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297 U.S. 225

Tuttle v. Harris

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued January 17, 1936. —

Decided February 3, 1936.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1936-02-03

2 counsel of record

Relies on Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans · Wolkenstein v. Slonim · 9 F. Supp. 909 - In Re Granada Hotel Corporation

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed · 8–0 · Decided 1936-02-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 48 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 1982 · most notably Woods v. City Nat Bank & Trust Co of Chicago (1941), United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. (1982)

28 federal appellate · 3 district · 4 state decisions

130193619401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Mr. George T. Buckingham, with whom Messrs. Don Kenneth Jones and Vincent O’Brien were on the brief, for petitioners.

¶2Mr. Maurice Walk, with whom Messrs. Frank E. Mc-Allister and William J. Grace were on the brief, for respondents.

¶3Mr. Justice Cardozo

¶4delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶5The controversy here, as in Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, decided at the same time, ante, p. 216, is one as to the meaning of the words “equity receiverships” in the statute for the reorganization of debtor corporations. Bankruptcy Act, § 77 B (a); 11 U. S. C., § 207 (a).

¶6A mortgagee brought suit against Granada Hotel Corporation in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, to foreclose a second mortgage upon real property of the corporation located in that state. A receiver was appointed to collect the rents and profits. Thereafter a-prior mortgagee, the trustee under a deed of trust' to *226secure an issue of bonds, brought suit to foreclose the prior mortgage, and in accordance with the law of Illinois laid claim to the possession of the property as owner after condition broken. In response to.,that claim the state-court made an order discharging the receiver, and directing that the prior mortgagee be let into possession.

¶7While possession was so hele], respondents brought a proceeding under Bankruptcy -Act, § 77 B, contending that the possession of the mortgagee was that of an equity receiver or' at least equivalent thereto. The District Court upheld that contention, denying a motion by petitioners, who had intervened in the proceeding, to dismiss the application, 9 F. Supp. 909; and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 78 F. (2d) 409. A writ of certiorari issued from this court.

¶8An equity receivership within the meaning of the statute does not result from the appointment of a receiver for the .collection of the rents in a suit to foreclose a mortgage. Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, supra. But here there was no receiver either for the collection of rents or for any other purpose. A mortgagee after.condition broken under the law of Illinois is the owner of a legal estate, and as such entitled as of right to the possession of-the mortgaged premises. Wolkenstein v. Slonim, 355 Ill. 306; 189 N. E. 312. The grantee under the deed .of trust was in possession not as receiver, but as owner.

¶9The decree should be reversed, and it is so ordered.

¶10Reversed.

¶11Mr. Justice Van Devanter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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