Volume 90 — New Jersey Equity Reports

<p>1. Section 0 of the act of March 3d, 1915 (P. L. 1915 p. 61), which provides that in all oases where any person shall die seized of any lands in his or her own right in fee-simple without devising the same, leaving him or her a widow or husband surviving, such widow or husband, as the case may be. shall take and have a life estate in one-third of such lands, is valid and constitutional, because the “object,” namely, the “descent” of land, is embraced in the title which is “An act amendatory of and supplemental to an act entitled ‘An act directing the descent of real estates,’ approved April sixteenth, eighteen hundred and forty-six.”</p> <p>2. Section 0 of the act of March 3d, 1915 (P. L. 1915 p. 61), was repealed by act of March 29th, 1917 (P. L. 1911 p. 81,1,) ; but, as complainant’s wife died intestate and without issue April 17th, 1916, while the acts was still in force, leaving her liusband, the complainant, her surviving, he took by descent a one-third interest for life in the land of which she died seized, and, his estate being vested, was not affected by the repealer.</p>

On motion ior leave to file an answer to a cross-petition in a divorce suit out of time, and to compel the husband’s solicitor to withdraw because he had formerly been the wife’s solicitor in another divorce suit between the same parties.

<p>1. A wife’s deed in which the husband was not made a party, did not convey the husband’s right of curtesy, although he was a subscribing witness to it.</p> <p>2. Where a husband did not join in a wife’s deed, the grantee did not receive a legal title to the land, but merely an equitable pledge.</p> <p>3. Where the. mortgagee had merely an equitable title to the land, the husband of the mortgagor not. having joined in the conveyance, a decree foreclosing the husband’s equity of redemption does not give the mortgagee a legal title to the land, and has no effect upon the husband’s curtesy, although the bill alleged joinder of the husband in the conveyance, which allegation the husband admitted by permitting a decree pro confesso to be taken against him.</p> <p>4. Such admission, in a suit for strict foreclosure, does not serve to give the mortgagee legal title to the premises upon entry of a decree foreclosing the right of redemption therein.</p>

<p>1. A provision in a contract for constructing water works, requiring the water to be pure and wholesome was complied with if the water was pure and wholesome at the time the water works were delivered, to the city according to the tests then known.</p> <p>2. Statutes of limitations do not apply to courts of equity, for the reason that the words of the statute apply only to particular remedies, but proceedings in equity to enforce a .legal right are within the spirit and meaning of the statutes and have always been so considered.</p> <p>3. In this case the city’s cause of action on account of the impurity of the water accrued at the latest when the city took over the water works and paid for them.</p> <p>4. Where the city obtained a deere.e directing .the water works contractor to convey the works to the city, an application for a bill of review on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, where the relief sought is money decreed for breach of the contract, not covered by the prayer of the original bill, the cause of action for which accrued after the entry of the original decree, is within the statute of limitations.</p> <p>5. Where the city recovered a decree directing the contractor to convey the water works to the city, and afterwards filed application for a bill of review on the ground of newly-discovered evidence to recover for breach of contract, an appeal will lie from the court’s denial of the application, as the city is a “party aggrieved.”</p>

<p>Where the law provides that officers whose duty it is to make a return to any writ shall put their own names thereto, and be amerced in damages for failure so to do, a constable serving a writ of ne exeat who made such return cannot, more than a year later and after his authority has expired, secure an order permitting amendment by changing the date of service, and make m a former sheriff’s name a return the truth of which is controverted.</p>

<p>Where a fund was deposited in a bank of discount in the name of A or B, in an active account, checks being drawn thereon by both parties, the parties are not joint tenants of the fund, and the fund does not therefore pass to the survivor on the death of one of the parties.</p>

<p>1. An action to levy an assessment on behalf of creditors upon the holders of stock of an Illinois corporation must be brought in Illinois and this court has no jurisdiction where the corporation has no assets, no agent and apparently no creditors in New Jersey.</p> <p>2. After a suit for an accounting of the assets and liabilities of an. Illinois corporation has been conducted to a finish in the State of Illinois and an assessment of stockholders ordered, to which proceeding all stockholders wherever resident are privies, and by which they are bound, then action can be maintained in a court of competent jurisdiction in New Jersey, against the executors of a former stockholder, to enforce such assessment.</p>

<p>On hearing on motion in behalf of alleged lunatic to vacate order for commission of lunacy.</p>

<p>On final hearing on hill of judgment creditor of husband to set aside a conveyance to the wife.</p>

<p>On bill for maintenance. On hearing on return of order to show cause for alimony and counsel fee pendente lite.</p>

<p>1. Equity can only recognize a voluntary intention to create a trust in land in favor of another when the trust has been executed — that is, when it has been perfectly and fully declared, and has thus resulted in the creation of a defined equitable estate in the donee.</p> <p>2. When a valuable consideration exists between the alleged trustee and the cestui que trust, a court of equity may deem a contract to declare a trust as equivalent to an actual declaration.</p> <p>3. 'While the terms of an express trust must be disclosed by written evidence with sufficient certainty tc enable a court of equity to enforce its performance, yet parole evidence is admissible to show the circumstances under which the written evidence was executed in aid of its construction.</p> <p>4. A voluntary parole promise by one to purchase land with his own money and hold it in trust for another is within the statute of frauds, and unenforceable as an express trust. If not founded on a consideration, even a written promise to become such a trustee could not be enforced as an express trust. <</p> <p>5. Revenue statements concerning- the real estate in question signed by’ the secretary or bookkeeper of the holder of the title to the land, and rendered to the supposed cestui que trust, or entries in the books of the legal holder of the title made by such secretary or bookkeeper, cannot be taken as evidence of the existence and terms of the trust to satisfy the words of the statute of frauds, unless such secretary or bookkeeper was authorized to declare a trust, especially as they do not disclose the nature and terms of any trust that may have existed.</p> <p>6. Parole evidence is not admissible to establish the nature and extent and terms of the interest of the cestui que trust. It may be used to construe latent ambiguities, but not to supply unstated terms to the signed writings which are claimed as executed voluntary declaration of trust.</p> <p>7. The evidence legally admissible in this case, held not to establish the trust stated in the bill.</p>

<p>1. An “estate upon condition” is granted on the limitation or condition that the grantee do certain things, or refrain from doing certain specified things, and if the grantee violates the prescribed conditions, the grantor may re-enter and take possession.</p> <p>2. An “estate upon conditional limitation” is one where the whole estate is given the grantee absolutely, to terminate absolutely on the happening of a specified event without re-entry; the mere happening of the event terminating' the estate, and the fee passing immediately elsewhere.</p> <p>3. Conditions subsequent are always construed strictly, and will never work a forfeiture unless clearly expressed in unequivocal terms or-necessarily implied.</p>

<p>1. Where sellers of real estate innocently misrepresent to the'buyers that the title was all right and marketable, and the buyers, relying on this representation part with their money, equity will grant them relief by rescission of the sale.</p> <p>2. If such sale is rescinded, the buyers must account for the use of the property and the sellers for the interest on the price paid.</p> <p>8. Tlie evidence in this case shows that the price of the property was $5,500 and not $5,000.</p>

William A. Bogers, the complainant’s grandfather, died seized of the land sought to be partitioned, leaving surviving a widow and five children.

<p>1. Emblements are covered by a mortgage until severance, but belong to the mortgagor afterwards, unless pledged specifically and expressly.</p> <p>2. The provisions of the mortgage under consideration did not give the mortgagee a lien in the crops after they were cut.</p>

<p>1. Where all of the estate of a life tenant charged with the payment of a legacy to remaindermen was bequeathed to one of the remainder-men, his executors must respond, although the legacy has no ear-marks of identification.</p> <p>2. If the life tenant got the entire principal of the legacy, where she had the right to use as much thereof as was necessary for her support, the fact that she mingled the legacy with her own funds would not, in the absence of fraud, require the executors of one to whom she bequeathed her entire estate, chargeable with the payment of the legacy, to account for the entire amount.</p>

<p>1. An insured cannot affect the rights of a beneficiary named in his policy of insurance by assigning the policy, although he reserved the right to change the beneficiary. An assignment is not a change of beneficiary.</p> <p>2. An “assignment” clause in a life insurance policy — Held, not to reserve dominion over the policy in the insured by implication so as to give an assignment the effect of a change of beneficiary.</p>

<p>1. The only question to be decided on objections to confirmation of a sale of lands under foreclosure of a mortgage is whether the price was the best that the property would then bring for cash.</p> <p>2. In a proceeding for confirmation of sale of lands under a foreclosure suit, in view of the purchaser’s lien thereon for money expended, a bid — Held, not so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience and prevent confirmation.</p> <p>3. Where the objection to the confirmation of sale was that the holder of a junior mortgage was prevented by illness from being present and bidding a specific price, and such mortgagee refused to make a deposit to guarantee his bid, the objection and bid must be held not bona fide.</p> <p>4. That a person appeared at the sale and urged the sheriff to delay the sale, stating that the money due on the decree could be secured, but refusing to state for whom he was acting, did not require the sheriff to delay the sale.</p>

<p>1. An agreement between a widow and a daughter to divide the principal oí the estate of a deceased equally, held fair, made without concealment or effort at overreaching,'and will not be set aside at the suit of the widow, but will be specifically enforced as prayed by the daughter.</p> <p>2. The will involved in this case created no trust, and an agreement to divide the estate equally between the widow and the daughter is valid.</p>

<p>On motion to strike out bill.</p>

<p>1. Sixty years unbroken adverse possession sets at complete rest a title to lands.</p> <p>2. Where parties entered into an enforceable contract for sale of lands, the time for performance of which was twice extended because of a mutual mistake as to the marketable character of the title to the lands involved, such contract will be enforced even if the terms of the extension agreements were not fully complied with, especially when it appears that the doubt as to the character of the title was raised by the defendant’s lawyer and agent, who afterwards acknowledged his mistake, and advised the defendant to accept the title offered.</p>

<p>1. A married woman may, with her husband, mortgage her land to secure the payment of a debt of his, or of any other person, for the payment of which she is in no way liable. Merchant v. Thompson, 34 N. J. Eq. 73, followed.</p> <p>2. The evidence in this case does not prove that there was no consideration for the mortgage in question, nor that it was a voluntary conveyance, and void under the statute of frauds.</p> <p>3. If a second purchaser of a mortgage with notice, acquire title from a first purchaser who was without notice and Ztona fide, he succeeds to all the rights of his immediate grantor.</p>

<p>A married woman’s contract lor the sale of lands is not enforceable in equity unless it lias been acknowledged by her in compliance with the statute.</p>

<p>1. The market value of the premises at the time of execution of a lease.with option to purchase is the measure of the fairness of the contract as respects the optionee’s right to specific performance.</p> <p>2. Under a lease containing an option to purchase, where the lessee exercised his option by notice in writing served on the owners, the contract to purchase was complete, vesting the equitable title in the lessee, and afterwards the owners could not, by breach of the covenant to convey, compel the continuance of the relation of landlord and tenant for the purpose of creating a breach of the covenant to pay rent, so as to enable them to declare the option forfeited.</p> <p>3. The complainant in a suit for specific performance of the purchase option in a lease is not precluded from prevailing because he failed, after exercising the option, to tender rent to mortgagees who held an assignment of rents, where debts to them could be fully protected upon passing of title.</p> <p>4. Where a lease of certain lands contained an option to purchase those and other adjoining lands, a sublease thereof, whether considered as an assignment of the lease or not, is not an assignment of the option to purchase.</p> <p>5. The evidence in this case shows that neither the lessee nor the sub-lessee intended that the option contract in the lease should pass to the sublessee.</p> <p>O. Where improvements to the property were ordered by the tenement-house commission to be made, which improvements increased the value of the property, it would be inequitable not to charge them to the purchaser.</p> <p>7. Where an option to purchase is silent as to the character of the title to be given, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the rebuttable implication arises that the title is to be free from encumbrances, but such implication may be overcome by parol evidence.</p> <p>S. Whore the option was “to purchase for a certain sum’ this indicates that the parties intended that title should pass in the ordinary manner, viz., that the deed and the purchase-money should be delivered and the encumbrances discharged simultaneously, and therefore to enforce specific performance the purchaser need not tender the money with his notice of the exercise of his option.</p>

<p>1. Where it is apparent that there exists a patent ambiguity, in that no beneficiary is named in the residuary clause in a will, parol evidence is inadmissible to supply the omission.</p> <p>2. A will must be considered in its entiret\f to determine if possible who was intended as beneficiary in a residuary clause in which no beneficiary was named.</p> <p>3. In construing' a will, the court may not indulge in mere speculation as to who was intended as the beneficiary in a residuary- clause.</p> <p>4. Where a residuary clause in a will failed to name a beneficiary, and it can neither be construed with other parts of the will nor determined from the construction of the whole will who was intended to be such beneficiary, such paragraph or clause must be held void.</p>

<p>1. Where by a codicil the testator increased the amount of the gift to his son, which was hedged around with conditions, the increased gift must be construed in the same manner as if it had been included in the original will.</p> <p>2. The terms of the will in this case creates a spendthrift trust in favor of the son.</p> <p>3. A testator may lawfully make a bequest of money directly to a legatee without the intervention of trustees, postponing the time of payment, or giving direction to Ms executors to make partial payments thereof at such times as they might deem proper.</p> <p>4. The testator, in creating a spendthrift trust, need not specify in the will the particular weakness of the legatee.</p> <p>5. A bequest of “my coal business” does not include coal on hand or a bank account kept in connection with the business, but does include the leasehold, wagons, horses and other equipment. The word “business” cannot be restricted to the trade and good-will.</p>

<p>1. This court cannot regulate the internal affairs of foreign corporations. AVbat are such internal affairs defined?</p> <p>2. The mere fact that the complainant is a resident of this state and that the property to which corporate action relates is situate therein, are not in themselves sufficient to justify this court in assuming jurisdiction to regulate the affairs of the corporation.</p>

<p>1. Under policies of life insurance, payable to insured’s wife, containing options or privileges of assignment, surrender for cash value, or substitution for another form of policy, or change of beneficiary, none of which options were exercised by the insured during his life, the proceeds of the policies, after the death of the insured, are payable to the beneficiary named in the policies, and not to a judgment creditor of the deceased, except as to premiums paid thereon 'by the insured after his insolvency.</p> <p>2. Section 38 and section 39 of the Insurance act (3 Comp. Stat. p. 2850) are not unconstitutional as violating the provision that laws shall have but one object and that object shall be expressed in the title.</p> <p>3. That policies of insurance are by their terms payable in another state is immaterial in a suit by a creditor who seeks in this court to subject the proceeds of the policies to the lien of his debt.</p>

<p>On bill, &C.</p> <p>On application for instruction to receiver.</p>

<p>On motion to strike out bill.</p>

<p>1. A court of equity has inherent jurisdiction, independent of statute, to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud. Carris v. Carris, 24 N. J. Eq. 516, followed.</p> <p>2. Power in some established court will be found to secure any civil right or redress any civil wrong.</p> <p>3. The fraud for which a court‘of equity will annul a marriage must be extraordinary, of an extreme kind and with respect to an essential of the contract, and the court will not grant relief where, even if the fraud be present, to vitiate the marriage, would be against good policy, sound morality and the peculiar nature of the marriage relation.</p> <p>4. If a party to a marriage is imposed upon by false representations of the other party, a court of equity will annul the marriage unless it appears that to annul it would be against good policy, sound morality and the peculiar nature of the marriage relation, and every case must bo determined according to its own facts. '</p> <p>5. Tile suppression by one party of the fact that he is suffering from a disease which renders the close intimacy of the marriage relation dangerous to the other, and which may result in a transmittal of the disease to offspring, is such fraud as will warrant a court of equity in annulling a marriage.</p> <p>C. Where, at the time of marriage, defendant husband was suffering from hereditary chronic tuberculosis and did not inform petitioner of the fact, for the reason that he feared, if he did, she would not marry him, and it appears that if she - had been so informed she would not have, in fact, married him, there was such fraud as will warrant the court in annulling the marriage, notwithstanding the fact that the parties lived together as husband and wife for a period of six months, until the discovery by the wife of the existence of the disease, and notwithstanding the fact that there was a child born, which only lived for four days, where it appeared that, immediately upon the discovery of the existence of the disease, petitioner ceased cohabitation.</p>

<p>On appeal of Rosie Soos from determination of receiver rejecting claim.</p>

<p>1. In a case in which it appeared that in October, 1916, the federal district court of this district had taken over the administration of the affairs of a corporation (engaged in the business of undertaking) in a general administration suit instituted by a non-resident creditor and stockholder with the consent of the corporation, and that the business had been conducted from the time of the appointment of the receiver down to the present time, and that none of the assets of the corporation had been liquidated except such as were liquidated incidentally in the running of the business, upon the application of a creditor upon a bill filed under the statute, in the court of chancery it was held — (a) that the proceedings in the federal court did not preclude proceedings under the statute in the court of chancery; (Z>) that the court of chancery would take jurisdiction, the statutory requisites being present; (e) that notwithstanding the fact that the assets were within the control of the federal receivers a receiver would be appointed, the statute and public policy requiring that, the corporation having been enjoined from exercising its privileges and franchises there should be in existence a statutory agent known as a receiver and the creditors and stockholders being entitled to the appointment of a receiver to represent their interest as well as the interests of the corporation; (d) that the receiver would be instructed to apply to the federal court to set up the proceedings in the court of chancery, urge that the proceedings in that court supersede the proceedings in the district court and ask the district court to direct the delivery to him of the assets for administration in the court of chancery; to ask the district court to, in any event, turn over to him the funds derived through the administration in the federal court before any distribution to creditors, to the end that the funds may be dealt with in accordance with the statute; to appear, if he is so advised, in the federal court, to urge upon that court such considerations as he may be advised is proper and in the interest of his cestui que trustent, and authorized to perform such acts, including, if he is so advised, consents in the federal court as he may consider in the interests of his trust, provided that he is not to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the federal court, as that court may have power to direct him in the performance of his duties as receiver, or to enjoin him from the performance of his duties, or any act directed' by the court of chancery, or to direct him to perform any act which may be forbidden by the court of chancery.</p> <p>2. The nature of proceedings under the statute concerning insolvency, &c„ considered and likened to probate proceedings.</p> <p>3. The court of chancery will, and will direct its receiver to, co-operate with the federal court so that there may be no loss to creditors or stockholders.</p>

<p>1. Upon exceptions to an adverse master’s report in a divorce case, where the hearing is brought on before .a vice-chancellor, under rule 113, he may direct the taking of additional testimony,, either in open court or before a master, and upon the return of the testimony deal with the subject-matter of the exceptions upon the entire record.</p> <p>2. In this case exceptions having been filed to an adverse report, the hearing brought on under rule 113, an order having been made permitting petitioner to take additional testimony before the master and permitting the master to return a supplemental report, and the additional testimony having been returned with a supplemental report of the master, to the effect that he considered that a case had been made out, the entire record was considered and a decree nisi advised.</p> <p>3. The rule is as well settled that corroboration may be by circumstances, as that relief will not be granted upon uncorroborated testimony of petitioner or defendant, or both.</p>

<p>1. In a case in which a corporation was organized for the purpose of reorganizing two preceding corporations, and its securities, first and second mortgage bonds, and stock were issued to security holders of the preceding corporations, and its board of directors from the outset was, in reality, representative of its first mortgage bondholders, and not in any true sense representative of its creditors and stockholders, and where, after a plan of reorganization had been formulated, under the provisions of which the first mortgage was to .be foreclosed, and all of its property bought in by a representative of the first mortgage bondholders, and then transferred to a corporation to be organized, the securities of such new corporation to be issued to the security holders of the old corporation, and proceedings were instituted to foreclose the first mortgage in pursuance of such plan, consented to by the board of directors, upon which there are a majority of the committee of first mortgage bondholders having power to bind the first mortgage bondholders to any act which might be considered necessary to secure the success of the plan, and with the consent of the board of directors a receiver was appointed, held that the first mortgage bondholders will be considered as mortgagees in possession and the new corporation to whom the assets have been transferred in pursuance of the plan, and whose securities have been issued in pursuance thereof, will be held liable upon a contract entered into by the old corporation, and a contractor, at a time after the plan had been formulated and agreed to and a short time prior to the filing of the bill to foreclose the first mortgage in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, providing for the filling in and enhancing the value of the lands of the corporation, the work proceeding during the time of the receivership and under the direction of the receiver, the contract having been entered into with the knowledge of the committee of bondholders.</p> <p>2. Bondholders are estopped from denying responsibility on a contract. the result of the performance of which, during a time when their representatives knew that proceedings in their behalf were being taken to foreclose the interest of the mortgagor and to effect a vesting of title in their creature, has been to enhance the value of their property, the contractor being without notice of any such proceedings.</p> <p>S. The second mortgage bondholders of the old concern who have been let in gratuitously to participate in the securities of the new concern, after a foreclosure of their rights in the old concern, cannot complain if the claim of a contractor, for work performed, which has enhanced the value of the property during foreclosure proceedings, is preferred to any interest that they may have.</p> <p>4. In a situation where a corporation was in control of a board of directors in reality representing first mortgage bondholders, and there was a committee of first mortgage bondholders, the majority of whom were members of the board of directors of the corporation, which committee had power from the bondholders to perform all acts which might be necessary in their judgment to effect a plan of reorganization, and a plan had been formulated, which provided for the foreclosure of the first mortgage, the purchase of the property by the representative of the first mortgage bondholders, the transfer to a corporation to be incorporated, and the issuance of securities by the new corporation to holders of securities in the old corporation, and on the eve of proceedings to foreclose being instituted and the plan carried out, a contract was made, to the knowledge of the representatives of the first mortgage bondholders, providing for work on the land which enhances its value, and the work proceeded without notice to the contractor of the plan, or of the proceedings thereunder, during most of which time the property was under the control of a receiver appointed at the instance of the first mortgage bondholders, with the acquiescence of the corporation, and the receiver supervised such work and actually participated therein, and the property was subsequently bought in by the nominee of the bondholders, and by him transferred to a corporation, incorporated by the bondholders, and the securities of that corporation issued to security holders of the old concern, in accordance with the plan, held that the land in the hands of the new corporation is charged with the lien for the amount that it has been enhanced by the work of the contractor, and that second mortgage bondholders who have been gratuitously let in after the foreclosure by the first mortgage bondholders are not entitled to any rights as against the contractor.</p> <p>5. In such a ease the land upon which the improvement had been made having 'been sold to a bona fide p'urchaser for value, without notice, a money decree may go against the new corporation, or such other decree as will have the effect of preferring the contractor to the interests of the first and second mortgage bondholders of the old concern.</p>

<p>Where a decree of the court of chancery is reversed by the court of errors and appeals, with costs, both in the court of errors and appeals and the court of chancery, the court of chancery may, under the provisions of section 91 of the act concerning the court of chancery (1 Comp. 8tat. p. JJiS), on entering a decree on the remittitur, award a reasonable counsel fee to the party prevailing in the court of errors and appeals, for services rendered in the court of chancery, to be included in the taxed costs.</p>

<p>The preference given by section 22 of the Workmen’s Compensation act (Comp. mat.-first supp. p. 16ÜS) is. in the case of insolvent corporations. under section SB of an act concerning corporations (Comp. Stat. p. 1650), confined to an amount representing the weekly award for the two- months preceding the institution of the proceedings in insolvency.</p>

<p>1. The right of the court of chancery to partition property in this state does not depend upon: statute.</p> <p>2. Where it appears that complainant and others, parties to the suit, derive title through a will made in 1836, probated in 1844, of lands, which are vacant salt meadow, not subject to be taken possession of in the ordinary method, and it not appearing that there are any adverse claimants, the parties having color of title, and there being nothing to prevent actual entry, the rights of the parties may be partitioned in equity.</p> <p>3. The general rule that, before a court of equity will decree partition, proof of title must be made which would prima facie entitle parties applying to a verdict in ejectment does not apply in all cases.</p>

<p>On appeal from Hudson county orphans court.</p>

<p>On appeal oí Jane IT Yan Winkle from order or decree of Bergen county orphans court.</p>

<p>Where a fund was on deposit in a business enterprise and by written document the owner of the fund agreed that the owner of the business should pay him interest in the fund during his life, and at his death the fund should belong to the owner of the 'business, such fund is not a “gift to .take effect at death” within the meaning of the Transfer Inheritance Tax law.</p>

<p>Where a deed and agreement, construed together, vest a right of user of a railroad siding so long, as the siding-, .continues to exist, unless sooner terminated on notice, any interference with the enjoyment thereof, so long as it remains in full force, entitles the aggrieved party to injunctive relief.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Backes and reported ante p. 65.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of tlie prerogative court adiised by Yiee-Ordinal’y Stevenson.</p>

<p>1. Courts of eguity will not aid one man to restrict another in the uses to which he may lawfully put his property unless the right to such aid is clear.</p> <p>2. Every doubt and ambiguity in the language of a covenant restricting an owner’s use of his property must be resolved in favor of the owner’s right.</p> <p>3. "Whether or not a covenant that “no building shall be erected on said lot unless the front foundation wall of the said building is at least seventy-five feet from” the street, is violated by the construction of a second-story sleeping porch upon the original one-story enclosed porch which rested upon three small cement piers, and which latter porch and piers, while in part within the restricted area, admittedly were not in violation of the covenant, is not so clear that a court of equity will aid in its enforcement.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree advised, by AUce-Chancellor Griffin, whose opinion is reported" in 104 Atl. Rep. 142, and 88 N. J. Eq. 91.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree in the prerogative court advised by Vice-Ordinary Lewis, reported in 89 N. J. Erg. 497.</p>

<p>On appeal from the court of chancery.</p>

<p>Chapter 154, P. L. 1916, provides a method of abating a public nuisance in., a summary manner, in the court of chancery, involving, inter alia, the sale of the premises in which the disorderly house is located, regardless of the knowledge of the owner, as to the disorderly conduct of the inmates. It was necessary to prove ownership of the premises in one of the defendants, and one of the complainant’s solicitors testified that he had searched the' records and found title in the alleged owner. — Held, not the best evidence and that the property in question could not be appropriated and placed in custodia legis, without" proper legal, proof of its ownership. — Held, also, that a defendant joining in a petition of appeal, without giving notice of appeal, was coram non judice.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Lewis, reported in 88 N. J. Eq. 143.</p>

<p>On appeal from the court of chancery.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Lane, whose opinion is reported in 89 N. J. Eq. 319.</p>

<p>On appeal from a Recree of tlie court of chanbery advised by Vice-Chancellor Lewis, whose opinion is reported in 88 N. J. Eq. 487.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised hy Vice-Chancellor Griffin, whose opinion is reported in 88 N. J. Eq. 99.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevens, whose opinion is reported in 88 N. J. Eq. 432.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Lane, whose opinion is reported in 88 N. J. Eq. 121.</p>

Cook, deceased, Eutli, Edmund, George and Margaret, each received from their father’s estate $109,510.30. Their mother, Margaret P. Cook, George E. Cook and Henry Palmer were appointed their guardians in April, 1911. In December, 1912, George E. Cook resigned, waiving compensation, and received his discharge. The two remaining guardians were continued under a new order of appointment, and in September, 1917, Mr. Palmer applied for and received his discharge.

The relief is prayed in aid of an action at law. “The officers of the company, so the bill charges, agreed to and with complainant that if he would procure a person who was ready, willing and able to invest approximately $50,000 as additional capital, the company would pay him $5,000 for bis services, he immediately to subscribe this sum to. the company’s stock. “It is said that one Kritzman was, through the efforts of complainant, ready and willing to make the investment.

“In 1913 two coi-porations — the Newark Brass Plate and Engraving Company and the James N. Morehouse Company — were doing business in Newark under the management and control of one Van Sickle. They owed the complainant, bank, $9,300 on a judgment recovered by it. The bank held stock of these corporations as collateral and had, in December, 1913, issued execution and made a levy upon their tangible property.

residence at Brotmanville, in this state. Their married life does not seem to have been the happiest, their dispositions being the opposite of each other. I think that the complainant was of a nervous, excitable disposition and apt to take offence at slight things, while that of the defendant was sullen and moody. Their married life was quite stormy, but I cannot say that the defendant was entirely responsible for it.

F. Gsand to complainant July 16th, 1913, and recorded July 19th, 1913. Both deeds express money considerations and declarations to the use of the grantee.

<p>On petition, &c. On application for sale of lunáticas personal properly.</p>

<p>On exception to master’s report.</p>

On bill, &c. On petition, &c. On application for an order that respondent forthwith, pay over moneys collected as solicitor.

<p>1. In a suit lor divorce for desertion none of the time occupied by the pendency of a former proceeding for divorce by one of the parties agains! the other can be computed as part of the time of the desertion in the' later case; and this, whether the same party is petitioner in both cases or is petitioner in the later one and defendant in the prior one. or vice versa, provided the first suit was Iona, fide.</p> <p>2. If a party files a petition for divorce for desertion, and afterwards files a petition for divorce as for a constructive desertion upon the same underlying facts, the petitioner will be 'permitted to amend the first petition by substituting a charge of constructive desertion for the allegation of actual desertion, and to. dismiss the second petition.</p>

<p>On final hearing on pleadings and prooís.</p>

<p>1. A purchaser of land sold for unpaid taxes under the Martin act has no right of entry on the land purchased until six months after the service of the notice required by the act.</p> <p>2. If no entry be made by the purchaser within twenty years next after such right of entry accrues, he is barred by the statute of limitations.</p>

<p>Where a testatrix gives her property to trustees to pay the income therefrom to her son for life, and, if necessary, to use part of the corpus for hig benefit, he being her sole heir-at-law and'next of kini and directs that after the death of her son the estate shall be distributed among her legal heirs and next of kin, the estate goes to the nephew and nieces of testatrix, on the son’s death, to the exclusion of the son’s widow.</p>

On vendor’s suit to compel specific performance bj vendee of a contract to accept deed to real estate and pay for the same. Heard on stipulations and papers admitted in evidence by consent.

<p>1. Under the Descent act of New Jersey, as amended by P. L. 1915 p. 67, the word “ancestor” means anyone from whom an estate is inherited.</p> <p>2. Where a person inherited a tract of land, onc-lialf from his father and one-lialf from his brother, and died intestate, both his maternal and paternal uncles share in the one-half part inherited from the intestate’s brother — the paternal uncles only in the part inherited from his father.</p> <p>3. Den v. Searing, 8 N. J. Law 340, followed.</p>

<p>1. The absolute inability of a defendant to perform bis undertaking at all, when called upon by a court to do so, precludes a decree against Mm for specific performance.</p> <p>2. Specific performance of a covenant in a deed granting to a city land for park purposes that the park would not be obstructed will not lie where the city lias by contract bound itself not to condemn the pier which is claimed to be an obstruction until it condemns other piers, and eomtilainants have acquiesced in that agreement.</p> <p>3. Where an answer to a bill for, specific performance shows a defence to the primary relief prayed for, it will not be stricken out on motion even though the alternative relief prayed for might be granted in the pleadings.</p> <p>4. Where a deed granting land to a city for park purposes contains a covenant, not forming part of the limitation in the deed, that the park shall remain unobstructed, the land would not revert for breach of covenant because at one end of the park there was a pier, but at most an action for damages might lie.</p>

<p>1. It is within the (jurisdiction of this court to entertain a bill to rescind and cancel a contract procured through coercion, misrepresentation, or any other fraudulent means, and in such suit to enjoin proceedings at law for the enforcement of the contract, and also to award recovery of the money paid under and by reason of the fraudulent contract. Whether the jurisdiction should be exercised, however, depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.</p> <p>2. Where a successful defence at law would afford but partial relief to complainant in this suit, that is alone a justification for the reten-, tion of the bill.</p> <p>3. The averments in the bill and affidavit in this case held to allege sufficient to justify a restraint of a trial at law until final hearing in tliis court.</p>

<p>On petition for divorce. On hearing on petition of defendant for alimony pendente lite.</p>

<p>1. The fact that a grantor, at or about the time it conveyed a block of lots with a restrictive covenant, conveyed to the same person another adjacent block of lots without the restrictive covenant, constitutes no defence to the right of an owner of one of the lots.in the restricted block to enforce the restrictive covenant.</p> <p>2. A hotel company which had 'no public bar and no place where liquor could be purchased except as it was ordered for service at a table, and served from a room to which the guests had no entry, was running a “public drinking house” within the restrictive covenant in the deed under consideration.</p> <p>3. A restrictive covenant in a deed will not bo enforced unless its • meaning is clear and free from doubt.</p> <p>4. A covenaut in a deed that the 'grantee shall not use the premises described to erect on said premises any building to be used for certain purposes, does not relate alone to the erection of a building for any of the purposes named, but prohibits such use of buildings already built.</p>

<p>1. A first and second mortgage to a building and loan association, prior in time to another to a brewing company, never having been canceled of record, will take precedence over the mortgage given the brewing company, although the building and loan association included them in still another mortgage to it, which itself may be subsequent to the mortgage to the brewing company.</p> <p>2. Every grantee is bound by everything that appears in his deed.</p> <p>3. A grantee is chargeable with knowledge of the title of his grantor as it exists in unbroken sequence on the records of the clerk’s office.</p> <p>4. A deed or mortgage made by a grantor in a fictitious name, good as between the parties, is not good as against a purchaser for value without actual or constructive, notice.</p> <p>5. Where a mortgage was recorded in a name not the name of the real maker, such mortgage was not constructive notice to a subsequent mortgagee.</p> <p>6. The recording of a deed to a man and his wife by the name of “Borbely” was constructive notice of tlie real names of the owners of the land to a mortgagee who took from them a mortgage in the name of “Barbi,” sometimes known as “Bavboe.”</p>

<p>Where a will causes a debt to be a charge upon the lands of a testator, there is an equitable estate in lands created thereby, and the debt not being barred by the statute of limitations at the testator’s death, it may be enforced within twenty years from his death against the lands as though- it were a legal estate given by will.</p>

<p>On motion to strike out.</p>

<p>On bill, pleadings and proofs.</p>

<p>1. Mistakes wliicli might have been avoided by common and ordinary care, and which result from negligence, will not be reformed in equity.</p> <p>2. There is .no authority for the doctrine that a unilateral mistake is ground for reformation in the absence of fraud.</p> <p>3. One who seeks reformation of a written instrument has the burden of proof.</p> <p>4. Equity will not decree a reformation when the. result will be inequitable.</p>

<p>On bill, pleadings and proofs in open court.</p>

<p>Where a case is referred to a master to ascertain what will be a reasonable sum to be paid to a grantor for services and profit in the purchase and sale of property, a finding by the master of a certain sum for the services of the grantor, no finding being made for the profit on the purchase and sale of the property in view of the services of the grantor and their value to the grantee, exception to such finding will be sustained.</p>

<p>Tlie fair value of lands of a cemetery company is properly ascertained by subtracting from their gross value the expenses of future development of the lands for cemetery purposes, and treating the association as a going concern, making no deduction to cover possible losses if the cemetery should not continue to be operated as a cemetery.</p>

<p>1. A vendor’s lien for unpaid purchase-money does not attach to lands sold to a cemetery association and devoted' to burial purposes.</p> <p>2. A vendor’s lien for unpaid purchase-money on lands of a cemetery association not used for burial purposes is waived by the agreement of t-ho vendor to accept payment out of the proceeds of tilio sale of burial plots.</p> <p>3. The costs of administration of a receivership are entitled to priority of payment regardless of the liens and claims of the litigants in a cause.</p>

<p>1. In a suit to prevent the surrender for cancellation of a bond and mortgage given by one of the complainants to one of the defendants, evidence held to show that the mortgagor had formed a company and caused that company to execute and deliver, or tender for delivery, its bonds 'and mortgages as agreed upon with the creditor, and thereby he satisfied his personal bond and mortgage, and was entitled to the surrender thereof.</p> <p>2. Where the private counsel of a creditor company was also its selection as a member of the creditors’ committee, his actions in this dual capacity must be regarded primarily as those of a committeeman.</p>

<p>1. Where a fire loss was submitted to appraisers who appointed an umpire to decide upon matters of difference only, items on which the appraisers agree should not be submitted to the umpire.</p> <p>2. When differences between the appraisers are submitted to the umpire, he is .not bound to coincide with the opinion of either appraiser, nor to confine himself within the limits 'of the appraisers’ estimates, but is required to use his own best judgment and make an independent valuation.</p> <p>3. Where an umpire or arbitrator exceeds his authority, the effect of his act is the same whether it was done -consciously -or by mistake, as in either -ca-se his award is void for misconduct. In the legal idea of misconduct, an evil intention is not u necessary ingredient.</p> <p>-1. Because the umpire did not perform his legal duty in one instance, the whole award need not be sent back to the appraisers, but may be corrected by this court.</p>

<p>1. inhere a company manufacturing- chemicals at a point on a river, five miles above the intake of water' supplied to a city for drinking purposes. discharges factory refuse into the river, and deposits such refuse on tlie river bank, such company will be enjoined from so doing at the suit of the department of health of the .state. Actual pollution of the water by the refuse need not be shown, as the statute imperatively prohibits the deposit of sueli refuse in portable streams or upon the banks thereof.</p> <p>2. Banks and rivers defined.</p>

<p>1. Where the record of a case exhibits the identity of the parties, the cause of action and the subject-matter, the essential elements of a plea of res adjudicata are exhibited; the forum, the form of the remedy and the nature of the xelief are immaterial.</p> <p>2. If after a decree in equity a party shall proceed at law for the same matter, eqixity will restrain him by injunction; such suit at law is treated as a contempt of court.</p> <p>3. Where a court of equity has jurisdiction over a transaction on account of alleged fraud, it does not lose jurisdiction because of the equities of an innocent pxxrchaser; it may refuse to exercise its juiisdiction agaixxst such higher equities.</p>

<p>1. A secret profit realized by a president of a company from an undertaking to deliver the corporate control of the company, enures to the corporation.</p> <p>2. Where the president of a company clandestinely dealt with corporate assets for his private gain, he is culpable, and not personally entitled to the profits of the transaction; and it makes no difference whether or not the transaction was independently -profitable to the company. A trustee is liable for secret profits even though the transaction from which they arose benefited the trust.</p>

<p>1. A gift to be effective in perpetuity must be charitable exclusively.</p> <p>2. Where a gift is to the trustees of a church, the income therefrom to be used “for support of the church or such benevolent purposes as the trustees of said church shall direct,” the power to use the fund for “such benevolent purposes as the trustees shall direct” embraces objects not charitable, and brings the gift within the rule" against perpetuities.</p>

<p>Where a life tenant of real estate, which was encumbered by a mortgage to a building and loan association, which also held shares of its own stock, the property of the life tenant’s deceased wife, as additional security for the mortgag-ed loan, paid dues to the building and loan association on isuch stock which dues will ultimately be applied to extinguish the mortgage indebtedness, he is entitled to be subrogated as to the shares of stock to the extent that he has made or will make payments thereon, and also when the association applies the dues paid on the stock in satisfaction of the mortgage, his right to subrogation as to the mortgage will then .be completo, and the mortgage must then be transferred to him to be realized out of the mortgaged premises.</p>

<p>1. -Possession is presumed to be in the holder of the legal tine to land, and a decree must go to him unless the defence of adverse possession is made out, clearly and positively, by a preponderance of evidence.</p> <p>2. In suit to quiet title to a strip of land fronting- about four feet on a street, and extending back about forty-one feet between the bouses of complainant and defendant, evidence held to show that defendant had not established adverse possession beyond a certain point, which included only one-lialf of the strip in dispute.</p>

<p>1. Where O. bought real estate at a bankruptcy sale in his own name, which sale, was afterwards confirmed by the bankruptcy court, and the trustee ordered to execute a deed to the purchaser, and afterwards the trustee executed a deed to O. and his wife, on the death of O. the wife takes the property as surviving tenant by the entirety.</p> <p>2. Under the evidence in this case — I-Ield, that the inserting of the name of the wife in the deed was not procured by her through “fraud, coercion and importunities" practiced upon her husband.</p>

<p>AAhere a debt, to secure which an intestate gave a pledge, had its situs in New York, where. there is primary administration, and none of the things pledged are in New Jersey, and the pledgee may be sued in New York, the ancillary administrator in New Jersey is not entitled to the' things pledged.</p>

<p>Where materialmen under á subcontractor file stop-notices under P. JO. 1911 p. 821, such notices are limited to the recovery of the value of the matea'iials furnished after the act Went into effect, as it does not appear that the 'act is intended to have any retroactive effect.</p>

<p>1. Under the Orphans Court act an allowance to an executor of three and one-half per cent, commissions is not excessive.</p> <p>2. Application to charge against the estate certain sums paid by the executor to his business partners for services rendered to the estate will not be allowed where the affidavits submitted do not show the value of the services, and such services must be considered as part of the services performed by the executor.</p> <p>3. In an estate of $2,289,000 the allowance of $35,000 to the counsel of the executor for their services in bringing and defending ten separate suits, and attending to many other matters, and of $11.000 to the counsel for the residuary legatee, who filed the bill resulting in the administration of -the estate by this court, and completed an involved litigation, is not excessive.</p> <p>4. Final allowance of commissions and counsel fees will be awarded regardless of whether certain assignees of the residuary legatee will be paid. Such assignees stand in the shoes of the residuary legatee, and have no greater rights than he has.</p> <p>5. .Where a part of the litigation connected with the administration of the estate had to do with the application of a trust fund created by the will, the income of which was to be paid to the residuary legatee and his children, such trust fund, or the income thereof, is chargeable with a proportion of the counsel fees allowed to the counsel for the residuary legatee. /</p>

<p>1. Unjustified refusal of sexual intercourse persisted in willfully, obstinately and continuously for the period of two years is a ground for divorce for the cause of desertion; the opinion expressed by the chancellor to the contrary in Watson v. Watson, 52 N. J. Eq. 349, is overruled by Raymond v. Raymond, 79 Atl. Rep. 430.</p> <p>2. Corroboration need not necessarily be by the testimony of other witnesses to the facts. The circumstances surrounding the acts of the parties, rendering petitioner’s testimony more probable, the circumstances surrounding the case, including the manner in which the trial, if contested, is conducted, may all be considered in corroboration of petitioner's story.</p> <p>3. While a divorce cannot be granted upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner and defendant, there may be considered as corroboration the circumstances surrounding the case, including, among other things, the manner in which the trial is conducted. Foote v. Foote, 71 N. J. Eq. 280; Robinson v. Robinson, 90 Atl Rep. 311; affirmed, 93 Atl. Rep. 699; Rogers v. Rogers, 89 N. J. Eq. 1; Orens v. Orens, 88 N. J. Eq. 29, followed.</p>

<p>1. Under article 32, chapter 152, of the laws of 1917, a municipality may, as consideration for the grant to it of a right of way for its pipe lines in another municipality agree to and actually furnish water to the owners of the tract through which the pipe line runs without the consent of the other municipality.</p> <p>2. Such a contract and such a furnishing of water is not within the provisions of section 1G of article 32 of chapter 152 of the laws of 1917, nor within the provisions of chapter 265, of the laws of 1907.</p> <p>3. Section 2 of chapter 265 of the laws of 1907 does not forbid the obtaining of water by an inhabitant of a municipality from another municipality without the consent of the first municipality. Kearny v. Jersey City, 78 N. J. Law 77, followed.</p> <p>4. A contract to furnish water to the owners of a tract through which a right of way for a pipe line is obtained in another municipality is incidental to the power to obtain the right of way and to enter into any agreements necessary for the purpose, and the furnishing of water under such a contract is not a doing of a water business within the contemplation of section 16 of article 32 of chapter 152 of the laws of 1917, nor the provisions of chapter 2G5 of the laws of 1907.</p> <p>5. Notwithstanding the fact that the supplying of water under a contract made with the municipality is not to commence until December, 1920, another municipality, whose rights, it is alleged, will be infringed by the furnishing of such water, may file a bill to obtain an adjudication in May, 1919.</p>

<p>1. A creditor of a decedent’s estate who lias presented liis claim to the administrator has his debt fastened on his debtor’s property so that he may maintain a bill against the buyer and the estate of the vendor (the decedent) to set aside a sale alleged to have been’made in violation of the Bulk Sales act. P. L. 1915 p. 59.</p> <p>2. It appearing that, unless such a suit is maintainable, the creditor of a decedent will be deprived of all remedy under the Bulk Sales act. leave will be granted under the provisions of section 65 of the Orphans Court act (3 Comp. Stat. p. 3832), to maintain such a suit against the administrator prior to the expiration of the six months’ immunity from suit granted to the administrator under such section.</p> <p>3. Muller v. Hubschmann, 84 N. J. Eq. 30, distinguished.</p>

<p>1. After decree in foreclosure of a mortgage interest runs, on the decree, as matter of damages for the detention of the debt at the legal rate.</p> <p>2. Whether interest, after maturity of the debt secured by mortgage in the absence of express provision, runs as an incident of the contract, or as matter of damages, before judgment, query?</p> <p>3. Interest as matter of damages is charged and allowed in accordance with principles of equity in order to accomplish justice in each particular case.</p> <p>4. The rule is that interest on claims against an insolvent corporation whether allowable as matter of contract or of damages, but certainly where allowable only as. matter of damages, ceases to run upon' the property being taken in custodio legis, and this rule applies as well to preferred as to general claims. The rule is subject to its exceptions and in each case the question is what is fair jn right and justice.</p> <p>5. The rule that where a creditor has a lien upon specific property by contract he is entitled to receive from the specific property the amount due him with interest, if provided for by the contract, is subject to its exceptions and the solution of the question may depend upon the nature of the events which prevented payment.</p> <p>O. Mortgagees having a lien upon property of an insolvent corporation by decree in foreclosure, at the time of the appointment of a statutory receiver, which property was sold in the insolvency proceedings free of the lien, the lien attaching to the proceeds, the proceeds being more than sufficient to satisfy the amount of the decree with interest, were allowed interest to the date of the payment of the purchase price to the receiver, it not appearing that delay in disposing of the property was occasioned by litigation as to the validity or extent of the lien. After payment to receiver, the mortgagees are entitled only to such interest as ma.y have been actually earned by the portion of the purchase price upon which the lien attached.</p>

<p>1. The contract evidenced by an instrument purporting to lease an automobile truck at a monthly rental, and providing that, at the termination of the period, the lessee is to return the machine to the lessor, and that the lessor will then sell the machine to 'the lessee for a consideration of one dollar, is that of a conditional sale.</p> <p>2. The court will not tolerate an evasion of the statutes requiring record of chattel mortgages and conditional bills of sales, and will look at the real transaction between the parties notwithstanding the terms of any written instruments.</p> <p>3. Where conditional bill of sale is invalid as against judgment creditors for lack of record but not against a receiver, creditors who have suits pending at the time of the appointment of the receiver will be permitted to enter judgments and the receiver directed to exercise their rights as judgment creditors.</p> <p>4. It would seem that the statute now in effect in respect to conditional sales is the act of May 9th, 1889, as amended March 14th, 1895 (1 Gen. Stat. p. 891)', and not section 71 of the act concerning conveyances (2 Comp. Stat. p. 1561).</p> <p>5. Where all installments have been paid on a lease providing for the rental of an automobile and for the sale of the machine to the lessee at the termination of the lease for one dollar, and the machine in possession of the lessee is taken by an officer at the instance of the lessor, for a claim under the Garage Lien law, and a new lease is then executed. the aggregate amount of rental being fixed by the amount due the lessor for repairs, &e., on other ears as well as on that leased, and an additional sum arbitrarily added by lessor, and the machine is then released to the lessee, the transaction is really that of chattel mortgage and the instrument not being recorded is void as against a receiver.</p> <p>(j. Must the words “attachment or levy” in section 5 of- “An act concerning conditional sales and to make uniform the law relating thereto,” passed 1919, to become effective July 4th, 1919, be confined to technical attachment or levy, or may the clause be extended to any lien acquired by operation of law or judicial process including the equitable lien acquired through the appointment of a receiver, query.</p>

<p>1. The court of chancery may enjoin a landlord from interfering with the possession of his tenant notwithstanding the landlord may have a judgment of possession in the district court in proceedings under section 107 of the act concerning district courts (¡8 Comp. Stat. p. 1988), and notwithstanding the provisions of section 113 of such act, where the remedy in an action in trespass at law is wholly inadequate.</p> <p>2. The court of chancery has jurisdiction, where the remedy at law is wholly inadequate, to entertain a bill to protect possession of land,' although there are no equitable rights involved other than the inadequacy of the remedy at law.</p> <p>3. Where it appears the subject of dispute is a storage warehouse, that complainant cannot find another place to locate, that his good will is worth in the neighborhood of $500,000, that he is under contracts for the storage of goods, and that goods under such contracts are in storage aggregating in value upwards of a million dollars, that if he is forced to surrender possession not only will he suffer loss or damage arising out of injury to his good will and loss occasioned by inability to secure business and carry out contracts, but because of breach of contracts with his customers, he will be exposed to rights of action by them against him, that it is impossible to calculate the loss, that before the consequential damages can be determined it will be necessary for him to wait until actions brought by customers against him shall be determined, that defendant is a foreign corporation and not able to respond in damages, that, if in an action for trespass he is entitled to recover consequential damages, such damages cannot, with any degree of certainty, be fixed, the remedy at law in. such an action for trespass is wholly inadequate and equity has jurisdiction to restrain interference with the possession.</p> <p>4. A tenant who invokes equitable jurisdiction to enjoin a landlord from interfering via summary proceedings with his possession, must establish his present right to possession as against the landlord. Hence it is immaterial, if in fact the tenant has no such present right, whether the defeasance clause in the lease is a condition or a limitation, however important that question might be in determining the jurisdiction of the district court.</p>

<p>1. After the issuance of an injunction under the statute enjoining a corporation, its directors and officers from exercising any of its privileges and franchises, directors who meet and pass a resolution authorizing the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and officers who execute such a petition are guilty of contempt.</p> <p>2. That directors and officers who perform acts in violation of an injunction of this court acted upon advice of counsel is no excuse.</p> <p>3. The effect of the appointment of a receiver and the award Of the statutory injunction is to take from those who previous thereto were officers and directors of the corporation their, power to act as such and to confer upon the receiver the right to exercise all of their powers and privileges.</p> <p>4. Acts performed and instruments executed after the appointment of a receiver and the award of the statutory injunction are as if performed by strangers and are in nowise binding on the corporation, nor are they corporate acts.</p> <p>5. A receiver appointed by this court of an insolvent corporation may not turn over assets to a receiver appointed by another court without consent of this court.</p> <p>O. AVhere it appears that after the award of the statutory injunction and the appointment of a receiver, officers and directors of a corporation have authorized and executed a petition in bankruptcy which has been filed and that the corporation is not insolvent within the meaning of the Bankrupt act, the receiver of this court will be directed to appear in the federal court and move to strike from the files the petition upon the ground that those purporting to act as directors had no power to act as such and that their acts are in no respect binding on the corporation, and the acts, the resolution and proceedings being in violation of the order of a court of competent jurisdiction they must be considered as void.</p> <p>f. That a receiver may so appear and not submit in any other particular to the jurisdiction of the federal court seems to be settled by the federal eases.</p> <p>S. Where it is represented that upon a voluntary petition in bankruptcy filed by officers and directors of a corporation acting in violation of the orders of this court, which acts are not binding upon the corporation, the referee in bankruptcy appointed a receiver, and it is represented that such appointment is contrary to the general practice of the federal courts in this district, the receiver of this court will be directed to apply to the judges of the federal court to vacate the order appointing the receiver and will be directed until such application can be made to retain control of the assets.</p>

<p>3. If bankruptcy proceedings are initiated after the appointment of a receiver of an insolvent corporation under the statute, and his taking possession' of the assets, and it appears that the bankruptcy court is entitled to the ultimate control of the property, the proper practice is for the receiver to apply to this court to pass Ms accounts, fix his fees and direct him to turn over the balance to the trustee.</p> <p>2. If the receiver fails to act, the trustee in bankruptcy may move this court for the same purpose.</p> <p>8. If the trustee in bankruptcy is dissatisfied by the determination of . this court, appeal lies in the ordinary course.</p> <p>4. A receiver appointed by this coui*t may not, without the consent of this court, either submit to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to fix his compensation or turn over to the trustee in bankruptcy or to any other officer of the bankruptcy court, or of any court, the assets of the corporation.</p> <p>5. If the receiver has parted with control of the assets, this. coui'L will not ordinarily Indicate its views as to the amount of compensation, the court ordinarily declining to make an order or decree which cannot be made effective by its own process.</p>

<p>On bill, &e. On claim of the American Type Pounders Com- ' pany, based on a chattel mortgage.</p>

<p>1. One, who in order to secure the action of the court in his own interests, presents at one time an 'affidavit setting up a certain state of facts and thereafter in his own interests, in order to secure the action of the court, presents another affidavit setting up a different state of facts, is guilty of contempt.</p> <p>2. In proceedings to punish for contempt to impose upon the court by perjured affidavits, where two affidavits filed by the respondent set up a contradictory state of facts, it is immaterial which affidavit represents the true facts.</p>

<p>On appeal from an order of the prerogative court, reported in 89 N. J. Eq. 509.</p>

<p>On appeal of Second National Bank of Hoboken.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of tlie chancellor reported in 87 N. J. Eq. 897.</p>

<p>On appeal from an order o£ the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Lane, whose opinion is reported in 89 N. J. Eq. 'R7Z.</p>

The bill averred, that Mollie Kobrin, wife of Charles Kobrin and sister of complainant,. died intestate and without issue in October, 1917, seized in fee of a described tract of land in Essex county, leaving as heirs-at-law five brothers and sisters, of whom complainant is one, who hold the lands as tenants in common in fee, subject to- the fight of curtesy of her husband, Solomon Kobrin, and that he is in possession of said lands and receives the rents thereof.

<p>On bill in equity .for the construction of the will of Geoige A. Bruce, deceased.</p>

<p>1. The court of chancery of this state has no power to allow counsel fees, in a cause instituted in this state, for professional services rendered in a foreign jurisdiction in an independent litigation. The allowance must be for services rendered in a cause over which the court making the allowance has jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Counsel fees ought not to be allowed a stockholder who institutes a suit against his corporation which is not for the benefit of any stockholder except ‘himself, especially when the suit is to the disadvantage of the other stockholders.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the .prerogative court advised by Vice-Ordinary Stevenson, whose opinion is reported ante p. 809.</p>

<p>On appeal from an order advised by Vice-Chancellor Lane denying motion to strike out bill of complaint.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree óf the court of chancery.</p>

<p>On appeal from an order of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Backes, and reported in 88 N. J. Eq. 496.</p>

<p>On appeal from the court of chancery.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Stevens, whose opinion is reported ante p. 14.</p>

<p>On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery.</p>

It is called a barrel numbering head, and is used for the purpose of successive numbering of coupon tickets. While no new mechanical principle and no new mechanical appliances were used, there was a novel use of familiar principles and appliances which resulted in the perfection of a head which might be used in connection with a rotary press for the continuous successive numbering of tickets.

Appeal of George A. Case et al. On appeal from a decree of the court of chancery advised by Vice-Chancellor Lewis, who filed the following opinion: I advise a decree in favor of Anna Mae Van Etten. The suit was an interpleader suit, and the fund has been deposited in this court. It appears from the evidence that Charles Case, a brother of Anna Mae Van Etten, held a benefit certificate in the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. He was separated from his wife.

James P. Pielder, advisory master, who filed the following opinion: The defendant Jersey Co-operative Realty Company was Ilia owner of two tracts of land in Union county,- the one known as the El Mora tract, and the other as the Elizabeth Heights tract. Through an agent it applied for and was ganted a loan by complainant on bond and mortgage in the sum of $20,000, which, mortgage was dated June 30th, 1913, and recorded July 5th, 1913.

The bill is filed under the provisions of the Health act. Comp. Stat. p. 8668.