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299 U.S. 92

Wainer v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued October 12, 1936.

Decided November 9, 1936.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1936-11-09

2 counsel of record

Relies on United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile · United States v. Yuginovich · United States v. Stafoff

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · 8–0 · Decided 1936-11-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 37 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1977 · most notably D'Aquino v. United States (1951), United States v. Battaglia (1968)

23 federal appellate · 3 district · 7 state decisions

14019361940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Mr. John E. Dougherty, with whom Messrs. Harry C. Heyl and Irwin S. Rubelle were on the brief, for petitioners.

¶2Mr. Gordon Dean argued the cause, and Solicitor General Reed, Assistant Attorney General McMahon, and Mr. Mahlon D. Kiefer filed a brief, for the United States.

¶3Mr. Justice Roberts

¶4delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶5The petitioners were convicted and sentenced in the District Court under an indictment, the second count of which charged them with conducting the business of wholesale liquor dealers without having paid the special tax imposed by the federal revenue laws. The judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.1 Certiorari was granted limited to the question whether the statute *93upon which the second count of the indictment was based was repealed by the National Prohibition Act2 and has not been reenacted.

¶6Many of the existing revenue acts imposing taxes in respect of manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors were superseded by the National Prohibition Act.3 The effect of § 5 of the Willis-Campbell Act4was to reenact all such laws in existence when national prohibition became effective, save such as were in direct conflict with any provision of the National Prohibition Act or the Willis-Campbell Act.5 The statutes taxing the business of conducting a wholesale liquor business and imposing the penalties for so doing without the payment of the tax6 were not in direct conflict with the prohibition act and were, therefore, reenacted.7 The difficulty of paying the excise upon the privilege of carrying on a business which is prohibited does not preclude the prescription of sanctions for non-payment.8 Petitioners insist it is a contradiction in terms to say the laws of the United States at the same time prohibit and license an occupation. The contention is based on misconception of the nature of the exaction. The United States has not licensed the liquor business but, as is clearly within its power, has laid an *94excise upon the doing of the business whether lawfully or unlawfully conducted.9

¶7The judgment is

¶8Affirmed.

¶9Mr. Justice Stone took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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