Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

64 Me. 195

Stubbs v. Lee

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine

Decided July 1, 1874

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · decided 1874-07-01

On report. Trespass vi et armis, for an assault upon the plaintiff' by the defendant and for an imprisonment by causing ber to be committed to and detained in the coxmty jail at Bangor for six months. Upon the eighth day of May, 1866, the governor and council commissioned Lyman Lee as a trial justice of Piscataquis county,. and he qualified himself by taking the requisite oaths, on the twenty-ninth day of the same month.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1874-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 13 later decisions — most recently December 1978

1 federal appellate · 12 state decisions — followed in 11 states

4018741880189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Appleton, C. J.

¶1The defendant, being a trial justice, was subsequently appointed and sworn as a deputy-sheriff. The question presented for determination is whether the acceptance of the last is a resignation of the first office.

¶2The offices in question must be regarded as incompatible. “I think,” remarks Bailey, J., in The King v. Tizzard, 9 B. & C., 418, “that the two offices are incompatible when the holder cannot in every instance discharge the duties of each. . . The acceptance of the second office therefore vacates the first.” . . . “So a man shall lose his office, if he accepts another office incompatible; as if one be under the control of the other; as, if the remembrancer of the exchequer be made a baron of the exchequer.” 5 Com. Dig., Tit, “Officer,” (1L, 5.) The appointment of a person to a second office, incompatible with the first, is not absolutely void ; but on his subsequently accepting the appointment and qualifying, the first office is ipso facto vacated. The People v. Carrique, 2 Hill, 93. A vacancy may arise in an office from an implied resignation ; as by the incumbent’s accepting an incompatible office. Van Orsdale v. Hazard, 3 Hill, 243. The acceptance of the office of constable of a town by a person holding at the time the office of justice of the peace, is of itself a surrender of the latter office. Magie v. Stoddard, 25 Conn., 565. In 3 Maine, 186, this court, in their answer to the senate say, “that the office of justice of the peace is incompatible with that of sheriff, deputy-sheriff or coroner.”

¶3*198Where one has two incompatible offices, both cannot be retained. The public has a right to know which is held and which is surrendered. It should not be left to chance, or to the uncertain and fluctuating whim of the office-holder to determine. The general rule, therefore, that the acceptance of and qualification for an office incompatible with one then held is a resignation of the former, is one certain and reliable as well as one indispensable for the protection of the public.

¶4The defendant having been appointed and sworn as a deputy-sheriff must be regarded as having accepted that office. By that acceptance he surrendered the office of trial justice, a judicial office incompatible with that of a deputy-sheriff. His judicial authority, therefore, as a trial justice was at an end.-

¶5The case to stand for trial.

Dickerson, Yirgin, Peters and Libbey, JJ., concurred.-
/64/me/195 · .json · Public domain