EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C.

                   PRELIMINARY PRINT

              Volume 605 U. S. Part 2
                             Pages 627–664




       OFFICIAL REPORTS
                                     OF


   THE SUPREME COURT
                                June 18, 2025


Page Proof Pending Publication


                    REBECCA A. WOMELDORF
                           reporter of decisions




    NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before
  the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter
  of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
  [email protected], of any typographical or other formal errors.
                        OCTOBER TERM, 2024                              627

                                 Syllabus


ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C., et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
                  the fth circuit
     No. 23–1229. Argued March 25, 2025—Decided June 18, 2025
The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a comprehensive venue framework
  for judicial review of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) actions
  designed to ensure proper distribution of cases among federal courts.
  Under 

(b)(1), “nationally applicable” EPA actions must
  be challenged exclusively in the D. C. Circuit, while “locally or regionally applicable” actions ordinarily belong in regional Circuits. However, locally or regionally applicable actions that are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” must be reviewed in the D. C.
  Circuit if EPA fnds and publishes that such basis exists. This tripartite system refects congressional intent to channel nationally signifcant
  EPA actions to the D. C. Circuit while keeping most regionally focused
  matters in local Circuits.
Page Proof Pending Publication
     Under the CAA's renewable fuel program, most domestic refneries
  must blend specifed amounts of ethanol and other renewable fuels into
  transportation fuels they produce. The Act provides a phased exemption scheme for small refneries—those processing no more than 75,000
  barrels of crude oil daily—allowing them to petition EPA for exemptions based on “disproportionate economic hardship.” § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
  Following this Court's decision in HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refning,
  LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., 

, which clarifed that small
  refneries could obtain exemption “extensions” even after their original
  exemptions had lapsed, the D. C. Circuit remanded pending exemption
  cases to EPA for reconsideration.
     EPA then proposed and ultimately denied 105 small refnery exemption petitions in two omnibus notices issued in April and July 2022.
  EPA's denials were based on two principal determinations: frst, its interpretation that “disproportionate economic hardship” covers only
  hardship directly caused by renewable fuel program compliance; and
  second, its economic theory that Renewable Identifcation Number
  (RIN) costs are fully passed through to consumers, creating a presumption against granting exemptions. EPA applied these determinations
  uniformly while conducting confrmatory reviews of individual refnery
  circumstances. EPA asserted in its denial notices that the denials were
  reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit, either as “nationally applicable”
628     EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                                  Syllabus

  actions or, alternatively, as locally applicable actions “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
    Small refneries challenged these denials in multiple regional Circuits.
  Most Circuits either dismissed the challenges for improper venue or
  transferred them to the D. C. Circuit. However, the Fifth Circuit retained jurisdiction, rejecting EPA's venue arguments and ruling for the
  refneries on the merits. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that EPA's actions
  were merely locally applicable because their “legal effect” was limited
  to the petitioning refneries, and that the actions were not based on
  determinations of nationwide scope or effect because EPA still examined refnery-specifc facts before issuing denials.
Held: EPA's denials of small refnery exemption petitions are locally or
 regionally applicable actions that fall within the “nationwide scope or
 effect” exception, requiring venue in the D. C. Circuit. Pp. 636–650.
    (a) Section 7607(b)(1) creates a two-step inquiry for determining
 venue. First, courts assess whether an EPA action is nationally applicable or only locally or regionally applicable. If nationally applicable,
 the case belongs in the D. C. Circuit. If locally or regionally applicable,
 courts proceed to the second step to determine whether the “nationwide
 scope or effect” exception applies to override the default rule of regional
Page Proof Pending Publication
 Circuit review. Pp. 636–642.
       (1) To identify the relevant “action,” courts must look to the authorizing CAA provision rather than how EPA packages its decisions. The
 enumerated “actions” in § 7607(b)(1) make clear that this provision
 “treats each activity the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to take as a
 distinct `action.' ” Kentucky v. EPA, 

, 460. Because the
 CAA allows “[a] small refnery” to “petition [EPA] for an extension of
 [its] exemption” and requires EPA to “act on any petition submitted,”
 each EPA denial of a refnery's exemption petition constitutes its own
 “action” for venue purposes. Pp. 636–638.
       (2) An action is “nationally applicable” if it applies “[o]n its face”
 throughout the entire country, or only “locally or regionally applicable”
 if it applies only to particular localities or regions. Sierra Club v. EPA,
 

. EPA's denial of a single refnery's exemption petition applies only to that refnery, a particular entity in a particular place,
 making such denials paradigmatically “locally or regionally applicable”
 actions. Pp. 638–640.
       (3) EPA's argument that it can control the unit of “action” for venue
 purposes by aggregating similar petitions into omnibus notices lacks any
 statutory limiting principle and would effectively give EPA veto power
 over venue. EPA's position that any action affecting more than one
 Circuit is nationally applicable would render actions with plainly local
                       Cite as: 

 (2025)                    629

                                 Syllabus

  or regional focus “nationally applicable” simply because the locality or
  region straddles Circuit lines. Pp. 640–642.
     (b) Because EPA's actions are locally or regionally applicable, the
  Court must determine whether the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies. This exception requires that (1) the action “is based on a
  determination of nationwide scope or effect,” and (2) EPA “fnds and
  publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” All agree
  the second requirement is satisfed. Pp. 642–650.
       (1) A “determination” refers to EPA's justifcations in taking the
  action. Determinations are of nationwide “scope” if they apply
  throughout the country “as a legal matter (de jure)” and of nationwide
  “effect” if they so apply “as a practical [matter] (de facto).” Kentucky,
  123 F. 4th, at 465. An EPA action is “based on” a determination of
  nationwide scope or effect only if that determination “lie[s] at the core
  of the agency action” and forms the primary explanation for and driver
  of EPA's action. Texas v. EPA, 

. This requires more
  than but-for causation; it requires that a justifcation of nationwide
  breadth be the most important part of EPA's reasoning. Courts should
  evaluate this de novo. Pp. 643–646.
       (2) Applying this framework, EPA's exemption denials were based

Page Proof Pending Publication
  on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. EPA's interpretation
  of “disproportionate economic hardship” under § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) and its
  RIN passthrough theory are clear determinations of nationwide scope
  or effect that apply generically to all refneries regardless of geographic
  location. These determinations formed the core basis for EPA's denials
  because EPA used them to reach a presumptive resolution to deny all
  petitions, then considered refnery-specifc factors only to confrm it had
  no reason to depart from this presumptive disposition. Where EPA
  relies on determinations of nationwide scope or effect to reach a presumptive resolution, those determinations qualify as the primary driver
  of its decision. EPA's confrmatory review of refnery-specifc facts
  is “[m]erely peripheral” by comparison. Texas, 

.
  Pp. 646–647.
       (3) The Court rejects EPA's argument that “determination” covers
  only the resolution of unsettled issues, as well as respondents' argument
  that “determination” is a term of art applicable only when a CAA provision textually directs EPA to make a “determination” for the entire
  Nation. The Court also rejects the argument that EPA's consideration
  of refnery-specifc facts precludes the exception's application, noting
  that the exception requires an action be “based on,” not “based solely
  on,” a determination of nationwide scope or effect. Pp. 647–650.

, vacated and remanded.
630     EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                                 Syllabus

   Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., fled a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., joined, post,
p. 650.

  Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for
petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor
General Harris, Solicitor General Prelogar, Assistant Attorney General Kim, Aimee W. Brown, Bryan J. Harrison,
Susannah Weaver, and Matthew Marks.
  Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondents Growth
Energy et al. in support of petitioner. With him on the
briefs were Matthew W. Morrison, Shelby L. Dyl, and David
M. Lehn.
  Michael R. Huston argued the cause for respondent Calumet Shreveport Refning, L.L.C., et al. With him on the
brief were Karl J. Worsham, Jordan M. Buckwald, Sopen
Shah, Alexandra M. Bromer, Jonathan G. Hardin, Aimee E.
Ford, and Eric Wolff.*
Page         Proof Pending Publication
 *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for the State of New
York et al. by Letitia James, Attorney General of New York, Barbara D.
Underwood, Solicitor General, Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General,
Elizabeth A. Brody, Assistant Solicitor General, and Morgan A. Costello
and Claiborne E. Walthall, Assistant Attorneys General, by Christian
Menefee, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions
as follows: Kris Mayes of Arizona, Philip J. Weiser of Colorado, William
Tong of Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings of Delaware, Brian L. Schwalb
of the District of Columbia, Kwame Raoul of Illinois, Anthony G. Brown
of Maryland, Andrea Joy Campbell of Massachusetts, Dana Nessel of
Michigan, Keith Ellison of Minnesota, Matthew J. Platkin of New Jersey,
Ellen F. Rosenblum of Oregon, Michelle A. Henry of Pennsylvania, Peter
F. Neronha of Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark of Vermont, Robert W.
Ferguson of Washington, and Joshua L. Kaul of Wisconsin; and for
NATSO et al. by Hyland Hunt and Ruthanne M. Deutsch.
  Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Countrymark
Refning and Logistics, LLC, by Aaron M. Herzig and Philip D. Williamson; and for Sen. Mike Lee et al. by R. Trent McCotter.
  Jeremy C. Marwell, Jennifer B. Dickey, Andrew R. Varcoe, and Eric
Groten fled a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America as amicus curiae.
                   Cite as: 

 (2025)             631

                      Opinion of the Court

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
   The Clean Air Act (CAA) establishes a tripartite system
for determining venue in CAA litigation. Challenges to
“nationally applicable” Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) actions belong in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the
D. C. Circuit, while challenges to “locally or regionally applicable” EPA actions ordinarily belong in a regional Circuit.

(b)(1). But, the CAA makes an exception
for local or regional actions that are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and accompanied by an
EPA fnding of this basis, which also must be challenged in
the D. C. Circuit. 

 Applying this framework to EPA's
2022 denials of certain small refneries' exemption petitions,
we hold that the refneries' challenges belong in the D. C.
Circuit. EPA's denials are only locally or regionally applicable, but they fall within the “nationwide scope or effect”
exception.
Page Proof Pending Publication I
                                A
   Section 7607(b)(1)—the CAA's venue provision—governs
where petitioners should fle challenges to EPA actions
under that statute. As originally enacted, § 7607(b)(1) dictated venue only for an enumerated subset of EPA actions.
Certain actions with a national reach, such as “any national
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard”
(NAAQS) were reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit.
§ 1857h–5(b)(1) (1970 ed.). Area-specific “implementation
plan[s]” went to “the appropriate” regional Circuit. Ibid.
Any other unmentioned actions could be heard only in district courts through their general grant of federal-question
jurisdiction. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 

 (1980); see 

.
   In 1977, Congress replaced this patchwork system with
the CAA's current scheme, which makes all EPA actions directly reviewable in a federal court of appeals. 

632    EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                      Opinion of the Court

(codified as amended at 

(b)(1)). The
amended statute specifes that, in addition to NAAQS and
other enumerated actions, “any other nationally applicable
. . . fnal action taken” by EPA under the CAA may be reviewed only in the D. C. Circuit. § 7607(b)(1). And, in addition to implementation plans, “any other fnal action of [EPA]
under this chapter . . . which is locally or regionally applicable” ordinarily may be reviewed only in a regional Circuit.
Ibid. Congress has since amended the CAA to specify additional kinds of actions that fall within these two categories.

; 

.
   Congress also created a third venue category in the 1977
amendments. This category provided an exception to the
default rule that locally or regionally applicable actions
should be reviewed in the regional Circuits. Congress instructed that a locally or regionally applicable action must
be reviewed in the D. C. Circuit “if [it] is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect” and “if in taking such
Page Proof Pending Publication
action [EPA] fnds and publishes that such action is based on
such a determination.” § 7607(b)(1).

                               B
  The EPA actions at issue in this case relate to the CAA's
renewable fuel program (RFP). The RFP “requires most
domestic refneries to blend a certain amount of ethanol and
other renewable fuels into the transportation fuels they
produce.” HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refning, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., 

 (2021). Each covered refnery's precise obligation turns on its proportional
share of various “nationwide volume mandates.” 

 at
385–386; see §§ 7545(o)(2)(A)(i), (o)(3); 

(a)
(2024).
  Covered refneries demonstrate compliance through a system of Renewable Identifcation Number credits (RINs).
See 

, 80.1426(a). A refnery generates
RINs whenever it blends renewable fuels, § 80.1426(a),
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 (2025)           633

                      Opinion of the Court

and refneries may also buy and sell RINs, 

(o)(5)(B). Thus, each year, a refnery may show
compliance “thanks to its own blending efforts, the purchase
of credits from someone else, or a combination of both.”
HollyFrontier, 

.
   The CAA contains a phased exemption scheme for small
refneries—i. e., refneries whose “average aggregate daily
crude oil throughput for a calendar year . . . does not exceed
75,000 barrels.” § 7545(o)(1)(K). The scheme exempted all
small refneries from RFP compliance until 2011. § 7545(o)
(9)(A)(i). It then required EPA to extend this blanket exemption, for at least two years, for all small refneries found
by a Department of Energy study to face “disproportionate
economic hardship” if subjected to the RFP's obligations.
§ 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii). Finally, the scheme allows a small refnery to “at any time petition [EPA] for an extension of [its]
exemption . . . for the reason of disproportionate economic
hardship.” § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). We interpreted this last proPage Proof Pending Publication
vision in HollyFrontier, holding that a small refnery may
obtain an “extension” even after its original exemption has
lapsed. Id., at 396.
                               C
   This case arose in the aftermath of HollyFrontier. Pending that decision, the D. C. Circuit had been holding in abeyance challenges to EPA's resolution of 36 small refneries'
exemption petitions for the 2018 compliance year. Afterwards, that court granted EPA's motion for remand without
vacatur, so that EPA could reconsider its orders in light of
the HollyFrontier litigation. Order in Sinclair Wyoming
Refning Co. v. EPA, No. 19–1196 etc. (CADC, Dec. 8, 2021),
p. 3. The D. C. Circuit instructed EPA to issue its new decisions within 120 days. Ibid.
   Shortly thereafter, EPA noticed for public comment a proposal to deny all pending exemption petitions. 

 (2021). EPA's notice set out two principles. First,
EPA offered its interpretation of “disproportionate economic
634   EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                     Opinion of the Court

hardship,” the CAA's threshold for an exemption petition to
be granted. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). On EPA's view, that phrase
covers only hardship that is caused by RFP compliance.
App. in No. 22–60266 etc. (CA5), pp. 545–548. Second, EPA
theorized that, as a matter of economics, small refneries ordinarily do not suffer disproportionate economic hardship as
a result of the RFP because “RIN costs are fully passed
through to consumers.” Id., at 549; see id., at 548–584.
Based on this “RIN passthrough” theory, EPA proposed denying all pending petitions “by fnding the petitioning refneries do not face [disproportionate economic hardship] caused
by compliance with their [RFP] obligations.” 

.
   After receiving comments, EPA followed through and denied the pending exemption petitions in two omnibus notices.
EPA issued the frst in April 2022 to deny the 36 petitions
subject to the D. C. Circuit's deadline. 

.
Page Proof Pending Publication
EPA issued the second in July 2022, to deny an additional 69
petitions from the 2016 to 2021 compliance years. 

. In both notices, EPA relied primarily on the principles from its proposal—namely, its statutory interpretation
of “disproportionate economic hardship” and its RIN passthrough theory. App. to Pet. for Cert. 100a, 107a, 242a,
249a. EPA treated the passthrough theory as creating a
presumption against granting exemptions, and it examined
the petitioning refneries' evidence regarding their specifc
circumstances to confrm that none of the refneries had rebutted this presumption. See 

 at 107a–108a, 163a–168a,
249a–250a, 305a–310a.
   EPA also asserted in the denial notices that its denials
were reviewable only in the D. C. Circuit. According to
EPA, the notices were “ `nationally applicable' ” actions
under § 7607(b)(1). Id., at 187a, 328a. Alternatively, if the
actions were only “locally or regionally applicable,” then
EPA invoked the exception for actions “based on a determination of `nationwide scope or effect.' ” Ibid. EPA in-
                      Cite as: 

 (2025)                  635

                          Opinion of the Court

cluded in both notices a fnding that its new statutory interpretation and RIN passthrough theory supplied the relevant
determinations of nationwide scope or effect. 

 at
187a–188a, 329a.
   Notwithstanding EPA's position, small refneries challenged these denials in a host of regional Circuits. Agreeing with EPA that the litigation belonged in the D. C. Circuit, most of these Circuits either dismissed the petitions for
improper venue or transferred them to the D. C. Circuit.1
   The Fifth Circuit took a different approach. Evaluating
the petitions fled by six small refneries (respondents here),
the Fifth Circuit held that the litigation was properly before
it. The majority rejected the arguments for transfer raised
by EPA and a group of intervenors, reasoning that EPA's
notices were merely locally or regionally applicable actions,
because their “legal effect” was limited to the petitioning
refneries. 

, 1131–1132 (2023). And, contra
EPA, the notices were not based on any determination of
Page Proof Pending Publication
nationwide scope or effect. Both EPA's new interpretation
and its RIN passthrough theory “fail[ed] to provide the
agency with a suffcient basis to adjudicate exemption petitions,” because EPA still looked to refnery-specifc facts before it issued its denials. 

. Accordingly, the case
properly belonged in the Fifth Circuit, and the majority proceeded to rule against EPA on the merits, vacating and remanding EPA's denials for further consideration. 

.
   Judge Higginbotham dissented on venue grounds. In his
view, EPA's denial notices were nationally applicable because
they applied throughout the country: EPA applied a consist-

  1
   See, e. g., Orders in American Rfg. Group, Inc. v. EPA, No. 22–1991
(CA3, Aug. 9, 2022), ECF Doc. 23; Countrymark Rfg. & Logistics, LLC v.
EPA, No. 22–1878 (CA7, July 20, 2022), ECF Doc. 13; Calumet Mont. Rfg.,
LLC v. EPA, No. 22–70124 (CA9, Oct. 25, 2022), ECF Doc. 16; Wyoming
Rfg. Co. v. EPA, No. 22–9538 (CA10, Aug. 23, 2022), ECF Doc. 26; see also
Hunt Rfg. Co. v. EPA, 

, 1113 (CA11 2024).
636    EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                      Opinion of the Court

ent approach to small refneries spanning “eighteen different
states, in the geographical boundaries of eight different circuit courts.” 

 at 1143–1144. And, if the notices were
only locally or regionally applicable, then EPA was correct
to fnd that the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applied: EPA's statutory interpretation and its passthrough
theory were “core determinations” that have nationwide
scope or effect in that they “are applicable to all small refneries no matter the location or market in which they operate.” 

. We granted certiorari to clarify where
venue properly lies. 

 (2024).

                              II
  Section 7607(b)(1) creates a two-step inquiry for determining venue. At the frst step, we assess whether an EPA
action is nationally applicable, or only locally or regionally
applicable. If the action is nationally applicable, then our
inquiry ends: The case belongs in the D. C. Circuit. If the
Page Proof Pending Publication
action is locally or regionally applicable, then we proceed to
the second step. There, we ask whether the “nationwide
scope or effect” exception applies to override the default rule
that locally or regionally applicable actions belong in the regional Circuits. Turning to § 7607(b)(1)'s frst step, we hold
that the actions before us are only locally or regionally
applicable.
                               A
  To properly categorize EPA's actions at the frst step, we
must determine what the relevant “action” is, and what it
means for an action to be “nationally applicable” as opposed
to “locally or regionally applicable.” Once those principles
are clarifed, the categorization here is straightforward.

                               1
  Because § 7607(b)(1) pegs venue to the scope of the EPA
action being challenged, our threshold task is to identify the
“action” at issue. To do so, we must read “action” in its
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 (2025)           637

                      Opinion of the Court

context. That word means “a thing done.” Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 21 (1976) (Webster's);
see also Black's Law Dictionary 26 (5th ed. 1979) (Black's)
(“something done”). But, we could defne the “thing done”
by EPA in different ways. Both EPA's denials of each individual exemption petition and its aggregation of those denials into omnibus notices are in a sense things done. The
former is an “activity the Clean Air Act allows the EPA to
take,” while the latter is how EPA has chosen to undertake
that activity. Kentucky v. EPA, 

, 460 (CA6
2024).
   To determine which framing matters for purposes of
§ 7607(b)(1), we look to the example “actions” this provision
enumerates. Section 7607(b)(1) lists various examples of
EPA actions that qualify as either “nationally applicable” or
“locally or regionally applicable.” For both these terms, it
then provides a catchall for “any other” “fnal action.” And,
Page Proof Pending Publication
we “interpret a `general or collective term' . . . in light of
any `common attribute[s]' shared by” statutory examples of
that term. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 

 (2022).
   The enumerated “actions” in § 7607(b)(1) make clear that
this provision “treats each activity the Clean Air Act allows
the EPA to take as a distinct `action.' ” Kentucky, 123
F. 4th, at 460. These “actions” all refer to particular exercises of EPA authority undertaken pursuant to particular
CAA provisions. For instance, the example of a NAAQS
must be understood by reference to § 7409(a), which directs
EPA to issue a NAAQS “for each air pollutant,” and thus
indicates that each pollutant-specifc standard is its own “action.” Likewise, § 7607(b)(1)'s example of EPA's approval of
an “implementation plan under section 7410” must be read
in light of § 7410, which makes clear that an implementation
plan is a proposal “submitted by a State,” and thus indicates
that EPA's approval decision is state specifc. § 7410(a)(2).
In each case, the enumerated EPA “action” is defned by ref-
638     EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                         Opinion of the Court

erence to the substantive authority under which EPA is acting. See id., at 461.
   Accordingly, for both § 7607(b)(1)'s enumerated examples
and “any other . . . fnal action taken” by EPA “under this
chapter,” we must look to the authorizing CAA provision to
identify the “action” at hand. This provision makes the
CAA's framing of the relevant “action” controlling, regardless of how EPA chooses to package its decisions in the Federal Register.2
                              2
   The next question is whether a given action is “nationally
applicable” or only “locally or regionally applicable.” Because § 7607(b)(1) does not defne those terms, we presumptively give those terms their ordinary meaning. Burrage v.
United States, 

 (2014). The word “ `[n]a-
tional' contemplates an activity with a nationwide scope,”
while the words “local” and “regional” relate only to particuPage Proof Pending Publication
lar “place[s]” or regions. See Black's 845, 923. And, the
word “applicable” requires us to ask what the EPA action in
question “ `ha[s] reference to.' ” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th, at 459.
Put another way, we ask whether the action “[o]n its face”
applies throughout the entire country, or only to particular
localities or regions. Sierra Club v. EPA, 

(CADC 2019).
   The statutory context supplied by § 7607(b)(1)'s enumerated examples confrms the correctness of this ordinary-meaning approach. The actions that § 7607(b)(1) identifes
as “nationally applicable” facially apply nationwide. For example, courts have identifed a NAAQS—a “ `national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard' ”—as “[t]he
textbook example of nationally applicable action.” Sierra
Club v. EPA, 

 (CADC 2022). Conversely,

  2
    The Fifth Circuit therefore erred in summarily accepting EPA's characterization of its omnibus notices as the “two EPA actions” at issue in
this case. 

, 1129 (2023); see supra, at 635.
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 (2025)                       639

                            Opinion of the Court

the actions that the CAA enumerates as “locally or regionally applicable” all have more particularized reach. For instance, “the prototypical `locally or regionally applicable' action” is EPA's approval of a state implementation plan,
which, as explained, is state specifc. American Road &
Transp. Builders Assn. v. EPA, 

 (CADC
2013) (majority opinion of Kavanaugh, J.); supra, at 637. Because catchall “clauses are to be read as bringing within a
statute categories similar in type to those specifcally enumerated,” the examples make clear that the ordinary meaning of the terms “nationally applicable” and “locally or regionally applicable” controls. Federal Maritime Comm'n v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 

 (1973).3
                                       3
   Applying these principles here, we treat each EPA denial
of a refnery's exemption petition as its own “action” for
venue purposes. And, EPA's denial of a single refnery's pePage Proof Pending Publication
tition plainly is only locally or regionally applicable.
   This conclusion follows from how the CAA defnes the submission and evaluation of an RFP exemption petition. The
CAA allows “[a] small refnery” to “at any time petition
[EPA] for an extension of [its] exemption” from RFP obligations. § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). EPA, in turn, is to “evaluat[e] a
petition” and then “act on any petition submitted . . . not
later than 90 days after the date of receipt of the petition.”
§§ 7545(o)(9)(B)(ii)–(iii). Thus, the CAA pegs EPA's “ac-
  3
    Because 

(b)(1) requires all actions to be either nationally applicable or locally or regionally applicable, diffcult edge cases may
arise. For example, if an EPA action must “formally appl[y]” to “the
whole country” to be nationally applicable, Kentucky v. EPA, 

, 460 (CA6 2024), then actions could apply to nearly the entire country
yet still be locally or regionally applicable, see, e. g., § 7545(i)(4). But, if
an action that formally applies to only a subset of the country can be
nationally applicable, see ATK Launch Systems, Inc. v. EPA, 

 (CA10 2011), then line-drawing questions may arise, Kentucky,
123 F. 4th, at 460–462. This case, however, does not present these issues.
640    EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                       Opinion of the Court

tions” under the exemption provision by reference to each
individual exemption petition.
   Against this backdrop, our classification decision is
straightforward. By defnition, EPA's denial of a single refnery's exemption petition only applies to that refnery,
which is a particular entity located in a particular place.
That limited reach makes EPA's denials paradigmatically
“locally or regionally applicable” actions. See Sierra Club,

.
                              B
   We are unpersuaded by EPA's and the intervenors' counterarguments. EPA proffers its omnibus denial notices as
the relevant “actions” on the ground that it has the discretion
to structure its decisions. According to EPA, it is free to
“aggregate similar petitions for joint resolution” in a single
“action”—here, its omnibus Federal Register notices—given
its right as an agency “ `to fashion [its] own rules of procePage Proof Pending Publication
dure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting
[it] to discharge [its] multitudinous duties.' ” Brief for Petitioner 26–27 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,

 (1940)). But, whatever discretion EPA
has to manage its internal affairs, Congress conclusively defned the term “action” in § 7607(b)(1) to focus on the specifc
statutory authority EPA is exercising.
   Tellingly, EPA's position that it can control the unit of “action” used to determine venue lacks any statutory limiting
principle. If EPA had free rein to group decisions into a
single “action” for venue purposes, then it could bundle even
unrelated matters into one Federal Register pronouncement
that is, in the aggregate, nationally applicable. Such a possibility would effectively give EPA a veto power over venue
under the CAA. We see no reason to read § 7607(b)(1) to
permit such gamesmanship. Absent indication that Congress meant to give a party unfettered control over venue,
we will not read a venue provision to confer such broad discretion. Cf. Deal v. United States, 

, 133–134
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                       Opinion of the Court

(1993) (disfavoring a reading that would “give a prosecutor
unreviewable discretion” as to a sentencing enhancement's
applicability).
   Because EPA does not dispute that the actions here can
be nationally applicable only if it is right that the omnibus
denial notices are the relevant “actions,” we need not resolve
EPA's remaining arguments. At a minimum, however, we
note that EPA's theory for distinguishing between nationally
applicable and locally or regionally applicable actions cannot
withstand scrutiny. EPA argues that any agency action is
nationally applicable if it affects more than one Circuit.
But, as we have recognized, the term “nationally applicable”
bears its ordinary meaning, supra, at 638, and EPA's view
would render actions with a plainly local or regional focus
“nationally applicable” simply because the locality or region
at issue straddles Circuit lines. For example, some EPA air
quality control regions cover metropolitan areas that extend
Page Proof Pending Publication
into two Circuits. It would defy credulity to say that an
EPA action regarding such a region would therefore be nationally applicable rather than locally or regionally applicable. Cf. Brief for Small Refnery Respondents 41 (“Can
there be any doubt that an EPA disapproval of a regional
implementation plan for only Region 90 (Metropolitan Kansas City) is a `regionally applicable' action . . . , even though
that action touches both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits?”).
Whatever the precise line should be, see n. 3, supra, EPA's
line cannot be it.
   EPA justifes its position based on § 7607(b)(1)'s language
equating regional Circuit review with review in “the appropriate circuit.” § 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added). To be reviewable only in a single “appropriate circuit,” EPA contends, the category of “locally or regionally applicable”
actions must be limited to those actions affecting only one
Circuit. But, in the absence of other evidence, § 7607(b)(1)'s
use of the defnite article “the” is too thin a reed to support
EPA's conclusion. See 

 (directing that “words
642    EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                        Opinion of the Court

importing the singular include and apply to several persons,
parties, or things” “unless the context indicates otherwise”).
   Finally, we fnd no merit in the intervenors' arguments for
why the denial of an individual refnery's exemption petition
should still be considered nationally applicable. According
to the intervenors, the individual denials are nationally applicable because they have follow-on effects for the amount
of renewable fuel that must be produced under the RFP and
because EPA in issuing the denials announced a new standard for adjudicating exemption petitions. But, again, we determine an action's range of applicability by “look[ing] only
to the face of the [action], rather than to its practical effects.”
American Road & Transp. Builders Assn., 

.
Any follow-on implications of EPA's denials have no bearing
on our analysis of their facial applicability. Cf. Sierra Club,

 (“The fact that `EPA's interpretive reasoning' may have `precedential effect in future EPA proceedings
. . . does not make [an action] nationally applicable' ”).
Page Proof Pending Publication
                                III
   Because we conclude that EPA's actions were only locally
or regionally applicable, we must proceed to the second step
of the § 7607(b)(1) inquiry. That is, we ask whether the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies to override the
default of regional Circuit review for locally or regionally
applicable actions. This exception channels an action to the
D. C. Circuit if (1) it “is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” and (2) “in taking such action [EPA]
fnds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination.” § 7607(b)(1). Here, all agree that the second requirement is satisfed: EPA included the necessary fnding in
both its April and June denial notices. Supra, at 634–635.
Accordingly, the question before us is whether EPA's exemption denials were “based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect.” We conclude that they were.
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                       Opinion of the Court

                                 A
  Here too, we begin by laying out the framework for deciding whether an action is “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” We conclude that this requirement is
met if such a determination supplies a core justifcation for
EPA's action and that courts should evaluate the basis for
EPA's determinations de novo. Applying that framework,
we hold that this case is one in which the “nationwide scope
or effect” exception applies.

                                 1
  To understand the phrase “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect,” we again turn to ordinary meaning. Burrage, 

. In particular, we look to
the plain meaning of this phrase's component words, which
are all terms of everyday usage. And, we read these words
“in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
Page Proof Pending Publication
statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury,

 (1989).
  To begin, a “determination” is the “settling and ending of
a controversy,” or “the resolving of a question by argument
or reasoning.” Webster's 616; see also 4 Oxford English
Dictionary 548 (2d ed. 1989) (“[t]he decision arrived at or
promulgated; a determinate sentence, conclusion, or opinion”). In an EPA action, EPA's underlying “determinations
are the justifcations [it] gives for the action,” which “can be
found in [its] explanation of its action.” Texas v. EPA, 

 (CA5 2016).
  In turn, a determination's “scope” and “effect” refer, respectively, to its “formal `area' of operation” and to its “ `operative infuence.' ” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th, at 465; see, e. g.,
American Heritage Dictionary 1164 (1969) (defning “scope”
as the “area covered by a given activity or subject”); Webster's 724 (defning “effect” as “something that is produced
by an agent or cause”). An agency's determinations are of
644    EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                      Opinion of the Court

“nationwide” scope or effect if they apply “throughout [the]
entire nation.” Id., at 1505. Taken together, an agency action involves determinations of nationwide “scope” if they
apply throughout the country “as a legal matter (de jure)”
and determinations of nationwide “effect” if they so apply
“as a practical one (de facto).” Kentucky, 123 F. 4th, at 465.
   Of course, nearly all agency actions can be said to involve
justifcations of nationwide reach or consequence. For example, most EPA actions presumably rely on EPA's interpretations of its governing statutes.
   The key question, then, is the degree of causality contained in the phrase “based on.” And, the meaning of that
phrase is context dependent. In many cases, it “indicates a
but-for causal relationship.” Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.
Burr, 

 (2007). But-for causation is a comparatively lenient standard, which is met so long as a result
“would not have occurred in the absence of—that is, but
Page Proof Pending Publication
for—[a party's] conduct.” Burrage, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other cases, however,
more is needed. Congress sometimes uses phrases such as
“based on” to cover only “core” causes amounting to an action's “sine qua non” or “ `gravamen.' ” See, e. g., Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 

 (2017);
OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 

 (2015).
   Section 7607(b)(1) incorporates the more demanding,
“core” understanding of “based on.” This constraint follows
from the function of the “nationwide scope or effect” exception as just that—an exception. Congress, after all, is unlikely to intend for an exception to swallow the rule. See
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos,

, 298–299 (2025). Thus, in this context, but-for
causation is inadequate: In almost any case, a determination
of nationwide scope or effect will be at least a but-for cause
of EPA's action, given that any EPA action is downstream
of EPA's conclusions as to what its governing statutes permit
or require. But, Congress made regional Circuit review the
                   Cite as: 

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                      Opinion of the Court

default for locally or regionally applicable actions, so we
must read the “nationwide scope or effect” exception in a
way that preserves regional Circuit review as the norm.
   It follows that an EPA action is “based on” a particular
determination only if that determination “lie[s] at the core of
the agency action,” so as to form the most important part of
the agency's reasoning. Texas, 

. Put more
concretely, an EPA action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect only if a justifcation of nationwide
breadth is the primary explanation for and driver of EPA's
action. A determination of nationwide scope or effect does
not rise to this level if EPA also relied in signifcant part on
other, “intensely factual” considerations, or if the key driver
of EPA's action is otherwise debatable. 

; see also

 (“The default presumption is that petitions for
review of locally or regionally applicable actions `may only
be fled in the United States Court of Appeal for the approPage Proof Pending Publication
priate circuit' ”).
                               2
   In deciding whether a particular EPA action is “based on
a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” courts should
assess EPA's reasoning de novo. This standard follows from
the structure of the “nationwide scope or effect” exception:
The exception applies only “if ” a locally or regionally applicable action is based on a determination of nationwide scope
or effect “and if ” EPA, in taking the action, fnds and publishes that the action has this basis. § 7607(b)(1) (emphasis
added). In other words, the CAA requires both that EPA
deem its action to have a qualifying basis and that the action
in fact have this basis. This dual formulation does not naturally suggest that courts should simply give EPA's fnding
deference. Cf. Regalado Cuellar v. United States, 

 (2008) (fnding it “implausible” to infer that Congress intended a particular meaning, where it used a “more
complex formulation”).
646     EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                           Opinion of the Court

   The upshot is that courts must “make an independent assessment of the scope of [EPA's] determinations.” Texas,

. That is, they should parse the reasoning
offered by EPA in taking an action to decide which determinations primarily drove the action. Courts routinely analyze flings to identify their substance, and the language of
the “nationwide scope or effect” exception directs them to
do the same here.
   In so holding, we do not downplay the importance of EPA's
role. Because the “nationwide scope or effect” exception
can apply only when “EPA so fnds and publishes” that it
does, EPA can decide whether the exception is even potentially relevant. Sierra Club, 

. And, where
EPA does invoke the exception, its explanation for doing so
will at a minimum focus the courts' assessment of the possible determinations of nationwide scope or effect.4 Thus,
EPA's choices will matter, even as courts must assess the
bases for EPA's actions themselves.
Page Proof Pending Publication
                                     3
   Applying this framework, we conclude that EPA's denials
of the small refneries' exemption petitions were based on
determinations of nationwide scope or effect. We agree
with EPA's fnding—published in both its April and June denial notices—that its interpretation of the phrase “disproportionate economic hardship” under § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) and its
RIN passthrough theory were determinations of nationwide
  4
    This case does not present the question whether, given principles of
issue preservation, courts can forgo consideration of determinations that
EPA has not itself identifed as the basis for its action. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 

 (1943) (confning review of agency action “to a
judgment upon the validity of the grounds upon which the [agency] itself
based its action”). But, we expect this issue to be outcome dispositive
only in rare cases. As a practical matter, an action is unlikely to be based
on a particular determination where EPA has failed, in promulgating the
action, to identify that determination as the relevant determination of nationwide scope or effect.
                   Cite as: 

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                      Opinion of the Court

scope or effect that formed the core basis for EPA's denials.
Supra, at 634–635.
   Both conclusions are clear determinations of nationwide
scope or effect: EPA invoked both its statutory interpretation and its passthrough theory in justifying its denials, and
both points apply generically to all refneries, regardless of
their geographic location. After all, the CAA is a federal
statute, and § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) by its terms applies nationwide. Likewise, EPA's RIN passthrough theory is a fnding
about how the national refnery market works. See supra,
at 634.
   These conclusions also can be deemed the “basis” for
EPA's denials here. EPA decided, in light of the foregoing
determinations, that it would presumptively deny all the exemption petitions before it. Supra, at 634. It then considered other, refnery-specifc considerations only to confrm
that it had no reason to depart from its presumptive disposition. Supra, at 634–635. In this posture, EPA's statutory
Page Proof Pending Publication
interpretation and passthrough theory plainly are the most
important parts of its reasoning. Or, put another way,
where EPA relies on determinations of nationwide scope or
effect to reach a presumptive resolution, those determinations qualify as the primary driver of its decision. EPA's
confrmatory review of refnery-specifc facts is “[m]erely peripheral” by comparison. Texas, 

.
   Accordingly, we agree with EPA that the “nationwide
scope or effect” exception applies here. The Fifth Circuit
should have transferred this case.

                                B
   We are unpersuaded by the counterarguments raised by
EPA, respondents, the Fifth Circuit, and the dissent.
   Although we agree with EPA's bottom-line position that
the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies, we reject
its roundabout approach to the word “determination.” EPA
argues that “[t]he word `determination' ” in § 7607(b)(1) “sug-
648     EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                          Opinion of the Court

gests a resolution of an unsettled issue,” such that EPA does
not make “determinations” when it “applies a previously established agency rule, policy, or interpretation to new . . .
circumstances.” Brief for Petitioner 41. We agree with
EPA that a “determination” here means the “ `settling and
ending of a controversy,' ” ibid.; supra, at 643, but nothing
in that term or its use in § 7607(b)(1) suggests that only novel
conclusions count. Rather, given § 7607(b)(1)'s focus on the
face of the agency action, “determination” is most naturally
read to cover any EPA conclusion within the four corners of
an action.
   Moreover, we do not see how EPA's proposed approach
can be squared with its requested disposition. If a “determination” covers only the resolution of an unsettled issue, it
is not obvious why EPA's June denials contain any determinations: EPA's June notice purported to “appl[y] the approach . . . adopted in the April” notice. App. to Pet. for
Cert. 80a. EPA attempts to avoid this diffculty by proposPage Proof Pending Publication
ing a holistic assessment of novelty that considers factors
such as “whether EPA announced the rule or policy at
roughly the same time as the challenged agency action itself.” Brief for Petitioner 41. But, we do not see how this
amorphous test follows even from EPA's view.5
   Respondents argue that the word “determination” in
§ 7607(b)(1) is a term of art, wherein an agency action can
trigger the “nationwide scope or effect” exception only if it
is undertaken based on a CAA provision that “textually direct[s] EPA to make a `determination' for the entire nation.”
Brief for Small Refnery Respondents 32 (emphasis deleted).
But, “determination” is “hardly a rarely used word,” and
nothing in the CAA's context suggests that Congress meant

  5
    EPA also contends that § 7607(b)(1)'s “based on” language speaks in
terms of but-for causation and that courts should assess the basis for
EPA's actions deferentially, through arbitrary-and-capricious review. For
the reasons already explained, we reject those contentions. Supra, at
644–645.
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                      Opinion of the Court

for its use in § 7607(b)(1) to reach only CAA provisions that
happen to use some variant of that word. Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC, 

 (2011). Such a limitation
would at best lead to arbitrary outcomes, as Congress did
not act in a standardized way when using “determination”
as opposed to other words. Compare § 7410(k)(3) (not
speaking in terms of “determinations”) with § 7410(k)(6) (requiring a “determination” when EPA “[c]orrect[s]” its actions under § 7410(k)(3)). At worst, respondents' approach
would render the “nationwide scope or effect” exception
meaningless: Respondents have conceded that their term-ofart view may render the exception “a null set, or close to a
null set.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 103–104. But, Congress would
not have gone to the trouble of creating a superfuous exception, so we will not “force [a] term-of-art defnitio[n]” where
it “plainly do[es] not ft.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 

 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Page Proof Pending Publication
   The dissent would similarly limit the “nationwide scope or
effect” exception to reach only statutorily enumerated determinations, but its arguments fare no better. The dissent
highlights that various CAA substantive provisions require
EPA to make particular “determinations” before taking an
action. Post, at 653–655, 659–660 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.).
But, it does not follow that Congress meant to encompass only
statutorily enumerated determinations when it spoke generally in the exception of actions “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect.” § 7607(b)(1) (emphasis added).
And, although some statutes “ `distinguis[h] between “considerations” that inform [a] “determination” and the “determination” itself,' ” post, at 659–660 (quoting Commissioner v.
Zuch, 

 (2025); alterations in original), statutes like the one in Zuch use “determination” to refer to an
agency's ultimate decision, see 

 at 428–429. In asking
whether a determination supplies the basis for an EPA action, § 7607(b)(1) uses the term in a different sense. Likewise, the dissent's concern that our test could be diffcult for
650    EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

“lower courts and lawyers to apply” is not a problem of our
creation. Post, at 660. Insofar as the reticulated venue
framework that Congress enacted creates diffculty for
courts or litigants, “it is a problem for Congress, not one
that federal courts can fx.” Lewis v. Chicago, 

 (2010).
   Finally, we are unpersuaded by respondents' argument,
accepted by the Fifth Circuit, that the “nationwide scope or
effect” exception is inapplicable in light of EPA's consideration of refnery-specifc facts. That exception requires that
an EPA action be “based on” a determination of nationwide
scope or effect, in contrast to another part of § 7607(b)(1)
where Congress used the phrase “based solely on.” Accordingly, EPA's consideration of local facts does not preclude its
invocation of the exception, either generally or here. So
long as a determination of nationwide scope or effect served
as the primary driver of EPA's action, other, more “peripheral” determinations “are not relevant” for venue purposes.
Page Proof Pending Publication
Texas, 

.
                         …
   We agree with the Fifth Circuit that EPA's actions here
are only locally or regionally applicable, although we clarify
that the relevant actions are EPA's individual denials of the
small refneries' exemption petitions. But, under a proper
understanding of § 7607(b)(1), the “nationwide scope or effect” exception applies, and the case belongs in the D. C.
Circuit. The Fifth Circuit therefore erred in denying EPA's
request to transfer. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
                                               It is so ordered.
  Justice Gorsuch, with whom The Chief Justice joins,
dissenting.
  Though I would reach a different judgment, the Court and
I travel much of the way together. This case involves six
                   Cite as: 

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                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

small refneries. Each petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency for a hardship exemption from the Clean Air
Act's renewable fuel mandates. The agency denied all six
refneries' petitions. The question we face does not concern
the merits of what EPA did, only where the small refneries'
lawsuit challenging the agency's actions should be heard.
The Act instructs that litigation over “nationally applicable”
EPA “actions” belongs in the D. C. Circuit, while disputes
over “locally or regionally applicable” agency “actions” generally belong in a regional circuit. 

(b)(1).
In Parts I and II of its opinion, the Court concludes that
these rules presumptively route the dispute before us to a
regional circuit because EPA's decision to deny an individual
refnery's petition for a hardship exemption is a “locally or
regionally applicable” action. With all that, I agree.
   But then, in Part III of its opinion, the Court pivots.
Even when a case challenges only a “locally or regionally
Page Proof Pending Publication
applicable” action, the Court observes, the Act routes it to
the D. C. Circuit if EPA's action “is based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect.” Applying a new multistep
test it announces, the Court concludes that EPA's actions at
issue here were based on such a determination. As a result,
the Court holds, the right venue for this case turns out to be
the D. C. Circuit after all.
   In my view, that pivot is a mistake. The Clean Air Act's
venue provision works in harmony with its substantive provisions. Throughout, those substantive provisions direct
EPA to make certain “determinations” before it may take
certain “actions.” When it comes to acting on a small refnery's hardship petition, nothing in the Act's substantive
provisions calls on EPA to make a “determination of nationwide scope or effect.” Instead, the Act requires the agency
to evaluate only whether a particular small refnery seeking
an exemption would suffer a hardship without one. Accordingly, the Act's venue provision routes this dispute to a regional circuit, just as the Fifth Circuit recognized below.
652     EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                         Gorsuch, J., dissenting

The Court's new and reticulated test for assessing venue disputes under the Act strikes me as both mistaken and likely
to render simple venue questions unnecessarily diffcult and
expensive to resolve.
                             I
   Start with how I would analyze this case. The Clean Air
Act's venue provision, found in 

(b)(1), supplies three basic rules. First, challenges to “nationally applicable” agency “action[s]” must be brought in the D. C. Circuit. Second, challenges to “locally or regionally” applicable
agency “action[s]” must be fled in the appropriate regional
circuit. Third, as an exception to the second rule, challenges
to locally or regionally applicable agency actions belong in
the D. C. Circuit if they are “based on a determination of
nationwide scope or effect.” 1 The central question this case
poses concerns the relationship between the second and third
rules: When is a locally or regionally applicable “action”
Page Proof Pending Publication
under the Clean Air Act “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”?
   As I see it, the Act itself supplies the answer. Working in
concert with the Act's venue provision, the Act's substantive
provisions tell us what kinds of “actions” the agency is lawfully authorized to take and when those actions may be based
on “determinations of nationwide scope or effect.” Here,
the relevant substantive provisions permit EPA to take a
specifc “action”—namely, the granting or denying of a small
refnery's hardship petition. But, by their terms, those provisions do not call for a nationwide “determination” when
the agency acts. Instead, the only decisions EPA must
make are refnery-specifc ones. Accordingly, the dispute
before us belongs in an appropriate regional circuit.

   1
     To implicate this exception, EPA must also certify its belief that its
action “is based on . . . a determination” of nationwide scope or effect.
§ 7607(b)(1). But that requirement is irrelevant in this case because all
agree that EPA satisfed it, so I will not address it further. Ante, at 642.
                   Cite as: 

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                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

                                A
   To appreciate how the Act's substantive and venue provisions interact, begin with a look at the substantive provisions addressing the renewable fuel standards that lie at the
heart of this case.
   As a rule, § 7545(o)(2) requires the Nation's fuel supply to
include ethanol or other renewable fuels in fxed amounts
that increase over time. See HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refning, LLC v. Renewable Fuels Assn., 

, 385–
386 (2021). But the Act also permits EPA to take various
actions inconsistent with that general rule if it makes certain
determinations. So, for example, § 7545(o)(7)(A)(i) allows
EPA to waive some renewable fuel mandates “based on a
determination” that enforcing them “would severely harm
the economy or environment of a State, a region, or the
United States.” Similarly, EPA may waive renewable fuel
requirements “based on a determination . . . that there is
Page Proof Pending Publication
an inadequate domestic [fuel] supply.” § 7545(o)(7)(A)(ii).
Similarly again, §§ 7545(c)(4)(C)(ii) and (iii) permit EPA to
waive other standards if it “determines that . . . extreme and
unusual . . . circumstances exist in a State or region.” Beyond those examples, § 7545 discusses various other actions
the agency may take after making various other determinations. (In all, § 7545 uses the word “determination” or one
of its cognates more than 70 times.)
   Now apply these observations about § 7545's substantive
provisions to the Act's venue provision. If, for example,
EPA waives a renewable fuel standard for a single State
under § 7545(o)(7)(A)(i) “based on a determination” that “implement[ing]” those standards “would severely harm the
economy . . . of a State,” § 7607(b)(1) would route disputes
over that action to the appropriate regional circuit. After
all, a determination about the economy of a particular State
is hardly one of “nationwide scope or effect.” § 7607(b)(1).
On the other hand, if EPA issues such a waiver based on a
“determination” that implementing the renewable fuel stand-
654   EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

ard in question “would severely harm the economy [of] the
United States,” § 7607(b)(1) would channel any litigation over
that action to the D. C. Circuit.
   The substantive provisions at issue in today's companion
case illustrate the same point. That litigation revolves
around federal air quality standards and the State Implementation Plans (SIPs) States must prepare to meet them.
See Oklahoma v. EPA, 

 (2025). Section
7410 sets forth the general rules about what SIPs must contain and how EPA must go about assessing them. But that
section also authorizes EPA to take certain actions inconsistent with those rules after making certain determinations.
(For its part, § 7410 uses “determination” or one of its cognates more than 20 times.) So, for example, § 7410(b) permits EPA to “extend the period for [the] submission of any”
SIP for up to 18 months “wherever [the EPA Administrator]
determines necessary.” And § 7410(g) allows EPA to “disPage Proof Pending Publication
approv[e]” a Governor's decision to suspend a SIP component
if the agency “determines” that his decision “does not meet”
certain statutory criteria (including whether the suspension is necessary “to prevent substantial increases in
unemployment”).
   Now consider where the Act's venue provision sends disputes about EPA actions under these substantive provisions.
Suppose EPA determines that it is “necessary” to extend
the submission deadline for SIPs across the country, and the
agency acts accordingly pursuant to § 7410(b). In those circumstances, an argument might be made that § 7607(b)(1)
routes disputes about that action to the D. C. Circuit. Cf.
Kentucky v. EPA, 

, 466 (CA6 2024). But if
EPA acts pursuant to § 7410(g) to countermand a Governor's
decision to suspend a SIP component based on a determination that his decision defes the Act's terms, § 7607(b)(1)
would likely send any dispute over that action to a regional
circuit.
                   Cite as: 

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                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

                                B
   With that much in hand, return to the question whether
the Act's venue provision directs this lawsuit to a regional
circuit or the D. C. Circuit.
   As we have seen, § 7545 lays out the Act's substantive renewable fuel standards and generally requires refneries to
mix a certain (and regularly increasing) amount of renewable
fuels into the transportation fuel they produce. See Part I–
A, supra; HollyFrontier, 594 U. S., at 385–386. But § 7545
also allows EPA to exempt small refneries from these mandates “for the reason of disproportionate economic hardship.”
§ 7545(o)(9)(B)(i). Seeking to take advantage of this provision, the six small refneries before us individually petitioned
EPA for hardship exemptions. See 

, 1129–
1130 (CA5 2023). In the end, the agency denied each refnery's request. App. to Pet. for Cert. 251a–252a; 

 at 305a–
310a. Now, the small refneries seek to challenge EPA's
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actions in court. That challenge belongs in a regional circuit
because nothing in the Act's relevant substantive provisions
calls for EPA to act on a determination of nationwide scope
or effect.
   Just walk through the substantive provisions addressing
small refneries one by one. To account for the fact that
small refneries may have more diffculty meeting evolving
renewable fuel mandates than their larger rivals, Congress
in 2005 granted them a blanket exemption until 2011. See
§ 7545(o)(9)(A); HollyFrontier, 594 U. S., at 386–387. After
that, Congress directed EPA to extend a small refnery's exemption “for a period of not less than 2 additional years” if
the “Secretary of Energy determines” that the refnery in
question “would be subject to a disproportionate economic
hardship if required to comply” with the Act's renewable fuel
mandates. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(II). Even beyond that, Congress permitted a small refnery to petition “at any time” for
“an extension” of its “exemption . . . for the reason of
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                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

disproportionate economic hardship.” § 7545(o)(9)(B)(i).
When it comes to deciding whether to grant or deny such a
petition, the Act directs EPA to “consul[t] with the Secretary
of Energy,” consider his “determin[ation]” whether “a” particular “small refnery” would suffer “disproportionate economic hardship if required to comply,” and consider “other
economic factors.” §§ 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). Nowhere
does the Act call for a determination of nationwide scope or
effect. To the contrary, after the blanket exemption for
small refneries expired in 2011, all agency actions and determinations became refnery-specifc ones.
   Any doubt on that score is resolved by comparing these
substantive provisions with others we have encountered.
Section 7545(o)(7)(A), remember, allows EPA to waive certain renewable fuel standards “based on a determination . . .
that implementation of the requirement would severely harm
the economy or environment of . . . the United States,” or
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“based on a determination . . . that there is an inadequate
domestic [fuel] supply.” As that provision illustrates, when
it wished to do so, Congress knew how to say that EPA may
take a certain action based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect. That we have nothing like that here is a
telling sign that the small-refnery provisions work differently and do not task EPA with taking any nationally applicable action or making any determination of nationwide
scope or effect. See Feliciano v. Department of Transportation, 605 U. S. –––, ––– (2025).
   EPA's own statements convey the same message. The
agency represents that it “ `consider[s] each petition on the
merits' ” and examines “ `individual refnery information' ”
when passing on individual hardship petitions. 86 F. 4th, at
1133. EPA represents, too, that it “determined that none of
the petitioning small refneries” merited a hardship exemption only after completing “a thorough evaluation of the data
and information provided” by each small refnery. Brief for
Petitioner 10; App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a–95a.
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                       Gorsuch, J., dissenting

   To be sure, EPA also highlights two features of its administrative proceedings that, it says, prove the agency took a “nationally applicable action,” or at least made a “determination
of nationwide scope or effect.” For one, EPA emphasizes
that it bundled the petitions from the six small refneries before
us together with a host of other similar petitions and dispatched them all in a pair of administrative decisions. See
Brief for Petitioner 28; 86 F. 4th, at 1129–1130. For another,
the agency stresses that, in evaluating each refnery's petition,
it relied on a single interpretation of the statutory phrase “ `disproportionate economic hardship' ” and a single economic
model (the agency's “RIN passthrough theory”). Ante, at 634.
   The Court correctly holds that none of this transforms
EPA's challenged actions into “nationally applicable” actions.
Ante, at 640. Yes, the agency may choose to bundle petitions together for administrative convenience. And, yes, the
agency may apply similar reasoning when faced with similar
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petitions. But, as the Court recognizes, the only “action”
the Act's substantive provisions call on EPA to take is to
grant or deny an individual hardship petition—and that is a
locally applicable action, not a national one. 

   As I see it, this same insight defeats EPA's suggestion that
its actions were “based on a determination of nationwide
scope or effect.” § 7607(b)(1). As a matter of administrative convenience, the agency may choose to address a number of petitions collectively rather than separately. And the
agency of course may (and, to avoid acting arbitrarily and
capriciously, generally must) apply consistent reasoning to
like petitions. But the Act's venue provision does not route
cases to one circuit or another based on how EPA packages
them or the quality or nature of its reasoning. Instead, the
Act's venue provision asks whether the agency based its action on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. And,
as the Act's substantive provisions make clear, EPA does no
such thing when it passes on an individual small refnery's
hardship petition.
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                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

                               II
   Turn now to how the Court resolves this case. As we
have seen, the Court frst holds that EPA's decision whether
to grant or deny an individual small refnery's hardship petition is a locally or regionally applicable “action.” See Part
II, ante. Accordingly, the Court starts with the (correct)
presumption that the suit before us belongs in a regional
circuit. Ibid. But then, the Court reverses course. While
EPA's challenged actions are local or regional ones, the
Court concludes, this case belongs in the D. C. Circuit because the agency's actions were “based on a determination
of nationwide scope or effect.” See Part III, ante. That
portion of the Court's opinion strikes me as both mistaken
and likely to cause confusion about where Clean Air Act disputes should be heard.
   To understand why, consider how the Court proceeds.
Pursuing what it calls an “ordinary-meaning” approach, the
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Court observes that the word “determination” often refers
to the “ `settling and ending of a controversy.' ” Ante, at 643
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 616
(1976)). Extrapolating from that dictionary defnition, the
Court reasons that “any EPA conclusion within the four
corners of an action” qualifes as a “determination.” Ante,
at 648 (emphasis added).
   But, the Court continues, whether an action is “ `based
on' ” a conclusion of nationwide scope or effect depends on a
“degree of causality.” Ante, at 644. Nor will just any
degree of causality do. Proving that some nationwide conclusion (or now, the Court adds, “justifcation” or “reasoning”) is the “but-for” cause of the agency's action will not
suffce. Ante, at 644–645. Instead, EPA must establish
that some nationwide conclusion (or justifcation or reasoning) qualifes as the “gravamen” or “core” or “driver” of its
action. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). And
when EPA's actions rely “in signifcant part on . . . `intensely
factual' considerations” or when “the key driver of EPA's
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                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

action is otherwise debatable,” that standard will not be satisfed. Ante, at 645.
   Applying all those ideas to this case, the Court holds that
all of EPA's challenged actions were based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect. That is so, the Court
says, because EPA's actions (its decisions to deny the small
refneries' petitions) rested at their “core” on a common (or
“nationwide”) understanding of the statutory phrase “ `disproportionate economic hardship' ” and a common (or “nationwide”) economic model. Ante, at 646–647 (quoting
§ 7545(o)(9) (B)(i)). To be sure, the Court acknowledges, the
agency also undertook a “review of refnery-specifc facts.”
Ante, at 647. But on the Court's account, those “refnery-specifc facts” mattered less to the outcomes here than EPA's
statutory interpretation and its economic model. Ibid.
   I fnd that chain of reasoning unpersuasive for a few reasons. For one thing, it seems to me pretty far afeld from
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the statutory text. As we have seen, the Clean Air Act's
venue provision speaks of actions and determinations, and
the Act's substantive provisions do too. And when a substantive provision calls for either a nationally applicable “action” or a “determination” of nationwide scope or effect, it
says so. To decide where a case belongs, then, no special
judicially devised test is required. Instead, lawyers and
judges need only open the statute books, fnd the relevant
substantive provision, and follow its lead. As we have seen,
the Court takes just this approach when addressing the
meaning of the term “action” in the Act's venue provision.
There, it concludes EPA took no nationally applicable “action” because the Act's substantive provisions “pe[g]” an action to a decision to grant or deny an individual hardship petition. Ante, at 639–640; see Part I–B, supra. On my view, we
should employ that same statute-driven approach to the
meaning of “a determination of nationwide scope or effect.”
   For another thing, the Court's test confates a determination with the reasons that inform it. Statutes often “distin-
660   EPA v. CALUMET SHREVEPORT REFINING, L.L.C.

                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

guis[h] between `considerations' that inform [a] `determination' and the `determination' itself.” Commissioner v.
Zuch, 

 (2025) (alteration omitted). The
Clean Air Act is no different. It authorizes EPA to take
certain actions (like waiving renewable fuel mandates or disapproving a single Governor's suspension of a SIP component). The Act authorizes those actions if certain determinations are made (like a determination that enforcing the
renewable fuel mandates would severely harm the national
economy or a determination that a Governor's partial SIP
suspension doesn't satisfy certain criteria). And to support
its determinations, the agency may offer any number of reasons. To avoid accusations of arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking, too, the agency will usually employ consistent
reasoning in like cases. See, e. g., Encino Motorcars, LLC
v. Navarro, 

 (2016). But none of that
means we should confate the determinations EPA must
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make under the Act with the reasons the agency offers to
support them.
   For another thing still, I worry that the Court's test will
prove tough for lower courts and lawyers to apply in practice. Having confated a “determination” with the agency's
underlying reasoning, the Court must fnd some way to go
about sorting and weighing all the reasons EPA may advance. But just consider what its approach entails. First,
lawyers and judges must consult the full scope of the
agency's reasoning (in this case, reasoning that runs over 280
pages). See App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a–330a. Next, lawyers
and judges must “parse” out which aspects of that reasoning
are particular to a locality or region and which are national
in scope or effect. Ante, at 646. Finally, lawyers and
judges must weigh those two sets of reasons against each
other and decide which set was the true “driver” of the
agency's decision and which was more “peripheral” to it.
Ante, at 647 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

   “ `[L]itigation over whether the case is in the right court
is essentially a waste of time and resources.' ” Navarro
Savings Assn. v. Lee, 

 (1980). When
it comes to the simple preliminary question where a case
should be fled, the rules of the road should be “clear and
easy to apply.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of
Chicago, 

 (2017); see Hertz Corp. v. Friend,

, 94–95 (2010). The test the Court announces
today can claim neither of those virtues. For the lawyers
and judges tasked with applying it, I can only wish them
luck.
                              III
   To get a sense of the challenges the Court's test poses for
future litigants and lower courts, compare this case to its
companion. See Oklahoma v. EPA, 

 (2025).
   As we have seen, that dispute involves SIPs, plans States
must submit to EPA outlining how they intend to comply
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with national air quality standards. See Part I–A, supra;
§ 7410. Among other things, a State's SIP must address the
Act's “Good Neighbor Provision.” Ohio v. EPA, 

, 283–284 (2024). Because “air currents can carry pollution across state borders,” id., at 283, that provision requires
each SIP to contain “adequate” measures to prevent in-state
“emissions activity” from interfering with other States' ability to satisfy federal air quality standards, § 7410(a)(2)(D).
In a single rule, EPA rejected 21 SIPs—including Utah's and
Oklahoma's—because, in the agency's view, none satisfed the
Act's Good Neighbor provision. Oklahoma, 

(citing 

 (2023)). Now, Oklahoma, Utah, and
certain industry groups seek to challenge EPA's actions in
court, and they argue that their litigation belongs in a regional circuit. Oklahoma, 

.
   EPA responds that the SIPs case is, in every way that
matters, like the small refneries' case and thus belongs in
the D. C. Circuit too. After all, the agency points out, it
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                        Gorsuch, J., dissenting

employed a common statutory interpretation and a common
methodology to assess each State's proposed SIP—just as it
did when considering the small refneries' petitions. If the
one case belongs in the D. C. Circuit, EPA argues, so must
the other. See Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–
1067 etc., pp. 30, 34–36; Tr. of Oral Arg. in Oklahoma v. EPA,
O. T. 2024, No. 23–1067 etc., pp. 39, 47.
   Along those lines, EPA observes that, in assessing each
SIP, it asked whether the state plan before it would contribute more than “1% of the permissible ozone level to a downwind State.” Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at 624–625; Brief for
Federal Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 9, 35. In practice, EPA argues, that 1% threshold proved critical. SIPs
that “fell under the 1 percent de minimis threshold” were
“approved on [that] ground.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 23–
1067 etc., at 38–39. Meanwhile, all (or nearly all) the SIPs
that exceeded the 1% threshold—including Oklahoma's and
Utah's—were rejected. See Brief for Federal Respondents
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in No. 23–1067 etc., at 7; Brief for State of New York et al.
as Amici Curiae in No. 23–1067 etc., pp. 24–25, n. 20. Accordingly, the agency argues, even if it took a local or regional “action” with respect to each SIP, nationwide determinations proved “essential to EPA's reasoning in
disapproving the state plans.” Brief for Federal Respondents in No. 23–1067 etc., at 37.
   The Court disagrees. As it must under the test it announces, the Court begins by consulting all the various reasons EPA offered (some 60-plus pages of them appear in the
Federal Register). Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at 622–625.2 In
doing so, the Court acknowledges that EPA used a common
(or nationwide) statutory interpretation and a common (or
nationwide) methodology when assessing all of the SIPs.
See 

. The Court recognizes, too, that the 1%
  2
   See 

 (omnibus rule); 

 (2022) (Air
Plan Disapproval; Utah); 

 (Air Plan Disapproval; Arkansas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas).
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 (2025)           663

                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

threshold played a signifcant role in separating the SIPs
EPA approved from those it rejected. See 

 at 624–625.
Still, when it comes to weighing the role that EPA's common
(or nationwide) justifcations played, the Court concludes,
they were not the “primary drivers” of the agency's challenged actions. Id., at 624. Instead, “factual determinations particular to the State at issue” predominated. Id.,
at 622 (internal quotation marks omitted). Relying on that
assessment, the Court holds that Oklahoma's and Utah's lawsuit challenging EPA's rejection of their SIPs belongs in a
regional circuit. Id., at 625.
   Maybe that's right. But I can certainly imagine arriving
at the opposite outcome under the Court's test. After all,
EPA used a common statutory interpretation and a common
methodology when assessing all of the SIPs, proceeding
much as it did when evaluating the small refneries' hardship
petitions. In both cases, too, the agency factored in certain
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local considerations, like individual “Stat[e] circumstances”
in the SIPs case, id., at 623, and individualized “data and
information” in the small refneries' case, App. to Pet. for
Cert. 94a–95a. Of course, the Court thinks EPA leaned
more heavily on individualized reasons in the SIPs case, and
more heavily on common ones in the small refneries' case.
Oklahoma, 605 U. S., at 623–624. But without any objective
standard for weighing which predominates, there seems to
me ample room for good-faith disagreement between litigants and among lower courts. And it is just that kind of
ambiguity that promises protracted and expensive venue litigation going forward.
   To avoid that problem, I would resolve the SIPs case the
same way I would resolve the small refneries' case: by looking to the Act itself. Section 7410(k)(3) requires EPA to approve or disapprove SIPs and, in passing on them, to assess
whether each individual State has or has not complied with
its obligations under federal law. See id., at 615. Nowhere
does that substantive provision call for a nationally applica-
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                     Gorsuch, J., dissenting

ble action or task EPA with making a determination of nationwide scope or effect. And no more is needed to know
that, under the Act's venue provision, the SIPs dispute before us belongs in a regional circuit. Id., at 626 (Gorsuch,
J., concurring in judgment).
                               *
   At the end of the day, venue rules are like traffc laws.
They simply tell litigants where to go, and they should be
easy to follow. As I read it, the Clean Air Act provides a
clear rule for cases like this one. Applying that rule here,
I would direct the parties to the appropriate regional circuit.
The Court doing otherwise, I respectfully dissent.




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                           Reporter’s Note

  The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication
and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination
makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of
publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions
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for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and
who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was
argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may
include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant
punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

None