Upon a count for keeping a disorderly house, charging that the defendant suffered persons of ill fame to come together, &c., evidence may be given of the general reputation of such persons. And the same evidence is admissible upon a count for keeping a bawdy house.</p>

<p>moved the Court to permit him to appear for the defendant without bail, because the" defendant had been discharged under the insolvent law of this district since the cause of action accrued.</p> <p>st.ated that the plaintiff was hot a resident of the District of Columbia, and was not the creditor at whose instance the defendant was confined. See the Act of May 6, 1822, entitled “An Act for the relief of certain insolvent debtors.” [3 Stat. at Large, 682.]</p> <p>Mr. Hall, in reply, contended that that act applied only to nonresident debtors who might be arrested and confined here. That the proviso does not extend beyond the evil intended to be remedied, which was that non-resident defendants had not the benefit of the Act of 1803. The Act of 1822 gives them the benefit, but with avproviso that the discharge shall not operate against any creditor residing out of the limits of the District of Columbia, except the creditor at whose instance the debtor may be confined.</p>

<p>It is not a valid objection to an affidavit to hold to bail in slander, that the plaintiff therein states that he is credibly informed and verily believes that the defendant spoke the words; the affidavit being positive that the plaintiff had sustained damage thereby to the amount of $5,000.</p>

Habeas coRpus, to Richard Butts, intendant of the Washington Asylum, commanding him to bring up the body of Thomas Williams, with the cause, &e. to do and submit, &c. Upon the return it 'appeared that the said Thomas Williams was detained by virtue of the following warrant: — “District of Columbia, county of Washington, to wit. To Richard Butt, intendant of the Washington Asylum, greeting.

The defendant Gorman, obtained a certiorari, upon his own affidavit, directed to John Chalmers, Esq., a justice of the peace, to bring up a cause depending before him, in which James Kennedy was plaintiff, and the said John B. Gorman, defendant.

Replevin. Avowry for rent-arrear. Plea, no rent-arrear. contended that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff, to show that he had paid the rent; the plea admits every thing necessary, namely, the demise, the tenancy for the time, and the amount of rent accruing for the time. 4 Stark, on Ev. 1297; Alexander v. Harris, 4 Cranch, 304.

Assumpsit, for $395.60, money had and received to the use of the infant, plaintiff.

This was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in favor of the appellee, upon a warrant for the penalty of ten dollars for firing a pistol, “idly-and for sport and amusement,” within certain limits prohibited by the by-law of the corporation of Washington of the 30th of March, 1813. moved the-Court to dismiss the appeal, and contended that this was a criminal prosecution, of which the justice had no cognizance; his jurisdiction…

Ejectment for a city lot sold to the plaintiff’s lessor by the trustee under a deed of trust from the defendant to secure a debt due by him to the plaintiff’s lessor. The verbal notice to quit, given by Mr. Fendall, was less than three months. A mortgagor in possession is entitled to notice ; but here, also, was a covenant that the grantor should retain possession until a sale should become necessary according to the terms of the deed of trust.

Indictment, for keeping a house of ill fame, found at the special session in September last, and continued over, by law, to this term. moved the Court to quash the indictment, because this Court, at this term, has not jurisdiction of the cause, there being no power to continue causes from the special session to this term.

<p>Upon an indictment for keeping a house of ill fame, evidence of the ill fame of the defendant herself, cannot be given.</p>

Assumpsit for money had and received. R. G. Lanphier, Jr., having made a seal for the Supreme Court of the United States, of which court the defendant was clerk, and being indebted to the plaintiff, drew the following bill: Washington, October 11, 1831. Mr. Carroll, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States.

This was an action brought by the United States for the balance ($21,966) against the defendant, as paymaster of the marine corps. offered an account stated in the Treasury Department, authenticated according to law, and commencing with a balance of a former account. objected that it was not evidence to charge the defendant with that balance.

I agree to pay to Mr. M. Foy $20 if your colour man did not execute my thre springs of my car-rage all to gether moening the four springs. John Fleming. “ Mr. A. Russell.” (the appellant,) contends, that no wager can be recovered at common law, and cites the following cases, to wit: Smith v. Ary, 3 Salk. 175, in which the Court held that indebi-tatus assumpsit would not lie upon mutual promises, because debt would not lie.

Indictment for keeping a bawdy-house. Mabala Tennison, a witness for the United States, had stated that she had lived in the house, and was asked what other women lived there. objected to the question, and cited Hodgkins’s case, Russel, 619. then called a witness to prove that his witness, Mahala Tennison, was a woman of ill fame.

This was an indictment for disturbing the congregation of the African meeting-house while engaged in the worship of God. After conviction, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment. contended, that if the disturbing of public worship in the established church was a common-law offence, yet the disturbing of a Methodist meeting was not. The holding of such a meeting was in itself -a common-law offence.

<p>The sale, in the District of Columbia, of a Maryland slave brought here by her owner, does not give the slave a title to freedom under the Maryland statute of 1817, e. 112, which prohibits the sale to a non-resident of the State, of any slave having a contingent right to freedom.</p>

This ivas a petition for freedom under the will of Mrs. Frances Edelin, and the Act of Maryland of 1796, c. 67, § 13. cited two eases decided by this Court, namely, Negro Jo. Thompson v. Clarke, June, 1817, (2 Cranch, C. C. 145,) and Negro Fidelio v. Dermott, June, 1807, (1 Cranch, C. C. 405;) Gainsborough v. Gainsborough, 2 Vern. 252 ; 2 Fonb. 291. cited and relied upon the case of Negro George v. Corse’s Administrator, 2 Har. & Gill, 1.

Upon affidavit filed, Mr. R. S. Coze moved for a writ, in the nature of a quo warranto, against the defendants, to show by what authority they claim to hold the office of President and Directors of “ the Washington, Alexandria, and Georgetown steam-packet company.” The suit is brought to try the validity of the election; the judges of the election not having been appointed by the president and directors, according to the provisions of the 3d and 4th sections of the charter.

Trespass, against the justice of the'peace, who issued five writs of fieri facias against the plaintiff upon five supersedeas judgments supposed to have been confessed by the plaintiff, but not confessed in the form required by the statute.

The grand jury found nine indictments against the defendant for stealing nine cows belonging to nine different persons. Six of them were charged to have been stolen on the same day, the 14th of October, 1833. moved the Court to quash the six indictments in which the thefts were charged to have been committed on the same day, insisting that the six indictments were all for one and the same offence ; and cited 1 Chitty, Cr. L. 254.

Petition for freedom. On the trial, offered in evidence the record of the deed of manumission from Reginald Magruder, recorded in the office of the clerk of this Court. objected and called for the original, and proof by the subscribing witnesses.

Indictment for stealing a pocket-book, of the value of seventy-five cents, and a promissory note for $200, at sixty days, made by William Emmons, payable to Colonel Ambrose H. Sevier, and indorsed by him and F. E. Plummer, in blank, of the promissory notes and of the goods and chattels of one William Em-mons.

Assumpsit on an open account assigned to Preston and Orme, on the 6th of March, 1833, and notice of the assignment given to Krofft on the 12th of March, 1833. The defendant gave notice of a set-off, namely, an acceptance by Deale of a draft at five months by Griffith in favor of Wyeth and Norris, due 28th March, 1833. This suit was brought on the 12th of March, 1833, and the acceptance-had become due when the plea was pleaded.

RepleviN. Issue upon the plea of nothing in arrear. The premises belonged to Burgess in common with the other heirs of Crawford. The demise to the plaintiff was by Burgess alone. The plaintiff offered to prove accounts for money paid to some of the other heirs, as payments on account of rent. objected ; and contended that there can be no set-off for avowry for rent; and if there could be, it is not pleaded, and no notice has been given.

Petition for freedom. contended, that a residence of the slave, in Washington, was evidence of an importation with intent to reside; which gives freedom under the first section of the. Maryland Act of 1796, c. 67; and cited the case of Negro William Green v. Jewett, in this Court in May, 1832. Although the residence was indefinite, it was in its nature temporary. It was intended to continue only until the estate should be settled.

This was an attachment of money in the hands of the Chesapeake and-Ohio Canal Company, due to the defendants, who were contractors to perform certain work upon 'the canal, and who were indebted to the plaintiffs. Before the attachment was laid, the company had declared the contract abandoned, for non-performance of the whole work by the appointed time.

Motion to dissolve an injunction which had been granted by the chief judge, out of court, to prevent the defendant, Elgar, the commissioner of the public buildings, from laying water pipes through the complainant’s lots in the city of Washington, and to' prevent him from taking water, for the capítol, from a spring which supplied water to the complainant’s mill in Washington.

Petition for freedom. The importation of the slave (the petitioner) was alleged to be justified Under the 11th section of the Act of Maryland, 1796, c. 67, which requires a list of the slaves so imported, distinguishing their sex. The list merely calls the slave “ Jo.”

Bill to foreclose a legal mortgage, and for an injunction to prevent the defendant from receiving the rents, and praying that a receiver may be appointed; on the suggestion that the property' is insufficient security for the debt.

Assumpsit, against the maker of a promissory note. prayed the Court to instruct the jury, in effect, that, if they should be satisfied, by the evidence, that the plaintiff loaned to the defend-. ant, on the 3d of November, 1820, the sum of $3,000, and on the 22d of December, 1820, the further sum of $12,000, and on the 26th of June, 1822, the further sum of $8,000, and that, at the times of the loans, respectively, it was agreed between the said parties, that the interest…

The return upon the habeas corpora, was, that the prisoners were held upon writs of ca. sa. which stated the judgment to be against the prisoners and one Hugh Tierney, and required the officer to take the two prisoners only, without suggesting the death of Hugh Tierney.

Assault and battery. Verdict for United Slates. moved in arrest of judgment, that no prosecutor’s name had been written upon the indictment before it was sent to the grand jury, as required by the Act of Assembly of Virginia of November 13, 1792, p. 105, §§ 23, 24; and contended that the Court would have quashed the indictment upon motion before trial. That there was no difference in principle between a motion to quash, and a motion to arrest the judgment.

• Debt on a single bill, in the following words: “ On demand we bind ourselves, our heirs, &c., to pay to Richard Turner, his heirs, &e., $651.

Indictment for larceny. The defendant had been indicted at this term for stealing two silver dollars, and an order drawn by Hoffman and Stephenson on for $15. Upon the trial, the order, produced in evidence, was drawn by Hoffmans and Stephenson. thereupon directed the clerk to enter a nolle prosequi, and the jury was discharged without the consent of the defendant, and a new indictment was found by the grand jury, reciting the order truly.

Assault and batteRy. In Turley’s case, in this Court, at November term, 1833, the Court was of opinion that the objection, for want of a prosecutor, was too late after verdict; but agreed to hear Mr. Heioitt again in H. Lloyd’s cases, on that point. It does not appear, however, that in these causes any thing further has been said upon it. The doctrine in Turley’s case, may, therefore, be considered as conceded. Mr. Hewitt moved to quash this indictment.

The indictment charged that the defendant, “intending to disturb the peace of the United Slates in the said county, and particularly to cause and procure a certain James Jack, in the peace of God and of the United States then and there being, to be assaulted and beaten, did persuade, instigate, and incite and endeavor to hire and employ a certain Daniel Fowler and a certain Philip Vernon then and there being, to way-lay, assault, and beat the said James Jack then and there…

<p>A slave, convicted of larceny in Alexandria county, is to be sentenced to be burnt in the hand and whipped.</p>

Action, of assault and battery, for freedom. The plaintiff’s mother, Clara, was the slave of James M. Stewart, and sold by him to Finley, the defendant’s intestate, on the 24th of July, 1805, by bill of sale, recorded May 10,1833, for the term of seven years. Finley bound himself to Stewart to emancipate Clara at the end of the seven years; and Stewart bound himself to Finley then to relinquish his right to Clara.

Indictment for assault and battery on Moses Hepburn, with intent to kill him.

. Assumpsit for $466.25, for work and labor as overseer, gardener, carpenter, &c. Plea, non assumpsit and set-off, and account in bar, consisting of cash payments, and cash received for vegetables sold, &c. Verdict for plaintiff, for $23.12. moved for a nonsuit, because the damages found are below the jurisdiction of this Court; and cited Maitland v. McDearman, 1 Virg.

Indictment for forging an order in the name of Mr. Dorsey, who was called as a witness for the United States. objects, and contends that no person, interested in setting aside the instrument, is competent as a witness, to prove the forgery. 2 Russell, 374; 4 Starkie, 573, 582, 583.

Robert Oliver guarantied a debt of $1,500, due by Mrs. Susan Decatur, to Alexander Brown & Sons, and when his obligation, as guarantor, had become absolute, he paid the money to Brown & Sons, and took an assignment of the debt, and brought this suit in the name of Alexander Brown & Sons, against Mrs. Decatur.

The bill in this ease was filed in Alexandria, and an injunction was granted by one of the judges, to restrain the Bank of Potomac, and the Bank of the United States at Washington, from paying to the defendant, and to restrain the defendant from receiving or transferring the money deposited therein by the defendant to his credit. moved the Court to dissolve the injunction for want of equity in the bill.

<p>Indictment for assault and battery.</p> <p>offered to prove .that the witness for the^prosecution, was generally reputed to be a common prostitute, in order to discredit her testimony; and cited 2 Hayw. 300 ; Hughes v. Scott, 3 Marshall. 261; Stale v. Murphy, 14 Mass. Rep. 387.</p>

The indictment averred that the defendant, “ unlawfully, wantonly, and cruelly, in the public street in the city of Washington, in the same county, and in a public place in the city of Washington in said county, and near the public streets of said city, and dwellings of the citizens thereof, and in view of the said streets and dwellings and said citizens, in said county, did cruelly with clubs and stones, beat, strike, and grievously wound and kill a certain cow, then and…

Indictment for the morder of his wife. At the request of the prisoner’s counsel, the Court asked each juror, “ whether he had formed and delivered an opinion as to the guilt of the prisoner upon this indictment.” After witnesses had been examined to prove that the prisoner had several times beat and kicked his wife, objected to further testimony on that point until proof should have been produced that a felony had been committed. • The Court (»«. con.) said, that the proper…

The following questions were submitted to Cranch, C. J., by the Attorney of the United States, and the Marshal. Whether the United States are liable to the marshal for the maintenance of free colored persons committed by justices of the peace as runaways, and discharged on habeas corpus.

<p>This was a bill in equity, to change the .trustee of a family settlement in which infants were interested, by consent of the parties. The sole object of the bill, and the whole relief prayed, was the change of the trustee, with the consent of the parties.</p>

Petition for freedom. Upon filing the petition, and a bill for an injunction, the chief justice had, in vacation, granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from removing the petitioner from the jurisdiction of the Court until further order. now moved for an attachment against Davis, for disobeying the injunction, and removing the petitioner, upon an affidavit stating the service and contemptuous language used by the defendant, on the service of the injunction, and his…

In the case of Negro John Thornton v. Orrine Davis, (which was a petition for freedom,) .upon a motion for attachment against the defendant for disobeying an injunction, H. B. Robinson and Madison Jeffers, two of the constables of this county, having been charged, in argument, by Mr. Brent,with assisting the defendant in violating the injunction, were permitted to speak in their own justification ; and, among other things, stated facts implicating the purity of the…

<p>This was an indictment for corruptly taking “insufficient security,” for the appearance of George Milburn, who was arrested on a capias ad respondendum, and in custody of the marshal upon an indictment for keeping “a certain gaming-table called a faro-bank,” (against the form of the Act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1831, [4 Stat. at Large, 448,] which makes it a penitentiary offence,) whereby the said George Milburn was released from the custody of the marshal, and escaped; and also by means whereof he did not appear at the said court, and therein made default, and hath not since appeared to be dealt with according to law, to the great hinderance of public justice, in contempt of the laws, and against the peace and government of the United States.</p> <p>The counsel for the defendant moved the Court to quash the indictment.</p> <p>1. Because it does not state in what respects the security taken was .insufficient; whether it was insufficient because the sum was t.oo small, or because the persons taken as bail were insufficient to answer the amount of the recognizance, or “because the form in which the security was taken was insufficient; and because it does not set out the security takenj so that the Court can judge whether it was regularly taken, and in an amount adequate to the offence, and in due form.</p> <p>2. Because it does not aver that the defendant ordered Milburn to be discharged from arrest.</p>

Indictment for keeping a disorderly house. Verdict guilty. Motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against evidence.

District Attorney, offered to give in evidence against the prisoner, who was indicted for larceny, what had been said before the examining justice in the presence and hearing of the prisoner, to which he had made no reply. for the defendant, objected, and cited The People v. Johnson, Wheeler’s Cases, 377.

This was an appeal from the Orphans’ Court upon a plenary proceeding by libel and answer. The principal question in the cause, was, from what time the administrator should be chargeable with the interest upon the sum of $>8,390.01| the amount of assets in his hands as administrator of the estate of Samuel Robinson. Mr. Dunlop, cited the following authorities on the subject of interest: Gwinnv. Dorsey, 4 Gill & Johnson, 453, 460; Perkins v. Baynton, 1 Bro.

On Monday, the 30th of March, 1835, the grand jury handed to the Court the following paper, namely : “The grand jury beg leave to represent to the honorable Court, that Doctors Causine, Bchrer, Sewall, and Clark, were directed to be summoned to testify in the case of Richard Lawrence, (who attempted to shoot the President of the United States,) to prove the sanity or insanity of the accused.

On the 30th of January, 1835, the prisoner, Richard Lawrence made an assault upon the President of the United States, (General Jackson,) with intent to murder him, by shooting him with a pistol as he came out of the rotunda of the capitol, after having attended the funeral service of Warren R. Davis, a member of the House of Representatives.

Replevin : discontinued at' March term, 1834, for want of appearance by the defendant. moved to reinstate it on the docket; on the ground that he had directed the clerk to enter his appearance for the defendant at March term, 1834, which he neglected to do.

moved to enter his appearance without special bail, the defendant having been discharged under the insolvent law of New York. stated that this action was brought upon a judgment recovered in Ohio, by the plaintiff, who was then a citizen of Connecticut. The discharge produced by the defendant, was under the insolvent law of New York. Mr. Wallach cited White v. Canfield, 7 Johns. 117; Licard v. Whale, 11 Id. 194; Hayton v. Wilkinson, 1 Hall’s Amer.

Assumpsit on two promissory notes. Plea, limitations. General replication and issue. a witness for the plaintiff, upon the trial testified, that in a conversation with the witness, who was the agent of the plaintiff, the defendant said that if he would withdraw this suit he would give the witness an order on his partner at New Orleans for the amount; but the witness was not authorized to dismiss the suit upon those terms. contended that this was not a sufficient promise to…

Assumpsit for $> 116.30, for lumber sold and delivered. The defendant had obtained an order of the Court upon the plaintiff, to produce, upon the trial, his original book of entries. After the jury was sworn the defendant called for the book. The plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Bradley, refused to produce it, although he had it ready; saying that the call was too late after the jury was sworn, and cited Geyger v. Geyger, 2 Dal. 332.

This was a special action upon the case for damages to the plaintiff’s dwelling-house, by graduating 'the street and raising the'earth so as to obstruct the plaintiff’s entrance, &c. The declaration, which was drawn by Mr. Jones, consisted of two counts; the first of which slated, in substance, that the plaintiff was seized in fee of a messuage and tenement, in Georgetown, D. C., fronting on Causeway street, which, long before the injury now complained of, had been regulated…

This was an action upon the case for permitting the plaintiff’s slaves to be carried away in the defendant’s stage-coach. The slaves were colored persons.

This was an indictment against a slave for the manslaughter of Robert Jackson. Verdict, guilty. Motion in arrest of judgment, and for a new trial. contended that the indictment was defective in not averring that the act was done by the prisoner “ in the fury of his mind.” It was an indictment for murder, changed to one for manslaughter, by striking out the allegation of malice prepense, and the word “ murdered.”

The complainants, infants, by their father and next friend, James B. Pye, allege, that a share of the real estate of Richard Arell, in the county of Alexandria, D. C., and in Virginia, descended to their mother Eleanor, the daughter of George Jenkins, subject to his life estate as tenant by the curtesy, she being then an infant years old.

Debt on a prison-bounds bond given to the United States in the penalty of $450, dated the 14th of June, 1830, and executed by Jacob Dixon, and the defendant, and another surety, with the following condition: Whereas the above bound Jacob Dixon is confined in the prison of Washington county, and in the custody of the marshal of the District of Columbia, by virtue of a writ of capias ad satis-faciendum, issued out of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for the…

At a special session of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, for the trial of criminal causes, held on the first Monday of September, 1833, by an order of the Court made at the preceding regular March term, District Attorney, moved the Court to order a new capias ad respondendum against the defendant, George Milburn, upon the presentment found at November term, 1832, for keeping a certain gaming-table called a faro-bank, upon which a capias ad, respondendum,…

MR. Gorman was summoned by T. C. Coote, Esq., a justice of the peace to attend before him as a witness for the Corporation of Washington against Robert Crook ; and having failed to attend, the justice on the 11th of May, 1835, issued his attachment under the Act of Maryland of 1791, c. 68, § 8, returnable to this Court on the fourth Monday of May, instant, to which day this Court stood adjourned. Mr. Gorman answered on oath, but did not purge himself of the contempt.

<p>Indictment for the murder of Henry Howard.</p> <p>asked for a j ury de medietate lin-gua.</p>

<p>This was an indictment, under the 2d section of the Maryland law of 1792, c. 58, for offering to sell and actually selling a ticket in a lottery “ not authorized by the legislature of the State of Maryland, nor by the Congress of the United States, called the Delaware and South Carolina consolidated lottery,” against the form of the statute, &c.</p> <p>contended that the charter of the city of Washington repealed the second section of the Maryland law of 1792, c. 58, adopted by the Act of Congress of the 27th February, 1801, [2 Stat. at Large, 103,] concerning the District of Columbia, so far as it was applicable to the city of Washington.</p> <p>By that section of the Maryland law, it is enacted, that if any person shall sell, or offer for sale, within that State, any ticket in any lottery not authorized by the legislature of that Slate, or by the Congress of the United States, he shall forfeit for every such ticket sold, or offered for sale, £10 current money, to be recovered by bill of indictment.</p> <p>By the seventh section of the charter of the city of Washington, power is given to the corporation, “ to provide for licensing, taxing, and regulating,” “ vendors of lottery tickets,” and to restrain or prohibit lotteries.”</p> <p>On the 4th of January, 1827, the corporation passed a by-law “ to restrain and prohibit certain lotteries.” The first section forbids private lotteries; the second prohibits the drawing of any lottery not authorized by act of Congress, or of the corporation. The third section provides that no licensed vendor of lottery tickets, or other person, shall sell any ticket in any lottery not specially permitted and authorized by some law of some State or Territory of the United States, or law of Congress of the United States, or act of the corporation, under the penalty of the $50 for every offence, &c.</p> <p>The by-law of July 12,1831, prohibits the exercise of the business of lottery-ticket vendor without license, for which $100 must be paid.</p> <p>Haiokins v. Cox Sf Smith, in this Court in June, 1819, (2 Crancfi, C. C. 173,) and Thompson v. Milligan, in June term, 1820, (lb. 207.)</p> <p>The charter of 1820, $ 7, has no negative words ; it is all affirmative, and not inconsistent with the then existing law ; both may stand together ; both may prohibit the same thing under different penalties. The corporation has power to license and regulate vendors of lottery tickets; but only to restrain and prohibit, not license, lotteries. In the great lottery case of the Corporation of Washington v. Clarke, (in the Supreme Court,) it was admitted on all hands,' that the power given to the city did not repeal the law of Maryland. Congress might, have repealed the law of Maryland, and might.have given that power to the city ; but the question is, have they given it, and whether the corporation has exercised it. Has Congress given the city the power to license all sorts of lottery tickets ? They could not mean to give the city the right to license the sale of illegal tickets ; but only tickets vendible by law. There were tickets, the sale of which was lawful.</p> <p>The same porV-er is given over gaming ; which, this Court has decided, did not repeal the general law of the land against gaming; and that the power was cumulative, so that the party may be liable to the Maryland penalty and the city penalty both. If the corporation had the power to repeal the Maryland law, they have not yet exercised it. They have not said what tickets it should be lawful to sell. The corporation had only power to license and tax the business of a vendor of lottery tickets ; not to authorize the sales of tickets, the sale of which was prohibited by law. It is not like the case of tavern licenses; for in that case there was nothing left for the Maryland law to operate upon.</p> <p>It is not necessary to contend that this charter repeals the Maryland law; the only question is whether the corporation has not the power to license the sales of such tickets in the city.</p>

<p>Indictment for assault and battery on a negro, a servant at Fuller’s Hotel.</p> <p>asked that they might be tried separately, as he wished' to examine Qach as a witness for the other.</p>

Indictment for forging a bill and receipt of Polkinhorn & Campbell against Major William T. Barry, of eight dollars and fifty cents, for a trunk, by altering the amount, which was originally $6.50 to ¡$8.50.

\ This was a petition for freedom. The defendant claimed under Mr. Ariss Buckner, of Virginia. . The petitioner claimed freedom by having been brought into the county of Washington, D. C., by Mr Buckner, from Virginia, to reside, or for sale, contrary to the 1st section of the Maryland Act of 1796, c. 67.

This was an action on the case, for “ that the defendant, not ignorant of the premises, (that is, of the plaintiff’s right of fishing,) but maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff in this behalf, and to deprive him of the use of his said fishery, did, on the day of and continually thereafter, for and during the space of days then next following, wrongfully and injuriously stop and anchor a certain vessel, then under the command of the defendant, in the berth and range…

This was a writ of habeas corpus, commanding Richard Butt, superintendent of the Washington Asylum, to bring up the body of Julia Reed with the cause of her commitment and detainer ; and, upon the return, it appeared that she was committed and detained by virtue of the following warrant: “ District of Columbia, county of Washington, to wit: To L. S. Beck, constable of the second ward of the city of Washington, and Richard Butt, intendant of the Washington Asylum. “Whereas…

Debt, on administration-bond. Breach assigned in not paying a note due by the intestate to Keirle & Son, and averring a previous return of non est inventus upon a capias ad respondendum against the defendant, in this county, in which he resided.

This was a bill to enjoin the amount of the supercargo’s commissions upon a voyage of the brig Ruth and Mary, out of the sum awarded by the commissioners under the treaty of indemnity with the 'king of the Two Sicilies, and to prevent the same from being paid out of the treasury of the United States to Mr. Callaghan, assignee of Coulter, the insolvent owner of the brig and cargo.

<p>Indictment for a riot, which originated in a quarrel between the members of the Typographical Society and some journeymen printers in the employment of General Duff Green, and which was immediately .provoked by an attack made by Harvey, one of those journeymen, upon Lowry, the secretary of a meeting of the society, in which General Green’s men were designated as rats, (which means, unworthy members of the profession;) a revised list of rats having been, on that day, published.</p> <p>After the evidence was closed on both sides, Mr. W. L. Brent, for the defendants, having cited 1 Russell on Crimes, 247, 249, 2 Cbitty, Cr. Law, 487, and 1 Starkie, 524, prayed the Court to' instruct the jury,</p> <p>“ 1st. That to constitute a riot, the violence and tumult must not only be premeditated, but the premeditation must be by three or four persons assembling, or already assembled together, with the intention to commit an act, and afterwards committing the same in a violent, turbulent manner, to the terror of the people.</p> <p>“2d. That should the jury be of opinion, from the evidence, that the disturbance, on the night of the 30lh of May, spoken of by the witnesses, was not premeditated, and arose upon a sudden quarrel or cause, produced by the previous attack on Lowry, and without promises of mutual assistance, before, or at the time, the defendants are not guilty of a riot.</p> <p>“ 3d. That, should the jury be of opinion, from the evidence, that the defendants did engage in the affray, after they had assembled to assist Lowry, who had been beaten, they are not guilty of a riot, unless it has been proven, by satisfactory evidence, that, before their engaging therein, or at the time thereof, they formed themselves into a party of three or more, and made mutual promises to assist one another.</p> <p>“4th. That, should the jury be of opinion, from the evidence, that the defendants were seen in the crowd, after the affray began, they are not guilty of a riot, unless it be satisfactorily proven that they were actively engaged in doing, countenancing, or supporting the same, or ready, if necessary, to support the same.</p> <p>“ 5th. That, in the present case, should the jury be of opinion, from the evidence, that the only proof of Walter’s being in the affray, is from his having assaulted Madden, he is entitled to a verdict of acquittal, because he has been tried and found guilty of the said assault, and cannpt be again tried and punished for the same.”</p> <p>Which instructions the Court refused to give, but instructed the jury, that, before they can lawfully convict the defendants, upon this indictment, they must be satisfied, by the evidence, that the defendants, to the number of three or more, assembled; and, either at the time of assembling, or afterwards, while assembled, formed an intent, with force and violence, to do the acts charged in the indictment, or some of them, and mutually to assist each other against any who should oppose them in doing such acts; and that the defendants did the same in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people.</p> <p>That it is not material how suddenly that intent was formed, nor whether it was produced by the previous contest between Lowry and Harvey.</p> <p>Nor is it necessary, to the conviction of the defendants, on this indictment, that they should have actually made formal promises to each other, of mutual assistance, if they had such a mutual intent.</p> <p>Nor is it necessary to. their conviction, that those who were assembled, with intent to commit the acts charged in the indictment, should have been actively engaged therein, if they were present, and ready to support, if necessary.</p>

The first count of the indictment was for a common assault and battery on “ one negro Milly.” The second count charged the defendant with an assault upon one negro Milly, “ in a public road and highway in the county aforesaid,” and cruelly beating her, “ to the great damage of the said Milly and to the terror and disturbance and annoyance of the good citizens of the United States then and there passing and re-passing on and near the said public road and highway, and there…

Indictment of a slave for an attempt to murder his mistress; and for burglary. The defendant was the slave of Mrs. Anna Maria Thornton. The indictment contained three counts.

The prisoner was convicted under the 9th section of the Penitentiary Act of March 2, 1831, of stealing “ one bank-note of the value of twenty dollars; and one hundred silver coins of the value of seventy-five dollars.” By that section of the act, it is enacted, “that every person convicted of feloniously stealing, taking, and carrying away any goods or chattels, or other personal property of the value of five dollars or upwards; or any bank-note, promissory note, or any…

Indictment for highway robbery of George Milburne. The Attorney for the United States offered to examine, as a witness for the United States, one Sandy Spriggs, a free mulatto who had been convicted of larceny, and suffered his term of imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary of this district. The prisoner’s counsel objected that the witness was incompetent because convicted of an infamous offence.

The defendant, Washington Henning, alias Haney Hedley, was convicted upon an indictment for attempting to sell a free mulatto boy as a slave for life, contrary to the fifteenth and sixteenth sections of the Maryland Act of 1796, c. 67. The indictment contained three counts, each concluding against the form of the statute.

This was an indictment for perjury in the answer to a bill in chancery. The defendant demurred to the indictment, because it neither averred that the allegations in which the perjury was said to consist, were material, nor did it aver facts showing their materiality. The plaintiffs in the bill in chancery were merchants; the defendant was their clerk. The bill charged him with embezzlement of the complainants’ money and goods.

Indictment for highway robbery of George Milburn. Mr. Milburn, the witness, testified, upon the trial, that, when the prisoner was arrestéd and brought into the magistrate’s office, and before he was informed for what he was arrested, the prisoner asked on what night it was. Being informed that it.was on the night of the 17th of October, he said he could prove by his bedfellow, that he was not there.

Indictment for highway robbery of one Latimer, by snatching his watch from his side pocket, it being fastened to his neck by a ribbon, which was broken by the first snatch, the owner not having been put in fear. cited Russ. & Ry. Cr. Ca. 419; 3 Chitty, 805. cited Rex v. Gos-nil, 1 Carrington & Payne,’ 304; S. C. 11 Serg. & Louder, 400.

This was a scire facias to revive a judgment obtained by William D. Digges, in his lifetime, on the first Monday of June, 1820, and which had been revived by an award of execution thereupon, on the first Monday of December, 1826. The defendant pleaded the Maryland Act of Limitations of April, 1715, e. 23,■ 6, and averred that “ the debt, or thing in action,” in the scire facias mentioned, was above twelve years’ standing at the time of the impetration of the writ.

Trespass, assault and battery, and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been, some time since, arrested upon a writ of ca. sa., issued in favor of these defendants, against himself and one James Kennedy, only, upon a judgment against them jointly with one Hugh Tierney, as recited in the execution ; and had been discharged from that arrest by this Court (Thruston, J., absent,) upon habeas corpus, upon the ground that an execution against two only upon a judgment against…

This was an indictment under the Act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1831, [4 Stat. at Large, 472,] entitled, “ An Act for the punishment of crimes in the District of Columbia,” commonly called the Penitentiary Act.

This was a petition for freedom. By the Maryland law of 1796, c. 67, which was continued in force in the county of Washington, D. C. by the Act of Congress of the 27th of February, 1801, [1 Stat. at Large, 103,] it was not lawful to bring into this county any slave for sale, or to reside therein, with some exceptions not material to the present case.

Petition foe FREEDOM. Upon the trial of this cause on the venire de novo ordered by the Supreme Court of the United States at its January term, 1834, (8 Peters, 44) — This Court, at the prayer of the petitioners’ counsel, instructed the jury that if they believe, from the evidence, that the petitioners were the slaves of R. B. Lee, deceased, in the State of Virginia, from whence he removed with his family to Washington county, D. C., where he continued to reside till his…

This was a scire facias, upon a recognizance, for a fine and costs recovered against one Noah Stinehcomb. General demurrer and joinder. contended, that, by the common law, all security to relieve a man from prison, was void, and that there is no statute law to justify this recognizance. submitted the question to the Court, without argument.

This was an indictment under the 17th section of the Penitentiary Act for the District of Columbia, of the 2d of March, 1831, [4 Stat. at Large, 472,] by which it is enacted, “ That if any free person shall, in the said district, unlawfully, by force and violence, take and carry away, or cause to be taken and carried away ; or shall, by fraud, unlawfully seduce, or cause to be seduced, any free negro or mulatto from any part of the said district to any other part of the said…

This was an indictment for an alleged cruel assault and battery of the defendant’s wife. offered the wife as a witness against her husband.

This was an indictment for keeping a certain common gaming-table called a sweat-cloth, against the .form of the Penitentiary Act for the District of Columbia, of the 2d of March, 1831, §§ 1 and 12.

<p>An execution upon a supersedeas judgment, confessed more than two months after the date of the original judgment, will be quashed.</p>

The defendants were convicted of a cheat, by passing and imposing a paper having the appearance of a bank-note, upon a free negro, born of a free colored mother. The only witnesses for the' prosecution were free negroes and mulattoes, born of free colored mothers. The defendants were free mulattoes.

The plaintiff, on the 25lh of June, 1835, filed in the clerk’s office his claim against the defendant, amounting to $1,711.98, and dated November 6th, 1833, and on the 29th of July, 1795, sued out a writ of scire facias, stating the filing of his claim “ in pursuance of the Act of Congress entitled,” &c., “ to be enrolled among the records of the said court, and which was so enrolled, as by the record thereof in the office of the clerk of the said court remaining, manifestly…

HenRietta Smith, a colored child, between nine andjten years of age, by J. A. M. Duncausen her next friend, filed her petition stating that she has no parent but her mother, a free colored woman of bad character, and unable to maintain the petitioner; that for three or four years past she was taken care of by Mrs. Dunkley, from motives of charity, who recently, on leaving this city, provided a home for the child with the said Duncausen, where she now is, and who is willing…

Indictment eor. a Riot. It charged that the defendants and six others to the jurors as yet unknown, “with force and arms at the county aforesaid, did on the 2d of April, 1835, unlawfully, riotously, routously, and tumultuously, assemble together to disturb the peace and government of the United States, and to’ break into and destroy the dwelling-house of one Martha , Nailor in said county; and being so assembled,” &c., made “great noises, riot, tumult, and disturbance,” “and…

Indictment for a Riot. The first count charged that the defendants, on, &e., at the county of Washington, did unlawfully, riotously, routously, and tumultuously assemble and gather together, to disturb the peace of the United States in the said county; and being so then and there assembled and met together, did then and there make great noises, riot, tumult, and disturbance; and then and there unlawfully, riotously, routously, and tumultuously surrounded and entered the…

Indictment for stealing the goods of Ann Hill. It appeared in evidence that Ann Hill was a feme covert; that her husband kept a tinman’s shop in Alexandria, and his wife a milliner’s shop in Washington, but not for her separate use. They lived together, that is, he came to Washington three or four times a week.

Indictment for larceny. Mr. W. L. Brent, for the defendant, objected to the testimony of the owner of the stolen goods, because excluded by the Act of Maryland 1715, c. 26, § 2, which gives the county courts jurisdiction of “ all thieving and stealing of any goods and chattels whatsoever, not being above the value of one thousand pounds of tobacco, (robbery, burglary, and house-breaking excepted,”) and to cause every person “legally convicted of any such thieving and…

Indictment for stealing “fifteen pieces of silver coin of the value of fifty cents each, and twenty pieces of silver coin of the value of twenty-five cents each, of the moneys, goods, and chattels of one Nicholas Callan.”

This was an indictment for publishing libels tending to excite sedition among the slaves and free colored persons in this district. It contained five counts. 1st. The first charged the defendant with publishing a libel containing, in one part thereof, these words: “Then we are not to meddle with the subject of slavery in any manner ; neither by appeals to patriotism, by exhortations to humanity, by application of the truth to the conscience.

The plaintiff’s original declaration contained three counts, namely, 1. Indebitatus assumpsit for ¡§100 for work, and labor, &e., in nursing the defendant’s slave, at the defendant’s request, while sick of the smallpox, at the plaintiff’s house. 2. For money paid, laid out, and expended, at the defendant’s request, for the like purpose. 3. Insimul compuiassent. The plaintiff afterward filed an amended declaration, with four counts.

Action on the case, for negligence of the defendants’ driver in running against the plaintiffs’ stage-coach. The driver of the plaintiffs’ stage-coach was called as a witness for the plaintiffs. objected that he was interested, because it is yet to be ascertained which driver was in fault; and if it was the fault of the witness, the plaintiffs have a right of action against him for his negligence.

Assumpsit for money had and received by the defendant to the plaintiff’s use. By a deed of trust, the property of the plaintiff and his wife was conveyed to Mrs. Susan G. Beall, in trust for the sole and separate use of the plaintiff’s wife, Anne Marshall, her executors, administrators, and assigns.

Assumpsit. First count for work and labor. Second count for money had and received. Pleas, non assumpsit, and the statute of limitations. The defendant also filed an account in bar, consisting of sundry items of payments made to the plaintiff, by the defendant. This suit was commenced on the 13th of November, 1834. contended, that, as the statute of limitations was pleaded generally, it must be good as to both counts, or it was not good as to either.

Case for enticing and harboring the plaintiff’s apprentice. The plaintiff oilers, in evidence, the indenture, under seal of Joseph R. White, the apprentice, Ambrose White, his father, and the plaintiff, by which the apprentice, with the consent of his father, binds himself, as» apprentice, to the plaintiff, to learn the art and mystery of a tailor, for three years, from the 2d of January, 1833. objected that the age of the apprentice is not stated in the indenture, nor does…

Replevin, for a slave named Mahala. The defendant, the marshal of the District of Columbia, had taken the slave by virtue of a fi fa. against one Elizabeth Beale, the mother of the plaintiff.

Assumpsit against the acceptor of a draft for $200, dated January 11,1834, payable forty-five days after date, drawn by Richard Wright, payable to his own order, and by him indorsed, in blank. Defence, usury. offered to examine Richard Wright, the drawer and indorser of the draft, to prove the usury ; and cited Gaither v. Lee, in this Court, at June term, 1820, (2 Cranch, C. C. 205.) objected that a party to an instrument, cannot be a witness to invalidate it.

This was an action upon the following letter of guaranty : “ 23d December, 1829. “Dear Sir: Thé bearer, Mr. Edward Tolson, informs me that he is unacquainted with you, and wishes to get a suit of clothes, to be paid for next April. “ If you will furnish him therewith, I will guaranty payment for them.

Assumpsit, to account for public money received by the defendant for certain purposes. The United States claimed a balance of $11,855.86, unaccounted for. The defendant claimed credits for certain items to the same amount. By the burning of the Treasury offices all his vouchers were destroyed ; he being an officer in the Treasury Department, and having left his vouchers in his desk on the 31st March, 1833, the night of the fire.

Francis S. Key, Esq., Attorney *of the United States for the District of Columbia, having laid before the Court a letter to him from the Secretary of State, in these words : “F. S. Key, Esq., United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. Department of State, Washington, May 27, 1836.

<p>The indictment charged that the defendant “on the first day of April, 1835, with force and arms, at the county aforesaid, did keep a certain gaming-table called a faro-bank, against the form of the statute,” &c.</p> <p>moved the Court to quash the indictment, because it was too uncertain, and did not describe the offence stated in the statute.</p> <p>The first section of the Penitentiary Act of the 2d of March, 1831, enacts that every person, who shall be convicted, in any court in the District of Columbia, of any of the. offences enumerated, and, among others, of the offence “of keeping a faro-bank or other common gaming-table,” shall be sentenced to suffer punishment by imprisonment and labor for the time and times therein-after described, in the penitentiary of the District of Columbia. And by the twelfth section it is enacted, that every person duly convicted “ of keeping a faro-bank or gaming-table, shall be sentenced to suffer imprisonment and labor for a period not less than one year, nor more than five years.”</p> <p>Thus, the first section refers to the twelfth to ascertain the duration of the punishment of the offence described in the first. The first describes the offence; the twelfth limits the time of imprisonment and labor.</p> <p>• In Henry Smith's case, at November term, 1835, [ante, 629,] this Court decided that the first section describes the offence, and the twelfth ascertains the duration of the punishment, and that both sections must be construed together; and that the punishment mentioned in the twelfth is to be applied to the offence described in the first.</p> <p>The offence described in the first section is the keeping of a “faro-bank or other common gaming-table.”</p> <p>The indictment does not charge the keeping of a common gaming-table, nor of keeping a faro-bank; but of keeping “a gaming-table called a faro-bank.”</p> <p>All the circumstances named in the statute as constituting the offence must be stated in the indictment. It is not sufficient to charge it as contra formam statuii. 1 Chitty, 282 ; Craven's case, Russ. & Ryan, 14, where, in an indictment upon the statute a'gainsi stealing bank-notes, the offence charged was stealing a certain note commonly called a bank-note; and it was held to be insufficient, and was quashed.</p> <p>The twelfth section does not require the word “common; ” and the Court would instruct the jury, upon a count omitting the word “common,” that they must be satisfied ■ by the evidence that it was a common gaming-table.</p> <p>The indictment charges the defendant with keeping a faro-bank, which is clearly within the statute. A thing is what it is commonly called. To say that the defendant kept a gaming-table called a faro-bank, is to say that he kept a faro-bank.</p> <p>It is not necessary to use other words, than those of the statute. Commonwealth v. Arnold, 4 Pick. 251; Brown v. Commomuealth, 8 Mass. Rep. 59; The People v. Holbrook, 13 Johns. 90; United States v. Bachelder, 2 Gall. 18; S. C. 6 Wheeler, 34.</p> <p>If there are two statutes in pari materiá, it is sufficient to take the words of either. So of two sections in the same statute.</p> <p>cited United States v. Bachelder, 6 Wheeler, 35.</p>

Petition, by an apprentice, to be discharged from his indentures. contended that the indentures were void because they do not state that the boy was present in the Orphans’ Court when he was bound out as an orphan child, under the Maryland Act of 1793, c. 45.

Petition for freedom, on the ground that he was brought from Virginia into this county, to reside, contrary to the Maryland Act of 1796, e. 67. The petitioner offered evidence that one Wilkes, was at the head of a company of sportsmen, (gamblers,) who resided in Richmond, in Virginia.

Trover, for a slave. There was a verdict for the plaintiff at the last term. The Court, at that term, upon affidavits granted •a new trial upon the condition of payment of costs.

Bill in equity by a feme covert, by her next friend, to have the proceeds of the sale of her share of the intestate real estate of her deceased father vested in a trustee for her sole and separate use; and to charge the loss, which occurred upon the resale, to the first purchasers; one of whom, was a co-heir with the plaintiff, and the other, the husband of another co-heir ; and to make their shares of the purchase-money liable for such loss.

The first count in the indictment was for keeping “ a certain gaming-table called a faro-bank.” This count was, upon the defendant’s motion, quashed by the Court, for the reasons stated in Coohfs case, {ante, 707.) The second count charged that the defendant kept “ a certain common, ill-governed, and disorderly house; ” “ and in the said house, for filthy lucre and gain, certain evil-disposed persons, of evil name, fame, and conversation, to frequent and come together, on…

The indictment charged the defendant with stealing “ one bank-note of the Union Bank of Georgetown, to the amount of five dollars, and of the value of five dollars; one bank-note of the Union Bank of Georgetown, to the amount of ten dollars, and of the value of ten dollars, &e., stating several others, in like terms.

T. Coote, Esq., a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in an action of debt in the name of the mayor, board of aldermen, and board of common council of the city of Washington, for the penalty of $50, for keeping a faro-bank contrary to a by-law of the corporation. objected, (among other things,) that the magistrate was a member of the board of aider-men, and, as such, was a plaintiff in the cause ; and cited Angelí & Ames on Corp. 204; Dunham v. Rochester, 5…

Indictment for taking insufficient bail upon a bench-warrant against Miller for “ keeping a certain gaming-table called a faro-bank.” prayed the Court to instruct the jury that the prosecution cannot be sustained, as this Court has quashed the original indictment against Miller, on the ground that it did not describe an indictable offence.

Replevin. Pleas non cepit, and property in G. W. Delaplaine. General replication and issue to both pleas.

Detinue, foe a slave. Both parties claimed under one Howard; the plaintiff by virtue of a bill of sale made in Charles county, in Maryland, in 1829; the defendants under a recent sale in Alexandria, D. C. The bill of sale to the plaintiff, which was absolute upon its face, was acknowledged and recorded according to the Maryland Act of 1729, c. 8, §§ 5 and 6, but the possession remained in the vendor until his sale to the defendants, who were bona, fide purchasers, for…

<p>The defendant was indicted for playing at cards in a public place, contrary to the statute of Virginia, of December 8,1792, § 5, which imposes a fine of $20 upon conviction before a justice of the peace, to be levied by distress and sale of the offender’s goods by warrant from the justice.</p> <p>at the last term, before the defendant was taken, offered to move the Court to quash the indictment ; but the Court, Thruston, J., contrd,) refused to hear the motion until the defendant should be taken.</p>