¶1dissenting.
¶2The majority opinion states that a wife may proceed under the Act of May 23, 1907, P.L. 227, as amended, 48 P.S. § 132 [hereinafter cited as the Act of 1907], only if the husband has separated himself from his wife or children without reasonable cause and has neglected or has refused *14to support his family. Commonwealth ex rel. Stein v. Stein, 487 Pa. at 1, 4-5 n. 1, 406 A.2d 1381, 1382-1383 n. 1. Yet, the majority has reached the merits of the case even though the parties resided in the same household when this action was instituted. The majority reasons that since appellant failed to raise any objection concerning this defect under the Act of 1907, the issue has been waived under Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). I cannot agree.
¶3In Brenner v. Sukenik, 410 Pa. 324, 328, 189 A.2d 246, 248 (1963), this Court held that the separation of spouses was basic to subject matter jurisdiction under the Act of 1907 and that the failure to enter a proper objection to jurisdiction was immaterial. Accord, Drummond v. Drummond, 414 Pa. 548, 550-51, 200 A.2d 887, 888 (1964). Furthermore, it is well settled that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel, consent, or waiver. See Drummond v. Drummond, supra; Brenner v. Sukenik, supra; Leveto v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 243 Pa.Super. 510, 515, 366 A.2d 270, 273 (1976); 9 Standard Pennsylvania Practice § 48 (rev.ed.1962).
¶4I respectfully dissent.
¶5 The cases cited by the majority do not concern failures to raise objections to subject matter jurisdiction. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974) concerns the waiver of a jury instruction issue. Matthew-Landis Co. v. Housing Authority, 240 Pa.Super. 541, 361 A.2d 742 (1976) concerns the failure to raise a non-jurisdictional statutory defense in a lower court.