Volume 86 — New Jersey Law Reports

<p>On t/vo warranto. Domm-rer to pleas.</p>

On certiorari. Tliis suit brings up for review the proceedings of the common council of the city o£ Newark which resulted in the awarding of a contract for the erection of a public market building to the Essex Construction Company. The proceedings prior to the actual awarding of the contract were conducted cn the part of the city by the market committee of common council.

<p>In 1879 the city of Millville agreed with the Millville Water Company that if the company would erect a plant and do all things necessary to supply the city with water the city would take such supply, and would annually in compensation therefor exempt the water company “from the payment of all taxes except those levied for state and county purposes.” In 1912, in violation of ' this agreement, the city having received its water-supply, compelled the water company to pay the tax due to the city for that year. Thereupon the water company sued the city for the price of the water so furnished, fixing in its complaint such price as the amount of the tax so paid. On a motion to strike out this complaint on the ground that the agreement to exempt from payment of taxes was void as against public policy — Held, that as between these contracting parties the true construction of the agreement was that the city would pay for the annual supply of water furnished to it by the water company a sum equal to the amount of the tax payable for that year by the water company to the city. Held, also, that if a complaint suggests an untenable or erroneous measure of damage, it is no ground for striking it out,</p>

<p>On opinion certified to tlie Court of Chancery.</p>

<p>In proceedings under the act of 1911 for the prevention of trespassing upon railroad trains and railroad property (Pcrnph. L. 1911, p. 659), it is necessary to prove a trespass contrary to the rules of the railroad corporation and an intention to ride without paying fare or to do the other acts mentioned in the statute.</p>

<p>Where an employe was injured prior to the act of 1913 (chapter 179) through the negligence of one not his employer, under such circumstances as to entitle him to compensation from his employer under the act of 1911, the employer could not recover of the tortfeasor for the compensation paid to the employe under the statute; the statutory compensation is a part of the compensation of the employe for services rendered for which the employer receives a quid pro quo. The loss to the employer is the value-of the services of the employe to him, not the necessary expense-of securing them.</p>

<p>On ejectment. On defendant’s rule to show cause.</p>

<p>The act of 1895 (Pamph. L., p. 764), as amended in 1898 (Pamph. Jj., p. 534; Comp. Btat., p. 408, pi. 16), permits a review by certiorari of a conviction before a police magistrate in a city for violation of a city ordinance and supersedes section 21 of the act of 1883 as construed in liahway v. Hunt, 74 N. J. L. 116.</p>

<p>On appeal from Atlantic City District Court.</p>

<p>1. The power to order an inspection of the books of a corporation is so great, and may have such ruinous results, that it will be ordered only when the court is satisfied that it will result in benefit to the stockholders.</p> <p>2. The inspection will not be granted when the court is satisfied that the application is not made in good faith, or with ulterior motives on the part of the applicant.</p>

<p>Section 10 of the act of April 14th, 1906 (Pamph. L., p. 210; Oomp. Siat., p. 5120), confers upon the board of equalization of taxes of New Jersey jurisdiction to review, on the appeal of a taxpayer, an order of the county board of taxation fixing a tax rate, and to render judgment reducing such rate and fixing it at the maximum rate permitted by the “Hillery Maximum Tax Rate act” (Pamph. L. 1906, p. 206; Oomp. Stat., p. 5164), and its amendments and supplements.</p>

<p>On motion to strike ont defences.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On appeal from the New Brunswick District Court.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari. On motion to quash indictment.</p>

<p>The second section of the act entitled “An act to promote the efficiency of fire departments in municipalities of this state other than cities of the first class,” approved April 11th, 1910 (Parnph. L., p. 412), creates an unconstitutional classification of municipalities similar in character to that discussed in Wilson v. Ramsey, 90 Ail. Rep. 265.</p>

<p>1. When a wife has been decreed to have alimony paid to her, and afterwards is adjudged bankrupt, she is entitled to all alimony accruing from the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed.</p> <p>2. Under the provisions of Bankruptcy act of July 1st, 1898, which provides that all property of the bankrupt which could have been transferred by the bankrupt, before the filing of the petition, passes to the trustee, arrears of alimony accruing to the wife, to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, pass to the trustee.</p> <p>3. Whether a foreign decree for alimony be within the full faith and credit danse, or not, the domestic court will enforce it on the ground of comity, where it is shown to he in full force.</p>

<p>1. The form of an indictment based upon section 65 of the Crimes act held sufficient, on the authority of State v. Griffin, 84 N. J. L. 429.</p> <p>2. Where a statute prescribing punishment for a criminal offence provides for imprisonment, such imprisonment, under the existing laws relating to the state prison, is necessarily to be at hard labor.</p>

<p>1. A party indicted for a high misdemeanor who waives trial by jury and is tried before the court without a jury by his own con- ■ sent, is not entitled to a reversal on the ground that his right to a trial by an impartial jury was infringed.</p> <p>2. Under Crimes act (Oomp. Stat., p. 1744, pi. 5a; Pamph. L. 1908, p. 577), denouncing the inciting to the unlawful burning or destruction of public or private property, the language used by defendant as charged in the indictment held in connection with the results of the acts advocated as disclosed by the evidence to amount to the destruction of private property.</p> <p>3. The question whether the indictment should have specified the owner or owners of property whose destruction was advocated, in violation of Pamph. L. 1908, p. 577, not considered because not raised before the jury was sworn, as required by section 44 of the Criminal Procedure act.</p> <p>4. The act (Pamph. L. 1908, p. 577) does not violate the constitutional provisions: (a) United States constitution, amendment 6; (5) United States constitution, amendment 14; (c) United States constitution, amendment 1, or New Jersey constitution, article 1, section 5 (liberty of speech, &c.).</p> <p>5. To constitute a violation of Pamph. L. 1908, p. 577, it is not necessary that the destruction of property advocated shall have taken place in fact.</p>

<p>On appeal from Passaic Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>A writ of certiorari was allowed to review a municipal ordinance which imposed a penalty for carrying on a business witliin the municipality without a license. The entire ordinance was set aside by the court as illegal and void, but while the proceedings to review were pending and before the entry of the judgment declaring the ordinance void, the municipality amended one of the sections of the ordinance which it claimed cured the illegality, but unless it was supported by the other sections of the ordinance adjudged void, the amendment was meaningless. After the ordinance was adjudged void, the municipality proceeded to enforce it as amended, and under it the prosecutors of the present writ were convicted. Held, that the ordinance which was adjudged void was not restored by an amendment made during proceedings instituted to review its validity, because when the ordinance was declared to be void, all of it, except perhaps the amendment, was non-existent in law, and nothing remained for the amendment to operate on, and if the amendment be considered a new ordinance, independent of the original one, it, standing by itself, would not support the conviction.</p>

<p>1. The duty of the clerk of a municipality governed by the statute commonly called the “Walsh act” (Pamph. L. 1913, p. 836), con'cerning the filing of a petition for the recall of an elective officer, is to ascertain whether or not the petition is signed “by the requisite number of qualified electors,” and to make a certificate showing the result of such ascertainment, but he has no power to determine the legal qualifications of the officer sought to be recalled, nor the question whether he has actually held his office for one year.</p> <p>2. When such an officer resigns and is immediately reappointed, such action does not vest him with a new term of office, but in deciding whether he has held office for more than one year, his service prior to such resignation and re-election is to be taken as a part of his service in determining whether he has actually held his office for at least one year.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. The act entitled “An act to prohibit sales of merchandise in bulk in fraud of creditors,” approved June 11th, 1907, is constitutional.</p> <p>2. The validity of a sale of goods made in contravention of that act may be inquired into in an action of replevin instituted by the vendee or his successor, claiming title against the levy of a constable under a writ of attachment against the vendor.</p> <p>3. The finding of the trial court that the sale by the debtor was made in contravention of the provisions of the act, renders the sale, if the finding be warranted, void ab initio, so as to invalidate a sale to a subsequent vendee claiming title and possession as against an attaching creditor.</p> <p>4. The enforcement of process by an officer properly authorized is to be regarded in construing this statute as the act of the creditor named therein.</p>

<p>Tlie facts in this case present a public work done for tlie benefit of the city, at the instance of its officials under a written contract, not ultra, vires, which the city contends was irregularly executed, the necessity for which work was not denied nor its cost disputed. Held, under Bourgeois v. Freeholders, 82 N. J. L. 82, the defendant is liable.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>Pamph. L. 1913, p. 502, which authorizes ' counties to make appropriations for the purchase of armory sites, does not by reason of the limitations contained in its title extend to the issuing of bonds for that purpose.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the Somerset District Court. .</p>

<p>On defendant’s rule to show cause.</p>

<p>On error to tie Passaic Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>1. In interpreting a statute due regard should be paid to the condition it was intended to remedy.</p> <p>2. Section 5a, 2 Comp. Stat. p. 1744, which provides: “Any person who shall, in public or private, by speech, writing, printing or by any other mode or means advocate the subversion and destruction by force of any and all government, or attempt by speech, writing or printing or in any other way whatsoever to incite or abet, promote or encourage hostility or opposition to any and all government, shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor,” does not include within its terms or "meaning one who denounces, in a newspaper article, the action of the police in suppressing a strike and the municipality for countenancing such action.</p> <p>3. The language, “promote or encourage hostility to any and all government,” refers to the advocacy of anarchy, and the phrase “any and all government” cannot be separated so as to include hostility or opposition expressed to particular administrations.</p>

<p>1. The right of the legislature to impair the public easement in a public highway by prohibiting vehicular business traffic thereon, is undoubted; and, therefore, the question whether the Essex County Park Commission may prohibit vehicular traffic upon the parkway known as Park avenue, depends upon whether or not the terms of the statute, under which it acts, are broad enough to include that power. If under the legislative authorization to enact rules for protecting, regulating and controlling highways, business vehicles may be prohibited the use of the parkway, then it has such power, otherwise not. The commission has not the power to prohibit all traffic; but, qimre, may it not for the protection of highways make a regulation that business vehicles of such heavy draught as would tend to injure and destroy them shall not use them, save, perhaps, under exceptional circumstances? This question is at least debatable, and, therefore, should not be foreclosed.</p> <p>2. Because the use of Park avenue by grocery delivery wagons such as are owned and used by the prosecutors, is not necessary for that highway’s protection, the ordinance under consideration prohibiting such use is unreasonable. Protection of the highway in question does not require the exclusion of such wagons therefrom.</p>

<p>1. If a jury believes certain witnesses and thus necessarily disbelieves a certain other witness as to what occurred between them and him; and, if he were found to be in error in this respect, the jury would have a right to believe that he was in error in other respects; and, if falsifying in any respect, they would have a right to believe that he was falsifying in all other respects, applying the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.</p> <p>2. A witness is not entitled to credit whose testimony is inconsistent with the common principles by which the conduct of mankind is naturally governed. This has application to the testimony to which reference is above made; and it was for the jury to say whether the deceased would have been likely to act as the single witness said he did, or whether he would have been likely to shrink from contact with a flashing wire itpon the well known principle of self preservation, appropriately called the first law of nature.</p> <p>3. A trial judge is only justified in directing a verdict upon a court question arising from the admitted or uncontroverted facts of a case; and conflicting testimony, and its weight, must always be submitted to the jury for their consideration and determination.</p> <p>4. It seems that a verdict will not be directed where the only person who could have contradicted the witness is dead.</p> <p>5. There was testimony tending to show that the wire in question was improperly strung, passing through a tree and touching the branches; that it had been insulated, and that the insulation was worn and broken from friction with the tree; that at the point where the wire was thus worn and bare, it broke on the 1 night of the accident. The respondent denied these facts and introduced evidence to show that the wire was properly inspected and that it did not break in the tree top at the point claimed by the appellant’s witnesses, but broke at an entirely different place, namely,'at a corner pole some distance away. This raised a question of fact for the jury to decide.</p> <p>6. The accident happened in the month of June when there was no ice or snow to weigh down the wire and hell) cause it to break. Its breaking, if due to the storm, could only have been occasioned by the velocity of the wind. The testimony showed that at the time of the accident the wind was blowing seventy miles per hour. Such storms, however, were shown not to be entirely infrequent, there being records in the preceding ten years of wind velocities of seventy-six, seventy-four, eighty, eighty-three, seventy-two, seventy-eight and ninety-six miles per hour, and that it would take a wind velocity of one hundred and thirty-five miles an hour to break the particular wire if it were in good condition. Therefore, it cannot be said as a matter of law, that the storm in question, happening when it did, was one of such severity and unlikelihood that it could not have been anticipated or guarded against.</p> <p>7. Besides, there was a question as to whether or not negligence of the respondent in the maintenance of this wire (including inspection of insulation) did not, in combination with the storm cause the injury resulting in the death of the appellant’s intestate. If the injury so resulted, it may be presumed that the damage was caused by a defective wire.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. A materialman, who is not the contractor, may maintain a mechanics’ lien claim suit against the building and land of the owner when the specifications do not accompany and are not filed with the written contract.</p> <p>2. An estate in remainder is a legal estate and will support an action under the Mechanics’ Lien act.</p> <p>3. Under our statute a mechanics’ lien claim suit may be maintained for the transportation and delivery of materials, as for labor performed, for the erection and construction of a building.</p>

<p>On appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 55 Vroom 500.</p>

<p>On appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from Monmouth Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from a judgment of the Camden Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from Hudson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from a judgment of the Hudson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. A voluntary confession by a person accused of crime is one not extorted by any sort of threats or violence, or obtained by any direct or implied promises.</p> <p>■2. A finding of fact by a trial court as a necessary preliminary to the admission or rejection of a confession is not reviewable on error, if there be any legal evidence to support it.</p> <p>3. Qumre. Does the lack of mental capacity of a defendant, at the time of making a confession, render such confession incompetent as evidence against him, or is it merely a factor to be considered in determining its credibility?</p>

<p>1. The Tenement-House act of 1904 (Pamph. L., p. 152) contains, inter alia, a provision requiring all non-fireproof tenements more than three stories in height to be furnished with exterior fire escapes and prescribes a specific penalty for the violation of any of the provisions of the act. A non-fireproof tenement owned by the defendant took fire, as a result of which the plaintiff’s intestate died of injuries attributable to the absence of fire escapes. Upon the trial of the issue joined in the action of negligence brought by the plaintiff the court permitted an amendment of the complaint striking out its allegations of negligence and in their stead charging the defendant with the violation of the statute, referred to, thereby shutting out a defence that was adr missible under the issue in the action of negligence. Held, that the action of negligence was the proper remedy by which to obtain whatever benefit upon common law principles inured to the plaintiff from such penal statute which, of itself, gave no civil remedy or private right of action, and that it was injurious error to permit an amendment the effect of which was to shut out a defence that was appropriate to the proper action.</p> <p>2. The Tenement-House act of 1904 is a purely public statute enforceable by specified penalties and evincing no legislative intention that, in addition thereto, the class of persons for whose protection it was enacted should have a private right of action in ease of injuries resulting from a violation of its provisions.</p> <p>3. Penal statutes that give no private right of action may nevertheless affect private rights upon common law principles applicable to the action of negligence.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. Under the act concerning proceedings on bonds and mortgages (3 Oomp. Stat., p. 3421), the right of action upon a bond secured by a mortgage is not barred by the lapse of six months after the sale of the lands upon which such mortgage was a lien in proceedings instituted to foreclose a prior mortgage thereon.</p> <p>2. In an action on a bond given as a part of the purchase price of lands when the sale, having been executed, has not been rescinded, false representations inducing such sale may be shown as evidence of a partial failure of consideration of such bond and in abatement of the debt claimed in such action.</p>

<p>1. An indictment charged the defendant with the commission of a certain act of carnal indecency (section 51 of the Crimes act), which was testified to by a single witness, a girl of seven years of age. Held, that it was error to charge the jury that they should take into consideration upon the question of the corroboration of the testimony of this witness whether she made a prompt complaint.</p> <p>2. The effect of evidence that a complaint was promptly made by the state’s witness, in cases where it is properly admitted, as in rape, is to affect favorably the credibility of such witness, not to corroborate the testimony given at the trial. Quare. Whether such evidence is admissible upon the trials of misdemeanors that do not involve the debauchery of the female sex organs by those of the male?</p>

<p>On appeal from the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. An agreement for the conveyance of land contained a clause fixing $1,000 as liquidated damages for the breach of all and singular the covenants and agreements, when the loss resulting from breaches of different covenants must clearly differ in amount. Held, that the amount is a penalty only and that the most that can be recovered for a breach is the actual loss.</p> <p>2. The inference arising from the annexation of personal property to real estate is an inference of fact, not a conclusion of law; the question whether it becomes part of the realty is a question for the jury, and evidence is admissible to prove either that there was no intent to annex the personalty to the realty or that subsequently by agreement it again became personal property as between vendor and vendee.</p>

<p>On error to Essex Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>On error to Essex Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. A contractor had a contract to build a school house. He subcontracted a part of the work. A materialman proposed to furnish materials to the subcontractor. The contractor agreed in writing to pay the materialman for such materials “when the work on the school house is completed.” The subcontractor did not complete Ms work. Held, that such agreement constituted no obligation to pay except out of moneys earned by the subcontractor.</p> <p>2. Telephone communications between parties stand legally upon the same footing as ordinary conversations, and are not sufficient to charge a defendant upon a special promise to answer for the debt of another.</p>

<p>On error to tlie Middlesex Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>On error to Essex Over and Terminer.</p>

<p>1. When a case is tried by the court, a jury being waived, its finding'on the blended law and facts cannot be reviewed on error.</p> <p>2. A record of pleadings, trial, and judgment below containing no error in the strict record, and no ruling of the trial court on matter of law excepted to, presents no case for reversal.</p> <p>3. The Practice act of 1912 and rules in pursuance thereof have made no change in the fundamental rules for review of actions at law as in error, that there must be some ruling, in the court below, that it must be adverse to the appellant and that the trial 'court must through the instrumentality of a formal challenge of that ruling have an opportunity to reconsider' and modify or change it.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>Where the employer failed to provide proper toilet facilities for employes in the building where they were at work so that they were obliged to and did habitually resort for such facilities during the working hours to another building of the employer, which lay across a public street, and which custom persisted for a considerable time, and as the court was entitled to find was therefore known and assented to by the employer — Held, that where the deceased while crossing the street in working hours to reach the toilet in question, was struck by a passing vehicle, sustaining injuries which caused his death, the trial court was justified in a finding that he came to his death by an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 55 Vroom 176.</p>

<p>A testator devised a life estate in lands to his widow, and after her death to his two children, and if one should die without lawful issue then his or her share should go to the other, but if both should die, then to another daughter. The latter died in the lifetime of the life tenant, and her heirs conveyed her interest in the land to the widow and the two children, who together subsequently conveyed the land by a deed with full covenants.. Held, that the latter conveyance passed an indefeasible title in fee-simple.</p>

<p>Where the lew loci contractus deals with the substantive liability of a party to a contract, executed and to be performed where made, the enforcement of which is sought in another jurisdiction, a limitation upon such liability, imposed by the law of the place of the contract, relates to the contract, and not to the remedy, and will be enforced by the forum where the remedy is sought, unless contrary to its public policy, for it involves the rights and merits of the parties to the contract.</p>

<p>A tenant complained to her landlord that a lock on one of the doors of the property leased was out of repair, and during her absence the landlord obtained from her son a key, left with him by his mother, and entering the apartment removed the lock and carried it away for the purpose of repairing it, leaving the door without a lock. Some time during the absence of the tenant, whether before or after the lock was taken off did not appear, some person unknown entered the apartment and carried away a small sum of money and a diamond ring for the value of which the tenant sued the landlord. Held, that the action could not be maintained because there was no evidence that the act of the landlord was the proximate cause of the loss.</p>

<p>Where the plaintiff has established a prima facie case as to any part of a divisible cause of action, a motion to nonsuit cannot prevail even if a part of the claim is barred by an unquestioned rule of law, for the plaintiff is entitled to have the verdict of a jury on . the case made.</p>

<p>Where the owner and contractor by agreement in accordance with the terms of the filed contract, change the terms of payment contained therein, by allowing the owner to undertake a part performance himself, thus eliminating one of the payments specified in the contract — Held, that such a change was not an alteration of the contract, but was within the contemplation of the parties in interest as subcontractors and otherwise, and that where the plaintiff claimed upon a stop-notice, based upon such changed payment, the direction of a verdict for the defendant under the circumstances was proper.</p>

<p>Where the plaintiff sued for a balance due on a contract for the construction of a public road, and the defendant pleaded non-performance and a counter-claim for damages, without alleging the failure of the plaintiff to procure the certificates of certain public officials as a condition precedent to payment — Held, that the failure to plead the condition precedent, precluded the defendant from insisting upon it at the trial as a bar to recovery.</p>

<p>1. Where a pedestrian, while attempting to cross defendant’s railroad tracks at a time when the gates at the crossing were up, was struck upon the head and injured by the sudden lowering of the gates, without warning, tjje refusal of the court to order a nonsuit or to direct a verdict for defendant, where there was testimony to sustain the complaint, held proper.</p> <p>2. The refusal of the court to charge that the duty of the railroad to the traveling public was fully performed when it supplied appliances of a standard character and kept them in repair, held proper.</p>

<p>1. Whether, where the facts are in dispute, as to its character, a by-way is a publicly traveled by-road is a question for the jury.</p> <p>2. Whether in using such a road or way, where it was crossed by the defendant’s third-rail system, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was a jury question.</p>

<p>Where a corporation directed by resolution its president to execute a lease for property, and also to enter into an option to purchase the same, at a certain figure, and the president executed the lease in the name of the corporation, but failed to procure the option, and the corporation thereafter paid rent for four months, in accordance with the terms of the lease, and in other ways treated the property as its own, under the lease, without at any time repudiating the act of the president in procuring it without the option — Held, that a refusal of the trial court to direct a nonsuit was proper, since the existence of a tenancy under the lease was a question of fact for the jury to determine, based upon the inquiry whether the corporation by its conduct had accepted the lease and ratified the act of its president in executing it.</p>

<p>The employes of the trustees of the free public library of Newark are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service act.</p>

<p>On error to the Essex Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>On appeal from ilie Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. Moral fraud in a misrepresentation is an essential element in an action for deceit.</p> <p>2. Before a plaintiff can recover in an action for deceit he must show that he has sustained damage, and where the action is predicated on the purchase of stock in a company, claimed to have been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation as to its value, there must be proof that the stock was in fact worth less than the plaintiff paid for it.</p> <p>3. Where the record of the trial shows that no objections were made to the rulings of the court, those rulings will not be considered in proceedings for review.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. A direction of a verdict by the trial court, where there is no disputed question of fact, is proper.</p> <p>2. Where two contracts which the plaintiff had signed, but which lie could not prove had been executed by the defendant, and which he, the defendant, repudiated as not binding upon him, were offered in evidence by the defendant, not as executed contracts hut simply as statements signed by the plaintiff, such papers were not evidential, and the offer of them was properly overruled.</p> <p>3. Representations as to quality, which had to do with the kind of brick to be furnished under a contract, and which brick the plaintiff in fact furnished, were properly excluded, because plaintiff supplied what he contracted to do.</p> <p>4. Proof that work under a contract was stopped because of trouble with reference to material furnished, without proof what the trouble was, does not justify the inference that it was because of lack of quality that the work was stopped.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme' Court.</p>

<p>Under the conditions existing at the trial of this case (recited in the within opinion), the trial judge properly refused to order a mistrial ; the granting of such order rested in his discretion, and his refusal was not assignable for error.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Cumberland Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On a¡Dpeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 84 N. J. L. 575.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 128.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit-Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On appeal frcim the Hudson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 165.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Oil appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 92.</p>

<p>1. The use of soft coal by railroad companies in operating their engines in this state is not negligence, for, in so doing they are exercising a right conferred upon them by the legislature; hence, it was error for the trial court,1 in an action brought to recover damages occasioned by smoke negligently emitted from engines of defendant company, to admit testimony that the company occasionally had operated their engines by using fuel that did not cause smoke.</p> <p>2. In an action brought against a railroad company for damages alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff, arising from the unnecessary blowing of whistles and letting off steam by employes of defendant, the trial court permitted to be offered in evidence a certain bulletin issued by a superintendent of said company, under date of January 7th, 1911, reciting that certain complaints had been made about excessive noises, and warning certain employes against unnecessary whistling and blowing off steam. Held, that the said recital of complaints had no probative force on the question whether employes of the company had been making unnecessary noises prior to the date thereof; and Held, further, that even if said recitals had any probative force, the admission of the bulletin in evidence was erroneous because it appeared that the plaintiff did not enter into possession of the premises, in the occupation of which she had been disturbed by such noises, until July 1st, 1911.</p>

<p>On demurrer to return to alternative writ of mandamus.</p>

<p>In an action upon a valued fire insurance policy, the primary question to be determined is whether or not the property described in the policy is that which has been injured or destroyed by the fire; and there can be no recovery by the insured unless he proves that fact.</p>

<p>A bill, which was a revenue measure, having been introduced and passed by the senate, was sent by it to the house of assembly for the latter’s consideration and action. The house of assembly referred the bill to a committee, which reported it hack without amendment, and the bill had a second reading. Subsequently, the bill was recommitted, and the committee reported a bill which had the title of “Assembly Committee Substitute” for the senate bill, and the house of assembly proceeded to deal with it as an original bill, and after three separate readings, passed it and sent it to the senate, where it was also given throe readings, was passed, and then approved by the governor. Held, that although the bill as originally introduced was a senate bill, yet the action of the house of assembly in reporting and passing a substitute bill was a discarding of the senate bill, and the substitute bill was a separate and distinct measure, first passed by the house of assembly, and then by the senate, and was a valid enactment of the legislature under the constitutional requirement that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of assembly.</p>

<p>1. By the provisions of “An act concerning the term of office of certain officers in cities of the second class of this state” {Pamph. L. Í904, p. 151), the term of office of the city surveyor of New Brunswick is three years, whether the appointee to that office be appointed at the end of the term of his predecessor, or to fill a vacancy.</p> <p>2. The title of the act of 1904 {Pamph. L., p. 151) sufficiently expresses the object thereof, and the act is not unconstitutional for lack of such expression.</p> <p>3. The charter provision of the city of New Brunswick which requires all ordinances involving an expenditure of money to be published between the second and third readings, does not apply to an ordinance which merely fixes the term of office of the city surveyor of that city.</p> <p>4. Where two persons each claim to be entitled to hold the same office, and each of them assumes to perform certain of the duties thereof, to the exclusion of the other, an information in the nature of a quo warranto is the proper process to test such claim.</p>

<p>The provisions of “An act concerning the term of office of certain officers in cities of the second class in this state” {Pamph. L. 1904, p. 151), fixing the terms of office of the several officers specified therein, repealed pro tanto the provision of section 5 of “An act relative to the time of election and appointment and terms of office of officers elected or appointed in cities in this state” {Pamph. L. 1901, p. 41) ; and was not, in turn, repealed by section 5 of “An act relative to the time of election and appointment and terms of office of officers elected or appointed in towns, townships, boroughs, and o-ther municipalities of this state” {Pamph. L. 1905, p. 14).</p>

<p>On error to Union County Quarter Sessions. •</p>

<p>1. Tbe fact that the legislature has prohibited the further sale of liquor to a man already visibly under its influence, does not make an innkeeper who violates this prohibition and so renders his customer less able to stand securely, criminally responsible for the death of his customer, if the latter, by reason of his intoxication, falls, and in his fall receives injuries, which are fatal.</p> <p>2. Where death is the result of an occurrence unanticipated by the defendant, but which arose from his negligence or inattention, his criminal responsibility depends on whether or not the injury which caused the death was the regular, natural and likely consequence of defendant’s conduct; if it was not, then a charge of manslaughter cannot properly be laid against him.</p>

<p>On error to the Union Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause.</p>

<p>The act under which county boards of taxation are created (Pamph. L. 1906, p. 210) by its third section provides that “each board upon organization shall have power to employ a secretary,” &c. Held, that the term of a secretary so appointed is limited to the life of the board that appointed him, since what each board may do upon its organization, no previously organized board can do for it.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>In a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation act, for compensation for the death of decedent, the contract of hiring was made in the State of New York, in which state there was no statutory provision for eompensation, and decedent was employed to do work partly in that state and partly in New Jersey; be died in New Jersey as a result of injuries received while doing work he was employed to do in this state. Held, that while the liability imposed by the Workmen’s Compensation act is contractual in character, it is not the result of an express agreement between the parties, but is an agreement implied by the law; and — Held, fiwther, that the lex fori must govern, and that the act in question makes no distinction between eases arising under a contract made in New Jersey and a contract made in another state.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On rule to set aside judgment and execution.</p>

<p>1. A “bailment” consists in the holding of a chattel by one person under an obligation to return or deliver it to another after some special purpose is accomplished. It may be actual or constructive.</p> <p>2. An -actual bailment exists where there is either (a.) an actual delivery consisting in giving to the bailee or his agent the real possession of the chattel, or (6) a constructive delivery consisting of any of those acts which, although not truly comprising real possession of the goods transferred, have been held by legal construction equivalent to acts of real delivery.</p> <p>3. A constructive bailment arises where the person having possession of a chattel holds it under such circumstances that the law imposes upon him the obligation to deliver it to another.</p> <p>4. Where delivery can be constructive only, there must be an intern tion to transfer such a possession of the property as would exclude, for the time of the bailment* the possession of the owner.</p> <p>o. The defendant operated a “quick lunch” restaurant, having- upon the walls notices “Not responsible for loss of coats, hats, umbrellas,” &c., and in which the cashier would, if requested, and sometimes did. take charge of overcoats for the patrons. The plaintiff testified that he had never seen the notices on the wall and did not know that the cashier would care for coats, although he had patronized the restaurant for twenty years almost daily. Plaintiff entered the restaurant and hung his overcoat on a elothes-tree hack of the stool on which he seated himself to eat his lunch, and while he was eating his coat disappeared. He did not in any way bring his coat to the attention of any of the defendant’s employes nor ask any of them to take charge of it. Held, that there was no bailment and the defendant was not liable for the loss of the coat.</p>

<p>1. Courts will take judicial notice-of the census taken under state authority and of the population of cities as determined by it.</p> <p>2. By virtue of the act of April 8th, 1913 (Panvph. L., p. 574), a license to sell intoxicating liquors in quantities less than one '/ quart, granted by the city council of South Amboy, is void and will be set aside, if, when granted, the ratio of population of the city to the number of licenses issued was not greater than five hundred to one, unless the licensed place was either — •(«) one in which the business of selling such liquors was lawfully carried on at some time within one year immediately preceding the passage of the act, or (6) a hotel having fifty spare rooms and beds, or (c) a picnic or recreation ground of one acre, or (d) a building entirely occupied by a regularly organized club or association, or (e) was granted pursuant to the statutory notice of abandonment of old place and intention to carry on such business in the place in question.</p>

<p>On error to the Essex County Quarter Sessions Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the District Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Passaic Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. A writ of mandamus will not be awarded unless the right to relief is clear at the time of the award.</p> <p>2. To entitle relator, who claims to be the custodian of school money of a municipality, to a writ of mmidamus to enforce payment to him of a balance of school money raised by taxation, he must be the custodian of such money at the time the writ issues.</p> <p>3. Under the facts as shown, it appears that the relator’s term of office, as custodian of school money, had expired at the. time application for a writ of mandamus was argued.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Under the amendment of the Mechanics’ Lien act {Pamph. L. 1912, p. 370), conferring jurisdiction on District Courts in mechanics' lien suits, the power of the court in such a suit to award a new trial, except for newly-discovered evidence, is limited to a period of thirty days after the judgment.</p>

<p>On appeal from the District Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Cumberland Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>On error to the Cumberland Quarter Sessions.</p>

On rule to show cause why a mandamus should not issue requiring defendant to sign and deliver to the town clerk of Boonton four specified ordinances duly passed by the town council on May 4th, 1913,

<p>1. In cities governed by the Charter act {Pamph. L. 1897, p. 46) the appointment of subordinate officers, such as street commissioner, must be by ordinance.</p> <p>2. Eckerson v. Englewood, 82 N. J. L. 298, followed.</p>

<p>1. In the case of a savings bank deposit payable only upon presentation of the deposit book, a valid gift oausa mortis cannot be made without actual delivery of the book.</p> <p>2. Whether under the present practice a single cause of action may be sued against the same person in the alternative as an individual and a personal representative, qucere.</p>

<p>On error to the Hudson Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari to judgment of Somerset Common Pleas under the Workmen’s Compensation act of 1911.</p>

<p>1. In an action against joint tort-feasors, the questions as to the liability of each defendant are separable, and tbe verdict and decision thereon is .subject to the provisions of the Practice act of 1912, which confines the granting of a new trial to the question or questions with respect to which the verdict or decision is found to be wrong, if separable.</p> <p>2. Under such statute where judgment has been recovered against three joint tort-feasors, and the judgment against two is wrong, but as to the other correct, the judgment so far as it is correct, will be affirmed, and the granting of a new trial limited to such of the defendants against whom the judgment is wrong.</p>

<p>An employment is not casual, within the meaning of that term as used in the so-called “Employers’ Liability act.” where one is employed to do a particular part of a service recurring somewhat regularly, with the fair expectation of the continuance for a reasonable period.</p>

On rule to show cause why an execution .should not be stayed, and the judgment which it was issued to enforce should not be declared to be paid and satisfied.

<p>A direction of the trial court- which slates as a fact proven in the ease a condition of affairs which is not in the case, and not properly inferable from the testimony, is not judicial comment, and presents ground for reversal.</p>

<p>3. TV here it appeared that the defendant Loizeaux had made an investigation of timber land in Newfoundland, Canada, with the assistance of guides and experts, from which he reached an estimate of value of the lands and timber and water rights which he thereafter communicated to the plaintiff, who acting upon his own initiative, and upon the invitation of the defendant, sent his son, an expert in forestry, to investigate conditions for him, who made his report, and thereafter as a result of . that investigation and his own inquiries the plaintiff purchased stock of the company owning the land — Held, in an action for deceit, the undisputed testimony concerning the plaintiff’s independent inquiry and investigation, made it manifest that the purchase was made upon the strength of his own investigation, and not as a result of the plaintiff’s representations.</p> <p>2. Where a vendor does nothing to hinder or obstruct an independent investigation by a proposed vendee, but invites, assists and encourages it, and such an investigation is made by the vendee, who thereafter purchases, statements of the vendor regarding the extent and value of the locus in quo, made before the investigation, will be regarded as mere matters of opinion, and will not present the basis for an action for deceit.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Essex Circuit.</p>

<p>On error to tlie Sussex County Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>On error to the Atlantic Oyer and Terminer.</p>

<p>1. An order of the Court of Common Pleas, made under tlie Employers’ Liability act based upon disputed questions of fact, will not be set aside.</p> <p>2. Dependents in that act mean dependent for the ordinary necessaries of life, one who looks to another for support or help.</p>

<p>A license granted for an inn and tavern by the commissioners of the city of Bordentown, in violation of an unrepealed ordinance passed by the excise commissioners tinder the act of 1901, page 239, is void.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On appeal from the District Court of Orange.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 532.</p>

<p>1. AATietlier or not a trial judge, lays down a correct rule of law as applicable 1o tlie facts of a case in his charge to the jury, a court of appeals is not called upon to decide, when no objection appears in the record with reference to the charge of the court.</p> <p>2. A motion to nonsuit is properly denied when the evidence shows that the plaintiff is entitled to damages, nominal or substantial.</p> <p>!>. Questions put to a witness as to the contents of a deed, are properly overruled when they amount to an attempt to introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a writing without laying a proper foundation therefor.</p> <p>4. Where defendant was the upper and plaintiff the lower riparian owner, a question as to whether improvements erected in a district in which plaintiff’s land was situate tended to prevent the natural flow of the water from the highland down through the district was properly overruled, the question at issue being one between the plaintiff and defendant, not involving conditions for which third parties were responsible.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 131.</p>

<p>1. On a trial of an action of ejectment by the city of Newark against a railroad company, to recover possession of a piece of land claimed to be part of a public street, although never used as such, it appeared that the city had entered into a contract with the company for the elimination of grade crossings by the elevation of defendant’s railroad, in which it was provided that the work should be done in conformity with certain plans and specifications referred to in, and made a part of, the contract; the plans and specifications provided that the station which stood upon a part of the locus in quo should be raised to the level of the railroad when elevated — Held, that by that contract the city recognized the right of the defendant to the exclusive possession of the station site, free from any user of public travel thereon, and that said contract was either an abandonment of a previous acceptance of dedication, or a recognition of the invalidity of such acceptance.</p> <p>2. The direction of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in an ¿etion of ejectment can only be justified when its right to the present possession of the locus in quo is conclusively shown.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. The plaintiffs, while making repairs to an elevated railroad structure in a highway, stood upon a temporary scaffold suspended in the air some ten feet above the level of the street, along which a covered express wagon of the defendant was being driven, the top of which came in contact with the bottom of the scaffold, causing injuries to the plaintiffs for which they recovered damages. The trial court charged the jury that it was the duty of the driver to drive in such a manner as not to injure the plaintiffs, and refused to charge a request by the defendant that the driver had a right to presume that the street was free from a scaffold suspended from the elevated structure. Held, that the instruction was erroneous and that the request should have been charged.</p> <p>2. Highways to their entire extent are presumed to be free from temporary and unusual conditions that obstruct or endanger passage thereon, and a driver is under no duty to look for such interferences with travel; if he sees them he must use reasonable care to avoid them, but he is not negligent merely because he does not look for them.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 536.</p>

<p>1. The power to sell land for taxes is a naked power, and the validity of the title derived from such a sale depends upon a strict compliance with the directions of the statute. The purchaser must show affirmatively that everything has been done which the statute makes essential to the due execution of the power. Woodbridge v. State, Allen, prosecutor, 43 X. J. L. 262, followed.</p> <p>2. Without a valid assessment, all proceedings to sell lands for taxes are a mere nullity.</p> <p>3. Under the Tax act one of the requisites of a valid assessment is notice to the owner, and although the statute provides that no proceedings for collection shall be invalid for lack of the notice or demand, this was meant only to prevent the failure of a tax lien in cases where the collector could not readily make the demand; it is not applicable in a case, where the owner is well known to the collector, lives in the same town, was supposed to have been already assessed, and to have paid taxes on the property regularly for three years' immediately preceding.</p> <p>4. Where the collector of taxes under authority of section 28 of the act undertakes to assess land as omitted property, he must give the owner immediate notice of the entry of the assessment upon the duplicate, and of the time and place of the next meeting of the county tax hoard.</p> <p>5. Upon a certiorari to review the proceedings on which a tax title is founded, where the facts necessary to show the validity of the sale do not appear by the proceedings returned with the writ, they must be shown by the recitals in the certificate of sale or by proof aliunde.</p> <p>6. Where a writ of certiorari to review proceedings on which a tax title is founded calls for all documents and proceedings, the return must be taken to contain a full statement of all the proceedings that were had.</p> <p>7. Upon a ceidiorari to review proceedings on which a tax title is founded, where there is nothing in the certificate or return to show that the tax was unpaid, that there were proceedings to perfect a lien by filing with the county clerk as required by section 50 of the statute, that the tax was in arrear on the ensuing first day of July as required by section 51, that public notice was given of the time and place of sale, or that advertisement was made in newspapers or by posting in five public, places, and where it also appears affirmatively that no notice of the sale was given to the owner, and there was a failure to file a report of sale with the clerk of the taxing district as required by section 54, the proceedings must be set aside.</p> <p>8. A purchaser at a tax sale gave notice to redeem to the owner; the owner by his attorney sent the collector of taxes a check for the amount of tax and costs and within a few cents of the amount of the interest; the collector refused to receive payment, solefy on the ground that the offer to redeem was by a stranger to the title. Held, that it is not important that the tax was not tendered in cash or that there may have been an error of a few cents in calculating the interest, since a formal tender would have been idle.</p> <p>9. Where no objection was made at the argument in the Supreme Court that a writ of certiorari was allowed after the time limited by section 14 of the Certiorari act, the Court of Errors .and Appeals ought not to consider the objection since the limitation is not applicable where the assessment of taxes has been made in violation of constitutional rights, and the court cannot know what facts might have been brought to the attention of the Supreme Court if the point had been made there.</p>

<p>1. The act of April 4th, 1911 (Pamph. L., p. 134), should be designated and referred to as the “Workmen’s Compensation act,” and the act of April 13th, 1909 (Pamph. L., p. 114), as the “Employers’ Liability act.”</p> <p>2. Where a complaint sets up a contract of hiring between employer and employe made subsequent to the taking effect of the Workmen’s Compensation act {Pamph. L. 1911, p. 134), and does not aver that the contract contained any express statement in writing that section 2 of the act was not intended to apply, nor that any written notice to that effect was given, it will be presumed that the parties accepted and were bound by the provisions of that section.</p> <p>3. Where a deceased employe by his agreement, either express or implied, had accepted and become bound by the provisions of section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation act {Pamph. L. 1911, p. 134). his personal representatives cannot maintain an action under the Death act {Pamph. L. 1848, p. 151; Comp. StaC., p. 1907) for damages for his death, even though the only dependents decedent left surviving him were aliens not residents of the United States.</p>

<p>1. A tenant of the mortgagor under a lease executed subsequently to the mortgage, upon which mortgage default has been made by attornment and payment of the rent accruing subsequently to 1he mortgagee, disentitles the mortgagor from recovering such rent from the tenant.</p> <p>2. Where, in an action for rent, the defendant liad judgment because, it appeared that he had rightfully attorned and paid to the mortgagee, such judgment will not be reversed merely because in his pleading the defendant described the person to whom payment was made as “the owner of the reversion,” when it appeared from the pleadings that such person was also the mortgagee.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Essex County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. The decree made by a court of a sister state adjudging alimony to a wife payable in future installments, is a final judgment entitled to the protection of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution as to all past-due installments, unless the right to the alimony is so within the discretion of the court rendering the decree that it does not vest in the beneficiary, even in the absence of the exercise of any discretionary power which the court may have to annul, vary or modify the decree.</p> <p>2. A decree for future alimony payable in installments and ■which the court may subsequently annul, vary or modify upon duo notice to all parties interested, confers a vested right in the beneficiary to all installments that have become due, which cannot be annulled, varied or modified as to them.</p> <p>3. The statute of the State of New York authorizing- the court to make directions concerning the allowance of alimony, with power at any time after final judgment to annul, vary or modify such judgments, confers no retroactive power to alter the judgment as to past-due installments, and the annulment, variation or modification can only affect installments which have not fallen due, and such decree, as to past-due installments is a final decree, entitled to the benefit of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution.</p>

<p>In view of the well-known fact that in rounding a curve the rear end of a si reel car will swing beyond the track and overlap the street to n greater extent (lian the front, the motorman is justified in presuming that an adult person standing in the street near the track, who is apparently able to see, hear and move, having notice of the approach of the car, and of the existence of the curve in the track, will draw back far enough from it to avoid being struck by the rear of the car as it swings around the curve in the usual and expected manner, and under such circumstances, it is not negligent operation on the pari of the motorman to continue the progress of the. car without warning such person of the possible danger of collision with the rear of the car, because of the swing, if he remains in the same position.</p>

<p>Oil appeal front the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. The right to contest the validity of proceedings of a municipality for a public improvement is a property right accorded to a taxpayer, whose interests as such may be injuriously or illegally affected, and hence, when it appears that the prosecutor in a writ' of certiorari to contest such proceedings is not a taxpayer, the writ should be dismissed.</p> <p>2. Where it appears that the prosecutor assumed the status of taxpayer on the eve of the day upon which he applied for the contesting writ, by purchasing the real estate of another, for the purpose of acquiring a legal status, he will be chargeable with the laches of his vendor in failing to attack the proceedings until the municipality had not only incurred the indebtedness but expended moneys upon the apparent legality of its contracts.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>A covenant in a lease to pay rent, by the tenant, and a covenant by the landlord to keep the cellar waterproof, are independent covenants. A breach of the latter is not a defence to an action for the non-payment of rent under the covenant.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Essex County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. Where the determination of the question of acceptance of goods, tinder the Sales act, depends upon disputed testimony, and there is evidence, which if credited, tends to show non-acceptance, the fact that the weight of the testimony may favor acceptance does not warrant a trial court in resting a direction of a verdict upon it, for it is the function of a jury to settle disputed questions of fact, and to draw the inferences therefrom when they are in doubt.</p> <p>2. The rule adopted in some jurisdictions, that when cross-motions for a verdict are made all questions of fact are left with the court and not submitted to the jury, has never been adopted in this state.</p>

<p>1. Where a foreign judgment had been assigned, and the assignee had obtained another judgment in renewal and assigned it, in an action brought in this state by the assignee to recover on the second judgment, it was not error to admit in evidence an exemplification under seal of the original judgment; it was proper to admit it in evidence to explain or introduce the second judgment and show the chain of title.</p> <p>2. Where counsel claims that certain questions ashed on cross-examination were prejudicial and for an ulterior purpose, it was his duty to request the trial judge to caution the jury to disregard the excluded questions.</p> <p>3. A court of review will not reverse a judgment because of trial errors which are non-injurious.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal-from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 134.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 549.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following memorandum was filed by Mr. Justice Yoorhees:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 48.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 479.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following opinion was rendered bv Mr. Justice Swayze:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed: «</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>Ou appeal from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 432.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which, court the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 84 N. J. L. 450.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 129.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 123.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 577.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed :</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed:</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 84 N. J. L. 85.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per cuñam was filed:</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 567.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 567.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 564.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 84 N. J. L. 556.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 104. •</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court, whoso opinion is reported in 84 N. J. L. 585.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 151.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>