Volume 72 — New Jersey Equity Reports

<p>On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>1. Evidence in a suit for divorce considered, and held not to sustain the master’s finding of willful, continued and obstinate desertion.</p> <p>2. A wife was shown to have frequently left her husband, but to have always returned to him upon his request. Her leaving him, which was claimed to be desertion, was proved, but he made no request for her return thereafter. A letter, claimed to have been received by him from her, might have excused him for not seeking her return, but the receipt of the letter was only proved by his uncorroborated evidence.—Held, that a report that her desertion was willful and obstinate was not supported by evidence.</p>

<p>Three causes tried together. Ou final hearing on bill, answer and proofs.</p>

<p>In partition. Final hearing on bill, answers ánd proofs.</p>

<p>Final hearing on bill and answer.</p>

<p>1. Where complainant acquired certain corporate stock as administrator of his father, who died in 1904, it was complainant’s duty either to have the stock transferred on the books of the company or to give distinct notice that subsequent notices of meetings sent to him as a stockholder should be sent to a certain address, in order to charge the corporation with neglect in continuing to send notices io the address of his father as the registered holder of the stock.</p> <p>2. Complainant acquired certain stock in defendant company as administrator of his father’s estate, but took no steps to have the stock transferred until after his return from Europe, when he learned that proceedings were in progress for the consolidation of the corporation with certain other corporations. Complainant waited some eight weeks before he employed local counsel to attack the merger, during which time the new corporation’s stockholders’ “rights certificates” and corporate bonds had been issued.—Held, that the complainant was not entitled to the relief prayed for, which consisted in the actual separation of the original assets of the corporation whose stock was held by complainant, ani the resuscitation of the corporation and its being compelled by a decree of this court to proceed to cnnrinct the business provided for in its articles of association.</p>

On exceptions to -the master’s report dismissing petition. Exceptions sustained, and decree granting divorce advised. The report of the master is substantially as follows: That on the 29th day of June, 1897 (this is an error for 1898, and the wife corrected her testimony in this respect), the parties were and had for a long time been living together as man and wife in this state, where they had been married; that on the day last named the defendant deserted the petitioner.

On final bearing on pleadings and proofs. The bill in this canse was filed on the 8th day of September, 1891, against William M. Force, the defendants’ testator. It was based on the idea that the complainants, in their collective capacity, constituted a corporation capable of suing. On the 31st of October, 1891, the defendant, Force, interposed a plea setting up that the complainants were not a corporation.

Heard on bill, answer, replication and proofs.. Eight of the defendants, who were also eight of the eleven owners of a vessel on which complainants shipped a cargo, made two deposits (the first of $23,000 and the second of $2,800) with the Camden National Bank, another defendant, and payment of these deposits to complainants John Leonard & Company is sought by their bill. At the time of each deposit the bank signed-a letter stating its object.

<p>Heard on bill, answer, decree of interpleader, statements of claim and proofs. .</p>

<p>1. Limitations do not run against a claim of a husband against his wife during the continuance of the marital relation.</p> <p>2. Laches will not be imputed to a husband merely from his failure to prosecute a suit against his wife during the continuance of the marital relation.</p>

<p>On bill for specific performance. Heard on bill, answer, replication and proofs.</p>

<p>1. A written contract with the United States government, providing for payment “at such times and in such amounts as the officer in charge of the work might elect,” cannot be varied by parol evidence that government officers stated, when attention was called to such provision just before signing, that payments could be. expected every thirty days.</p> <p>2. Where a contractor fails to fulfill his contract, it is the duty of the other party to make reasonable exertions to mitigate his loss.</p> <p>8. Evidence of a claim for damages for breach of contract filed with a receiver considered, and held not to show that the claimant could have done anything to mitigate the loss.</p> <p>4. The burden of proving that damages for breach of contract could have been mitigated rests on the party guilty of the breach.</p> <p>5. The provision in a shipbuilding contract giving the party contracting for the ships power to complete the work in the event of failure by the other party is not compulsory.</p>

<p>1. A corporation, authorized to issue stock oC the par value of $250 in payment of property or corporate stock, must, to make lawful the issue of stock in consideration of acquiring the stock of another corporation, and to supply a sufficient consideration for a promise to pay an additional sum for such stock, make a bona fide appraisal of the actual cash value of the stock acquired at a sum not less than the par value of the stock issued, together with the additional sum agreed to be paid.</p> <p>2. An intentional disregard of the statutory rule, involving an intentional overvaluation of property acquired by a corporation, is a form of fraud prohibited by the statute, and the issuing of stock without making any appraisal of the value of the thing purchased thereby is unlawful.</p> <p>3. A domestic corporation was authorized to issue stock of the par value of $250 in payment of property of that value, including shares of corporate stock. The corporation agreed to pay $250 in its own stock for each share of a foreign corporation, and agreed to pay, in addition, $106.25 in ten semi-annual installments.—Held, that if each share of stock of the foreign corporation was worth $356.25, the semi-annual installments would be ordinary debts, the equivalent of which had gone into the treasury of the domestic corporation, and would not be dividends.</p> <p>4. A domestic corporation agreed to pay $250 in its own stock for each share it acquired of the stock of an Ohio corporation, and, in addition, it agreed to pay $106.25 for each share. The domestic corporation brought suit in the courts of Ohio against the foreign corporation and a trust company, acting on behalf of the certificate-holders, to set aside the agreements.—Held, that a decree of the Ohio court canceling the agreements was binding on the trust company, and was res judieata in a proceeding by it to establish a claim against the domestic corporation for the amount which it had agreed to pay for the stock.</p>

On proceedings for order for possession and writ of assistance. Motion for order heard on verified petition of purchaser and verified answer of party in possession.

<p>1. A manufacturer of building materials declared for the open shop, and its employes, who were union men, struck. The labor organizations embracing the building trade, through their officers, notified the boss carpenters that the manufacturer’s goods were unfair, and that members of the unions would not handle them, and if a boss carpenter received them his employes would be called out. Some of the boss carpenters broke their contracts with the manufacturer, and others, who had been its regular customers, refrained from using its goods. The scheme of the officers of the unions included coercion of the employes of the boss carpenters to strike against their will.—Held, that the manufacturer was entitled to an injunction restraining the officers of the unions from directing or inducing by threats, &c., the employes of the boss carpenters to strike.</p> <p>2. Where a third person intentionally, by the use of any kind of means, causes a breach of contract involving damage, he is prima facie guilty of a tort.</p> <p>3. Every dealer is entitled to a free market, and to enjoy the right he must have all other dealers with him left free to deal or not, as they may voluntarily elect, and a violation of the right consists in coercing the market.</p> <p>4. It is the absolute right of all men to contract or refrain from contracting, and the motives which actuate a man in refraining from making a contract in relation to labor or merchandise, or anything else, are beyond inquiry.</p> <p>5. Men have an absolute right to act in voluntary combination in respect to contracting or refraining from contracting, however immoral their motives may be.</p> <p>6. A manufacturer of building materials declared for an open shop, and its employes struck. The labor organizations embracing the building trades, through their officers, notified the boss carpenters that the manufacturer’s goods were unfair, and that the members of the unions would not handle them. The scheme of the officers of the unions included the coercion of the employes of the boss carpeuters to quit work in case materials were purchased from the manufacturer. The coercion, if exercised, would be exercised in accordance with the regulations of the unions.— Held, that the officers of the unions wore not justified in interfering with the manufacturer’s market by coercion exercised on the employes of the boss carpenters.</p>

<p>On pleadings and proofs.</p>

<p>Where payments under a building contract were due on the certificate of the architect, a stop notice served on the owner on the day after the last certificate was given was insufficient to give the party serving the notice priority over other persons holding orders of the contractor upon the owner.</p>

<p>On demurrer to a bill to quiet title.</p>

<p>The agreement of 1833, between the commissioners representing the States of New Jersey and New York, fixing the boundaries between such states, article 2, provides that the State of New York shall retain its present jurisdiction of and over the islands lying in the waters of the bay of New York.—Held, that such agreement did not deprive the State of New Jersey of that element of state sovereignty which permits the 'determination of the status and ownership of lands within the state limits, and hence the court of chancery has jurisdiction to enforce its decree of foreclosure of mortgage and sale of islands in the harbor of New York, but within the New Jersey boundary.</p>

<p>1. A corporation, by pledging its own stock as collateral to another corporation, cannot empower the pledgee corporation to exercise a power or incident of ownership which the real owner does not possess.</p> <p>2. Evidence examined, and held to show a pledging of stock, not made in good faith for the purpose of affording additional security for loans, but for the purpose of placing- the stock in the hands of those friendly to the existing management, in order that it might be voted on to retain them in power, and thus avoid the letter and spirit of the prohibition contained in the thirty-eighth section of the General Corporation act of this state. P. L. 1898 p. 277. ■ , .</p>

<p>1. Where the only evidence of the desertion of petitioner’s husband, which was alleged to have occurred in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1892, was that of petitioner herself, and the only other testimony in the case was given by persons residing in New Jersey, that the husband had not visited his wife since her return to her father’s house in 1895, there was not sufficient corroboration as to the fact of desertion to entitle petitioner to a divorce.</p> <p>2. Where, in a suit for divorce for desertion, the original separation was not shown to have been a desertion, evidence proving its continuance was insufficient to entitle the wife to a divorce.</p>

<p>On pleadings and proofs.</p>

<p>On petition for divorce.</p>

Heard on bill, answer, cross-bill, answer to cross-bill and replications. This is a bill filed by John Barber, a lunatic, by Cecilia Matilda Barber, his guardian, against Alexander A. Miller and another.

Heard on motion, affidavits in support thereof and affidavits on behalf of defendants. This suit was instituted by a bill praying that a judgment docketed from the district court of Hoboken in the Hudson county common pleas be decreed a nullity and void, and that a sale of real estate belonging to the complainant, made by the sheriff of Hudson county on December 13th, 1906, to the defendant Scutellaro be declared void.

Proceedings on behalf of the receiver of the defendant company to punish John B. MacAfee as for a contempt. Heard on petition of receiver and proofs attached thereto. By a final decree in this court, entered on the 18th day of June, 1906, the above-named defendant was in this suit decreed to be insolvent, and an injunction in pursuance of the statute was issued against it and its officers, and a receiver was appointed for it.

<p>In the absence of any clause or expression in a will showing an intent to the contrary, a devise or bequest from a wife to a husband “to him and his heirs forever,” lapses upon the death of the husband in the lifetime of the testatrix; the words “heirs forever” being words of limitation and not of substitution.</p>

On demurrer to bill. The bill alleges that defendant agreed to sell to the North Jersey Street Railway Company a certain strip of land and to convey an absolute title to the same for the consideration of $30,000. Subsequently the railway company, with the consent and acquiescence of defendant, assigned the contract of sale to complainant and complainant entered into possession under the contract.

<p>On final hearing on bill, answer, replication and proofs.</p>

<p>On bill for injunction.</p> <p>The bill in this cause is filed to procure an injunction to restrain defendant from backing water, by means of a dam, upon complainant’s lands, and to compel defendant to remove the dam. The bill alleges that complainant is the owner of land on either side of an ancient water course called “Scotland Branch.” That complainant’s land, adjacent to the water course, is in use as a cultivated cranberry bog which requires the use of the stream in its natural condition for drainage. That defendant has for a great many years maintained a dam across the water course at a point below complainant’s land for the purpose of obtaining water power with which to operate his mill, and has recently raised the level of the pond formed by the same so that the water backs up and overflows complainant’s land and cranberry bogs causing complainant irreparable injury, and that defendant threatens to raise the water even higher.</p> <p>The answer denies any knowledge as to complainant’s ownership of the land in question, and denies that defendant has at any time raised the level of the water so that it backs up to complainant’s land or injures it or the cranberry bogs, and denies any threats or intention upon defendant’s part to raise the water higher, and avers that any excess of water at complainant’s land is caused by improper'discharge of water from a mill-dam on the same stream above complainant’s land and also by clogging of the channel of the stream at and below complainant’s lands. The answer further avers that the dam of defendant and the waters held by the dam have been maintained by defendant as they now are for more than twenty years continuously next preceding the filing of the bill.</p>

On motion to strike ont eacb paragraph of the answer, and also the entire answer. The bill is filed by Amy A. Van Dyke as one of the next of kin of Sarah E. Buck, deceased, against the administrators of Sarah E. Buck, deceased, and their sureties, to determine the amount of the distributive share of the personal estate of intestate to which complainant is entitled as such next of kin.

<p>1. Legislative grants of franchises, whether granted by special charters or under general laws, confer privileges which are exclusive in their nature as against all persons upon whom similar rights have not been conferred. Any attempted exercise of such rights, without legislative sanction, is not only an unwarranted usurpation of power, but operates as a direct invasion of the private property rights of those upon whom the franchises have been so conferred.</p> <p>2. A court of equity will enjoin the unlawful invasion of a statute franchise.</p> <p>3. The restraining power of a court of equity is exercised for the protection of rights, the existence of which are clearly established, and so far only as may be essential for the protection of those rights.</p> <p>4. Public grants are construed strictly, and in all cases of grants of franchises by the public to a private corporation, the established rule of construction is that any ambiguity in the terms of the contract muse operate against the corporation and in favor of the public. The corporation takes nothing that is not clearly given by the act.</p> <p>5. The word “town,” as used in legislative acts in New Jersey, has no fixed significance, and its use must be applied according to the manifest legislative intention as gathered from the occasion and necessity of the act.</p> <p>6. Injunction denied because o£ want o£ sufficient certainty as to complainant’s rights.</p>

On motion to strike out bill of complaint. The bill is filed by complainant as widow and devisee of Theodore Holton, deceased, to establish a trust touching certain land conveyed to defendant by testator in his lifetime. Defendant is the daughter of testator. Defendant now moves to strike out certain portions of the bill and also to strike out the bill in its entirety.

<p>On bill, answer, replication and proofs.</p>

<p>A person who files a claim with a receiver of an insolvent corporation and sustains his claim before the receiver and before this court on appeal, is not a complainant within the meaning of the ninety-first section of the Chancery act (P. L. 1902 p. 5J/0). and is not entitled to the allowance of a counsel fee to be included as taxable costs.</p>

<p>1. A chattel mortgage may be made a lien on the outstanding book accounts due to a mortgagor, and also upon such book accounts as shall thereafter become due to the mortgagor in the regular course of his business.</p> <p>2. The general manager of a corporation, who was also a stockholder and a member of the board of directors, held to be entitled to preferment under P. L. 1896 p. 303 § 83 for two months’ wages next preceding the institution of proceedings of insolvency.</p>

On bill for injunction and answering affidavits. Tbe bill seeks to enjoin defendant from constructing its elevated railway across Cherry street, Camden. The proposed structure will be an embankment which wholly prevents travel along the old line of the street. Complainant is the owner of property in the block where the crossing is being constructed.

<p>On bill to quiet title.</p>

On order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. Heard cn bill, answer and affidavits. Alfred Johanson and wife, two of the present defendants, are in possession of and claim to own certain lots of land on the north side of Salem street, between Burlington street and Broadway, Gloucester, and claim to own the fee of Salem street, in front of the lots, to the centre line of that street, subject alónete the servitude occasioned by the public highway.

<p>A court of equity will not decree the specific performance by vendor of a contract for the sale of land when the vendor is not the owner of the equitable title of the land which he has agreed to convey.</p>

On bill and cross-bill. The bill is filed by complainants as executor and devisees of Lewis E. Jeffreys to remove a cloud from the title to certain real estate, which cloud consists of an outstanding agreement dated ■July 3d, 1903, wherein complainants’ testator agreed to extend to cross-complainant an option of purchase of the land, upon the terms specified in the agreement, for a period of two years from the date of the agreement.

<p>On bill for injunction.</p>

On bill for injunction. The bill is filed by the township of Landis to enjoin defendant company from laying its gas pipes in the highways of that township. Defendant claims the right under its charter act. P. L. 1857 di. 16k• The cause has been heard on bill and answering affidavits at the return of an order to show cause for a preliminary injunction.

<p>1. When an application is made to an orphans court for an order directing an administrator to sell lands of his intestate for the payment of debts, on the ground that the personal estate is insufficient, under the provisions of sections 82 to 90 of the Orphans Court act of 1898, and upon the return of the rule to show cause issued thereon it appears that the personal and real estate of intestate are, and are known to the administrator to be, together insufficient to satisfy the debts claimed— Held, that the orphans court may decline to make the order of sale, because the application should have been made under sections 99 to 110 of the act, the estate being insolvent under those sections.</p> <p>2. The proofs before the orphans court justified the inference that the administrator, in making the application under section 82 et seq., instead of under section 99 et seq., acted in bad faith.—Held further, that the orphans court may decline to make the order of sale on that ground.</p>

<p>On application for probate.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Cumberland county orphans court.</p>

<p>On appeal from Monmouth county orphans court.</p>

<p>On appeal from Hudson county orphans court.</p>

<p>On appeal of Griffiths and others, from a decree of the court of chancery, reported in 69 N. J. Eq. (3 Robb.) 15.</p>

<p>1. A wife sued for divorce, for the custody of the children, and for alimony. The husband, a non-resident, was only brought in by publication and personal service out of the state of a notice of the pendency of the suit. He did not appear. A decree as prayed for was granted. His property in the state was sequestered to enforce the decree. He filed a petition attacking the validity of the decree for lack of jurisdiction, and prayed for the vacation thereof, for the setting aside of the writ of sequestration, and for the dismissal of the bill, and for “other and further relief.”—Held, that his appearance for this purpose was not a general submission ■ to the jurisdiction of the court, and did not operate to give validity to the adjudication against him of which he complained.</p> <p>2. An award of alimony, in a decree for divorce, whether absolute or from bed and board, is.void against a defendant who has not been served with process within the state and has not entered an appearance in the suit; and is not enforceable against property of defendant within the state.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Bergen, whose conclusions are reported in 70 N. J. Eq. Robb.) 588.</p>

<p>1. The prohibition of section 30 of the General Corporation act (P. L. 1896 p. 886) that “no corporation shall make dividends except from the surplus or net profits arising from its business, nor divide, withdraw, or in any way pay to the stockholders, or any of them, any part of its capital stock, or reduce its capital stock, except according to this act,” is to be read in connection with the provisions of sections 27 and 29 respecting a decrease of capital stock, and deals with the payment of a dividend out of capital as amounting in effect to a reduction of capital stock.</p> <p>2. While it is a function of the board of directors of a corporation to determine whether net earnings or surplus exist applicable to the payment of dividends, they cannot, by an erroneous determination of this point, confer either upon themselves or upon the corporation the power to make dividends out of capital.</p> <p>3. The approval of a majority of the stockholders does not validate the declaration of dividends out of capital.</p> <p>4. Neither the directors nor a majority of stockholders can waive the right of the company, under section 30 of the General Corporation act (P. L. 1896 p. 886), to recover from the directors the amount of dividends made out of capital.</p> <p>5. The rule that courts will not ordinarily interfere with the internal management of corporations has no application to transactions that are •ultra -vires the company or prohibited by positive law.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevens, whose opinion is reported in 70 N. J. Eq. (4 Robb.) 318.</p>

<p>1. A gift of personal property from husband to wife must be clearly proved. There must be clear and convincing evidence of a delivery of the property by the husband with the intention of divesting himself of all dominion and control of it, and of vesting title in the wife.</p> <p>2. The common-law rule that “suitable ornaments and wearing apparel of a married woman, which come to her through her husband during coverture, remain his personal property during his life, and he may sell and dispose of them during his life,” has not been abrogated by our Married Woman’s act (Q-en. Btat. p. 2012), or by any other statutory provision.</p>

<p>On appeal from an order of the ordinary, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Eq. (1 Buch.) 210.</p>

. At the start the question was raised whether either of the complainants was qualified under our statute to bring this suit. Held: that such a person, holding a claim for unliquidated damages, is qualified as a creditor to be the actor in the suit; that does not follow.

<p>On appeal from an order of the chancellor, advised by AUee-Cliancellor Pitney, whose opinion is reported in 70 N. J. Eq. (4 Robb.) 135.</p>

<p>On appeal from an order of the chancellor, advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevens.</p>

<p>On appeal from an order of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Grey, whose opinion is reported in 70 N. J. Eq. (4 Robb.) 418.</p>

On appeal of the Pennsylvania Iron Works Company from a decree in the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Bergen, who filed the following opinion: The defendant company gave two mortgages, one for $10,000 to the complainant, another for $7,235 to Annie Lisle Balling-all, which she assigned to the complainant.

On ajqieal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Yice-Ohancellor Stevens, who filed the following opinion: This is a suit which was begun by William G. Lipp in his lifetime for the… Held: and from which she appears to have realized $500. The complainant’s insistment is that at the time of the conveyance of the tract in controversy to his wife, it was verbally agreed between them that the property should be his if he survived her.

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Grey, whose opinion is reported in 59 Atl. Rep. 880.</p>

<p>On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>On bill to foreclose. Application for distribution of surplus moneys.</p>

<p>On bill for relief.</p>

<p>In proceedings lor contempt.</p>

<p>On order to show cause why an injunction should not issue. Heard on bill and affidavits.</p>

Heard on bill and combined plea and demurrer. This is the second suit in this court between these parties. It was commenced by bill filed on the 7th day of September, 1906. The complainant is one of the children of Henry P. Simmons, late of the city of Passaic, and one of the ceslui que trusts under his will. The defendant Mary Eliza Pladley and her husband, Jacob E. Hadley, William Nelson and Colin R. Wise are the executorb named in said will.

On petition for divorce on the ground of adultery charged with Frank T. Huntoon, who appeared under the statute and was made a defendant. Final hearing on petition, answer and proofs. For previous proceedings in this case, see Duke v. Duke, 70 N. J. Eq. (4 Robb.) 135, 149.

<p>1. In a proceeding by an attorney to obtain part of the proceeds of a compromise of a suit as compensation under a contract of retainer, evidence examined, and held to show that the contract was made.</p> <p>2. Where an attorney contracted with his client that, as compensation for conducting the suit, he should receive one-third of the proceeds of the action, the contract gave him an equitable lien upon the proceeds when they took form.</p>

<p>On final hearing on bill, answer and proofs:</p>

<p>On application for modification of injunction issued on final decree.</p>

<p>Heard on bill, answers, replication and proofs.</p>

<p>1. Where, in a suit by the vendee in a contract for the sale of land for specific performance, it appeared that after the time when conveyance should have been made defendant had leased the premises, on which there were buildings belonging to complainant, and which he had placed there under a lease, and that defendant had rented the real estate and buildings for a sum amounting to merely the value of the ground rent without regard to the building, on a decree for complainant, defendant should be charged, not only with such ground rent, but with the reasonable additional value of the rent of the buildings.</p> <p>2. The fact that, on an application to restrain defendant from collecting the rents and for a receiver, by consent of all parties an order was made authorizing defendant to collect the rent until disposition of the litigation,, did not sustain a contention that defendant had been in charge of the premises as a receiver for a certain period, and that during such period he should not be charged with more rent than he actually received.</p>

<p>1. Where a railroad purchased the fee of land for occupation by its tracks in the exercise of its public franchise of operating a railroad, one who had an easement of a right of way over such land, which easement was interfered with by the operation of the railroad, was entitled to compensation under the Eminent Domain act (Revision, P. L. 1900 p. 1/9), providing for compensation to all persons having any interest in the land taken.</p> <p>2. An injunction will lie to restrain a railroad from occupying- complainant’s real estate, and to compel the removal of its tracks, unless compensation be made.</p>

<p>On exceptions to master’s report.</p>

<p>Heard on bill, answer, replication and proofs.</p>

On application for preliminary injunction. Heard on bill and affidavits, answering affidavits and cross-examinations in open court.

<p>1. Where a decree awarded the custody of certain children to their mother, but authorized the father to visit them at specified intervals, a letter written to the father by the mother’s father that the mother had moved from New York to Portland, in the absence of any showing that the mother had authorized such statement, was insufficient to show that the mother had changed her permanent residence from New Jersey to Maine.</p> <p>2. Where, in a proceeding to determine the custody of certain children, the mother answered, claiming the custody of the children, and the court awarded the same to her, with the provision that the father should be permitted to visit them, and it was established in that proceeding that the mother and the children were residents of New Jersey, the court, having acquired jurisdiction in the first instance, was entitled to modify the previous decree, notwithstanding the removal of the mother and children to another state.</p> <p>3. A petition for the custody of children, as between parents living separately, authorized by P. L. p. 263 § S, in which a writ of habeas corpus may issue, as provided by section 12, is not a common-law habeas corpus proceeding, such writ being merely ancillary for the purpose of enabling the court to obtain jurisdiction of the children.</p> <p>4. Where parents are living separately, the court may order their children kept within the state, or, if absent, brought within it.</p> <p>5. Where the custody of children was awarded to the mother, who was living separate from the father, a modification of such order would not be made merely because the mother had taken the children to Maine, in the absence of proof that she intended to keep them there permanently, and to prevent the father from visiting the children as provided by the decree.</p>

<p>A minority stockholder filed a bill against his corporation, its entire board of directors and other parties, the object of which was to protect the corporation by enjoining certain contracts or transactions into which the board of directors proposed to have the corporation enter. A preliminary injunction was refused upon grounds which largely involved the whole merits of the case.—Held (1), that complainant was not entitled on the final hearing to bring in separate grievances of the corporation against some of the defendants only who were directors of the corporation and obtain injunctive relief with reference to such grievances with which the other defendants were not concerned, and which were not within the scope iof the broad relief prayed for against all the defendants; and (2) that the complainant was not entitled, after the most of the testimony in the cause had been taken, to set up by amendment to his bill a grievance against a part only of the defendants which arose before the filing of the bill, or to set up by an addition to the bill under Rule 210® such a grievance which arose after the filing of the bill; and that (S) the decree dismissing the bill would be made without prejudice to the filing hereafter of any bill on behalf of the complainant in respect of the grievances so excluded from consideration in this case.</p>

<p>Where the owner of land granted defendant the right to dig and build a reservoir at a certain spring on the land, the reservoir not to occupy more than one-half acre, and to lay pipes therefrom over such land and to draw the water from the reservoir, and defendant located a reservoir, an injunction would lie at the suit of the owner to restrain him from entering, after ten years, to put down a' well in order to acquire an additional supply of water, although the well would be within an area, including a reservoir, of one-half an acre, if the boundaries should be fixed as desired by defendant.</p>

On bill to foreclose. Hearing on order to show cause wby final decree should not be opened and corrected as to amount due complainant.

On bill for injunction to restrain defendant from violating restriction contained in deed. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs.

<p>On petition for divorce. On exceptions to master’s report.</p>

<p>1. An answer by way of cross-bill, filed under chancery rule 206, is a pleading in the original cause, and costs taxed thereon are costs for which the solicitor filing a bill for a non-resident complainant is responsible, if the complainant has not given the security required by the statute.</p> <p>2. The power to hold a solicitor for costs, when the complainant is a non-resident, is purely statutory, and will only be enforced where the complainant is required to give security, and if the right to such security is waived, as to the complainant, by the defendant, the waiver inures to the benefit of the solicitor.</p> <p>3. If the defendant proceeds with the cause on his own behalf after obtaining an order requiring the complainant to give security, it amounts to a waiver of the right to security.</p>

<p>1. Where the pertinent fact alleged in a bill of complaint as ground for relief raises a doubt as to complainant’s right thereto, a general specification of want of equity in a motion to strike from the files the bill of complaint is sufficient.</p> <p>2. Where an executor was to invest a sufficient sum to produce $1,200 annually, which was to be paid to the annuitant during her natural life, “in payments quarterly of three hundred dollars each,” such bequest is an annuity.</p> <p>3. Where an administrator pendente Ute pays a legacy to a person entitled to it, which the character of his appointment does not authorize him to do, he will nevertheless be allowed such payment in his accounting, if the estate was able and liable to pay-after all prior charges were provided for.</p>

<p>On final hearing on pleadings and proofs.</p>

On application for an order directing the application of moneys raised by the sheriff from the sale of defendant’s property under an execution in favor of complainant.

<p>On bill for receiver.</p>

<p>On bill for injunction. On demurrer.</p>

<p>A testatrix, after appointing an executor, directed the payment of her debts, and then blended her real and personal estate, giving to four children each one-sixth; to another child, one-sixth, less $800, charged as an advancement, and the remainder to the executor in trust for another child.—Held, that the executor had authority to convey real estate, since to make the division and establish the trust a sale of the real estate was necessary.</p>

<p>On bill for injunction. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs.</p>

<p>In a suit to quiet title, a motion for a new trial of an issue directed to be tried at law will be denied by the court of chancery without examining into the merits of the decision, since an appeal can be taken as well from the judgment directed by the justice of the supreme court, as from any judgment upon the same question emanating from this court.</p>

Heard on bill, answer, replication and proofs in open eonrt. The complainants are executors and trustees under the will of Lewis B. Brown, deceased. The defendants are the persons interested in the estate of the testator. The bill is filed to obtain a construction of the will in -various respects, and to procure directions to the trustees concerning various matter s_ respecting their trust. The will was dated November 22d, 1898. Lewis B. Brown died on the 28th of June, 1900.

Heard on bill and answers. This is a bill filed by Alpin J. Cameron. He is the surviving executor of the will of Alexander J. Cameron, and also the executor of the will of Alice E. Cameron. The defendants are the grandchildren of Alexander J. Cameron. The object of the bill is to. procure instructions concerning the complainant’s duty as executor with respect to a matter arising under the wills of the two persons above named.

<p>Hoard on motion, under rule 213, to strike out bill.</p>

<p>1. An enrolled decree may be opened on petition to permit the defendant to make a defence on the merits.</p> <p>2. Where a 'decree was taken against a party without a trial on the merits as to a particular proposition in the case, it is within the discretion of the chancellor to open the decree and permit a defence on the merits of such question-.</p> <p>3. Evidence held to require a finding that an alleged lost deed executed by a son to his mother was not for the benefit of petitioners, and that they were therefore not entitled to open an enrolled partition decree for the purpose of claiming title to a portion of the property under such deed.</p>

<p>On appeals from receiver’s determination.</p> <p>The main suit was a proceeding under the Corporation act to have the company declared insolvent and an injunction issued and a receiver appointed.</p> <p>The injunction was issued, and the receiver appointed on the 13th of November, 1905.</p> <p>On the 26th day of February, 1906, Clarence B. Iserman and Harvey Iserman presented claims to the receiver, the former for the sum of $1,200 and the latter for the sum of $1,686.77. Attached to each claim was a certificate of stock of the defendant corporation. Clarence B. Iserman’s certificate called for one hundred shares, and was dated October 20th, 1905, and Harvey Herman’s certificate called for two hundred and seventy shares, and was dated the same day.</p> <p>The receiver disallowed the claim of Clarence B. Iserman for $1,000 and allowed it for $200. He disallowed the claim of Harvey Iserman for $1,468.29 and allowed it for $218.48. •</p> <p>Each of these claimants has taken an appeal from the determination of the receiver.</p> <p>Other creditors have taken appeals from so much of the receiver’s determination as allows anything to either of the Her-mans.</p> <p>The case was heard upon the testimony taken before the' receiver, together with the exhibits and documentary evidence.</p>

Heard on bill, answers, replications and proofs. This is a bill to foreclose a mortgage made by Beardsley to the complainant. The defendants are Beardsley, Baker, who is the holder of a mortgage upon the same premises, and Shippee, who is the present holder of the title to the property in question.

<p>1. An agent of an insurance company collected insurance money under a power of attorney from the beneficiary and deposited it with a third person, who refused to deliver it to the beneficiary unless the beneficiary would give him one-half thereof to pay to the agent pursuant to an alleged agreement between the beneficiary and the agent.—Held, that the beneficiary could bring an equitable action against the' agent and the third person to impress the money in the third person’s hands with a trust in favor of the beneficiary, and after adjustment to compel the payment of the money to the complainant.</p> <p>2. The court of chancery possesses a general jurisdiction in cases of fraud, as well where there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, as in other cases.</p>

Heard on demurrer to bill. Hannah Grundy died on the 6th day of May, 1892. By her will, -which was duly probated in the orphans court of Passaic county, she bequeathed general pecuniary legacies aggregating $12,400, and then gave, devised and bequeathed all the rest, residue and remainder of her estate, real and personal, wheresoever‘situate, or of whatsoever the same might consist, to her cousin, John Clough, and appointed Jacob H. Blauvelt sole executor.

<p>Heard on bill, answer, replication and proofs.</p>

Heard on bill, answer, replication and proofs. This is a bill filed by Delia, Peter, Ellen and Ann Tuite against Mary J. Tuite. Mary J. Tuite is the mother of the four complainants. The father was Michael J. Tuite.

On bill to quiet title. Motion for new trial on return of postea of feigned issue. Complainants filed a statutory bill to quiet title. At the preliminary hearing in this court complainants were found to be in peaceable possession of the land in question. Defendants demanded an issue at law for the trial of the controverted facts upon which title depended under the issues as framed, and a feigned issue was accordingly awarded by this court.

On information by the attorney-general for injunction. The information seeks to restrain defendant corporation from extending its gas mains through the highways of the borough of Vineland and township of Landis. Defendant was incorporated in the year 1900 under the General Corporation act. P. L. 1896 p. 277. Among the objects named in its certificate of incorporation is the power to perform the acts which are now sought to be restrained.

On bill for injunction and relief. The bill seeks to enjoin defendants from interfering with the use by complainant of the rear portion of defendants’ lots. The nse sought by complainant is the right to pass over the rear portion of defendants’ lots with teams in order that complainant may have access to and from the rear of his own lot.

<p>Under Gen. Btat. p. 1988 § 1, providing that where no time is fixed by a will within which legacies are to be paid, the executors have one year after probate in which to make payment, where an order of the orphans court admitting a will to probate was suspended by appeals, the executor had one year from the day certified copies of the decrees of the appellate courts were filed with the surrogate and probate adjudged by him within which to pay the legacies.</p>

<p>1. Where the domicile of matrimony is in a certain state, and the husband deserts the wife, the domicile of the wife continues in that state until she has acquired one elsewhere.</p> <p>2. The law will not presume the place of birth as a domicile, based upon the abandonment of the last domicile, without the intention of adopting a new one, unless the evidence clearly establishes the facts on which that presumption is based.</p> <p>3. In an action for divorce, evidence held not to show an abandonment by the complainant of the domicile of matrimony.</p>

On bill of interpleader. Hearing on return of order to show cause for injunction pursuant to prayer of bill of interpleader.

<p>1. Where lands are devised in the first instance in language indeterminate as to the quality of the estate, from which an estate for life would result by implication, and words adapted to the creation of a power of disposal, without reservation as to mode of execution, are added, the will vests in the devisee an estate in fee.</p> <p>2. A power given to a devisee to sell when in her judgment a sale is necessary for her comfort and convenience, is a power without limitation within the rule that where lands are devised in the first instance by language indeterminate as to the quality of the estate, and words adapted to the creation of a power of disposal, without reservation, are added, the will vests in the devisee an estate in fee.</p> <p>3. While force should be given to the intention of the testator, his intention must be gathered by the application of the known rules of construction and interpretation.</p>

On bill, answer, replication and proofs. The bill is filed by complainant to procure an accounting from defendant as a partner, and also to have defendant declared to hold the title to certain real estate in trust for the partnership. Complainant and defendant were engaged in the meat and vegetable business at Holly Beach, New Jersey, as partners.

On bill, answer, replication and proofs. Complainant seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant contained in a deed made by complainant of lands now owned by defendant Jennie Riener. In the year 1891 complainant purchased some five thousand acres of land in Cape May county for the purpose of establishing thereon a settlement of Hebrews.

On final hearing on pleadings and proofs. The bill is filed by the receiver of the Ocean Crest Hotel Company, an insolvent corporation, to test the validity of a mortgage which was given by that corporation in part payment for land sold to the corporation by defendant Mrs. Lillie M. Malott. Horace E. Nixon is made a defendant as the present holder of the mortgage.

The bill is filed by complainant, as a stockholder of Beacon Land Company, in behalf of himself and other stockholders, to set aside a sale made by the sheriff of Ocean county to defendant William A. Marr under an execution issued on a judgment held by defendant Marr against the land company.

On bill for injunction. Complainant is the owner of a hotel on Arkansas avenue, in Atlantic City, known as “The Hotel Dominion,” and seeks to restrain defendant from using the name “The New Dominion” for a hotel which defendant has recently erected on that avenue within a few hundred feet from the hotel owned by complainant. The theory of the bill is that defendant is violating rights which complainant has acquired by prior appropriation of the trade name stated.

<p>On bill for the construction of the will of Ezra B. Lake. Heard on bill, answer, replication and proofs.</p>

On petition of Hazer Feinberg for modification of that part of the decree of divorce providing for maintenance of minor child Sylvia Feinberg, and for correction of taxed costs.

On bill for injunction. The bill is filed by complainants to restrain defendant from the erection of a building in violation of the following restrictive building covenant: “And also under and subject to the express conditions and restrictions that no building of any description whatever shall at any time be erected within ten feet of the front line of said avenue, nor within four feet of the side lines of said lot (excepting where a party may own two or more contiguous…

On bill for injunction to restrain action at law. Defendant issued an attachment against the Taylor Hydraulic Air Compressed Company, limited, and served notice of garnishment on complainant. The defendant in attachment appeared, and at trial judgment was rendered against it for the amount of the debt for which the attachment was issued.

On bill to foreclose, &e. Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. The bill seeks to foreclose a purchase-money mortgage made November 17th, 1902, by the Locust Wood Cemetery Company to complainant. Tlie defence is made that by the provisions of section 8 of the Cemetery act of 1875 (Gen. Stat. p. 850 § 8), the cemetery lands covered by the mortgage cannot be sold to satisfy the mortgage debt.

On bill for injunction. Defendant is a gas company of Atlantic City, New Jersey, incorporated under the General Gas act of April 21st, 1876 (Gen. Stat. p. 1608), and is about to increase its bonded indebtedness to an amount exceeding two-thirds of the amount of its capital stock.

<p>On bill by a receiver to set’ aside a judgment.</p>

<p>A receiver will not be appointed for a building and loan association in process of liquidation under P. L, 1904 p. 44 on the mere suggestion that the trustees appointed under the act named were men who were too closely connected with the former management of the association, together with criticism as to the manner of their selection, without substantial evidence of wrong-doing.</p>

On final hearing, pleading and proofs. Complainant is engaged in the business of canning tomatoes and seeks the specific performance of a contract wherein defendant agreed to sell to complainant the entire product of certain land planted with tomatoes. Defendant contests the power of this court to grant equitable relief.

<p>A petition to open a final decree for error apparent in the record must be brought within the time allowed for an appeal or writ of error, where the complainant has been under no disability during that period.</p>

■On motion for an injunction to restrain the execution of a judgment at -law. On June 7th, 190-4, one Samuel L. Bailey recovered a judgment by default against the complainant, Wilson, in the supreme court of the State of New York for $1,594.31. This judgment was assigned to the defendant Anthony, who brought suit thereon in the New Jersey supreme court.

<p>1. P. L. 1892 p. 869, creating a lien on funds due public contractors for the benefit of laborers and materialmen, and providing for the enforcement of such lien, does not contemplate an action in the chancery court by the original contractor against the municipality.</p> <p>2. P. L. 1892 p. 869 creates a lien on funds due municipal contractors for the benefit of laborers and materialmen, which sections 1 and 5 declare shall extend to the full extent of the claim or demand and to the extent of the liability of the contractor for the claim preferred.—Held, that a proceeding to enforce such lien was a proceeding m rem limited to a determination of the lien claims against the contractors, and to the application of the funds due the contractors from the municipality to the extent necessary to pay such liens, or if the fund is insufficient, then to distribute the same among the lienors pro rata.</p> <p>3. In a suit to enforce a lien on an amount due a municipal contractor, given by P. L. 1892 p. 869, the court has no jurisdiction to entertain a cross-bill by the contractor’s representatives for the purpose of an accounting between such representatives and the municipality.</p>

<p>On appeal from Bergen county orphans court.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the Hunterdon county orphans court.</p>

<p>1. An owner who divides his lands into lots and streets as shown by a map filed by him with the county clerk, and who sells lots as shown thereon, does not, in the absence of a neighborhood scheme calling for the erection of but one building on a single lot, impliedly covenants not to sell the lands except in the parcels delineated on the map, but he may subdivide the lots into smaller parcels and sell them in such parcels or devote any part of the same to public uses, as streets, parks, &e.</p> <p>2. An owner who divides his lands into lots and streets as shown by a map filed by him and who sells lots as shown thereon impliedly covenants with his grantees that they shall have a right of passage over such streets as an appurtenant to the premises granted to them; and such grantees may enjoin a change in the location of or a narrowing of the width of the streets, without first showing that the same will result in depreciation of the value of the lot purchased.</p>

<p>The seventh section of the act of 1899 (P. L. p. 536), entitled “An act to prevent the pollution of the waters of this state by the establishment of a state sewerage commission,” as amended by P. L. 1900 p. 113, makes it unlawful for a municipality to build or operate any plant for the treatment of sewerage from which the effluent is to flow into any of the waters of the state, except under such conditions and upon such plans as shall be approved by the commission.—Held, that this legislation, by necessary implication, removes such disposal plants, when constructed on plans and under conditions approved by the commission, from the supervision of the state board of health, which was conferred upon that body by the act to secure the purity of the public supplies of potable waters (P. L. 1899 p. 73), and relieves the owners and users of such plants from the liabilities created by that act.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevenson.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Bergen, whose conclusions are reported in 71 N. J. Eq. (1 Buck,.) 595.</p>

<p>Upon a creditor’s bill filed to have a judgment against a husband declared a charge against the wife’s house and lands, on the ground that the property had been conveyed to the wife by the husband through a third party, in fraud of his creditors, the court refused to declare the deed fraudulent as against complainant, but it appearing that the husband, since the transfer, had paid the interest on a mortgage upon the premises, and also taxes and assessments thereon during a period of thirteen years to an aggregate amount but little less than the amount of the judgment, made a decree charging the land with the payment of the judgment to the extent of those payments.—Held, on appeal, that it appearing from the evidence that at least part of the money so paid by the husband was advanced to him by his son for the purpose of making those payments in relief of his mother’s home, and it further appearing that during the whole period the husband, whose duty it was to provide a home for his family, had used and occupied his wife’s house and lands for that purpose, and it not being made to appear that the amount of such payments were in excess of the amount necessary for the reasonable support of the wife and family, such payments were not fraudulent as against creditors, and that the bill should have been dismissed.—Held further, that it appearing that the creditor had delayed the filing of his bill- for thirteen years after the recovery of his judgment, and that the situation of the wife had been entirely changed thereby from what it otherwise would have been, to her prejudice, the bill should have been dismissed on the ground of laches also.</p>

<p>1. Where an executor has paid the collateral inheritance taxes upon legacies given by the will, although it is his duty to deduct such tax at settlement with the legatee, under Gen. Stat. 3340 ¶ 338, he may properly make the payments and have allowance for them in his final account.</p> <p>2. An executor is not ordinarily compelled to pay such tax until the expiration of the year allowed him by law for the settlement of the estate, and he should not be refused allowance for such interest as he would be required to pay if the tax were paid within the year.</p> <p>3. He will not ordinarily be chargeable with interest on moneys in his hands uninvested for and during the year allowed him in which to settle the estate.</p> <p>4. An executor is not entitled to commissions until his accounts have been settled and allowed by the court, and if he withdraws from the estate prior to such settlement any money on account of such commissions he will be chargeable with interest thereon to the time of his accounting.</p>

<p>1. Under the General Corporation act (P. L. 1896 p. 298 §§ 65, 68), the title of an insolvent corporation to its property continues until there is either an adjudication of insolvency or the appointment of a receiver or trustee.</p> <p>2. Upon the filing of a bill of complaint against an insolvent corpora1 tion, under section 65 of the General Corporation act (P. L. 1896 p. 298), the court of chancery made an order restraining the corporation from paying or transferring its moneys and effects, or contracting any debts, and from selling, assigning or transferring its property, and also requiring it to show cause on a later day why an injunction should not issue and a receiver be appointed. Thereafter, and before the hearing of the order to show cause, a common-law judgment was recovered against the corporation, upon which execution was issued to the sheriff, who made a levy upon personal property of the corporation sufficient to satisfy the judgment. Upon the hearing of the order to show cause, a receiver was appointed, who tools possession of the personal property upon which levy had been made and used it for the benefit of the estate of the corporation. —Held, that the judgment creditor was entitled to priority in payment.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree advised by Vice-Chancellor Bergen.</p>

<p>The orphans court, upon an executor’s accounting, may ascertain the condition of the estate as fully as the court of chancery, and in the absence of fraud, or accident unmixed with negligence or fraud on the part of the accountant, or of some matter of pure equity cognizance, the decree upon the accounting is conclusive upon the executor as to the propriety of allowances claimed by him.</p>

<p>1. The clause in section 5 of the act to quiet titles (3 Gen. Stat. p. SJ/87), which enacts that when an issue at law shall be directed to try the validity of a claim of title to land, the court of chancery shall be bound by the result of such issue, is constitutional.</p> <p>2. The previous determination in this case by this court that the power conferred upon the court of chancery to take jurisdiction of this class of suits and to award a feigned issue was not in conflict with the constitution, and the further determination that the order of the chancellor refusing a new trial of the issue should be affirmed involved and settled the constitutionality of the entire provision respecting a trial at law and the finality of the verdict thereon.</p>

In a suit brought by John J. Ketchum against Henry C. Bell and others to redeem mortgaged premises, setting up the execution of an absolute deed from complainant to defendant, accompanied by a written agreement by the latter to reconvey the premises and account for rents received, a decree was made July 10th, 1905, declaring that complainant was entitled to redeem, and that defendant should account for rents and profits received, and that the cause be referred to a special…

J. Eq. (1 Buck.) 6SB. The bill in this case is filed by John Vanderbilt against Myra L. J. Vanderbilt, his wife, William Godfrey Vanderbilt, an infant, appearing herein by guardian, and Henry Mitchell, as medical superintendent of the bureau of vital statistics of the State of New Jersey.

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Garrison, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Bq. (1 Buck.) ‘682.</p>

Appeal of Thomas F. McGran, receiver of the Paterson Building Company. On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, in inter-pleader suit, advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevenson, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Bq. (1 Buck.) 138.

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevens, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Eq. (1 Buoh.) 560.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Emery, whose opinion is reported in 69 N. J. Eq. (3 Robb.) 606.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree overruling the plea to the jurisdiction, advised by Vice-Chancellor Pitney, .whose opinion is reported in 70 N. J. Fq. (4 Robb.) 1S5.</p>

On appeal of Lilian N. Duke from a decree of the court of chancery granting the respondent a divorce, advised by Vice-Chancellor Pitney, whose opinion is reported ante p. £M.

On appeal of Frank T. Huntoon, intervenor, from a decree of the court of chancery adjudging him guilty, advised by Vice-Chancellor Pitney, whose opinion is reported ante ¶. BIS.

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Emery, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Eq. (1 Buch.) 524-</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevens.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the prerogative court on accounting of executor, advised by the vice-ordinary, whose opinion is reported in 64 Atl. Rep. 1020.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Bergen.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Garrison, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Fq. (1 Buck.) 697.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, made by the chancellor, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Bq. (1 Buck.) 823.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevenson, whose opinion is reported in 67 Atl. Rep.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Yice-Chancellor Pitney, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Ecj. (1 Buck.) 882.</p>

<p>On appeal taken by Elizabeth A. Brockhurst from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Garrison, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Fq. (1 Buch.) 70S. '</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Pitney, whose opinion is reported in 71 N. J. Eq. (1 Buck.) 353.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery, advised by Vice-Chancellor Pitney, whose opinion is reported in 70 N. J. Fq. {Jf. Robb.) 192.</p>