¶1OCTOBER TERM, 2004
¶3Syllabus
¶5BRADSHAW, WARDEN v. STUMPF
¶7certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
¶8the sixth circuit
¶10No. 04—637. Argued April 19, 2005–Decided June 13, 2005
¶12Respondent Stumpf and his accomplice Wesley committed an armed robbery
¶13that left Mr. Stout wounded and Mrs. Stout dead. Stumpf admitted
¶14shooting Mr. Stout but has always denied killing Mrs. Stout. In
¶15Ohio state court proceedings, Stumpf pleaded guilty to, among other
¶16things, aggravated murder and one of three capital murder specifications
¶17charged in his indictment. This left Stumpf eligible for the death
¶18penalty. In a contested penalty hearing before a three-judge panel,
¶19Stumpf’s principal mitigation arguments were that he had participated
¶20in the robbery at Wesley’s urging, that Wesley had killed Mrs. Stout,
¶21and that Stumpf’s minor role in the murder counseled against the death
¶22sentence. The State, however, claimed that Stumpf had shot Mrs.
¶23Stout, and that he therefore was the principal offender in her murder.
¶24In the alternative, the State noted that even an accomplice can be sentenced
¶25to death under Ohio law if he acted with the specific intent to
¶26cause death, and the State argued that such intent could be inferred
¶27from the circumstances of the robbery regardless of who actually shot
¶28Mrs. Stout. The panel concluded that Stumpf was the principal offender
¶29and sentenced him to death. At Wesley’s subsequent jury trial,
¶30however, the State presented evidence that Wesley had admitted to
¶31shooting Mrs. Stout. But Wesley argued that the prosecutor had taken
¶32a contrary position in Stumpf’s trial, and Wesley was sentenced to life
¶33in prison with the possibility of parole. After Wesley’s trial, Stumpf
¶34moved to withdraw his own plea or vacate his death sentence, arguing
¶35that the evidence endorsed by the State in Wesley’s trial cast doubt on
¶36Stumpf’s conviction and sentence. This time, however, the prosecutor
¶37emphasized other evidence confirming Stumpf as the shooter and again
¶38raised, in the alternative, the aider-and-abettor theory. The court denied
¶39Stumpf’s motion, and Ohio’s appellate courts affirmed. Subsequently,
¶40the Federal District Court denied Stumpf habeas relief, but the
¶41Sixth Circuit reversed on two grounds. First, the Sixth Circuit found
¶42that Stumpf had not understood that specific intent to cause death was
¶43a necessary element of the aggravated murder charge, and that his
¶44guilty plea therefore had not been knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
¶45Second, the court found that the conviction and sentence could not stand
¶49Syllabus
¶51because the State had secured convictions of both Stumpf and Wesley
¶52for the same crime, using inconsistent theories.
¶54Held:
¶561. The Sixth Circuit erred in concluding that Stumpf was uninformed
¶57of the aggravated murder charge’s specific intent element. While a
¶58guilty plea is invalid if the defendant has not been informed of the
¶59crime’s elements, Stumpf’s attorneys represented at his plea hearing
¶60that they had explained the elements to their client, and Stumpf confirmed
¶61that the representation was true. This Court has never held
¶62that the judge must himself explain a crime’s elements to the defendant.
¶63Rather, constitutional requirements may be satisfied where the record
¶64accurately reflects that the charge’s nature and the crime’s elements
¶65were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel.
¶66Stumpf argues that his plea was so inconsistent with his denial of having
¶67shot Mrs. Stout that he could only have pleaded guilty out of ignorance
¶68of the aggravated murder charge’s specific intent element. But that
¶69argument fails because Stumpf’s conviction did not require a showing
¶70that Stumpf had shot Mrs. Stout. Ohio law also considers aiders and
¶71abettors who act with specific intent to cause death liable for aggravated
¶72murder. Stumpf and Wesley entered the Stout home with guns, intending
¶73to commit armed robbery, and Stumpf admitted shooting Mr. Stout.
¶74Taken together, these facts could show that the two men had agreed to
¶75kill both Stouts, which in turn could make both men guilty of aggravated
¶76murder regardless of who shot Mrs. Stout. Stumpf’s claim that he and
¶77his attorneys were confused about the relevance and timing of defenses
¶78that they planned to make is not supported by the record. Finally, the
¶79plea’s validity may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that
¶80Stumpf made what he now claims was a bad deal. Pp. 182—186.
¶812. The Sixth Circuit was also wrong to hold that prosecutorial inconsistencies
¶82between the Stumpf and Wesley cases required voiding
¶83Stumpf’s guilty plea. The precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial
¶84to Stumpf’s aggravated murder conviction, and Stumpf has never
¶85explained how the prosecution’s postplea use of inconsistent arguments
¶86could have affected the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of his
¶87plea. Pp. 186—187.
¶883. The prosecutor’s use of allegedly inconsistent theories may have a
¶89more direct effect on Stumpf’s sentence, however, for it is arguable that
¶90the sentencing panel’s conclusion about his role was material to its sentencing
¶91determination. The opinion below leaves some ambiguity as to
¶92the overlap between how the lower court resolved Stumpf’s due process
¶93challenge to his conviction and how it resolved his challenge to his sentence.
¶94It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals would have found
¶99Opinion of the Court
¶101Stumpf entitled to resentencing had it not also considered the conviction
¶102invalid. Likewise, the parties’ briefing here, and the question on which
¶103this Court granted certiorari, largely focused on the conviction. In
¶104these circumstances, it would be premature for this Court to resolve the
¶105merits of Stumpf’s sentencing claim before giving the Sixth Circuit the
¶106opportunity to consider in the first instance the question of how the
¶107prosecutor’s conduct in the Stumpf and Wesley cases related to Stumpf’s
¶108death sentence in particular. Pp. 187—188.
¶110367 F. 3d 594, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
¶112O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Souter,
¶113J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 188.
¶114Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post,
¶116p. 190.
¶118Douglas R. Cole, State Solicitor of Ohio, argued the cause
¶119for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jim Petro, Attorney
¶120General, Diane Richards Brey, Deputy Solicitor, and
¶121Charles L. Wille, Henry G. Appel, Stephen E. Maher, and
¶122Franklin E. Crawford, Assistant Solicitors.
¶124Alan M. Freedman, by appointment of the Court, 543 U. S.
¶1251143, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
¶126brief were Carol R. Heise, Laurence E. Komp, Gary Prichard,
¶127and Michael J. Benza.*
¶129Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
¶130This case concerns respondent John David Stumpf’s conviction
¶131and death sentence for the murder of Mary Jane
¶132Stout. In adjudicating Stumpf’s petition for a writ of habeas
¶133corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the
¶134Sixth Circuit granted him relief on two grounds: that his
¶135guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and
¶136that his conviction and sentence could not stand because the
¶137State, in a later trial of Stumpf’s accomplice, pursued a theory
¶138of the case inconsistent with the theory it had advanced
¶140*Ellen S. Podgor and Joshua L. Dratel filed a brief for the National
¶141Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as amicus curiae urging
¶142affirmance.
¶146Opinion of the Court
¶148in Stumpf’s case. We granted certiorari to review both
¶149holdings. 543 U. S. 1042 (2005).
¶151I
¶153On May 14, 1984, Stumpf and two other men, Clyde Daniel
¶154Wesley and Norman Leroy Edmonds, were traveling in
¶155Edmonds’ car along Interstate 70 through Guernsey County,
¶156Ohio. Needing money for gas, the men stopped the car
¶157along the highway. While Edmonds waited in the car,
¶158Stumpf and Wesley walked to the home of Norman and Mary
¶159Jane Stout, about 100 yards away. Stumpf and Wesley, each
¶160concealing a gun, talked their way into the home by telling
¶161the Stouts they needed to use the phone. Their real object,
¶162however, was robbery: Once inside, Stumpf held the Stouts
¶163at gunpoint, while Wesley ransacked the house. When
¶164Mr. Stout moved toward Stumpf, Stumpf shot him twice in
¶165the head, causing Mr. Stout to black out. After he regained
¶166consciousness, Mr. Stout heard two male voices coming from
¶167another room, and then four gunshots–the shots that killed
¶168his wife. Edmonds was arrested shortly afterward, and his
¶169statements led the police to issue arrest warrants for Stumpf
¶170and Wesley. Stumpf, who surrendered to the police, at first
¶171denied any knowledge of the crimes. After he was told that
¶172Mr. Stout had survived, however, Stumpf admitted to participating
¶173in the robbery and to shooting Mr. Stumpf. But he
¶174claimed not to have shot Mrs. Stout, and he has maintained
¶175that position ever since.
¶177The proceedings against Stumpf occurred while Wesley,
¶178who had been arrested in Texas, was still resisting extradition
¶179to Ohio. Stumpf was indicted for aggravated murder,
¶180attempted aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and two
¶181counts of grand theft. With respect to the aggravated murder
¶182charge, the indictment listed four statutory “specifications”–
¶183three of them aggravating circumstances making
¶184Stumpf eligible for the death penalty. See App. 117—118;
¶188Opinion of the Court
¶190Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03 (Anderson 1982).* The case
¶191was assigned to a three-judge panel in the Court of Common
¶192Pleas.
¶194Rather than proceed to trial, however, Stumpf and the
¶195State worked out a plea agreement: Stumpf would plead
¶196guilty to aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder,
¶197and the State would drop most of the other charges;
¶198with respect to the aggravated murder charge, Stumpf
¶199would plead guilty to one of the three capital specifications,
¶200with the State dropping the other two. The plea was accepted
¶201after a colloquy with the presiding judge, and after a
¶202hearing in which the panel satisfied itself as to the factual
¶203basis for the plea.
¶205Because the capital specification to which Stumpf pleaded
¶206guilty left him eligible for the death penalty, a contested penalty
¶207hearing was held before the same three-judge panel.
¶208Stumpf’s mitigation case was based in part on his difficult
¶209childhood, limited education, dependable work history, youth,
¶210and lack of prior serious offenses. Stumpf’s principal argument,
¶211however, was that he had participated in the plot only
¶212at the urging and under the influence of Wesley, that it was
¶213Wesley who had fired the fatal shots at Mrs. Stout, and that
¶214Stumpf’s assertedly minor role in the murder counseled
¶215against the death sentence. See § 2929.04(B)(6) (directing
¶216the sentencer to consider as a potential mitigating circumstance,
¶217“[i]f the offender was a participant in the offense but
¶218not the principal offender, the degree of the offender’s participation
¶219in the offense”). The State, on the other hand, argued
¶220that Stumpf had indeed shot Mrs. Stout. Still, while
¶221the prosecutor claimed Stumpf’s allegedly primary role in
¶222the shooting as a special reason to reject Stumpf’s mitigation
¶223argument, the prosecutor also noted that Ohio law did not
¶224restrict the death penalty to those who commit murder by
¶225their own hands–an accomplice to murder could also receive
¶227*Unless otherwise noted, all citations to Ohio statutes refer to the versions
¶228of those statutes in effect in 1984, at the time of the crime and trial.
¶232Opinion of the Court
¶234the death penalty, so long as he acted with the specific intent
¶235to cause death. As a result, the State argued, Stumpf deserved
¶236death even if he had not personally shot Mrs. Stout,
¶237because the circumstances of the robbery provided a basis
¶238from which to infer Stumpf’s intent to cause death. The
¶239three-judge panel, agreeing with the State’s first contention,
¶240specifically found that Stumpf “was the principal offender”
¶241in the aggravated murder of Mrs. Stout. App. 196. Determining
¶242that the aggravating factors in Stumpf’s case outweighed
¶243any mitigating factors, the panel sentenced Stumpf
¶244to death.
¶246Afterward, Wesley was successfully extradited to Ohio to
¶247stand trial. His case was tried to a jury, before the same
¶248judge who had presided over the panel overseeing Stumpf’s
¶249proceedings, and with the same prosecutor. This time, however,
¶250the prosecutor had new evidence: James Eastman, Wesley’s
¶251cellmate after his extradition, testified that Wesley had
¶252admitted to firing the shots that killed Mrs. Stout. The
¶253prosecutor introduced Eastman’s testimony in Wesley’s trial,
¶254and in his closing argument he argued for Eastman’s credibility
¶255and lack of motive to lie. The prosecutor claimed that
¶256Eastman’s testimony, combined with certain circumstantial
¶257evidence and with the implausibility of Wesley’s own account
¶258of events, proved that Wesley was the principal offender in
¶259Mrs. Stout’s murder–and that Wesley therefore deserved to
¶260be put to death. One way Wesley countered this argument
¶261was by noting that the prosecutor had taken a contrary position
¶262in Stumpf’s trial, and that Stumpf had already been sentenced
¶263to death for the crime. Wesley also took the stand
¶264in his own defense, and testified that Stumpf had shot
¶265Mrs. Stout. In the end, the jury sentenced Wesley to life
¶266imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 20 years.
¶268After the Wesley trial, Stumpf, whose direct appeal was
¶269still pending in the Ohio Court of Appeals, returned to the
¶270Court of Common Pleas with a motion to withdraw his guilty
¶271plea or vacate his death sentence. Stumpf argued that
¶275Opinion of the Court
¶277Eastman’s testimony, and the prosecution’s endorsement of
¶278that testimony in Wesley’s trial, cast doubt upon Stumpf’s
¶279conviction and sentence. The State (represented again by
¶280the same prosecutor who had tried both Wesley’s case and
¶281Stumpf’s original case) disagreed. According to the prosecutor,
¶282the court’s first task was to decide whether the Eastman
¶283testimony was sufficient to alter the court’s prior determination
¶284that Stumpf had been the shooter. Id., at 210.
¶285Contrary to the argument he had presented in the Wesley
¶286trial, however, the prosecutor now noted that Eastman’s testimony
¶287was belied by certain other evidence (ballistics evidence
¶288and Wesley’s testimony in his own defense) confirming
¶289Stumpf to have been the primary shooter. In the alternative,
¶290the State noted as it had before that an aider-andabettor
¶291theory might allow the death sentence to be imposed
¶292against Stumpf even if he had not shot Mrs. Stout.
¶294Although one judge speculated during oral argument that
¶295the court’s earlier conclusion about Stumpf’s principal role
¶296in the killing “may very well have had an effect upon” the
¶297prior sentencing determination, ibid., the Court of Common
¶298Pleas denied Stumpf’s motion in a brief summary order without
¶299explanation. That order was appealed together with the
¶300original judgment in Stumpf’s case, and the Ohio Court of
¶301Appeals affirmed, as did the Ohio Supreme Court. State v.
¶302Stumpf, 32 Ohio St. 3d 95, 512 N. E. 2d 598 (1987), cert.
¶303denied, 484 U. S. 1079 (1988).
¶305After a subsequent request for state postconviction relief
¶306was denied by the state courts, Stumpf filed this federal
¶307habeas petition in the United States District Court for the
¶308Southern District of Ohio in November 1995. The District
¶309Court denied Stumpf relief, but granted permission to appeal
¶310on four claims, including the two at issue here. The United
¶311States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding
¶312that habeas relief was warranted on “either or both”
¶313of “two alternative grounds.” Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F. 3d
¶314594, 596 (2004). First, the court determined that Stumpf’s
¶318182 BRADSHAW v. STUMPF
¶320Opinion of the Court
¶322guilty plea was invalid because it had not been entered
¶323knowingly and intelligently. More precisely, the court concluded
¶324that Stumpf had pleaded guilty to aggravated murder
¶325without understanding that specific intent to cause death
¶326was a necessary element of the charge under Ohio law. See
¶327Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2903.01(B) and (D). Noting that
¶328Stumpf had all along denied shooting Mrs. Stout, and considering
¶329those denials inconsistent with an informed choice
¶330to plead guilty to aggravated murder, the Court of Appeals
¶331concluded that Stumpf must have entered his plea out of
¶332ignorance. Second, the court concluded that “Stumpf’s due
¶333process rights were violated by the state’s deliberate action
¶334in securing convictions of both Stumpf and Wesley for the
¶335same crime, using inconsistent theories.” 367 F. 3d, at 596.
¶336This violation, the court held, required setting aside “both
¶337Stumpf’s plea and his sentence.” Id., at 616. One member
¶338of the panel dissented.
¶340II
¶342Because Stumpf filed his habeas petition before enactment
¶343of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
¶344(AEDPA), we review his claims under the standards of the
¶345pre-AEDPA habeas statute. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521
¶347U. S. 320 (1997). Moreover, because petitioner has not argued
¶348that Stumpf’s habeas claims were barred as requiring
¶349announcement of a new rule, we do not apply the rule of
¶350Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), to this case. See Schiro
¶352v. Farley, 510 U. S. 222, 229 (1994); Godinez v. Moran, 509
¶353U. S. 389, 397, n. 8 (1993).
¶354A
¶357The Court of Appeals concluded that Stumpf’s plea of
¶358guilty to aggravated murder was invalid because he was not
¶359aware of the specific intent element of the charge–a determination
¶360we find unsupportable.
¶362Stumpf’s guilty plea would indeed be invalid if he had not
¶363been aware of the nature of the charges against him, includ
¶368Opinion of the Court
¶370ing the elements of the aggravated murder charge to which
¶371he pleaded guilty. A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important
¶372rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly,
¶373and intelligently, “with sufficient awareness of the relevant
¶374circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v.
¶375United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748 (1970). Where a defendant
¶376pleads guilty to a crime without having been informed of the
¶377crime’s elements, this standard is not met and the plea is
¶378invalid. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U. S. 637 (1976).
¶380But the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Stumpf had
¶381not been properly informed before pleading guilty. In
¶382Stumpf’s plea hearing, his attorneys represented on the record
¶383that they had explained to their client the elements of
¶384the aggravated murder charge; Stumpf himself then confirmed
¶385that this representation was true. See App. 135,
¶386137—138. While the court taking a defendant’s plea is responsible
¶387for ensuring “a record adequate for any review that
¶388may be later sought,” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 244
¶389(1969) (footnote omitted), we have never held that the judge
¶390must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant
¶391on the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites
¶392of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately
¶393reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements
¶394of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own,
¶395competent counsel. Cf. Henderson, supra, at 647 (granting
¶396relief to a defendant unaware of the elements of his crime,
¶397but distinguishing that case from others where “the record
¶398contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial
¶399judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that
¶400the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused”).
¶401Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the
¶402court usually may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the
¶403defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements
¶404of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.
¶406Seeking to counter this natural inference, Stumpf argues,
¶407in essence, that his choice to plead guilty to the aggravated
¶411Opinion of the Court
¶413murder charge was so inconsistent with his denial of having
¶414shot the victim that he could only have pleaded guilty out of
¶415ignorance of the charge’s specific intent requirement. But
¶416Stumpf’s asserted inconsistency is illusory. The aggravated
¶417murder charge’s intent element did not require any showing
¶418that Stumpf had himself shot Mrs. Stout. Rather, Ohio law
¶419considers aiders and abettors equally in violation of the aggravated
¶420murder statute, so long as the aiding and abetting
¶421is done with the specific intent to cause death. See In re
¶422Washington, 81 Ohio St. 3d 337, 691 N. E. 2d 285 (1998);
¶423State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St. 2d 155, 165, 400 N. E. 2d 375, 382
¶424(1980). As a result, Stumpf’s steadfast assertion that he had
¶425not shot Mrs. Stout would not necessarily have precluded
¶426him from admitting his specific intent under the statute.
¶428That is particularly so given the other evidence in this
¶429case. Stumpf and Wesley had gone to the Stouts’ home together,
¶430carrying guns and intending to commit armed robbery.
¶431Stumpf, by his own admission, shot Mr. Stout in the
¶432head at close range. Taken together, these facts could show
¶433that Wesley and Stumpf had together agreed to kill both of
¶434the Stouts in order to leave no witnesses to the crime. And
¶435that, in turn, could make both men guilty of aggravated murder
¶436regardless of who actually killed Mrs. Stout. See ibid.
¶438Stumpf also points to aspects of the plea hearing transcript
¶439which he says show that both he and his attorneys were confused
¶440about the relevance and timing of defenses Stumpf and
¶441his attorneys had planned to make. First, at one point during
¶442the hearing, the presiding judge stated that by pleading
¶443guilty Stumpf would waive his trial rights and his right to
¶444testify in his own behalf. Stumpf’s attorney answered that
¶445Stumpf “was going to respond but we have informed him
¶446that there is, after the plea, a hearing or trial relative to the
¶447underlying facts so that he is of the belief that there will
¶448be [a] presentation of evidence.” App. 140. The presiding
¶449judge responded that “[o]f course in the sentencing portion
¶450of this trial you do have those rights to speak in your own
¶454Opinion of the Court
¶456behalf [and] to present evidence and testimony on your own
¶457behalf.” Ibid. A few moments later, there was another exchange
¶458along similar lines, after the judge asked Stumpf
¶459whether he was “in fact guilty of” the aggravated murder
¶460charge and its capital specification:
¶462“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . Your Honor, the defendant
¶463has asked me to explain his answer. His answer is
¶464yes. He will recite that with obviously his understanding
¶465of his right to present evidence at a later time
¶466relative to his conduct, but he’ll respond to that.
¶468“JUDGE HENDERSON: At no time am I implying that
¶469the defendant will not have the right to present evidence
¶470in [the] mitigation hearing . . . . And I’m going to ask
¶471that the defendant, himself, respond to the question that
¶472I asked with that understanding that he has the right
¶473to present evidence in mitigation. I’m going to ask the
¶474defendant if he is in fact guilty of the charge set forth
¶475in Count one, including specification one ...?
¶477“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.” Id., at 142.
¶479Reviewing this exchange, the Court of Appeals concluded
¶480that Stumpf “obviously . . . was reiterating his desire to challenge
¶481the [S]tate’s account of his actions”–that is, to show
¶482that he did not intend to kill Mrs. Stout. 367 F. 3d, at 607.
¶483But the desire to contest the State’s version of events would
¶484not necessarily entail the desire to contest the aggravated
¶485murder charge or any of its elements. Rather, Stumpf’s desire
¶486to put on evidence “relative to the underlying facts” and
¶487“relative to his conduct” could equally have meant that
¶488Stumpf was eager to make his mitigation case–an interpretation
¶489bolstered by the attorney’s and Stumpf’s approving
¶490answers after the presiding judge confirmed that the defense
¶491could put on evidence “in mitigation” and in “the sentencing”
¶492phase. While Stumpf’s mitigation case was premised on the
¶493argument that Stumpf had not shot Mrs. Stout, that was
¶497Opinion of the Court
¶499fully consistent with his plea of guilty to aggravated murder.
¶500See supra, at 183—184.
¶502Finally, Stumpf, like the Court of Appeals, relies on the
¶503perception that he obtained a bad bargain by his plea–that
¶504the State’s dropping several nonmurder charges and two of
¶505the three capital murder specifications was a bad tradeoff
¶506for Stumpf’s guilty plea. But a plea’s validity may not be
¶507collaterally attacked merely because the defendant made
¶508what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. See
¶509Brady, 397 U. S., at 757; Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U. S. 504, 508
¶510(1984). Rather, the shortcomings of the deal Stumpf obtained
¶511cast doubt on the validity of his plea only if they show
¶512either that he made the unfavorable plea on the constitutionally
¶513defective advice of counsel, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411
¶515U. S. 258, 267 (1973), or that he could not have understood
¶516the terms of the bargain he and Ohio agreed to. Though
¶517Stumpf did bring an independent claim asserting ineffective
¶518assistance of counsel, that claim is not before us in this case.
¶519And in evaluating the validity of Stumpf’s plea, we are reluctant
¶520to accord much weight to his post hoc reevaluation of
¶521the wisdom of the bargain. Stumpf pleaded guilty knowing
¶522that the State had copious evidence against him, including
¶523the testimony of Mr. Stout; the plea eliminated two of the
¶524three capital specifications the State could rely on in seeking
¶525the death penalty; and the plea allowed Stumpf to assert his
¶526acceptance of responsibility as an argument in mitigation.
¶527Under these circumstances, the plea may well have been a
¶528knowing, voluntary, and intelligent reaction to a litigation
¶529situation that was difficult, to say the least. The Court of
¶530Appeals erred in concluding that Stumpf was uninformed
¶531about the nature of the charge he pleaded guilty to, and we
¶532reverse that portion of the judgment below.
¶534B
¶536The Court of Appeals was also wrong to hold that prosecutorial
¶537inconsistencies between the Stumpf and Wesley cases
¶541Opinion of the Court
¶543required voiding Stumpf’s guilty plea. Stumpf’s assertions
¶544of inconsistency relate entirely to the prosecutor’s arguments
¶545about which of the two men, Wesley or Stumpf, shot
¶546Mrs. Stout. For the reasons given above, see supra, at 183—
¶547184, the precise identity of the triggerman was immaterial
¶548to Stumpf’s conviction for aggravated murder. Moreover,
¶549Stumpf has never provided an explanation of how the prosecution’s
¶550postplea use of inconsistent arguments could have
¶551affected the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of
¶552his plea.
¶554The prosecutor’s use of allegedly inconsistent theories may
¶555have a more direct effect on Stumpf’s sentence, however, for
¶556it is at least arguable that the sentencing panel’s conclusion
¶557about Stumpf’s principal role in the offense was material
¶558to its sentencing determination. The opinion below leaves
¶559some ambiguity as to the overlap between how the lower
¶560court resolved Stumpf’s due process challenge to his conviction,
¶561and how it resolved Stumpf’s challenge to his sentence.
¶562It is not clear whether the Court of Appeals would have concluded
¶563that Stumpf was entitled to resentencing had the
¶564court not also considered the conviction invalid. Likewise,
¶565the parties’ briefing to this Court, and the question on which
¶566we granted certiorari, largely focused on the lower court’s
¶567determination about Stumpf’s conviction. See, e. g., Pet. for
¶568Cert. ii (requesting review of Stumpf’s conviction, not sentence);
¶569Reply Brief for Petitioner 3 (challenge to Court of
¶570Appeals’ decision is focused on issue of conviction); Brief for
¶571Respondent 15, n. 3 (“arguments regarding Stumpf’s death
¶572sentence are not before this Court”). In these circumstances,
¶573it would be premature for this Court to resolve
¶574the merits of Stumpf’s sentencing claim, and we therefore
¶575express no opinion on whether the prosecutor’s actions
¶576amounted to a due process violation, or whether any such
¶577violation would have been prejudicial. The Court of Appeals
¶578should have the opportunity to consider, in the first
¶579instance, the question of how Eastman’s testimony and the
¶583Souter, J., concurring
¶585prosecutor’s conduct in the Stumpf and Wesley cases relate
¶586to Stumpf’s death sentence in particular. Accordingly,
¶587we vacate the portion of the judgment below relating to
¶588Stumpf’s prosecutorial inconsistency claim, and we remand
¶589the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶591It is so ordered.
¶593Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
¶594concurring.
¶596I join the opinion of the Court and add this word to explain
¶597the issue that I understand we are remanding for further
¶598consideration. As the Court notes in its opinion, although
¶599respondent John Stumpf challenged both his conviction and
¶600his death sentence, his attack on the sentence was not always
¶601distinct from the issue raised about the conviction.
¶603I understand Stumpf to claim that it violates the basic due
¶604process standard, barring fundamentally unfair procedure, to
¶605allow his death sentence to stand in the aftermath of three
¶606positions taken by the State: (1) at Stumpf’s sentencing hearing;
¶607(2) at the trial of Stumpf’s codefendant, Clyde Wesley;
¶608and (3) in response to Stumpf’s motion to withdraw his guilty
¶609plea in light of the State’s position at the Wesley trial. At
¶610the hearing on Stumpf’s sentence, the State argued that he
¶611was the triggerman, and it urged consideration of that fact
¶612as a reason to impose a death sentence. App. 186, 188—189.
¶613The trial court found that Stumpf had pulled the trigger and
¶614did sentence him to death, though it did not state that finding
¶615Stumpf to be the shooter was dispositive in determining the
¶616sentence. App. to Pet. for Cert. 219a. After the sentencing
¶617proceeding was over, the State tried the codefendant, Wesley,
¶618and on the basis of testimony from a new witness argued
¶619that Wesley was in fact the triggerman, App. 282, and should
¶620be sentenced to death. The new witness was apparently unconvincing
¶621to the jury, which in any event was informed that
¶622Stumpf had already been sentenced to death for the crime;
¶623the jury rejected the specification that named Wesley as the
¶627Souter, J., concurring
¶629triggerman, and it recommended a sentence of life, not death.
¶630Stumpf then challenged his death sentence (along with his
¶631conviction) on the basis of the prosecution’s position in the
¶632Wesley case. In response, the State did not repudiate the
¶633position it had taken in the codefendant’s case, or explain
¶634that it had made a mistake there. Instead, it merely dismissed
¶635the testimony of the witness it had vouched for at
¶636Wesley’s trial, id., at 125, and maintained that Stumpf’s
¶637death sentence should stand for some or all of the reasons it
¶638originally argued for its imposition. At the end of the day,
¶639the State was on record as maintaining that Stumpf and
¶640Wesley should both be executed on the ground that each was
¶641the triggerman, when it was undisputed that only one of
¶642them could have been.
¶644Stumpf’s claim as I understand it is not a challenge to the
¶645evidentiary basis for arguing for the death penalty in either
¶646case; nor is it a claim that the prosecution deliberately deceived
¶647or attempted to deceive either trial court, as in
¶648Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935) (per curiam); nor
¶649does it implicate the rule that inconsistent jury verdicts may
¶650be enforced, United States v. Powell, 469 U. S. 57 (1984);
¶651Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390 (1932). As I see it,
¶652Stumpf’s argument is simply that a death sentence may not
¶653be allowed to stand when it was imposed in response to a
¶654factual claim that the State necessarily contradicted in subsequently
¶655arguing for a death sentence in the case of a codefendant.
¶656Stumpf’s position was anticipated by Justice
¶657Stevens’s observation 10 years ago that “serious questions
¶658are raised when the sovereign itself takes inconsistent positions
¶659in two separate criminal proceedings against two of
¶660its citizens,” and that “[t]he heightened need for reliability
¶661in capital cases only underscores the gravity of those
¶662questions . . . .” Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U. S. 1067, 1070 (1995)
¶663(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Justice
¶664Stevens’s statement in turn echoed the more general one
¶665expressed by Justice Sutherland in Berger v. United States,
¶669Thomas, J., concurring
¶671295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935), that the State’s interest in winning
¶672some point in a given case is transcended by its interest
¶673“that justice shall be done.” Ultimately, Stumpf’s argument
¶674appears to be that sustaining a death sentence in circumstances
¶675like those here results in a sentencing system that
¶676invites the death penalty “to be... wantonly and . . . freakishly
¶677imposed.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 774 (1990)
¶678(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 188 (1976) (joint
¶679opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); internal quotation
¶680marks omitted).
¶682If a due process violation is found in the State’s maintenance
¶683of such inconsistent positions, there will be remedial
¶684questions. May the death sentence stand if the State declines
¶685to repudiate its inconsistent position in the codefendant’s
¶686case? Would it be sufficient simply to reexamine the
¶687original sentence and if so, which party should have the burden
¶688of persuasion? If more would be required, would a de
¶689novo sentencing hearing suffice?
¶691Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins,
¶692concurring.
¶694I join the Court’s opinion. As the Court notes, the State
¶695has not argued that Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989),
¶696forecloses Stumpf’s claim that the prosecution’s presentation
¶697of inconsistent theories violated his right to due process.
¶698Ante, at 182. With certain narrow exceptions, Teague precludes
¶699federal courts from granting habeas petitioners relief
¶700on the basis of “new” rules of constitutional law established
¶701after their convictions become final. 489 U. S., at 310 (plurality
¶702opinion). This Court has never hinted, much less
¶703held, that the Due Process Clause prevents a State from
¶704prosecuting defendants based on inconsistent theories.
¶705Moreover, it is “[a] threshold question in every habeas
¶706case . . . whether the court is obligated to apply the Teague
¶707rule to the defendant’s claim,” and “if the State does argue
¶711Thomas, J., concurring
¶713that the defendant seeks the benefit of a new rule of constitutional
¶714law, the court must apply Teague before considering
¶715the merits of the claim.” Horn v. Banks, 536 U. S. 266,
¶716271 (2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶717The State also has not argued that Stumpf procedurally defaulted
¶718his due process claim, even though it appears that
¶719Stumpf never presented this argument to the Ohio courts.
¶720Stumpf did not even raise the inconsistent-theories claim in
¶721his first federal habeas filings. See App. to Pet. for Cert.
¶722134a—140a. Instead, the District Court raised the issue for
¶723Stumpf sua sponte, and ordered supplemental briefing on the
¶724point. See App. 97—98. The Court’s opinion does not preclude
¶725the State from advancing either of these procedural
¶726defenses on remand in support of Stumpf’s death sentence.
¶728Moreover, I agree with the Court that “Stumpf has never
¶729provided an explanation of how the prosecution’s postplea
¶730use of inconsistent arguments could have affected the knowing,
¶731voluntary, and intelligent nature of his plea.” Ante,
¶732at 187. Similar reasoning applies to Stumpf’s sentence.
¶733Stumpf equally has never explained how the prosecution’s
¶734use of postsentence inconsistent arguments–which were
¶735based on evidence unavailable until after Stumpf was sentenced–
¶736could have affected the reliability or procedural fairness
¶737of his death sentence. At most, the evidence and
¶738purportedly inconsistent theory presented at Wesley’s trial
¶739would constitute newly discovered evidence casting doubt on
¶740the reliability of Stumpf’s death sentence, a sort of claim
¶741that our precedents and this Nation’s traditions have long
¶742foreclosed, see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 408—417
¶743(1993); id., at 427—428 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Bill of
¶744Rights guarantees vigorous adversarial testing of guilt and
¶745innocence and conviction only by proof beyond a reasonable
¶746doubt. These guarantees are more than sufficient to deter
¶747the State from taking inconsistent positions; a prosecutor
¶748who argues inconsistently risks undermining his case, for op
¶753Thomas, J., concurring
¶755posing counsel will bring the conflict to the factfinder’s attention.
¶756See ante, at 188 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that
¶757Wesley’s jury was informed that Stumpf had already been
¶758sentenced to death for the crime).