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502 Pa. 542

467 A.2d 323

Commonwealth v. Thirkield

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Decided November 16, 1983

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · decided 1983-11-16

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“); Commonwealth v. Thirkield, 502 Pa. 542, 543 , 467 A.2d 323, 324 (1983) (McDermott, J., dissenting) (“Limiting the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment uses severely impedes the truth-determining process. The Court should address this issue and allow the use of such statements as substantive evidence.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 381 Pa. Super. 181 - Commonwealth v. Doa

Applies CA EVID § 1235 · KS 60 § 60-460

Relies on 264 Pa. Super. 398 - Commonwealth v. Loar

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1983-11-16

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently January 2010

15 state decisions

801983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

McDERMOTT, Justice,

¶1dissenting.

¶2I regret the summary disposition of this case. Appeal was allowed to review the issue of the substantive admissibility of prior statements made by a present testifying witness. The all too frequent occurrence is that of a witness’ pretrial statement, often the basis of the prosecution or the hope of the defendant, being lost simply by his saying, “I don’t remember making a statement.”

¶3When a witness is present before the fact-finder, testifies in court, and is available for cross-examination, no valid purpose is served by barring the witness’ prior statements from use as substantive evidence where such statements bear sufficient indicia of reliability. While the prior statements themselves may not have been given under oath, or subject to cross-examination, the fact that such are supplied in the current trial defuses hearsay concerns and provides the fact-finder with ample opportunity to determine truth. Indeed, the weight of recent authority is persuasive in this direction.1

¶4The easy refuge of forgetfulness is far too tempting an opportunity for those who would seek by fear or favor to influence a witness. Limiting the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment uses severely impedes the truth-determining process. The Court should address this issue and allow the use of such statements as substantive evidence.

¶5. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1); Cal.Evid.Code § 1235; Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-460(a); 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1018 (Chadboum Rev.1970); McCormick, Evidence § 251 (1972). See also, the able opinion of now President Judge Spaeth, in Commonwealth v. Loar, 264 Pa.Super. 398, 399 A.2d 1110 (1979).

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