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464 F.2d 535

Docket No. 72-1052.

Turack v. Guido

Third Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted June 5, 1972 Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6).

Decided June 23, 1972.

Third Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1972-06-23

5 counsel of record

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Haines v. Kerner · Pierson v. Ray · Kauffman v. Moss

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1972-06-23

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently August 2004

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

801972198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Anthony J. Turack, pro se.

¶2Ned J. Nakles, Greensburg, Pa., for appellees, O’Connell, Kradel, Scales and Mihalich.

¶3Louis H. Ceraso, New Kensington, Pa., for appellees, Guido and Cipolla.

¶4T. E. Macurdy, Natrona Heights, Pa., for appellee Thomas Macurdy.

¶5*536Herman C. Kimpel, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee Green.

¶6Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, and GIBBONS and MAX ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

¶7OPINION OF THE COURT

¶8PER CURIAM:

¶9The appellant, who appeared pro se both in this court and in the district court, appeals from an order dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6). The complaint refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks money damages from two state justices of the peace, the district attorney of Westmoreland County and his two assistants, a court administrator, appellant’s former attorney, and the attorney for his former wife, an adversary in a divorce case. The appellant is dissatisfied with the handling of the' divorce proceedings and other domestic disputes. Even when judged by the less stringent standards by which we judge pro se pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), Marshall v. Brierley, 461 F.2d 929 (3d Cir., filed 1972), the complaint was properly dismissed.

¶10The judicial officers are immune from damage suits growing out of their official duties. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Redding v. Walsh, 449 F.2d 1301, 1302 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1971); Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969). The prosecutors are similarly immune. Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1970); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966). Moreover, the complaint fails to allege in what manner the appellant could have been damaged by the refusal of the prosecuting authorities to bring criminal proceedings against a third party. The claims against appellant’s own attorney are essentially malpractice contentions and do not allege a deprivation of civil rights under color of state law. The allegations against the former wife’s attorney do not even rise to the level of malpractice contentions, but are merely complaints about the advice given to that client. The district court proceeded in due compliance with the notice provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and properly granted the appellees’ Rule 12(b) (6) motions.

¶11The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

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