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373 U.S. 59

White v. State of Maryland

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued April 16, 1963.

Decided April 29, 1963.

Supreme Court of the United States · decided 1963-04-29

White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the arraignment is a critical stage in the criminal trial that attaches the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Source: Wikipedia ↗

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[w]hatever may be the normal function of the `preliminary hearing' under Maryland law, it was in this case as `critical' a stage as arraignment under Alabama law [dealt with in Hamilton v. Alabama, supra], for petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel.”

quoted by 13 later decisions, including DeToro v. Pepersack, Ronzzo v. Sigler

“[o]nly the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently”

quoted by 10 later decisions, including McBryar v. McElroy, Taylor v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary

Relies on Hamilton v. Alabama · White v. Maryland · White v. State

Cited together with Hamilton v. Alabama · Gideon v. Wainwright · Powell v. State of Alabama Patterson

Cited in Case Law’s definition of “critical stage”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed · 9–0 · Opinion by Per Curiam · Decided 1963-04-29

How this case has been cited

Cited by 1,991 later decisions (110 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2024 · most notably Chapman v. State of California (1967), United States v. Wade (1967)

643 federal appellate · 61 district · 861 state decisions — followed in 49 states

1.1k01963197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Fred E. Weisgal, Baltimore, Md., for petitioner.

Robert F. Sweeney, Baltimore, Md., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

¶1

Petitioner, who was sentenced to death while his codefendant was given life, appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. 227 Md. 615, 177 A.2d 877. We granted certiorari 'limited to the point of law raised in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114.' See 371 U.S. 909, 83 S.Ct. 259, 9 L.Ed.2d 169.

¶2

Petitioner was arrested on May 27, 1960, and brought before a magistrate on May 31, 1960, for a preliminary hearing. But that hearing was postponed and not actually held until August 9, 1960. At that time petitioner was not yet represented by a lawyer. When arraigned at that preliminary hearing he pleaded guilty. That Maryland calls the 'arraignment' was first held September 8, 1960; but since petitioner was not represented by counsel, his arraignment was postponed and counsel appointed for him on September 9, 1960. He was finally arraigned on November 25, 1960, and entered pleas of 'not guilty' and 'not guilty by reason of insanity.' At his trial the plea of guilty made at the preliminary hearing on August 9, 1960, was introduced in evidence.* Since he did not have counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing, he argued that Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, applied. The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying that arraignment in Alabama is 'a critical stage in a criminal proceeding' where rights are preserved or lost (368 U.S. 53—54, 82 S.Ct. 158), while under Maryland law there was 'no requirement (nor any practical possibility under our present criminal procedure) to appoint counsel' for petitioner at the preliminary hearing nor was it necessary for appellant to enter a plea at that time.' 227 Md., at 625, 177 A.2d, at 882.

¶3

Whatever may be the normal function of the 'preliminary hearing' under Maryland law, it was in this case as 'critical' a state as arraignment under Alabama law. For petitioner entered a plea before the magistrate and that plea was taken at a time when he had no counsel.

¶4

We repeat what we said in Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, at 55, 82 S.Ct. at 159 that we do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted: 'Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently.' We therefore hold that Hamilton v. Alabama governs and that the judgment below must be and is reversed.

¶5

Reversed.

*

Although petitioner did not object to the introduction of this evidence at the trial (227 Md., at 619—620, 177 A.2d, at 879), the rationale of Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, does not rest, as we shall see, on a showing of prejudice.

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