HENDERSON, Justice¶1(concurring in result).
¶2Blurring of precedent can inadvertently take place. Schuler, cited in the majority opinion, is not a punitive damages case. It is not authority for, nor can it be any authority, pertaining to punitive damages or excessive punitive damages.
¶3Ruple, cited in the majority, involved punitive damages. Ruple, as here, pertained to the tort which is termed “intentional infliction of emotional distress.” The third amended complaint in this case alleged the conduct of defendants was willful, malicious, and oppressive with intent to cause plaintiff severe pain and distress.
¶4Hulstein, cited in the majority opinion, is the leading South Dakota case on punitive damages and depicts five factors, set forth in the majority opinion, which are likewise set forth in Ruple, 352 N.W.2d at 656.
¶5Precedent springs, inter alia, from other decided cases on the same subject or South Dakota statutes or legal treatises or authority outside of this state. I believe that it is important, for those who read our opinions in other jurisdictions, to examine *250our statute, in light of this decision. It is SDCL 21-3-2 and it provides:
Punitive damages in discretion of jury. In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, or in any case of wrongful injury to animals, being subjects of property, committed intentionally or by willful and wanton misconduct, in disregard of humanity, the jury, in addition to the actual damage, may give damages for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant. (Emphasis added.)
¶6As I read this case over, I am struck with the fact that three doctors, including Dr. Arbes, a psychologist, and Dr. Gehl-hoff,1 a psychiatrist, all examined and treated plaintiff Wangen. This treatment was for depression; there was no diagnosis or treatment for alcoholism. Defendants/appellees took it upon themselves to have a company nurse and counselor (not doctors or psychologists or psychiatrists) undertake a company examination which wound up with an admonition to Wangen that he had to go to alcoholic treatment for some thirty days or face termination. Wangen’s wife was very upset and cried at this turn of events and Wangen drove that night, in his car, from Sioux Falls, starting first for the Western part of the state and then returning to Sioux Falls; thence he drove to Pipestone, Minnesota, Beresford (South Dakota), Hartford (South Dakota), and thence back to Pipestone, Minnesota, calling his wife from pay phones during the course of the night. A travel agency received a letter expressing that Wangen could no longer travel on company credit. Wangen was also told to turn in his gear, which he did, so Wangen definitely believed that he had been terminated. According to the testimony, he had a difficult time functioning as a human being because of this so-called medical department, within a corporate structure, which mandated an arbitrary treatment. Elmore, defendant/appel-lee, admitted that the medical situation of Wangen had turned into some type of a contest between Wangen’s doctor and Knudson, defendant/appellee. Knudson, the company counselor, was not licensed as a counselor, nor was he a psychologist or a psychiatrist. It appears from the trial transcript that there was knowledge within the corporate ranks that Wangen had been treated by Dr. Arbes at McKennan Hospital in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. It appears that this company counselor and Wangen’s supervisor interfered with Dr. Arbes’ professional treatment. Needless to say, the jury did not like it and believed that Wangen had met his proof of establishing severe mental pain and distress. Perhaps the moral of the story is: Corporate America can go too far in regulating the medical treatment of its employees and, thus, actually interfere with its employees’ choice of doctors/treatment. Wangen was apparently paying for his medical services, out of his own pocket, to cure his depression. Our state capital is at Pierre, South Dakota, and is also the situs for “River Park,” a well-known chemical dependency treatment center. Pierre is centrally located in South Dakota. Wangen, while in the corporate offices, was told by his supervisor that he must make a decision before he left his chair as to whether or not he would go to River Park in Pierre or its facility in Rapid City or another chemical dependency unit in his hometown of Sioux Falls. Sioux Falls is in extreme eastern South Dakota. I draw the reader’s attention to Ruane v. Murray, 380 N.W.2d 362, 364 (S.D.1986), which enumerates three elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress: “(1) the act causing the anguish was done intentionally; (2) the act was unreasonable; and (3) the actor should have recognized it as likely to result in emotional distress.”
¶7Lastly, I note the rationale of the trial court mentions that “[t]he compensatory damage award was substantial and would to some extent punish the Defendants.” *251This, in my opinion, is a conceptual error: Compensatory awards are to make a party whole for a detriment sustained (SDCL 21-3-12); whereas, punitive damages are an award of damages by way of setting an example and to punish/deter (SDCL 21-3-2). We should not intermix these two awards into a hybrid that blurs the distinction set by the Legislature in SDCL §§ 21-3-1 and 21-3-2.
¶8. Dr. Gehlhoff is the Chairman of the Psychiatry Department at the St. Joseph Hospital in Chicago; he was in private practice in Sioux Falls when this incident took place. Dr. Gehlhoff agreed with Dr. Arbes’ diagnosis that Wangen was depressed. Dr. Gehlhoff opined that Wan-gen was not an alcoholic and had never been an alcoholic.
¶9. SDCL 21-3-1 provides:
For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not. (Emphasis added.)
