Volume 62 — United States Reports

This was ,an appeal from the Circuit Court, of the United States for the district of Maryland, sitting in admiralty; The facts of the case are stated in the . opinion of the court. The District Court decreed that the libellants should recover the- sum of three thousand, dollars, they having claimed six thousand.

These two cases were appeals in admiralty from the District Court of the United' States for the district of. "Wisconsin. .’ , Roth cases were founded upon the samé facts, which are fully stated in the opinion of the court. In the first ease, that of Cordes, the District Court decreed •• that the libellant should recover,$3,763.76, with costs; and in • the other case,, that Sexton should recover $4,964.50, with costs.

Held: that in cases of losses on policies issued on cash premiums, the cash fund, must be ! first exhausted to meet said losses, and then resort may be had to the premium notes.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Mississippi; In some of its connections it had twice before been before this court, (as reported in 2 Howard, 28, and 9 Howard, 297.) . The history of the case is given in the opinion of the court, and need not be repeated.

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin. The cáse is stated in the opinion of the court. upon which side thére was also a brief,by Brown and Ogden, and by Mr. Doolptle for the appellee. As. the case went off upon a question of jurisdiction, the, ’ arguments and points of the eou.nsel upon its merits are omitted.

This was a case which was brought before this court from' the Territory of Minnesota. It was before the court at the preceding term, under the circumstances sfeited in the opinion of the court. now moved to revoke the mandate and annul the judgment of dismissal which wa3 entered at the last term. The motion was as follows: “This cause was on the calendar of the last terra, Ño. 109.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. It was an action of ejectment brought by Robert Forsyth, a citizen of Missouri, against Kelsey and Hotchkiss,, to recover certain lots in the county of Peoria.

This ease was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States' for the northern district of New York. It was an action brought by Winans against the railroad company for a violation of his patent for a new and useful improvement in the construction of cars or carriages intended to travel upon railroads.

Held: if a decedent be domiciled in the State at the time of his or her death, stocks of other States, or of corporations of other States, and debts due in other States, in the hands of the executors or administrators, are liable to this tax. (4 Harris’s Rep., 63; 18 Howard’s Rep.) But if the domicil of the deceased be not in Pennsylvania, then the estate is not subject to the tax.

Held: that the tangible property of a railroad could be sold, but that its franchise could not. A turnpike road cannot be' sold on execution. Ammans y. New Alexander Turnpike Co., 13 Rawle, 21Ó. In this case, the grant was to the corporators for the benefit of the public.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court'of the United States for the southern district of New York, sitting in equity. Livermore and Sexton, who;filed the bill; were citizens of New York, and Jenckes, Earnum, and Waterman, citizens of Rhode. Island. The complainants claimed to set aside an assignment made on the 19th, of April, 1854, by Waterman, to Jencke3 & Earnum, upon the ground that the assignment was to enure to such of Waterman’s creditors who should sign a release!

Held: that the-rule is applicable only in suits between parties to the agreement, and their representatives and those claiming under them, and not to strangers. It is also held in England, in several cases, that the rule is not applicable to strangers.

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California. . It was a claim made by Sutter for land, in California, under two different grants. 1. A claim for eleven leagues of land, alleged to be granted to him by Alvarado, on the 18th of June, 1841. 2. A claim for an additional quantity of twenty-two leagues, alleged to be granted to him and his son, John A. Sutter, by Micheltorena, on the 5th of February, 1845.

• This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of South Carolina,' sitting in admiralty. ' • ... . ■ - ■.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the western district of Virginia.

Held: alternately, in Wilmington and in Philadelphia; and that an office shall be kept open "in • Wilmington, for the transfer of the stock of the company.

• This case was brought up by writ of error from the Oiréuit Court of the United States for the northern district of California.- The case having been decided by this court upon a point of practice, it is necessary to state only so much of it as to show how the point of practice arose.

Held: as a matter of law, that the deed was a complete defence to the action, and that the patent issued to Fosgit. related back to the location of the warrant, and constituted part of Spencer’s title. This consideration involves a question of great practical importance to States and-Territories where entries exist on which patents have not issued, as sales of such titles are usual and numerous.

This was an appeal from tbe District Court of tbe United States for the district of Wisconsin. It was before this court at a prior term, and is reported in 18 Howard, 263. It is proper to remark that tbe bill, in this casé, set forth that the controversy in the State court, which was referred to in 18 Howard, had become terminated. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that this power did not extend to the purely internal commerce of a State. Chief Justice Marshall, in,delivering the

Held: in the case of Rufus Allen et. al. v. H. L. Newberry, at this term, that a contract of affreightment between ports and places within the same State was not the subject of admiralty jurisdiction, as it concerned the purely internal trade of a State, and that the jurisdiction belonged to the. courts of the State.

Held: that the several shipments were subject to the increased duty imposed under the 17th section of the act of August 30, 1842 ; and allowed the plaintiff to recover the excess over and beyond the amount chargeable under this last section. The principal question in the case is, whether or not the 17th section of the actuf 1842 applies in the appraisal of merchandise imported by the manufacturer.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The Circuit Court decreed that $14,230, (being the one-half of the sum of $28,460 awarded,) less five per cent., together with interest thereon from the 20th of June, 1855, and costs, be paid by Pemberton to the complainants. From this decree, Pemberton appealed to this court.

Held: in a more analogous case, (Tayloe v. Merchants’ Eire Ins. Co., 9 How., 402 ,) that where the mode of payment is not prescribed, the agent, may exercise a discretion. *269 11. The judgment should he affirmed, with costs.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio. It wa3 an ejectment brought by Diekins’s lessee to recover a lot of one hundred acres, being number eight in the donation tract, Marietta district, Ohio, in township nine, range eleven, in the district of lands subject to sale at Ckillicothe, formerly in the Marietta district.

<p>Where it appeared from the record that a party sold land to a railroad company, the price of which was paid in the stock of the company, guarantied by certain persons to be at par after a named time, and suit was brought upon this written contract, the case does not appear to be open to a demurrer by the defendants, and the judgment of the court below sustaining such a demurrer must be reversed. It is an original contract, and, being declared on as sucb, tbe plaintiffs are entitled to judgment.</p>

This- case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland. Eord lived in New York, and brought an action against John S. Williams & Brother upon the following contract: Baltimore, October 31, Í855.

This was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oregon. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The arguments of the counsel were directed chiefly to the' merits. On the point of jurisdiction, Mr. Baxter gave an 'account of the singular spectacle exhibited by the American settlers in Oregon,- who established a provisional Government amongst themselves, whilst the entire Territory was still in the joint occupancy of the United States and Great Britain.

Held: if the oral testimony in the.case can be *301 considered on such a question, that Phelps did not in fact present the claim, and that Morehouse did, it is equally certain that Morehouse did not present it in his character as administrator, and must, from the manner in which he did present it, he deemed to have presented it for whom it might concern.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the western district of Virginia. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error made the following points: 1.

This case was brought up’ by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island. The facts in the case, -the instructions asked for and refused upon the trial in the Circuit Court, and also those given to the jury by the court, are all set forth in the opinion of the court. Under’ these instructions, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed his damages in the sum of two thousand dollars.

Held: and calling on all persons who could set up any right to any part of said lands, in consequence of any irregularity or illegality connected with said sales, to show cause át .the first term of the Circuit Court of said county, six months after the publication of said notice, being the present term of the court, why the respective sales so made should not be confirmed, pursuant to a petition to be filed in this court…

This was an appeal from the Cireuit Court of the United States for the districts cf California, sitting íd admiralty. • The libel was filed in the District Court for the northern district of California, which after hearing .dismissed the libel; and upon appeal to the Circuit Court, the decree was affirmed. The libellants then brought the case to this court.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit • Court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio. The facts of the case and also the instructions given to the jury upon the trial are all set forth in the opinion of the court. The Attorney.

New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 366 (1858), was a companion case to the more well-known Fellows v. Blacksmith (1857). At the time Fellows was decided, this case had reached the U.S. Supreme Court but had not yet been argued.

.-This was an appeal from the Circuit-Court of thé United States for the southern, district of New York, sitting in admiralty. ■ The case is. fully stated in the opinion of the court. In cases of collision, it is difficult to make an abstract of the arguments of counsel, because the whole évidence is before the court, and resorted to by both sides in support of the positions which they respectively take.

<p>‘ This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States, sitting in admiralty, for the district of Missouri.</p> <p>. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.,</p>

‘This was an appeal from the .Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. It was dismissed, and a motion made to reinstate it, under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the. court.

This case was brought up by writ of error from' the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>fijfter a ease has been beard and dismissed for want of jurisdiction, because it ’did not appear that tbe valué of the property in’ controversy exceeded two thousand dollars, affidavits of its value come too late.</p> <p>The cases upon this point examined.</p> <p>■Moreover, the value of the property - is stated in the' proceedings of the court ■ below, and affidavits have never been' received here to vary it or enhance it in . order to give jurisdiction.</p>

This ease, was brought up from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky by a writ of error issued under tbe 25th section of the judiciary act. A motion was made to dismiss the writ, upon the ground stated in the opinion of the court.

This ease was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana. The case is explained in the opinion of the court.

<p>This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, ,</p> <p>The chronological history of the case was this:</p> <p>In 1839, Combs was the proprietor of a large amount of bonds issued by the State of Texas for various sums, which certificates concluded in this way: ■</p> <p>■ “ This eértificate is transferable by the said Leslie Combs,' or.his legal attorney or representative, on the books of the stock commissioner only.”</p> <p>Two of these certificates — viz: No..5219, for five thousand dollars, and No. 5229, for one thousand.dollars — were the subjects of the present suit. No notice-will be taken in this report of the other' bonds.</p> <p>In 1840, Combs endorsed these certificates in blank, and placed them in the' hands of James Love, of Galveston, Texas, for the purpose, as he alleged, of enabling Love to receive payment, which was then expected, but which was not made.</p> <p>In 1846, one Josiah Lee brought a suit in the Commercial Court of New Orleans against William L. Hodge, to recover back money which he had paid to Hodge for the purchase of Texas bonds. Hodge took defence upon two grounds, viz: 1. That it was supposed that there was a power to transfer in the hands of a-Mr. Love, of Galveston, which plaintiff was bound to refer to. 2. That the blank endorsement of the owner authorized plaintiff to write over it the necessary authority. The court, however, gave judgment for Lee against Hodge.</p> <p>By subsequent legislation of Congress and of Texas, the bonds became payable at the Treasury of the United States, where payment of them was claimed by J. Ledgear Hodge, a resident of Pennsylvania; administrator with the will annexed of' Andrew Hodge, deceased, in whose name the bonds, had been deposited at the Treasury. Whereupon Combs filed a bill against J. L. Hodge, the administrator as aforesaid, William L. Hodge, and Jam,es Love. An injunction was obtained to stay the payment of the money until the determination of the •suit. The record of the suit in New Orleans and copies of let-' ters were attached to the bill as exhibits..</p> <p>J. L. Hodge, the administrator, answered that he had no personal knowledge of any of the matters stated in the bill.</p> <p>William L. Hodge, amongst other matters, said that the bonds'had been transferred by Love to Andrew Hodge fairly and for their full valúe. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill, and Combs appealed to this court.</p> <p>The principal points made by the counsel for the appellant were the following:</p> <p>I. This is a proceeding in the nature of a bill of interpleader, the Treasury of the United States being the stakeholder. (Clarke v. Clarke, 17 How., 321.)</p> <p>In such a controversy, the parties stand on their respective legal and equitable rights.</p> <p>n. The appellant is the creditor of Texas, holding the legal title to this scrip, which can pass only in the manner prescribed by the law of Texas, and apparent on the face of the scrip. (Menard v. Shaw, 5 Texas Rep., 334.)</p> <p>The distinction between stocks passing by delivery or assignment, except in a particular mode, and the effect of their assignment in any other mode, is well established. (Union Bank v. Laird, 2 "Wheat., 251; Zaeharie and others v. Black and others, 3 How., 513; Glynn v. Baker, 13 Ea'st., 509; Gongen v. Melville, 3 B. and C., 45; 10 E. C. L., 16; Attorney General v. Diamond, 1 Cromp. and Jar., 356, 70; Attorney General v. Hope, 1 Cromp., Mees., and Ros., 330; Jame v. Bowens, 4 Mees, and "Weis., 171; Miller v. Race, Smith L. C.. 250, and notes; Story Con. of'L., sec. 383, and notes.)</p> <p>HI. The legal t/tle being in Combs, the appellees have shown no equity in themselves.'</p> <p>IV. Had Love authority to sell ?</p> <p>1. It was argued below that the power was conferred by the endorsement in blank.</p> <p>2. That such authority is proved by complainant’s Exhibit H., in which Love asserts he had a power of attorney.</p> <p>.As to the power implied from the endorsement.</p> <p>1. There is an express limitation on the face of these bonds upon their transferable character. It is not denied that, as between the original parties, an endorsement in blapk, for a fair consideration, followed by delivery, would vest in the purchaser an equitable title, which would, upon satisfactory proof, enable him to compel the endorser, in a court of equity, to do everything necessary to effect a complete transfer of his interest. He could sue in his own name in equity alone. His title would be equitable. And it may be conceded that he had an assignable property in the bonds.- But he .could assign no more than his equity. “ The • stream could not rise higher than the fountain.” The purchaser, therefore, could not, as against the original party, stand in any better condition than the first assignee.</p> <p>These are familiar general principles, and will, be found to be fully sustained in the following cases: Turton v. Benson; 1 P. Wm.’s, 496; S. C., 2 Vern., 764; Davies v. Austin, 1 Yes., jun., 247, and see the cases collected in the note, [Perkins’s Ed.,] 1 Bro. Ch., 484; Gator v. Burke, and 3 Bro. Ch., 179 ; Davies v. Austin and others, and notes; Scott v. Shreeve, 12 Wheat., 605 ; and also 17 How., 615.</p> <p>Undoubtedly, these general principles are subject to certain exceptions; but there are none such in this case. It is not pretended that the purchase was from Combs, and it is obvious they understood his authority was requisite to complete the title. They have failed to show any facts giving rise to an equity other than the actual possession of the bond with Combs’s name endorséd upon it; and this alone is wholly insufficient, the object for which that was done having been satisfactorily shown.</p> <p>2. The statement contained in the letter of Love is introduced by the complainant for the purpose of showing the pretences under which it is supposed the defendant sets up title, and to negative such pretension.</p> <p>The bill is. sworn to, and emphatically states and reiterates ■that complainant never gave any authority, in any form, to Love, to dispose of.the bonds.</p> <p>And it is a Violent-invasion, of the rules of evidence to say, that when a complainant introduces, by way of exhibits, in his bill, the unsworn statements of his defaulting agent, as to transactions alleged to be fraudulent, and sought to be set aside, and under oath negatives them, he shall be held bound by the very falsehoods he seeks to .overthrow, and they shall be taken as proof that his sworn statements are false. The essence of the bill is, that the agent had fraudulently appropriated the bonds to his own use, under the pretence of an authority to sell; and it is to repudiate and discredit this pretended authority that he makes him and his imputed assignee parties defendant, and seeks from the.m a discovery of the facts. Tbe answer of Love would have been evidence against the complainant. Hodge, upon leave, could have examined him as a witness. Yet he does not answer, and is not examined. The complainant was.-entitled to his answer under.oath; to that extent, it was a bill for a discovery. He was duly sum-’ moned, but, being a non-resident, there was no means of compelling his answer. His failure to answer must, so far as he is concerned, be taken as an admission of the allegations of the bill. But if the statement of this letter was true, he could not,, and for his own sake would not, have refused, at the instance of an innocent purchaser from him, to have produced the power, and supported it by proof. The pretence in the letter is contradicted in terms, and charged to have been a fraud. ■To say,, then, that it-is evidence to prove the authority, is a solecism, and a contradiction in terms of the plainest rules of chancery pleading. If this is out of the case, there is no scintilla of proof to give countenance to the pretence of an- authority.</p> <p>Finally, Combs having the legal title, the whole burden is on the appellees to establish, by satisfactory proof, an equity which will draw to it the legal title.. (Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How.,- 612.)'</p> <p>I. That there is evidence that Love had authority from complainant to dispose of these certificates; and if so, there can be no question as to the propriety of the decree.</p> <p>• 'The ground upon which the judgment rested in the case of .“.Lee v. Hodge,” filed as Exhibit E to bill, was, that in that case there .was an agreement by defendant for a special power of transfer, which was not' obtained; though, had -there been no such special agreement, say the- court, the blank endorsement' standing alone would have weight in the view there urged, that such blank endorsement gave authority to a holder to write over- it the necessary power to transfer.</p> <p>In the case at bar, the blank endorsement does stand alone, (in the sense of being affected by any special agreement,) and the argument based upon it is strengthened by the avowals of the agent as to his power from Combs, appearing in complainant’s Exhibit H to bill, which is also made evidence in the cause by agreement.</p> <p>II. That the possession of these certificates by Love, with complainant’s blank endorsement, constituted him, as to third persons, an agent for the general negotiation of the bonds, and complainant cannot limit his liability by special private instructions to the agent, which are not divulged to a “ bona fide ” purchaser for. value.</p> <p>The blank endorsement on the certificates eán mean nothing' else than authority to Love to place over it the necessary form of power of attorney. As the certificates call for a transfer in person, or under such a power, the Government of Texas would in no event have' paid to Love the amount of the certificates, except upon presentation by him of some such authority; and as it is not pretended that, when these certificates were first placed in Love’s hands for the purpose indicated in-the bill, there was any separate power of attorney given, the endorsement in blank of complainant’s name, whei’e the parties were many hundred milés apart, could import nothing else than authority to fill over the name such power as would authorize. Love to surrender to the Government, upon receipt of the sums indicated ; and that would be, equally as to third parties, innocent “ bona fide” purchasers) without notice of special instructions, power to receive purchase-money, and transfer to them upon the books of Texas. (1 Parsons on Contracts, 89; 1 Peters, 290, Schinmelpennick v. Bayard; 3 Gill, 251, Chesley v. Taylor; 9 Howard, 580, Baldwin v. Ely; Story on Agency, see. 73, p. 3, see. 127; 19 Howard," 322, Commercial Ins. Co. v. Union Ins. Co.; 22 Engl. Law and Eq. R., 516, Montague v. Perkins; 10 Cush. Mass. R., 378, Androscoggin Bank v. Kimball; 22 Wendell, 348, Com. Bank of Buffalo v. Kórtright; 4' Bow and Ryls, 641, Gorgier v. Mieville — 16 E. C. L., 217; Douglass, 633, Peaeoke «'. Rhodes; IBos. and Pull, 648, Collins v. Martin.)</p> <p>HI. If Love’s possession of the certificates so endorsed he not, as to third pérsons, authority to dispose generally of the bonds, yet it was sufficient to have induced a person of ordinary precaution to' infer such authority; and if, by the fraud of Love, such party was misled into a “bona fide ” purchase of the bonds for full value, even a court of law, and a fortiori a court of equity, will throw the loss-upon the principal who put it -into the agent’s power to commit a fraud on- innocent parties. (Story on Agency, sec. 127; 1 Term R., 12, Eitzherbert v. Mather; 4 Barn, and Aid.; 1 Wookey Pole, 6 E. C. L., 323 ; 22 Eng. Law and Eq., 516, Montague v._ Perkins.)</p> <p>. TV. Although the face of the .certificates calls for a transfer on the books of Texas by Combs, or his attorney or representative, such clause relates only to the legal title;' and if equity supports the appellee’s claim, or that of-any purchaser under similar circumstances, it would decree that Combs transfer the naked legal title as required- by the certificate. (3 Howard, 483, Black v. Zacharie;. 22 'Wendell, 348, Com. Bank of Buffalo v. Kortright. — See Chancellor’s Opinion.)</p> <p>V.- But the act of Texas of 1846, (p._ 220,) modifies.the stringency of the original certificates by authorizing the transfer on the books of the State to be made, not only by the original holder, his attorney or ■representative, but also 'by his assignee — in which position we stand in equity, and can therefore, as against the complainant, in a court of equity, call for a transfer of the bonds.</p>

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the northern, district of California. The facts of the case and grounds of . the claim are stated in the opinión of the court. For the United States, it was contended that, under the laws of 1824 and 1828, the Governor had not the power to issue such a grant, and that, when it was issued, Micheltorena was not defacto Governor.

This was an appeal -from the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The case, like the preceding one of Nye, depended upon the validity of Sutter.’s general title, and the same-points are applicable to both.

8. Palmer v. Lawrence, (3 Sandf. Law Rep., 162.) “ A party will not be permitted to rescind a contract, the fruits of which he retains, and can never be compelled to restore.” Syllabus. 4. Steam Nav.

■ This base was brought up from the Supreme Court of Missouri by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act. It was a petitionin the nature of an ejectment'brought by Easton against Salisbury in the St. Louis Court' .of Common ,Pleas, to recover the lots described in the opinion of the court. The Court of. Common Pleas gave judgment for the defendant, and this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. .

<p>"SVbere an accommodation bill of exchange was paid by one of tbe endorsers, and there was no special agreement that they should' be bound to pay in equal pro portions as co-sureties, the endorser who took it up had a right to assign it as collateral security for a pre-existing debt; and the assignee can maintain a suit against the original payee, who was also an endorser.</p> <p>The endorser who took up the bill'was a trustee; but the plea was defective in not averring that there remained sufficient funds in the trust estate to pay this bill after discharging the trust.</p>

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: and considered, as a part of .the public domain of the United States;” but if favorable, the decrees rendered by the commissioners or the courts “ shall be conclusive between the United States and the claimants.” These acts of Congress do not create a voluntary jurisdiction, that the claimant may seek or decline.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States, sitting in admiralty, for the southern district of New York. The facts in the case are set forth in the opinion of the court. The District Court dismissed the libel, each party paying his own costs.

This was an appeal from the .Circuit Court of the,United States for the district of Maryland..

<p>The decision in the preceding case again affirmed.</p>

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. The case is explained in the opinion of the court. The examination, by the counsel, of the various acts of Con- . gress bearing upon the point in dispute is rendered unnecessary by the investigation of* them contained in the opinion of the court, and also in the opinion of the dissenting judges.

<p>This case -was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the "United States for the- district of Missouri.</p> <p>The 'case is explained in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>This ease was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana.</p> <p>On the 18th' of March, 1857, Hiram Clearwater, a citizen of Ohioj brought a suit against Johnson, Meredith, and Tyner, citizens of Indiana; and in the declaration said, that the “defendants, together with one Caleb B. Smith, who, at the time of the commencement of this suit, was not a citizen of the State of Indiana, and . is therefore, not joined as a defendant herein, made and delivered to the plaintiff their certain written agreement,’’ &c., &c.</p> <p>The cause of action-was a written agreement, signed by the four persons above named', guarantying that the stock in a railroad company should be at par within a certain time, in consideration that Clearwater had executed a deed of conveyance of land to Meredith, (to whom the same had been sold by the company,) Clearwater having previously contracted to sell it to the company.</p> <p>The three defendants named in the caption appeared and filed the following demurrer:</p> <p>“ The said defendants, by counsel, come and say the declaration nf the said plaintiff, and the several counts therein contained, are severally insufficient in law to enable Baid plaintiff' to have and maintain his action against said defendants, and for cause of demurrer shows to the court the following:</p> <p>“ 1 The jurisdiction of the court is not shown by proper averment.</p> <p>j, “.2. No sufficient consideration is shown for the undertaking.</p> <p>: “'3. The several counts do not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”</p> <p>This demurrer was sustained by the court below, and a writ of error brought this ruling before this court.</p> <p>"With respect to the first ground of demurrer, Mr. Pugh contended that the non-joinder of Smith was excused by the first section of the act approved February 28, 1830, (5 Stat. at L., 321, 322; 14 Peters, 60;) and* moreover, the omission should have been pleaded in abatement. It was nót a ground, of demurrer. With respect to the other two grounds, the conveyance of the land tó Meredith was a sufficient consideration for the promise of the defendants.-</p> <p>that the omission was fatal,-inasmuch as the declaration does not show a case of which the Circuit Court had jurisdiction.. The.'rule is thisthat when there are two or more plaintiffs or defendants, each' of the plaintiffs must be capable of suing, and each of the defendants of being sued, in order to support- the jurisdiction’.. Bank, of Vieksburg v. Slocomb et kl., (14 Pet., 64,) where this interpretation is given to the act of February 28, 1839. (5. U. S. Stat., 321.) . The declaration here should show that Smith is a citizen of a different State from".the plaintiff; for, in the Federal courts, jurisdiction must be shown. If it is not shown, the objection is fatal, at any stage, of the case. It needs .no plea. And this is, the ground, evidently, upon which the demurrer was sus-, tained below.</p>

This was an appeal from the Circuit. Court of the United States for the eastern district of Tennessee.' It was a bill filed by Leá for the purposes stated in the opinion of the court, where the facts of the case are also given. The points made by the counsel are noticéd and commented on in the opinion of the court.

Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that state courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts, overturning a decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The Court found that under the Constitution, federal courts have the final power to decide cases arising under the Constitution and federal statutes, and that the States do not have the power to overturn those decisions. Thus, Wisconsin did not have the authority to nullify federal judgments or statutes. For example, it is illegal for state officials to interfere with the work of U.S. Marshals acting under federal laws.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington. The dates of the several steps taken with respect to the appeal are stated in the opinion of the court.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court .of the United States for the districts of California, sitting in admiralty. . It was a libel filed by Brittan, under the circumstances stated. in the opinion of the court. The District Court dismissed the libel, and the Circuit Court affirmed the decree. The points only made by the- counsel can be noticed. On the part of the appellant, they were the following: 1.

Held: and a majority of the votes of the county cast in favor of the subscription ? Is it to be determined by the court, in this collateral way, in every suit upon the bond, or coupon .attached, or by the board of commissioners, as á duty imposed upon it before .making the subscription? The court is of opinion that the question belonged to this board.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana. It was similar, in most of its aspects, to tbe preceding case. In this case there was no notice whatever of the increase of the stock made bythe board at their meeting on 26th February, 1849, and also it was shown that less than a majority of the whole vote of the county was polled.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court, of the United States for the southern district- of Ohio. It was a case of collision between the propeller Ogdensburgh and the steamer Atlantic, under the circumstances which are particularly set forth' in' the opinion of the court..

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio. It wa% in fact a cross-appeal in the preceding case, although there was no cross-libel filed. Being a branch of same case, it was argued by the same counsel.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

This was an appeal from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for the District of Columbia. The facts are stated in tbe opinion of the court.

This was an appeal from the the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court. The reporter would give these arguments in extenso, but for tbe circumstance that tbe points in the case are thoroughly examined in tbe opinion of tbe court and in tbe dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Daniel.