Volume 87 — New Jersey Law Reports

<p>On error to the Essex Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>On error to the Union County Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>Where a commutation ticket sold by a railroad company contains a provision that in consideration of the reduced rate of fare, it shall entitle only the person named therein to ride thereon, and a stipulation that if presented for passage by any other person it will be forfeited and taken up by the conductor, the right of the company to take it up is not limited to the occasion when it is presented by such other person; and if the condition has already been violated, the ticket may he subsequently taken up when presented by the owner. Harris v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co., 77 N. J. L. 278, followed.</p>

On rule to show cause. Plaintiff recovered a verdict at the Mercer Circuit, for $7,000 damages, for injuries received by him on the 24th day of October, 1912, by having been drawn against an Adams Express train of the defendant railroad passing Trenton station, or by having been thrown to the platform of said station by what is called suction, of said passing train. The:' injury complained of is a permanent stiffening of the elbow joint, or ankylosis as it is termed.

<p>On error to the Morris Quarter Sessions.</p>

<p>1. A criminal assault may be committed with an automobile driven along a public-street at an excessive rate of speed that endangers the safety of other persons and actually results in such an injury.</p> <p>2. The driving of an automobile at an excessive rate of speed is a willful act likely to inflict injury from which the malice and intention to .inflict injury which are the essentials of a criminal assault may, if the circumstances so warrant, be implied.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the Morris Pleas.</p>

<p>Under the Workmen’s Compensation act the court must determine the compensation only on the facts before it, not upon uncertain possibilities.of the future; hence, when the injury sustained by the petitioner was a very serious injury to his eye, which would be permanent unless a successful operation was performed, the case should have been treated by the court as one of permanent, and not temporary, disability.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

Ou certiorari of taxes. The prosecutors claim an exemption from taxation by reason of the original ordinance authorizing the Point Pleasant Water Works Company to lay pipes for water in the public streets, and a contract made in pursuance thereof. The fourth section of the ordinance provides that said company shall at all times furnish to the said borough a full and uninterrupted supply of water, free of charge, for the use of public buildings, including school-houses.

<p>1. It can fairly be held that the legislature by section 23 of the Workmen’s Compensation act meant that “daily wages” should be taken to be what would be earned by working the ordinary number of hours, irrespective of enforced idleness during working hours and overtime employment.</p> <p>2. Where the regular week was six days of ten hours each, and the wages twenty-five cents an hour, the hourly rate reduced to a weekly rate would be $15.</p>

<p>1. Plaintiff’s intestate, a member of the fire department of Atlantic City, in the performance of his duty went with other firemen into the tower of the city hall to extinguish a fire that had broken out there. It was evident that fixtures in the room were charged by escaping electricity sufficiently to produce a “small shock” on contact. Whilst endeavoring to put out the fire and locate its origin, decedent unintentionally came in contact with a metal pipe, which, unknown to him, was charged with a deadly current of electricity which had escaped from wires installed and maintained by the defendant electric company for the purpose of furnishing light from its street lighting system to lamps in the tower. He was killed by the shock. The evidence tended to show that the wires were installed and maintained in an unsafe and negligent condition, and that for a long time the defendant knew of the defect. Held, that the defendant was under a duty to decedent to exercise reasonable care, and that the alleged negligence of the defendant and the contributory negligence of the decedent were questions for the jury.</p> <p>2. Where the evidence tends to show that the next of kin of the decedent were deprived of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage from a continuance of the life of the deceased, it is for the jury, taking into account, all the uncertainties and contingencies of the particular case, to assess the damages, if any.</p> <p>3. It is the duty of an electric light company that maintains and controls wires charged with a deadly current of electricity in a place where there is a likelihood of human contact therewith, to use reasonable care to maintain proper insulation of such current, and this involves reasonable care in inspection for the discovery of possible impairment or delects.</p>

<p>1. Where a landlord lets out portions of a building to several tenants, retaining in his possession or control the passageways and stairways for the common use of the tenants and those having occasion to visit them, he is under the responsibility of a general ' owner of land who holds out an invitation to enter upon and use his property, and is bound to see that reasonable care is exercised to have the passageways and stairways reasonably fit and safe for such use.</p> <p>2. Evidence “that the heel of plaintiff’s shoe caught in a tin covering (originally attached to the wooden step to prevent its wear), which was loose, but was not then noticed by him, causing him to trip and fall down stairs,” is not sufficient to justify a finding that the landlord of the premises had been guilty of any want of reasonable care in keeping the stairway safe for use, unless there is also evidence tending to show that the defect causing the fall either (1) had been in fact brought to the previous notice of the landlord, or (2) had existed for such a space of time before the accident as would have afforded a sufficient opportunity to make proper inspection of the stairway and to repair its defects.</p>

<p>Under Workmen’s Compensation act of 1911 (Pamph. L., p. 134) the word “disability” is not restricted to mere loss of earning power; and the fact that an injured workman was employed at the same work and the same wages, as before the injury, will not disentitle him to compensation under the act if his physical efficiency has been substantially impaired.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. It is the duty of a municipal body solely invested by law with the power to grant licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors, upon compliance with statutory requirements, to afford to parties making lawful objections on points which, if sustained, would oust the specific jurisdiction to grant a license in a particular case, a reasonable opportunity to substantiate by evidence their grounds of objection.</p> <p>2. Such duty is not performed by an attempted delegation of it to a subordinate body not authorized by law to deal with the matter.</p> <p>3. The signatures of twelve reputable freeholders to a recommendation for a license under the Inns and Taverns act (Comp. Stat., p. 2S90) should normally be their personal signatures, or if signed by another under their authority the fact should appear on the certificate and the authority should be shown.</p> <p>4. The customary affidavit that the certificate is “signed” by the requisite number of freeholders is naturally understood to mean that such freeholders signed it themselves, and not that they merely authorized someone else to do so for them.</p>

<p>On rule to show cause why mandamus should not issue.</p>

<p>Where the act of 1800, p. 276 (Comp. Btat., p. 2912), requires the county clerk to pay certain license fees collected by him to the body or person entitled to the legal custody of the funds of a municipality in his county, and it appears that the affairs of such municipality are being administered by an organized government whose title is at least colorable, and its finances conducted by one holding as the financial officer of that government, mandamus will issue to compel payment of such moneys to said officer, notwithstanding the existence of a dispute as to the de jure character of his tenure.</p>

<p>On certiorari to judgment of Board of 'Equalization of Taxes of Yew Jersey.</p>

<p>An action brought by a father to recover for the loss of the services of his daughter, and the expenses incurred in restoring her to health, is not an action “accruing for injuries to persons caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person or persons,” and the limitation of the actions described in section 3 of our statute of limitations (Comp. Stai., p. 3162) is not a bar to such an action.</p>

<p>After maturity and protest, for non-payment by the mater, of a promissory note, a renewal note of the same character was discounted and the original note paid out of the proceeds and surrendered to the endorser who passed it, with his endorsement uncanceled, to another in payment of his personal obligation. Held, that the note continued to be negotiable so far as the endorser was concerned, and by its reissue the endorser charged himself with a primary liability to his endorsee.</p>

<p>On appeal from the First District Court of the city of Newark.</p>

<p>The plaintiff was injured by falling upon a public street caused by ice which had formed there by the freezing of water, which had run upon the sidewalk from the melting of snow lying upon the defendant’s land. The plaintiff offered testimony from which an inference might be drawn that some snow had been brought upon the premises which had not naturally fallen there. The court was asked to charge that, in order to permit the plaintiff to recover, it must be shown that the snow was brought upon the premises from the sidewalk or from off the premises, and that the mere shoveling of snow on the preiñises to make paths on the land or roadway, will not entitle the plaintiff to recover, which request the trial court refused. Held, that this was error, and that it was not cured by the instruction, “It is for you td decide whether the defendant did permit and allow this snow to be shoveled and accumulated on this property,” for it was not an adequate, substitute for the defendant’s specific request.</p>

On certiorari. The city of Yew Brunswick, by popular vote, adopted the act entitled, as amended in 1912 (Pamph.

<p>1. The defendant was indicted for a violation of a statute which makes it a misdemeanor for any witness summoned before a legislative committee, to refuse to appear before it and be sworn. The indictment charges that the defendant was summoned to appear without stating where he was served with the writ; and it was moved to quash upon the ground that unless he was served in the county where the indictment was found, no crime was committed in that county, and therefore the place of service was a material fact and should be charged in the indictment. Held, that the place of service is not material, for the offence was not complete until refusal to appear and be sworn at the place named in the summons, and the pla.ce of the offence was where he is summoned to appear in order that he may be sworn, and his refusal to appear amounts to a refusal to be sworn, which is the material offence created by the statute.</p> <p>2. AVliere the indictment avers that two committees of the legislature constitute a joint committee of the legislature, it is a sufficient averment that the two were a joint “legislative committee.”</p>

<p>On appeal from the Warren Common Pleas.</p>

<p>Where a wife by reason of the cruel treatment of her husband leaves him, her abandonment cannot be construed to be a constructive abandonment of her by him, so as to warrant his indictment and conviction under the prolusions of 2 Comp. Stat., p. 1770, as a husband who deserts or willfully refuses or neglects to maintain his wife, and providing that he shall thereby be guilty of a misdemeanor.</p>

<p>1. Pamph. L. 1908, p. 399, prohibiting the sale of morphine, except upon a physician’s prescription, does not include “heroin” as one of the prohibited habit-forming drugs therein specifically referred to.</p> <p>2. The act being penal in its consequences will not receive a construction which will enlarge its specific scope.</p> <p>3. Where the defendant denied the sale of the drug, and testified that he had given specific orders to his cleric to sell no habit-forming drugs, and that he was not aware until a recent period that the drug in question was included in that category, a direction of conviction was erroneous.</p>

<p>1. A sergeant-at-arms of a district court, who levies upon personal property under a writ of attachment issued out of that court, and leaves the property in the possession of the defendant, has such special ownership in the property levied upon as to entitle him to bring an action of replevin to recover the value of the property and damages for its detention.</p> <p>2. The provisions of section 69 of the District Court act, that property attached shall be inventoried and appraised and safely kept by the officer, is obviously for the benefit of the plaintiff in attachment, and a defendant cannot escape the effect of the lien because the property attached was left in his possession, as he thereby merely became the bailee of the property.</p> <p>o. A demand for the return of the property before institution of the replevin suit was not necessary under the facts of this ease, and even if sucli demand and a refusal were essential, the failure thereof is not a ground for a nonsuit under section 28 of the Replevin act.</p> <p>4. There having been sufficient proof to entitle the case to be submitted to the jury, a motion to direct a verdict for the defendants was properly denied.</p> <p>5. If the action of replevin is brought under section 33 of the Replevin act, whereby the goods remain in the possession of the defendant, the value of the property as well as damages for its detention, may be recovered by the plaintiff.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the Somerset Court of Common Pleas.</p>

<p>On defendant’s rule to show cause.</p>

<p>On plaintiff’s rule to show cause.</p>

<p>On appeal from the First District Court of Jersey City.</p>

<p>A deceased workman fell from a scaffold upon which he was not working in the course of his employment, but on the contrary had been told by his employer to keep off scaffolds and not to do any climbing. Held, that the injuries which caused his death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, and that there can be no recovery for such death against the master.</p>

<p>On. error to the Cumberland Quarter Sessions Conrt.</p>

<p>1. In a complaint under section 1 of “An act concerning disorderly persons,” charging that defendant did “use or pretend to use or have skill in physiognomy, palmistry or like crafty science, or did pretend to tell destinies, or fortunes,” proof of the practice of any one of the specified acts will be sufficient to sustain the charge of being a disorderly person.</p> <p>2. The statute before cited describes an offence in .such general terms as will embrace a variety of circumstances, and a general description, though pursuant to the words of the act, is insufficient; the facts from which it would appear that the statute has been violated must be set forth.</p> <p>3. The offence charged in the complaint must be positive and certain, and not in the alternative, so that the defendant will be protected from a second prosecution for the same act.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>The District Court is without jurisdiction to try a disposession suit under the Landlord and Tenant act, where the relation of landlord and tenant is not established.</p>

<p>A resolution of the common council of Newark, appropriating the sum of $25,364.15 in payment of a bill for work alleged to have been done under a void contract, is set aside as illegal, not being based upon an examination and consideration of what the work was fairly worth, such as a quantum meruit.</p>

<p>The act of the legislature (Pamph. L. 1913, p. 448), which is a supplement to the act of 1906, p. 644, providing for the assessment and collection of a franchise tax in cases where street railway systems are operated by steam railroad companies, or operated over and upon the tracks of steam railroad companies, does not offend against the constitution.</p>

<p>On appeal from the District Court.</p>

<p>1. A tender of performance of a promise of marriage must be made in good faith, and if, in any view of the testimony, the good faith of the tender is questionable, then it is a question of fact for the jury.</p> <p>2. In an action for breach of promise to marry, an unequivocal intention on defendant’s part not to perform his contract, may he inferred from his conduct.</p> <p>3. Where no time of performance of a marriage contract is fixed, an action for breach thereof may be brought after a reasonable time.</p> <p>4. It is presumed that a marriage contract, where no time is fixed, is not intended to he performed more than a year after its making, and, therefore, it does not fall within the statute of frauds requiring a promise not to be performed within a year, to be in writing; and, as such a contract is possible of performance within a year, a jury would have a right to infer that the defendant did not intend to perform it, when, in fact, he permitted five years to elapse without having done so.</p> <p>5. Defendant’s offer of marriage after breach is, as a rule, no defence.</p> <p>6. An offer on the part of the defendant to fulfill the promise of marriage after his refusal to do so, or a renewed offer in his answer or in open court,- is not a defence unless it is made bona ficLe, and unless, also, the plaintiff has not signified an intention to regard the contract as at an end; these questions are questions of fact, and are for the jury.</p>

<p>A brakeman employed by a railroad company operating a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, inserted his arm between an engine-tender and the car next back of it to make an adjustment of the couplers owing to the fact that they would not work automatically by impact, and his arm was crushed, necessitating amputation. He sued and recovered damages. Held, that under the “Safety Appliances act” the duty of the railroad company to provide car couplers which would couple automatically by impact was an absolute duty; and from the fact that the couplers did not so work on the given occasion, it was inferable that the company had failed to comply with the Standard raised by the “Safety Appliances act,” and, therefore, under the “Federal Employers’ Liability act” the employe was to be held not to have been guilty of contributory negligence, nor to have assumed the risks of the employment, and the case was properly submitted to the jury.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>The act of March 14th, 3883, entitled “An act to provide for the purchase, construction and maintenance of public parks by the cities and other municipalities in this state” (Comp. Stat., p. 4141), does not authorize municipalities that take advantage of its provisions to appropriate for park purposes the public waters of the state; and therefore a condemnation by a municipality of the right to take and divert water perpetually from a river which borders upon a public park of another municipality, does not superimpose an additional public use upon one already existent.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 468.</p>

<p>1. The act approved March 31st, 1914, to regulate the assessment and collection of taxes upon shares of capital stock of banks, banking associations and trust companies (Pamph. L. 1914, p. 141), does not violate the constitutional rule, because such property is made a class by itself for purposes of taxation and is taxed by a uniform rate in lieu of the variant rates that prevail in different taxing districts, for the reason that the property so taxed has peculiar characteristics justifying the making of it a class by itself for the assessment and collection of taxes.</p> <p>2. Where words used in a statute have received a judicial construction, the legislature will be deemed to have used them in the sense that has been thus ascribed to them.</p> <p>3. Where two interpretations of the language of a statute are possible, the one that renders the act constitutional will be deemed to express the legislative intent, rather than the interpretation which would render it unconstitutional.</p> <p>4. The act of March 31st, 1914 (Pamph. L., p. 141), by the fourth section, provides that the tax imposed upon the shares of stock of banks, banking associations and trust companies, by the act, shall be in lieu of all other state, county or local taxation upon such shares, and the fact that a given savings institution has capital stock issued, does not violate the uniform rule of the constitution, because such savings bank by reason of its shares of .capital stock is either within the act or else it is subject to the general laws relating to the taxation of such institutions provided by the act approved March 26th, 1888. Pamph. L., p. 264.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 56.</p>

<p>.On appeal from the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 83 N. J. L. 46.</p>

<p>A certificate made by a city board of education to the board of school estimate asked for the appropriation of a lump sum for the purchase of land, the construction of a new school building and furnishing the same and for repairs to existing school buildings; it was not shown that any but ordinary necessary repairs were contemplated. Held, that the certificate was defective because the amount asked for repairs was not separately stated.</p>

<p>The district courts cannot entertain jurisdiction of a notice of re- • coupment that claims more than $500.</p>

On error. Ejectment for a small gore of land. The titles of the plaintiff and defendants are from the same grantor. The conveyance under which defendants -claim is the earlier. The boundary line between the two lots runs the same course and distance in both deeds. It runs from Midland avenue, Mont-, clair, to a point in the rear line of the lots, but no monument is there given nor was any shown to have been there.

On error to the Supreme Court. Motion to quash attachment. on two grounds—first, that the property attached was not the property of the defendant in attachment, and second, that there was no debt due from the defendant to the plaintiff. The Circuit Court quashed the writ and upon certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the order.

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. In the absence of knowledge to the contrary, a servant has a right to assume that his master has taken reasonable care to have the machine upon which he puts his servant to work reasonably safe for the work.</p> <p>2. A servant cannot be said as a matter of law to have assumed the risk of danger caused by a latent defect in a gauge and safety valve designed to register and regulate the air pressure on a machine upon which he has been put to work, even though he had by implication asserted his ability to operate it by acceding to his master’s direction to do so, when it appears that he was injured at the end of the first hour’s work, and that, until the happening of the accident, the air pressure had been normal.</p> <p>3. A servant who, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered a latent defect in a gauge and safety valve designed to register and regulate the air pressure on a machine upon which he has been put to work, cannot, for that reason alone, be said as a matter of law to have assumed the risk resulting from operating the machine, since, not only must the imperfection be apiiarent, but the danger of operation of the machine in its imperfect condition must also be apparent.</p> <p>4. In a suit by a servant to recover for injuries received while at work upon a defective machine, when the evidence tends to show that prior use of the machine in its defective condition had disclosed that it was dangerous, and that the master knew or ought to have known that it was dangerous, the question of the master's negligence must be submitted to the jury.</p> <p>5. It is the duty of the master to warn and instruct his servant as to the dangers of the employment of which the master knows, or ought in the exercise of reasonable care to know, and of which he knows or ought to know the servant has no knowledge, actual or constructive.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Essex Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from tlie Mercer Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. Whether the existence of an actual traveled highway across an open tract of land conveyed without mention thereof is a breach of a general covenant of warranty, qnasre.</p> <p>2. When there is no open highway across land conveyed and no indication on the ground of such highway to apprise the grantee of its physical existence, and no subjection of the land to highway uses recognized in the title deeds by express mention or reference to other documents, a prior dedication to public use, afterward accepted by the public and enforced by judgment, will support a suit for breach of warranty.</p> <p>3. Language of the deeds in question in this case examined and held not a recognition of a highway right over the loons in quo.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 87 Atl. Rep. 92.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Where the plaintiff’s case disclosed that an individual doing business under a partnership name, had in his employment a bookkeeper who was also in charge of the principal office, and who made the sale for which recovery is sought by an action at law, and the defence was a rescission of the contract of sale by defendant after an unreasonable delay, which delay it is sought to excuse, because the bookkeeper had waived it, it was error to hold that a bill of sale of the property and rights of the business theretofore conducted under the partnership name, which the bookkeeper signed with the owner and two other persons, in which they were not designated as partners, was conclusive evidence that the bookkeeper was a partner authorized to waive, the rights of the person theretofore conducting the business, and did not justify the overruling of all testimony tending to show the character of his employment and the want of any authority to make the alleged waiver.</p>

<p>1. Where a street railway company and the counties interested consent to the making of an order by the board of utility commissioners requiring the railway company to connect its lines running to each side of a county bridge, lay its tracks, and operate its line across the bridge, and it complies with such order, it is estopped to deny the power of the board to make the order to which it consented and of which it has availed itself as a privilege to use the bridge.</p> <p>2. The legislature has the power to fix the compensation to be paid ' for the use of a county bridge by a street railway company, and to delegate to the board of public utility commissioners the power to ascertain what is a reasonable compensation.</p> <p>3. Such compensation is not a tax, but may be imposed for a distinct and unusual use, requiring a more expensive structure than the ordinary use by the public demands, for the additional cost is for the benefit of a private enterprise in excess of the public need and for which it should pay a reasonable compensation.</p> <p>4. The court will not, on appeal, disturb the order of the board in fixing a rate for such use unless it be unreasonable or based upon some illegal principle, or lacks evidential support.</p>

<p>Promissory notes in the hands of a bona fide holder for value are not invalid by reason of the fact that they were dated on Sunday, where there is nothing on the face of the notes to indicate that fact or that the notes were an accommodation to the payee, or because the payee was at the time of the maturity of the notes indebted to the maker. Held, under such circumstances the direction of a verdict for the plaintiff was correct.</p>

<p>Where a boy fifteen years of age had for years been in the habit of carrying his father’s supper to him to the train of the Central railroad of New Jersey as it stopped at the South Amboy station; and where it appeared that the roadbed and station were the property of the New York and Long Branch Railroad Company, and were used by the Central railroad and the Pennsylvania railroad under an agreement for the operation of their trains; and that a rule of the railroad owner required all trains approaching the station, where a passenger train has stopped to receive or discharge passengers, to stop before reaching the station until signaled to move, or until the passenger train shall have moved away, and that the deceased on the night in question was struck by a light engine which approached the station without warning. Held, that the issue of negligence thus presented was a jury question.</p>

<p>Prior to the passage of the act of 1907 (Pamph. L., p. 121) the town of Guttenberg elected at large five members of the board of councilmen, under the provisions of its charter and supplementary legislation. The act of 1907 provided for the election of a councilman-at-large, to be called mayor, in each of the incorporated towns of the state. Held, that the act of 1907 does not operate to reduce the number of the board of councilmen to be elected by the town, and that the election of but four councilmen created a vacancy which it was competent for the board of councilmen to fill.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. The title of the act of the legislature entitled “An act with reference to the degree of care necessary to be used by travelers over railroad crossings protected by flagman or safety appliances or both” (Pamph. L. 1909, p. 37) sufficiently expresses the object of the act within the constitutional provision.</p> <p>2. The modification of the legal rule of caution, barring recovery where neglect, on the part of a traveler approaching a railroad crossing, to look and listen as effectively as the location and circumstances permit, proximately contributes to the injury, is a merely incidental matter and is not in itself a necessary part of the title of the act and need not be expressed in it.</p> <p>3. Under the statute above referred to (Pamph. L. 1909, p. 37), the plaintiff’s intestate was absolved from stopping, looking and listening before passing over the railroad crossing, even though the electric bell, placed to warn travelers of the approach of a train, was out of order.</p> <p>4. Where there is conflicting testimony by witnesses whether or not the statutory signals of an approaching locomotive engine, by either blowing a whistle or ringing a bell, were given, the question is clearly for the jury to decide.</p>

<p>1. Plaintiff was working in close proximity to the end of a railroad track maintained and solely under the management of defendant company. While defendant’s servants were making an effort to couple cars on its line, the rear car was pushed off, causing injury to plaintiff. There was evidence to establish that defendant's servants knew the condition of things at the end of the line. It was conceded that no notice or warning of the movement of the cars was given by defendant’s servants. Held, that defendant failed to perform the dnty of exercising reasonable care toward plaintiff.</p> <p>2. The defendant's contention that a duty rested upon the plaintiff’s employer to give notice or warning of danger to his servant cannot exonerate the defendant from its failure to discharge a duty which the law has cast upon it.</p> <p>3. If such a duty was likewise imposed upon plaintiff’s employer, the failure to discharge such duty would not charge the servant with his employer’s neglect so as to bar plaintiff’s recovery against the defendant.</p> <p>•1. A workman, injured in an accident for which a tort-feasor, other than his employer, is responsible, does not lose his right of recovery against the tort-feasor by reason of having received compensation from his employer under the Workmen’s Compensation act.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. It is the settled law of this state that a defendant is not precluded from having other grounds urged by it for a nonsuit considered for the purpose • of sustaining it, if the conclusion should be reached that the judgment of nonsuit cannot be supported upon the theory adopted by the trial judge.</p> <p>2. That it is not negligence per se for a person to board a trolley car while it is in motion, is not open to debate in this state. Whether such person is chargeable with negligence must depend upon the attending circumstances and accordingly may be either a court or jury question.</p> <p>3. The degree of care required of a child, who has reached the age of discretion, and is considered sui juris, will, as a matter of law, be no higher than such as is usually exercised by persons of similar age, judgment and experience, and whether that degree of caution has been exercised by a child in a given case, is usually, if not always, a question of fact for the jury.</p> <p>4. Where there was testimony that defendant’s servant, a motorman, invited plaintiff to board his car and while he was doing so and before he reached a place of safety, the motorman accelerated the speed of the car or started it up in such a manner as to jerk plaintiff from the car—Held, to be sufficient evidence for the jury to find that defendant was negligent.</p> <p>5. Where defendant's servant, a motorman, invited plaintiff, a child, to ride free on his car, it is not a valid defence that such conduct was not within the motorman’s scope of employment or contrary. to his instructions. While it may be reasonable to say, as a rule of law, that a grown person has no right to enter a car except as. a passenger, and if he does so as a friend of the conductor, that such a situation creates no relationship between such person and the car company; it would be unreasonable to ■ apply the same rule to a child under similar circumstances. It is the legal duty of every one dealing with a child to protect it against its own indiscretion.</p>

<p>When a written contract contains the whole agreement, parol evidence is not admissible, to engraft terms upon the written agreement.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. Money in the city treasury, not raised by taxation, or appropriated for any specific purpose, may be transferred to and used by the building commission in connection with a new city hall.</p> <p>2. A taxpayer of the city and prosecutor of a writ of certiorari is not injured by the use of the money for such a purpose.</p>

<p>On the sale of a machine on approval for one month and the rejection of the same within the month, as not satisfactory, the title to the machine does not pass to the buyer.</p>

<p>On appeal from tlie Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. The policy of the law does not favor forfeitures, and the provision in section 16 of the Mechanics’ Lien act, which invalidates the entire claim if the bill of particulars shall “willfully or fraudulently’’ misstate any of the matters directed to be included therein, is to be construed strictly.</p> <p>2. Whether the omissiou of an item of credit in the bill of particulars of a mechanics’ lien was or was not “willful or fraudulent” is a question of fact depending upon the peculiar circumstances of each case; and where the trial judge, sitting as a jury, finds as a fact that it was not, and there is evidence to support him, the finding will not be disturbed.</p> <p>3. Where there is evidence tending to show “diligent prosecution” of a mechanics’ lien claim within the year prescribed by the statute, the question whether it was, “diligently prosecuted” becomes one of fact, and the finding of the trial judge, sitting as a jury, that in fact the claim was diligently prosecuted within the year, will not be disturbed.</p> <p>4. Where there is no diligent prosecution the lien itself falls at the end of the year in the absence of a court order within the year extending the time; but where in fact there was diligent prosecution within the year, the lien does not of itself fall at the expiration of the year, and a court order extending the time, or an . actual trial of the cause, is in time although after the termination of the year, provided it takes place before an order discharging the lien shall be made by the court Because of failure of diligent prosecution whether wholly or partially within, or wholly or partially without the year. Following Ennis v. Eden Mills Paper Co., 65 N. J. L. 577.</p>

Justice Swayze delivered the following memorandum: “I think the prosecutor has failed to make out a ease. The contract is authorized by section 30 of the Railroad act, and although the procedure under the decision in Clark v. Elizabeth, 61 N. J. L. 565, must he regulated by other statutes relating to the town, the act of 1895 (Comp. Stat., p. 3549), suffices to convey authority, so far as the ordinance vacates, straightens, alters or widens any street already laid out.

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 436.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 92.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:</p> <p>“Per curiam—The defendants are entitled to judgment. ' The reasons are sufficiently stated in the opinion filed in the case of Commercial Trust Co. v. Hudson County Board of Taxation, 86 N. J. L. 424.”</p>

De Eazio was in the service of the defendant. He was found dead lying under a train of cars, with a hole, about six inches in diameter, in his abdomen. There is no proof of the accident. Two points are raised, first, that the circumstances do not show that it was an accident; second, that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. As to the first, we think that a prima facie case of accident was shown.

For the purpose of extending its development within the territory which it served, the Eastern Telephone and Telegraph Company obtained an ordinance from the board of chosen freeholders of the county of Cape May designating certain highways within the county to be occupied by it. It also obtained a similar ordinance from the borough of Avalon, in the county of Cape May. These ordinances were duly presented to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners for its approval.

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 512.</p>

<p>On appeal' from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 85 N. J. L. 457.</p>

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court affirming a judgment of the Essex Common Pleas in a case under the Workmen’s Compensation act. The Common Pleas found that the petitioner was an actual dependent upon the deceased and allowed her $5 a week for a period of three hundred weeks.

Jersey City, 84 N. J. L. 454, and Paterson v. Kearny, 84 Id. 456, are applicable in the present case. It is only necessary to add that the city’s power to condemn water and water rights seems to be clear under the act of 1895.” Comp. Stat., 2198, pl. 38.

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:</p> <p>“Per curiami—The proceedings are affirmed, with costs, for the reasons stated in the opinion in the case of Paterson v. Glen Ridge, No.’ 290, of the same term.”</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:</p> <p>“Per cwriam—The proceedings are affirmed, with costs, for reasons that are sufficiently stated in the opinion in Paterson v. Jersey City, 84 N. J. L. 454, and Paterson v. Kearny, 84 Id. 456, of the same term.”</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed:</p> <p>“Per curiam—The proceedings are affirmed, with costs, for the reasons stated in the opinion'filed in Paterson v. Kearny, 84 N. J. L. 456.”</p>

<p>On appeal from the judgment of the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 84 N. J. L. 456.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On error to the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 75.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed: “Per curiam—The indictment in this case must be quashed. The case cannot be distinguished from State v. Nugent, 48 Vroom 157.”

On error to the Supreme Court. The plaintiff in error was convicted in the Hudson County Quarter Sessions of the crime of carnal abuse. The judgment entered thereon was reviewed in the Supreme Court and there affirmed in a per curiam which reads as follows: “There was a conviction of carnal abuse of a female under the age of sixteen.

On error to the Supreme Court, in which court the following per curiam was filed: “Per curiam—The judgment is affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion in State v. Sutton just decided.” 86 N. J. L. 46.

The plaintiff-respondent recovered a judgment in the District Court of the city of Plainfield, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in a per curiam which reads as follows: “The plaintiff-appellee recovered judgment in the District Court of the city of Plainfield, county of Union, for the sum of four hundred eighty-seven dollars and seventy cents ($487.7'0), together with costs of suit, against the defendant-appellant, for lumber and building materials sold and delivered by…

On-appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following memorandum by Mr. Justice Parker was filed: “This is a certiorari attacking the validity of a sale for assessments in the borough of Edgewater. “The ground of attack is that the sale was held more than two years after the imposition of the assessment.

<p>On quo warranto. Tenmrror to information.</p>

<p>On quo warranto. Demurrer to plea.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Hunterdon Common Pleas Court.</p>

<p>The penalty of interest at the rate of one per centum per month upon taxes unpaid on the first day of February following their levs’, provided by the General Railroad Tax act (Pamph. L. 1911, p. 434), is a remedy applicable to overdue taxes assessed under the supplemental act of April 27tli, 1911 (Pamph. L., p. 580), but such penalty cannot by a supposed analogy to the existing legislation be made to run from an earlier date than that expressly fixed by the statute.</p>

On certiorari to the Cumberland Pleas. • This is a proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation act. Allen was employed by the city on street work. Kates was director of streets and public improvements of the city. In his private capacity he owned and employed teams on different kinds of work, but none of them were employed by or for the city'' of Millville. In his employ was a driver, Robert Chambers, who, on the morning of the accident, was carting freight for Kates.

<p>On certiorari to the Morris Pleas.</p>

<p>1. A complaint contained three counts—(1) breach of promise of marriage, (2) seduction, (3) assault and battery by violating the plaintiff’s person and having sexual intercourse with her and seducing her under promise of marriage. Said, that the action sounded in contract and not in tort.</p> <p>2. To warrant a capias in an action on contract, proof must be made to the judge or commissioner; he must certify it and file it in the clerk’s office, and the proof must be of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to an order to hold to hail.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the Burlington Common Pleas Court.</p>

<p>1. The title of chapter 368 of the laws of 1912 sufficiently expresses the object of the act.</p> <p>2. Chapter 368 of the laws of 1912 is a constitutional act.</p>

<p>Flour was shipped from the northwest to New York on through bills of lading; it was unloaded and held at the pier in Jersey City for the purpose of repacking and blending. Held, that the continuous journey was thereby broken and the flour was subject to local taxation.</p>

<p>On certiorari to the Warren Pleas.</p>

<p>On appeal from the District Court of the city of Elizabeth.</p>

<p>1. The plaintiff, on a clear dark night, was driving his Ford touring car 'on a public highway towards the defendant’s railroad crossing at a speed of from twelve to fifteen miles an hour. He was familiar with the road and knew that the tracks were there. His automobile was equipped with electric headlights of ordinary brilliancy, and they were lighted. When about twenty feet away he observed something on the crossing. He could have stopped in from twelve to fifteen feet. He did not stop or slacken speed, but attempted to go around the obstruction. When he had gone five or six feet farther he put on his brakes, but nevertheless hit a freight car of the defendant’s train which was momentarily standing on the crossing. The automobile was slightly injured by the impact. It appeared that the defendant had performed its statutory duty. There was no evidence that the defendant had created extraordinary danger at the crossing, nor of unreasonable operation of the train. Held, that there was no proof of negligence of the defendant which was the proximate cause of the injury, and that motions for nonsuit and for a direction of a verdict for the defendant should have been granted.</p> <p>2. A transcript of the stenographic report of the proceedings and testimony certified by the judge of the District Court under chapter 138 of the laws of 1905, page 259 (Comp. Stat., p. 1957, ¶ 13b), although not transmitted to the clerk of the Supreme Court within fifteen days by the appellant, may be treated as a part of the state of the case when the appellee has made no objection to such state of the case under rule 155 of this court, and no preliminary motion to strike out such part of the state of the case has been made.</p>

<p>1. An eviction is an act of a permanent character done by the landlord in order to deprive, and which had the effect of depriving, the tenant of the use of the thing demised, or a part of it.</p> <p>2. Facts found by the District Court judge, sitting without a jury, will be presumed to rest on competent proof when nothing appears to the contrary.</p> <p>3. A mere trespass upon the demised premises resulting only in slight interference with the tenant, does not constitute a constructive eviction as a matter of law.</p> <p>4. Trespasses, or other acts of third persons, impairing the usefulness or enjoyment of the demised premises, do not amount to an eviction by the landlord, unless the acts from which an eviction is asserted to result were committed under the direction of or at the instance or with the consent of the landlord.</p> <p>5. It is only when the minds of the parties to a lease concur in the . common intent of relinquishing the relation of landlord and tenant, and execute that intent by acts tantamount to a stipulation to put an end thereto, that a surrender by act and operation of law arises.</p> <p>0. When, from the evidence, it is open to die trial judge, sitting _ ■without a jury, to find that the minds of the parties did not concur in a common intent to relinquish the relation of landlord and tenant, his finding that there was no surrender by operation of law will not be disturbed.</p> <p>7. The mere fact that a landlord, after his tenant had abandoned the premises against the will of the landlord, endeavors unsuccessfully to relet the premises, does not constitute, as a matter of law, an acceptance of an alleged surrender of the term.</p>

<p>On appeal from the District Court of the city of Trenton.</p>

<p>On certiorari to award of Middlesex Pleas in workmen’s compensation ease.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>The petitioner was hired and paid by W., who were contracting teamsters. They had a contract with V. to haul sand, &c., for him at a fixed price per day, which included the services of driver, horse and wagon. Petitioner was paid by and assigned to work by W. each morning, although V. could object to any driver, and when such objections were made such driver would not be put upon V.’s work. When petitioner was assigned by W. to V.’s work he did whatever V. told him to do. While so engaged petitioner was injured. Held, that W. was the employer of petitioner under the meaning of the word “employer” in the Workmen’s Compensation act.</p>

<p>On certiorari to convictions of violating ordinance of Atlantic Citv.</p>

On certiorari to judgment of the Common Pleas judge of Union county vacating a conviction for alleged violation of ordinance of the city of Summit.

<p>1. Under section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation act, the willful negligence of the workman is not a defence to the action. Willful negligence, is a defence only under section 1 of the act, whore the liability is made to depend, not upon any implied contract for compensation, but upon the negligence of the employer, either at common law or resulting from the requirements of the act itself. Sneli provision is omitted in section 2 of the act, where the only exemption is when the injury or death is intentionally self-inflicted, or when intoxication is the natural and proximate cause of the injury.</p> <p>2. Tinder the original Workmen’s Compensation act funeral expenses were not allowable unless there were no dependents. The supplement of 1913 to the act (Pamph. L. 1913, p. 302, ¶ 4) made no change in this respect. Consequently, when an accident arose prior to the passage of the supplement of 1914, providing for burial exjjenses in all cases, it was erroneous to make an allowance for burial expenses where there were actual dependents.</p> <p>3. The Workmen's Compensation act does not require the trial judge to make a statement of the proportions of the award to go to the widow and child unless there is a special application for that purpose.</p>

<p>1. The office of member of the board of chose.n freeholders, where such member is elected in a city, the common council of which have, power to fill vacancies in such board, and that of a member of the common council of such city are incompatible offices, and where a member of such council is elected a chosen freeholder of the county in which the city is located, and he accepts the office, such action creates a vacancy in the common council.</p> <p>2. The election by a common council of a person as a member of that body is transacting business within the meaning of a statute which forbids less than a quorum to transact business.</p> <p>3. Where the statute fixes the number of the common council at seven the attendance of more than three members is required to constitute a quorum, and three members cannot legally fill vacancies in the council.</p> <p>4. Where a vacancy in such board exists, which the electors have a right to fill, and a majority of the voters cast ballots in favor of their choice, such election is not void because no one was nominated at the primaries as candidates for the office, for it is the constitutional right of every citizen of the United States to vote for all elective officers, and they cannot be deprived of this right because through neglect or ignorance candidates are not named in a prescribed manner.</p>

<p>1. Upon an indictment for burglary it was competent for the state to prove the corpus delicti, by showing that the defendant had been seen in the city on more than one occasion on the day of the crime, and that the finger prints found upon a column of the balcony of the house entered were similar to the finger prints of the defendant.</p> <p>2. It was competent to show the finger prints upon the column by a photograph thereof, and to identify the finger prints of defendant made by experts after defendant’s arrest.</p> <p>3. It was not improper for the trial court to refer to the defendant’s failure to be sworn as a witness to deny the incriminating fact that he was seen in the city upon the day of the crime; such proven fact being a necessary link in the state’s chain of proof to make out a case to warrant a conviction upon the circumstantial testimony adduced.</p>

<p>Where the testimony in an action in ejectment presents a case for the plaintiff based upon mathematical surveys, maps and photographs, supported by the evidence of expert witnesses who made them at the time in controversy, as well as by the testimony of witnesses corroborating them, by which the boundary lines defining the locus in quo are clearly and unmistakably established, and the only testimony in opposition thereto is furnished by the memories of witnesses after a lapse of twenty-five years, during which period the conformation of the locus has been altered and changed—Held, that a verdict based upon the accuracy of the latter testimony is against the weight of the evidence.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>3. Mandamus will not lie to compel a county superintendent to reapportion school moneys after the state board of education have sustained the original apportionment on an appeal to that body. The proper remedy is to test the legality of the judgment of the state board by a writ of certiorari.</p> <p>2. Since the school law requires that certain reports, necessary to form the basis of the apportionment, shall be made to the county superintendent by the 15tli of March, it necessarily excludes an apportionment in favor of a board of education which comes into existence after that date.</p>

<p>. 1. Where the board of eouneilmen of a town bad tbe power either to amend or repeal an ordinance which establishes a police department in such town, it is immaterial which method is adopted.</p> <p>2. ' It is not the method adopted by tbe board to rid the town of an extravagant police department that is important, but whether the board acted in good faitli to accomplish their object.</p> <p>3. To establish a charge, of fraudulent conduct, or lack of good faith, against a legislative body in passing an ordinance, the proof of such fraudulent conduct must be clear and convincing.</p>

<p>On certiorai i.</p>

<p>1. Tlie misrepresentation as to name and age is not such a fraud as to operate to relieve an employer from the obligation to make compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation act in the absence of proof that he was induced to enter into the contract hy reason of such misrepresentation.</p> <p>2. Whether or not the father and mother and minor brothers and sisters, living together in the same household, and subsisting in part on the earnings contributed by the deceased to his father, and applied by the father to the support of himself and his family, were actual dependents upon the deceased, was a question of fact for the trial judge to determine.</p> <p>3. It is not essential to the right of a dependent who seeks to recover compensation under the act that such dependent should be actually or entirely dependent upon the earnings of the deceased; but it is sufficient if it appears that he is dependent in fact.</p> <p>4. Where, under paragraph 12 of the Workmen’s Compensation act, it was found as a fact that there were dependent upon deceased, a father, a mother and several minor brothers and sisters, an award of sixty per cent, of the wages was excessive, such a maximum award being only authorized where there are orphans in excess of two or where there is a widow with five or more children.</p>

<p>3. The act entilled “An act to establish an excise department in incorporated towns and cities of this state,” (Pamph. L. 1901, p. 239), provides that the common council of any town may, by ordinance passed by the affirmative vote of all the members, establish a hoard of excise commissioners, and that within ten days after the passage the same shall he filed.with the "clerk of Common Pleas who shall notify the presiding judge'. The charter of the town of Boonton provides that all ordinances, before taking effect, shall receive the mayor's approval, in writing, or else be returned by him to the town clerk in fourteen days after its passage, with his objections, in writing, and further provides that no ordinance shall ho originally passed without the concurrence' of five members, or over the mayor's veto except by a two-thirds vote. An ordinance to establish an excise, department'under the act of 1901 was passed by the. common council of Boonton, by a majority vote; was vetoed by the mayor; and it was claimed to have been illegally passed over his veto, field, that the ordinance in question was not subject to veto by the mayor, the act of 1901 providing a special modi' of procedure by which the ordinance became effective upon receiving a majority vote of council and a certified copy filed with the clerk, as directed by the act.</p> <p>2. The alleged unconstitntiouality of the act upon which the ordinance is based not considered because not relied on in the brief of counsel, though assigned as one of the reasons for declaring the ordinance void.</p> <p>3. The constitutionality of the act ivas fully considered in Schwarz v. Dover, 70 N. J. L. 502, and held to he constitutional.</p>

<p>On certiorari to tin: Hudson County Court of Common Pleas.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>On certiorari.</p>

<p>1. An indictment, charging that the defendant did unlawfully and injuriously, on a public highway, leading- from Dover to Landing, in Morris county, put, place and maintain a certain bridge across a certain canal, known as the Morris canal, followed by an allegation that the defendant did suffer and permit the same to be and remain in and upon the said public highway, whereby said public highway was obstructed, &c., is not uncertain and ambiguous and sets forth the facts with sufficient clearness, the highway referred to being the one leading from Dover to Landing, and not the Morris canal, fo‘r nowhere in the indictment is the canal designated as a public highway.</p> <p>2. The unlawful placing of an obstruction in a public highway to the inconvenience and injury of the general public is a nuisance, and it is of no consequence how little or how much of the public highway is encroached upon.</p> <p>3. The fact that the canal company is authorized by section 12 of its charter (Pamph. L. 1824, p. 158) to make good and sufficient bridges across the canal is no bar to an indictment charging it with having unlawfully and injuriously placed in a public highway a bridge to the common nuisance of the traveling public.</p> <p>4. On a motion to quash an indictment, only what appears on the face of the indictment is considered. The question whether the state can substantiate, by competent evidence, the facts as laid in the indictment, cannot be considered on a motion to quasli.</p>

<p>On certiorari to tlie Burlington Common Pleas Court.</p>

<p>In order to subject the defendant to a penalty under section 11 of the act of 1911 (Pamph. L., p. 56), entitled “An act for the appointment of fire wardens, the prevention of forest fires and the repeal of sundry acts relating thereto,” which section provides, “no person shall set fire to or burn, or cause to be burned, any waste land, brush land or forest land,” &c., it is essential that it appear that the burning or causing to he burned be the intentional act of the defendant and not the result of mere negligence.</p>

<p>1. Temporary, as distinguished from permanent disability, under the Workmen's Compensation act, is a condition that exists until the injured workman is as far restored as the permanent character of the injuries will permit.</p> <p>2. Where the petitioner suffered a permanent injury, equal to the loss of four-fifths of the usefulness of each eye, compensation should have been awarded on the basis of eighty per cent, of the loss of both eyes, under clause 6 of paragraph 11 of the statute (Pamph. L. 1913, p. 302). and not on the basis of eighty per cent, of the loss of each eye under clause c.</p>

<p>A special election in the borough of Stone Harbor for the adoption of a bond issue in compliance with section 41 of the Borough act (Pamph. L. 1910, p. 205), and section 85 of the General Election act (Pamph. L. 1898, p. 237), is legal. The act of 1911, page 276, known as the Geran act, does not apply. It is not necessary that a blanket ballot be used; separate ballots may be used at such an election.</p>

<p>3. Chapter 35 of the laws of 1009 (Pamph. L., p. 54; Comp. Stat., p. 4238) provides that when a person is killed or injured when attempting to cross the tracks of a railroad company, by being struck by a locomotive or train where gates are maintained, and such gates are not down at the time of the injury, the question whether the person so killed or injured was or was not guilty of contributory negligence shall be determined by the jury. This is meant to render liable railroad companies running trains through cities at any rate of speed, and does not limit the liability of such companies for accidents at crossings where safety gates are established, whether within or without a city, unless the safety gates are lowered.</p> <p>2. When the enacting clause of a statute is ambiguous the preamble may be resorted to to explain the intention of the lawmaker.</p> <p>3. Where the enacting clause of a statute is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms, the preamble cannot control the enacting part.</p> <p>4. Chapter 96 of the laws of 1909 (Pamph. L., p. 137; Comp. Stat., p. 4238) provides that wherever a railroad company has installed safety gates to protect the traveling public at any crossing, any person shall, during such hours as posted notices shall specify, be entitled to assume that such safety gates are in good order and will be duly operated, unless a written notice, “Out of order,” be posted in a' conspicuous place at such crossing; and in any action brought for injuries to person or property, or for death, at such crossing, the plaintiffs shall not be barred because of the failure of the person injured or killed to stop, look and ■ listen before passing over said crossing. Held, that the fact that ' no notice was posted by respondent at the crossing in question, cannot prevent the operation of this statute. To hold otherwise would be in effect to permit the respondent to reap the advantage of the failure to perform a duty which arises from the clearest implication.</p> <p>5. No notice having been posted at the crossing in question, giving the hours when the gates were to be operated, the respondent cannot successfully controvert the statement that a person passing over the crossing was not entitled to assume that the gates were in proper order, especially in the absence of a notice that the gates were out of order.</p> <p>6. Where the view of the deceased was obstructed by freight cars which stood within five feet of the crossing, and he could not see the approaching train until he had passed the freight ears, there being a distance of eight feet and three inches between, the two tracks, whether the deceased in proceeding onward, under all the circumstances, exercised duo care, presented a question for the jury.</p> <p>7. This action was brought for death occasioned by the wrongful act of defendant, and the mother was the next of kin to whom the damages would go. The trial court directed the jury to allow what capital sum would represent the money which the mother had a reasonable expectation of receiving during her life; that it seemed from the evidence that she did not get over six dollars a week, and that the jury were to find how many weeks she had a reasonable expectation of receiving that, and then capitalize that into a fixed sum. Held, that the word “capitalize,” as used, meant to convert a periodical payment into a sum in hand, and the jury are presumed to have so understood it, and the instruction so given, though not luminous, was technically correct.</p> <p>8. The trial court excluded a question as to the earnings of the plaintiff’s second husband, but the question was not directed to showing how much her second husband contributed to her support, but was merely introductory, and such ruling was not, in itself, harmful to the defendant.</p>

<p>1. The Practice act, section 69, provides that the recognizance which may be given by a defendant arrested on a capias ad respondendum shall be to the effect and not literally in the form therein set out, and section 77 provides, independently, that subsequent to the return of the capias ad respondendum,, either before or after judgment, the defendant may render himself or be rendered in discharge of bail. Held, that a recognizance given in the form set out in section 69, with the exception of omitting the last alternative in the condition contained in the statutory form, viz., “or render him (defendant) into the custody of the sheriff,” does not make the recognizance void.</p> <p>2. Our statute does not enact that a recognizance of bail given in a form varying from that set out shall be void; and we have no statute or rule which operates to nullify the recognizance sued on by the parties to this cause.</p> <p>3. The record in this cause being silent as to any eoerciop or duress, and the bond sued on not being prohibited by statute, and not being contrary to public policy, but, being founded upon a good and sufficient consideration and intended to subserve a lawful purpose, is, between the parties, good as a voluntary bond.</p> <p>4. The surety on a bond of the character, and given under the circumstances, above mentioned, is estopped from objecting to its validity.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. The trial judge, after charging the jury that they were to take all the testimony in the case and say whether or not the defendant told the truth, and after they had considered all the testimony then they were to take into consideration the question of reasonable doubt, proceeded as follows: “If there be any reasonable doubt in your mind as to his guilt, then, of course, you are to give him the benefit of the doubt and declare him not guilty. And in this connection I would say he has produced here a number of witnesses who have sworn to his good character ; they say that they have known him for several years last past, and that he has been a man of good character. In considering the testimony of the case, if you feel undecided as to what you ought to do, then you ought to take into consideration the testimony that was given concerning his character, and if that casts a reasonable doubt, in connection with the other testimony, upon his guilt, you must give him the benefit of that doubt.” Held, error, because the defendant was entitled to have all the relevant testimony including that relating to his good character and reputation, considered by the jury at the same time, and if there was a reasonable doubt of guilt, even if that doubt were engendered by previous good repute, he was entitled to be acquitted. Such right was denied to the defendant, when, by way pi qualification and limitation, the trial judge further charged as above stated, that “in considering the testimony of the case, if you feel undecided as to what you ought to do, then you ought to take into consideration the testimony that was given concerning his character, and if that casts a reasonable doubt, in connection with the other testimony, upon his guilt, you must give him the benefit of that doubt.” Baker v. State, 53 N. J. L. 45, approved and applied.</p> <p>2. When part of a charge is unsound and no proper qualification of it is to be found in the context or in the entire charge, there is error; and this is so when the erroneous part is in and of itself a particular qualification and limitation of language which, without such qualification and limitation, is unobjectionable.</p>

<p>1. Assuming that it is error to admit in evidence on the trial of an indictment for murder testimony given by a witness at a coroner’s inquest, which witness died after the inquest and before the trial, if such testimony be merely cumulative as to uncontroverted facts, the error is harmless. Cumulative evidence means additional evidence to support the same point and of the same character as evidence already admitted. Upon a disputed fact cumulative evidence might be the controlling factor in deciding the point in favor of the party offering it, and, in such a case, if the cumulative testimony were illegal, it would be injurious. Myers v. Weger, 62 N. J. L. 432, explained.</p> <p>2. The rules of law with regard to the admission of evidence are generally alike in civil and criminal cases; and evidence improperly admitted, but which is merely cumulative as to uncontroverted facts, is not injurious error, as well in criminal as ' in civil cases.</p> <p>3. Ornare: Is the testimony given by a witness at a coroner’s inquest, which witness died between the date of the inquest and the trial of the accused, admissible upon the trial of an indictment for murder upon the theory that such a proceeding is tantamount to a preliminary hearing of a charge against an accused person before a magistrate, when the hearing is conducted in the presence of the accused who is confronted with the witnesses and afforded an opportunity to cross-examine them, either by himself or with the aid of counsel?</p> <p>4. If in the course of a trial a witness is asked a question which is not objected to, and, after being answered, motion is made to strike out, but no recognized legal ground of objection is stated, although an observation be made by counsel in moving to strike out, which, of itself, is irrelevant to the answer and does not go to the question at all, the question and answer are properly allowed to stand because no legal or valid ground of objection is invoked against their admissibility.</p> <p>5. A voluntary confession is one not extorted by any sort of threats or violence or obtained by any direct or indirect promise; and, when shown not to have been induced by either the one or the other of these legally objectionable methods, it may be offered in evidence.</p> <p>6. A trial judge is justified in admitting in evidence the confession of a criminal defendant notwithstanding that the friends and family of the accused were denied admission to the jail until after the confession was made, there being no statute or rule of law which provides that a confession shall not be taken from a.prisoner until after he shall have been visited either by friends or relatives.</p> <p>7. It is the rule that on cross-examination a witness may not be examined relative to matter upon which he was not examined in chief, and which matter is material only by way of defence; and it is also the rule that if cross-examining counsel questions a witness upon matter not elicited on direct examination, he makes him his own witness as to such matter, the same as if he had called him when putting in his client’s proofs.</p> <p>8. In view of the law that a voluntary confession is one not extorted by any sort of threats or violence or obtained by any direct or implied promise, it cannot be involuntary because counsel representing the accused was not present when it was made.</p> <p>9. Article 6 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, providing, inter alia, that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defence, cannot be invoked by one indicted for an infraction of the penál code of tills state, as that amendment operates solely upon the federal authorities.</p> <p>10. The constitution of New Jersey provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel in his defence. It does not provide that a defendant shall have the right to have the assistance of counsel from the time of his .arrest, but 'only for his defence. The word defence, as here used, means that the defendant is entitled to be represented and defended by counsel when put in jeopardy on his trial, and that his counsel shall have reasonable access to the prisoner for the purpose of preparing his defence; and the provision cannot be construed to mean that one accused of crime shall have the benefit of counsel to advise him as to whether or not he shall confess.</p> <p>11. If a criminal defendant were entitled' to the assistance of counsel to advise him as to making a confession, his right in that regard would be no higher or greater than the right to have the assistance of counsel in his defence, which is a right and privilege for the benefit of accused persons which they may waive and renounce; and when the record in a criminal case does not disclose whether the defendant was of ability to procure counsel or whether he requested that counsel be assigned to him, it will be presumed that he failed to invoke the privilege.</p>

<p>The Water Company act of 1870 (Comp. Stat., p. 3635). authorizing water companies incorporated under that act, to “take and divert any and all such springs and streams of water * * * as shall be necessary and proper to enable said corporation to carry into effect the purposes of its incorporation” by condemnation proceedings, limits the exercise of such power to the acquisition of water, and water rights, which may be reasonably necessary for the supplying of the municipality, and the inhabitants thereof, in which tlie company’s works are located. The supplement of 1S88 (Pamph. L., p. 180) to the said act. providing that it should be lawful for any company incorporated under the act to add to and extend their works and to take all such land arid divert all such streams of water as shall be necessary for the purposes of its incorporation, does not enlarge such 7 power so as to give such -company the right of condemnation for the purpose of supplying water to other communities than the one in which its works are located.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 460.</p>

<p>On appeal from a judgment of the Supreme ('ouri.</p>

<p>1, Chapter 106 of the laws of 1911 imposes liability to pay for the cost of drainage incurred under color of an unconstitutional statute upon the municipalities in which the drained district lies, in proportion to the taxable ratables. Held, that the courts could not hold the act unconstitutional because the method of apportionment is unjust and inequitable.</p> <p>2-, Chapter 106 of the laws of 1911 is in form and effect a general law applicable to all cases where proceedings to drain had been taken and expense incurred under the unconstitutional act of 1903, and is not limited in its effect by proceedings had in particular municipalities.</p> <p>3. Chapter 106 of the laws of 1911 does not provide for a special assessment for benefits but for taxation for a public improvement, and the apportionment among the municipalities affected according to taxable ratables is within the power of the legislature.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Iiudson Circuit.</p>

<p>The act of 1908 (Pamph. L., p. 577; Comp. Stat., p. 1744, pl. 5e) makes it a high misdemeanor to encourage or incite the unlawful burning or destruction of public or private property. Held, that' an indictment which charged that the defendant willfully and unlawfully encouraged and incited to the destruction of private property failed to charge a crime under the statute, since it is the destruction that is required by the statute to be unlawful.</p>

<p>1. Certiorari is the proper remedy to review an order and proceeding of the Circuit Court against unknown owners and persons in interest had under section 3 of a supplement to the Martin act (Pamph. L. 1889, p. 309; Comp. Stat., p. 5218, ¶ 325), upon which a deed of conveyance to a purchaser at a tax sale is founded.</p> <p>2. In a proceeding under section 3 of a supplement to the Martin act (Pamph. L. 1889. p. 309; Comp. Stat., p. 5218, ¶ 325), where the order made by the Circuit Court, and the notice directed thereby, required the unknown owners, &c., “to redeem said lands on or before the 19tli day of December, 1908, or show cause before the Circuit Court on that day at ten o’clock in the forenoon at the court house in the city of Newark, why a deed therefor should not be delivered to the purchaser,” the owners had until ten o'clock in which to redeem or to show cause. They were, not required to do both. And the owners, having- redeemed the lands at nine-thirty o’clock in the forenoon by -payment to the city comptroller, the Circuit Court was without power at ten o’clock in the. forenoon or thereafter to make an order for the delivery of a deed.</p> <p>3. A petition against unknown owners of land, under section 3 of a supplement to the Martin act (Pamph. L. 1889, p. 309; Comp. Stat., p. 5218, ¶ 325), having for its object the delivery of a deed to a purchaser of lands at a tax sale, must describe the iands by metes and bounds, and in default of such description is invalid.</p> <p>4. Every requirement of section 3 of a supplement to the Martin act (Pamph. L. 1889, p. 309; Comp. Stat., p. 5218, ¶ 325), prescribing the procedure which tends to the security of the owner, or is for his benefit, must be. strictly conformed to.</p>

<p>1. In an action where several counter-claims arc. filed by the defendant, any one of them may be stricken out which the court finds cannot be conveniently tried with the other causes of action joined in the same suit.</p> <p>2. When it does not affirmatively appear upon what ground an order striking out a counter-claim was made, and there is no finding of the court below, on appeal all facts necessary to support the order will be presumed to have been found in favor of the prevailing party, and the order will be sustained if there is any ground disclosed by the record upon which the order could properly have been made.</p> <p>3. Where a defendant in one of several counter-claims sought to recover against the plaintiff, who was suing on a contract, an affirmative judgment for unliquidated damages for a tort committed by the plaintiff’s assignor, and thereby raised an issue which was separate and distinct from those raised by the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s other counter-claims, the court may strike out the counter-claim as not being convenient to try with other causes of action joined in the same suit.</p> <p>4. Plaintiff, an English manufacturer, contracted in writing with the defendant, of Newark, as follows: Defendant was to have ' the sole agency in the United States for the sale of plaintiff’s goods; plaintiff was to consign goods to the defendant “f. o. b. New York, duty paid;” the goods were to remain the property of the plaintiff until sold; defendant was to remit monthly for the stock sold at prices mentioned in the contract (less a discount of five per cent.) plus the net amount of duties paid by the plaintiff; either party might terminate the contract on six months’ notice in writing. The contract was so terminated. The plaintiff sued to recover amount due for goods sold. Held, that under the contract the defendant was not entitled to counterclaim for transportation charges from New York to Newark or for handling charges at the latter place.</p>

<p>1. In ail action against a railroad company for damages sustained by a traveler at a highway grade crossing, when the testimony given by the plaintiff was that his horse was walking, that he listened carefully for a bell or whistle and heard nothing, motions to nonsuit and to direct a verdict, upon the ground that there was no evidence of defendant’s negligence in failing to give the statutory signals, were property denied.</p> <p>•2. Chapter 278 of Pampli. L. 1910, p. 490, entitled “An act concerning the liability of railroads for injury to persons and property caused by running cars across public streets and highways, at which crossings no safety gates, bell or other device to give warning to the traveling public have been installed,” does not violate tiie constitutional provision that every law shall embrace but one object and that shall be expressed in the title. The sole object of the statute was to provide that in suits for injury or death occurring at a grade crossing where the railroad had not installed safety gates, hell or usual safety device, the plaintiff should not be nonsuited on the ground of contributory negligence, but the question whether the plaintiff or decedent exercised reasonable care should be left to the jury, and that object was within the purview of the title. \</p> <p>3. Chapter 278 of Pamph. L. 1910, p. 490, does not violate that clause of article 1, paragraph 7 of the constitution which provides that the right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate.</p> <p>4. The rules relating to nonsuiting the plaintiff in an action to recover for injuries or death of a traveler at an unguarded grade highway crossing of a railroad, having been established by the courts and not by the constitution, the legislature may change tliem by providing that the plaintiff shall not be nonsuited on the ground of contributory negligence, and that it shall be left to the jury to determine whether the plaintiff or decedent exorcised reasonable care under the conditions existing at the crossing at the time of such injury or death.</p>

<p>If a contract between a railroad company and an express company provides that the latter’s messenger shall render service to the railroad company and in consideration thereof receive a sum of money and also two passes a month for use of his family, such a pass is a “free pass” in the sense intended by the Hepburn act (34 Stat. at L., p. 584), and a clause printed on the pass whereby the passenger undertakes to assume all risks is binding on the party using it.</p>

<p>When a public utility corporation is in the enjoyment of privileges to use streets and public places in this state for the purposes of its business, whether such privileges be conferred by the state alone, or partly by the state and partly by the municipality, and whether they be exclusive or subject to duplication, such privileges constitute a special franchise which is property, is subject to taxation and has normally a substantial value; and in making a valuation of the property of such corporation for the purpose of establishing a basis for the regulation of rates to be paid to it by the public for its product or service, it is erroneous to assign no value, or a merely nominal value, to such franchise when a substantial value is fairly reflected in the total market value of its securities.</p>

<p>A railroad company is not chargeable with negligence as regards brakemen on its freight trains in failing to illuminate at night a low bridge over its tracks, in the absence of any proof that such a provision was customary in railroad practice.</p>

<p>1. Where a policy of fire insurance is written in a standard form approved by governmental authority, the maxim Verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem has no special applicability.</p> <p>2. A principal is liable for the fraud of his agent acting within the scope of his authority, whether or not the principal would benefit by the success of the fraud.</p> <p>3. Where an insurance policy provided that it should become void in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured touching any matter relating to the insurance or the subject thereof, whether before or after a loss, and the insured delegated to agents the duty of doing everything» required to make complete proof of loss, without question or supervision—Held, that the act of such agents in presenting false and fraudulent vouchers to the company pursuant to demand, vas imputable to the insured and that the policy vas vitiated.</p>

<p>1. In an action against a devisee of lands for the debt of the devisor, and also as executor of his last will and testament, the devisee answered denying the liability of her deceased ancestor for the debt, and confessed the devise of lands to her by the deceased debtor. The verdict was against her on the issue raised by the plea of non-liability, and a general judgment entered against her. Held, that the judgment should have been special that the debt be made out of the lands devised, because the answer denying the 'obligation of the ancestor was not a false plea within the terms of the statute making a devisee liable for a false plea.</p> <p>2. To make such a plea false and the pleader personally liable, it must be false to the pleader’s knowledge.</p> <p>3. Where a devisee is charged in respect to his ancestor’s debt, a plea denying the debt is not a false plea, for the charge is rested upon the debt of the ancestor, and his land only can be taken in execution, for that is the cause of his charge.</p>

<p>Where a person, employed by the insured to adjust a fire loss, innocently, and without intent to defraud, furnishes to the insurance company upon its demand, without the knowledge or concurrence of the plaintiff, copies of bills of purchases procured for him by a third person, whom he might justly assume had knowledge of the facts, and some of the bills proved to be false, such act is not a fraud chargeable to the plaintiff within the meaning of a clause contained in a policy of insurance that it shall be void for “fraud or false swearing,” where the insurer has not relied upon it or suffered any loss therefrom. Forfeitures are not favored in law, and where the insurance company has not been injured by the innocent mistake of an agent of the insured, his right to recover his actual loss is not forfeited for that reason.</p>

<p>The statute (Pamph. L. 1913, p. 810) provides that all persons who may have been elected as members of a board of chosen freeholders, the title to whose office has been adversely affected by a judicial decision may “have and receive the expenses incurred by them in and about procuring their election as members of such board according to their respective statements under oath and filed by them according to law.” Held, that by this statute the legislature has fixed the criterion by which the amount due for such expenses should be ascertained, and that the statement was conclusive evidence of the amount that might be recovered, and that a plea seeking to dispute the eanclusiveness of such certificate is frivolous and was properly stricken out.</p>

<p>Where the owner of a tract of land in the town of Bloomfield laid it out upon a filed map as a park, with streets and water mains therein, and in advertising the scheme informed the public that the houses thereon were to'be supplied with'water through pipes laid in the streets—Held, that bis failure to supply . water through the pipes gave to the owners of plots and their grantees a right to invite the town to supply the water and to use the park mains for that purpose. Held, further, that an implication arose from the grant eje necessitate that if the grantor failed to supply the water, the grantees might do so, or might authorize a third party, in this instance the town, to do so for them.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Essex Circuit.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Camden Circuit.</p>

<p>1. Where the infant plaintiff, about seventeen years of age. was employed by defendant, a carrier engaged in interstate commerce, to fire its engine preparatory to tlie same being attached to a train scheduled to run from Weehawken, New Jersey, to Ravenna. in New York, and while assisting in operating the engine in the railroad yard for the purpose, of taking on a barrel of oil to be. carried on the engine to Ravenna, the plaintiff was injured —Held, that at the time of the accident the plaintiff and defendant were engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the terms of tlie Federal Employers’ Liability act.</p> <p>2. The questions arising upon the controverted testimony as to the negligence of tlie defendant, under the circumstances, and as to the assumption of risk by the plaintiff. Held, to be jury questions.</p> <p>3. In the suit by tlie father to recover damages sustained by reason of the injury to the infant plaintiff—Held, that the Federal Employers’ liability act does not by its terms extend to the common law right of the father, and that in tlie absence of a clear legislative intent to so apply it. the common law right of recovery in the father subsists.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. Where the testimony at the trial showed that plaintiff’s intestate was walking along the centre of the platform of defendant railroad company, the platform at that point being about five feet in width; that a train of the defendant company, going at a high rate of speed, passed the platform, without any warning or notice of its approach being given, and the deceased was drawn toward the train and thrown to the platform with fatal results—• Meld, that the questions of the negligence of defendant or the negligence attributed to the deceased were for the determination of the jury.</p> <p>2. Where the complaint alleged that the train “did with great force and • violence strike, draw to it, and drag along the said Carl Schulz,” &c., there was enough in the complaint to have warranted the plaintiff to have based her claim for damages on the theory that deceased had been drawn toward the train by suction, especially since the case was tried on that theory without objection from defendant. ;</p>

<p>1. In a criminal prosecution for assault and battery and rape, the testimony of a sister of the prosecutrix of complaint made to her by the prosecutrix eight or ten hours after the assault, is admissible. The delay in making the complaint lessens the value and weight of such testimony, but does not affect its competency.</p> <p>2. The legal rule enunciated in State v. Ivins, 36 N. J. L. 233, that a complaint, made by a prosecutrix soon after a rape has been committed upon her, is admissible in evidence, commented upon -and explained.</p> <p>3. Where the objection made at the trial to certain testimony was that it was too remote to be admissible in evidence, and the trial court, in refusing to strike it out. made remarks in the . presence of the jury, to which no objection was made, no advantage of such remarks can be had on appeal on the ground that such remarks were injurious to the defendant.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Monmouth Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. The roof of an apartment-house, which is divided into separate apartments, stands upon the same basis as the passageways, staircases and the like, so far as the landlord’s liability for negligence extends.</p> <p>2. Evidence of changes and repairs made subsequent to the injury in an accident case is not admissible to show a prior wrong, but such evidence may become admissible for another purpose, and when so admissible the trial judge should be requested to limit its application, by the jury, to the purpose for which it was competent.</p>

<p>On appeal from 'Union Hi remit Court.</p>

<p>1. The act of J8HS, page 42(5, which is a supplement to the act of 1884, page 178, the title of which, regulating lettings in cases where no definite term is fixed, does not offend against article 4, section 7, plucitum 4 of the constitution of the state, which provides, “Every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.”</p> <p>2. The title to the District Court act cannot support a change in the relative rights and liabilities of landlords and, tenants, but it is broad enough to cover a mere transfer or extension of judicial power.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme -Court.</p>

<p>Under the evidence in this case (stated below) it was Held error for the trial court to charge the jury to the effect that if they found for the defendant they should find no cause of action, and if they found for the plaintiff then they should find a verdict for $672.65, “and that there was no middle ground in the case; it was either one thing or the other.”</p>

quantities as possible.’ Therefore under this contract the plaintiff was bound to ship the purchaser as nearty as possible eighty-three and thirty-three hundredths tons per month. The shipments began in November of 1911, and by March 1st there 'had been delivered three hundred and forty-two tons, or an average of . about eighty-five tons a month.

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>■On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion.is reported in 86 N. J. L. 446.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 1.</p>

Cahill, one of the defendants, for the purpose of obtaining from that court an order .directing the comptroller of the city of Newark to execute and deliver to her a deed of conveyance for certain lands in the county of Essex purchased by her at a tax sale held by the city comptroller on the 28th of May, 1906, including the final order made therein directing the execution and delivery of such conveyance by the comptroller. “At the hearing had before the (.’iron it Court,…

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 471.</p>

The suit was upon an alleged oral understanding by defendant to protect plaintiff against any loss that might be incurred by her purchasing certain mining stock at defendant’s suggestion as claimed. The stock deteriorated in market value, and plaintiff called upon defendant to indemnify her. It was disputed whether he had ever agreed to indemnify her, and also whether there was aim liability on such alleged agreement.

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

This case arose on a certiorari out of the Supreme Court directed to The Boulevard Commissioners of tho bounty of Hudson, awarding a contract for the relaying, re-inforcing and re-surfacing with bituminous concrete, of the Hudson boulevard between Newark avenue and the Paterson plank road in Jersey City, and Liberty place and Fourth street in the township of Weehawlcen, to the Uvalde Asphalt Paving Company.

<p>On appeal from the Hudson County Circuit Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 84 N. J. L. 463.</p> <p>On rehearing.</p>

The issues presented by the pleadings and submitted to the jury were—first, whether or not the services for which the plaintiffs claimed compensation were rendered by them to the defendant and were within the scope of the former’s employment by the latter, and second, the reasonable value of such services as were so rendered. “The grounds of appeal, nine in number, deal wholly with alleged errors in the admission of evidence.

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 505.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 478.</p>

<p>On appeal from tlie Camden Circuit Court.</p>

On error to the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed : “We think the trial court committed no error in refusing to permit the defendant to introduce in evidence a conversation… Held: had the power to control the place; or permitted or suffered it to be so kept and maintained, having the power to prevent it.

<p>On error to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Atlantic County Circuit Court.</p>

The plaintiff is an architect, and claims a lien for the agreed price for drawing plans and specifications and superintending the work of erecting a building for the defendant Laura Dalio.

Oil appeal from the Supreme Court, in which the following per curiam was filed: “The suit was instituted upon a mechanics’ lien, and the verdict of tlie jury was for the plaintiff. The parties to the litigation entered into a contract whereby the former was to provide all materials and perform the work necessary to replace and repair everything that was destroyed by fire, water or otherwise, in the building No. 216 Market street, Newark, on -January 29th, 1912.

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On appeal from the Supreme Court, whose opinion is reported in 86 N. J. L. 422.</p>