Volume 97 — Federal Reporter

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p> <p>This case was disposed of in the lower court upon demurrer to the amended bill of complaint, the complaint having been adjudged insufficient to warrant any relief. The bill was filed by Daniel R. Wagstaff, Marilla J. Wagstaff, Isabella Wagstaff, Lelah Wagstaff Liebe, Lotta Fern Wagstaff, and Charity J. Goss, the appellants, against Samuel G. Collins, Sewell T. Collins, Michael Spangler, William D. Todd, the Kansas Pacific Railway Company, and the Union Pacific Railway Company,' the appellees, and the case thereby made was, in substance, as follows:</p> <p>, The complainants below and the appellants here are the heirs at law of James Wagstaff, who died intestate in the month of January, 1880. On December 26, 1871, the deceased applied to the register and receiver of the United States land office at Denver, Colo., to enter as a homestead the N. % of the N. E. %, and the N. E. of section 23, township 4 S., range 68 W., and was allowed to do so; Ifis application being in due form, and the applicant himself duly qualified to make the application. Having made his application, he entered on the land and resided thereon until about September 1, 1874, when he relinquished the possession to the Kansas Pacific Railway Company, which claimed the land as a part of its land grant. On December 11, 1879, the land was patented by the United States to the la.st-named railway company, as belonging to it under the act and the amendments thereof which granted to it certain lands in aid of the construction of its railroad. 12 Stat. 489; 13 Stat. 356; 14 Stat. 79. Under the provisions of the aforesaid act and its amendments, as subsequently construed in Railway Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629, 5 Sup. Ct. 566, the land in controversy did not pass to the railway cotnpany as a part of its grant, and should not have been patented to it, because when it filed its map of definite location -with the secretary of the interior on May 9, 1870, certain parties, to wit, Sylvester Markwell and A. Hopkins, had, respectively, on November 13, 1865, and April 11, 1866, filed pre-emption claims to the land which prevented the railroad grant from attaching thereto, within the rule announced in the Dunmeyer Case.' The complainants remained ignorant of the homestead entry that had been made by their ancestor on the land in controversy until on or about August 11, 1891; but after discovering the entry that had been so made, and the facts in relation thereto, they made an application to the register of the United States land office at Denver, Colo., under the provisions of section 2 of the act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat. 287, 238), to perfect their title and obtain a patent therefor, and at the time of such application made a tender to the United States of the price of the land, at the rate of $1.25 per acre. The bill further alleged that the Kansas Pacific Railway Company conveyed the land in controversy to the appellees Samuel G. Collins and Sewell T. Collins as early as March 6, 1876, before the receipt of a patent; that the grantees in such conveyance well knew that the railway company had no title to the land, and. that James WagstafE had made a homestead entry thereon, hut that, notwithstanding such knowledge, they had taken possession thereof, and still held it, and had mortgaged a part of the tract to secure a promissory note in the sum of $30,000, which mortgage was made on July 30, 1890. The hill appears to have been filed originally on January 6, 1892, and to have been amended on June 12, 1896. The amended bill prayed that the defendants below he adjudged to hold the legal title to the land in trust for the complainants, and that they be required to convey it to them by a good and sufficient deed of conveyance.</p>

<p>1. Receivers — Power of Court to Appoint — Foreign Corporations.</p> <p>A court of equity has general power to appoint a receiver for the assets of a foreign corporation within its jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Same — Validity of Appointment — Collateral Attack.</p> <p>An order appointing a receiver, where it was a part of the relief sought, by the bill, and the court had jurisdiction, cannot be attacked collaterally.</p> <p>8. Same — Federal and State Courts — Ancillary Receivership.</p> <p>When a receiver has been appointed for a corporation by a court of the state where it is domiciled, a federal court of another jurisdiction has power to appoint the same person as ancillary receiver in such jurisdiction.</p> <p>i. Removal oe Causes — Suit for Appointment of Ancillary Receiver.</p> <p>A suit for the appointment of an ancillary receiver in a different jurisdiction is not ancillary to the suit in which the primary receiver was appointed, but entirely independent, and, if brought in a state court, is subject to removal to a federal court, the same as other causes.</p> <p>6. Same — Ancillary Suits — Action against Federal Receiver.</p> <p>A suit brought against a receiver oí a federal court to determine his right to assets claimed by him as such receiver is ancillary to the suit in which he was appointed, and, if brought in a state court, may be removed by the receiver into the federal court by which he was appointed, without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the amount in controversy.</p>

<p>1. Deeds — Proof—Certified Copies of Record.</p> <p>Under Rev. St. Mo. 18S9, §§ 48G4, 4865, a certified copy of the record of a deed which was properly acknowledged when made, but not in accordance with the law in force when it was recorded, is admissible in evidence, without proof of the. execution of the original deed, where the record was made more than 30 years before such copy is offered in evidence.</p> <p>2. Ejectment — Evidence of 'Outstanding Title.</p> <p>In an action of ejectment, where plaintiff claims title through a deed which recites a consideration, a deed from a common grantor to a third person, executed before the one under- which plaintiff deraigns title, but not so proved or acknowledged as to entitle It to record so as to charge subsequent purchasers with notice, and in the absence oí proof that the grantee therein was ever in possession of the land or ever claimed title thereto, is not admissible to prove an outstanding title.</p> <p>8, Power or Attorney Given jbv Ldnatic — Vaiudity.</p> <p>A power of attorney given by a lunatic is void, and a deed executed by the grantee by virtue of such power Is not admissible against the grantor.</p>

<p>1. Accident Insurance— Construction of Policy — Effect of Prior Adjudication.</p> <p>In an action on an Insurance policy containing a provision which had, prior to the issuance of such policy, been given a uniform judicial construction by the courts of last resort of several states, such construction will be adopted as the one presumably intended by the parties.1</p> <p>2. Same — Death from Inhaling Gas.</p> <p>An accident policy Contained a provision that the insurance should not cover “injuries, fatal or otherwise, resulting from poison, or anything accidentally or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed, or inhaled.” Prior to the issuance of the policy such provision in another policy issued by the same company had been construed by the supreme court of a state, and held not to exempt the company from liability for the death or injury of the insured resulting from the unconscious and involuntary inhaling of illuminating gas while asleep, and in another state policies containing similar provisions had received a similar construction. Held, that the same construction would be adopted by the court in an action on such later policy for the death of the insured from the same cause, regardless of the views which the court might hold if the question was res integra.2</p> <p>Sanborn, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>1. Foreign Corporations — Service of Process on — State Laws.</p> <p>A mode of service prescribed by state laws for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations, which is recognized by the local courts as valid, will receive the same recognition by the federal courts, subject to the limitation that such courts will determine for themselves whether the mode prescribed violates the fundamental rights of the defendant not to be condemned unheard, or compelled to answer a complaint in a foreign jurisdiction without a fair and reasonable notice.</p> <p>2. Same — Removal of Office from State.</p> <p>The fact that a foreign corporation which had maintained an office in Minnesota, and there contracted a liability, before suit brought in a court of the state to enforce such liability had withdrawn its local office, does not exempt it from being subjected to a personal judgment in such suit, on service made on its president within the state in the mode prescribed by Gen. St. Minn. 1894, § 5200.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Bankruptcv — Priority of Claims — Wager of Labor.</p> <p>A creditor of a bankrupt, who describes himself as a traveling salesman, and was employed by the bankrupt in that capacity at an annual salary of $5,000, is not a workman, nor a clerk or servant of his employer, within the meaning of Bankr. Act 1898, § 64b, according priority of payment out of bankrupt estates to “wages due to workmen, clerks or servants.”</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Time of Piling Petition.</p> <p>Under Bankr. Act 1898, § Sb, providing that a petition in Involuntary bankruptcy may be filed within four months after the commission of an act of bankruptcy by the defendant, the four months are to be reckoned by excluding the day on which the act of bankruptcy is committed, and including that on which the petition is filed.</p> <p>2. Same — Piling Duplicate of Petition.</p> <p>The court acquires no jurisdiction in a case of involuntary bankruptcy unless the duplicate originals of the petition required by the act are both filed within four months after the commission of the act of bankruptcy alleged; and, where the petitioning creditors filed only one copy of the petition within four months, the court has no authority to allow them to file the other after the expiration of that time, but will dismiss the petition on motion of the respondent.</p> <p>8. Same — Clerk’s Docket.</p> <p>Under general order No. 1 in bankruptcy (18 Sup. Ct. iv.), providing that “the clerk shall keep a docket” which “shall contain a memorandum of the filing of the petition,” the docket should show that the petition was filed in duplicate, as required by the statute, if this requirement of the law is really complied with.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On application for injunction.</p>

In Bankruptcy. On opposition to bankrupt’s application for discharge. In February; 1899, Oliver H. P. Cornell was adjudged bankrupt on his voluntary petition, and in due course filed an application for his discharge. Specifications in opposition thereto were presented by Crawford, Simpson & Crawford, judgment creditors of the bankrupt, and the matter was referred to Morris Wise, referee in bankruptcy, to find and report the facts.

In Bankruptcy. In 18S8, Gustav L. Klein made a voluntary assignment for the benefit of nis creditors pursuant to the laws of Illinois, hut, after the estate had been administered thereunder for about a year, the proceeding was discontinued, upon the petition of a majority of the creditors, in accordance with the statute, and an order was made directing the assignee to pay over the funds in Ms hands to Klein.

<p>In Bankruptcy. On application by the bankrupt for discharge.</p>

<p>In Equity. On demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>1. National Banks — False Report by Officer — Voluntary Reports.</p> <p>To constitute the offense of making a false report of the condition of a national bank, within Rev. St. § 5209, it is not necessary that such report, when made by an officer of the hank to the comptroller, should have been made in response to a call or request of the comptroller.</p> <p>2. Constitutional Law — Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.</p> <p>The constitutional inhibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is a limitation upon the power of the state to make such searches and seizures for its own benefit, and has no reference to the unauthorized acts of individuals.</p> <p>8. National Banks — Prosecution of Officers — Evidence Unlawfully Obtained.</p> <p>The fact that a letter written, by the comptroller of the currency to the president of a. national bank, which formed a part of the official correspondence of the bank, was taken by some individual from a box marked as containing private papers of the president, and was afterwards given to the officers of the United States, does not render such letter inadmissible in evidence on the part of the government in a prosecution of the president for a violation of the national hanking laws.</p> <p>A Same.</p> <p>Books of a national bank, which were turned over to officers of the United States by the receivers of a state bank which succeeded such national hank, are not inadmissible in evidence on behalf of the government In the prosecution of an officer of the hank for a violation of the national banking law on the ground that they were unlawfully obtained in violation of the constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and seizures,</p> <p>6. Same — Books of Bank as Evidence.</p> <p>In view of the provisions of the national hanking act requiring the books of a national bank to be truthfully kept, by making it an offense to make false entries therein, proof that hooks are those of a national hank in which the record of its daily business was kept raises a presumption that they were properly kept, which renders them admissible in evidence without further proof, when offered by the government in a criminal suit against an officer of the bank for making false reports.</p> <p>8. Same — False Reports — Evidence op Intent.</p> <p>On the trial of the president of a national bank, charged with having made a false report of its condition to the comptroller, prior reports, attested by him, containing false statements, together with testimony that such misstatements were called to his attention by an examiner prior to his making the report in question, are admissible on the question of Intent.</p> <p>'L Same — Overdrafts—Overdraft Notes.</p> <p>Whore the account of a'depositor with a national bank shows that he has drawn out more money than has been credited to him, the excess constitutes an overdraft, and is required to be so reported in the bank’s statement to the comptroller. The fact that the depositor has given the bank a note to secure overdrafts, where it has not actually been discounted, and the proceeds placed to his credit on the hooks, does not warrant the reporting of such overdraft under the head, of “loans and discounts.”</p> <p>8. Same — Evidence—Harmless Error.</p> <p>The admission of expert testimony as to the meaning of certain entries in a report made by a national bank to the comptroller is not prejudicial error, conceding the construction of the report to be properly a matter of law for the court, where it appears that the witnesses correctly interpreted such entries.</p>

This was a suit in equity by the Cleveland Target Company against the Empire Target Company, A. H. Hebbard, Charles C. Hebbard, and William H. Bankin for the infringement of certain patents relating to improvements in traps for sending flying targets.

This is an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill for the infringement of a patent. The case has a somewhat peculiar history.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the northern District of Illinois.</p>

<p>Í, Patents — Invention.</p> <p>It is not enough to sustain a patent for a compound that it shall bo novel and useful, but its production must also involve invention or discovery.</p> <p>S. Same — Pyroxyline Compounds — Imitation Onyx.</p> <p>The Stevens & Harrison patent, No. 543,36*0, for a method of producing a pyroxyline compound in imitation of onyx, is void for want of patentable novelty and Invention; the method described having been, anticipated by the France method of making imitation agate and cornelian, and also by the method disclosed in the Molding patent, No. 231,860, for a method of manufacturing artificial stone veneer.</p> <p>8. Same — Articles of Celluloid.</p> <p>The Thurber & Schaefer patent, No. 542,452, for improvement in celluloid articles, and in the process of manufacturing the same, is void for want of invention in either the product or method of production.</p>

<p>1. Patents — Infringement—Art of Maturing Tobacco Leaves.</p> <p>The Rickard and Long patent, No. 604,338, for an improvement in the art of maturing tobacco leaves, which, as described, consists in spraying the leaves of the growing plant, at about the time they reach maturity, with alkali in solution, such as potash, whicli gives them a spotted appearance, if valid, can only be sustained on the claim that such treatment promotes the burning quality of the leaf when used as a cigar wrapper; and, although its claims are broader, it cannot be construed to cover the use for such spraying of an alkali which is not a combustion-producing agent.</p> <p>2. Same — Construction of Claims.</p> <p>A broad claim to include an entire class as equivalents, — as all alkalies, —cannot be sustained where some members of the class do not possess the properties required to accomplish the only. result which can give validity to the patent.</p>

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court dismissing the bill of the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company against the Triumph Electric Company, seeking to enjoin the alleged infringement of a design patent (No. 21,416) issued March 22, 1892, to Albert Schmid, and assigned by Schmid to the complainant. The patent was for a design of a new and useful configuration of a frame for electric machines.

<p>This was a suit in equity by the Chandler Adjustable Chair & Desk Company against the town of Windham for infringement of a patent. On final hearing.</p>

<p>This was a suit in equity by the Yale & Towne Manufacturing Company against Sargent & Co. for infringement of a patent. On final hearing.</p>

This was a libel in personam by the Wisconsin Steamship Company against the city of Chicago to recover damages for injuries to libelant’s steamer, the Thomas Davidson, then in tow of the tug William Dickinson, by collision with the Indiana Street Bridge, which occurred May 13, 1895, through the alleged negligence of the bridge tender.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United Slates for the Dis trict of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>On Motion to Bemand to State Court.</p>

This was a suit in equity to establish the amount and to enforce •collection of a contingent fee for legal services rendered under a written contract. Heard on exceptions to the report of a master.

This is an appeal from an order dissolving a temporary injunction. The bill of complaint upon which this order of injunction was granted was brought in the court below by the appellants against the appellee for an accounting and other equitable relief. It is only necessary to state such facts disclosed in the bill as are material to the determination of the questions arising out of the order of dissolution.

<p>1. Action for. Personal Injury — Survival—Minnesota Statute.</p> <p>Gen. St. Minn. 1891, § 5912, wbicb provides that “a cause of action arising out of an injury to the person dies with the person of either party except as provided in the next section,” applies to all causes of action, whether founded on contract or tort; and under it the personal representative of a person whose death was caused by an injury received while a passenger on a street railroad cannot maintain an action for breach of the contract for safe carriage, counting on the expense and loss of time caused the decedent prior to his death by the injury as the damages resulting from such breach, where the suit is not brought in accordance with the provisions of section 5913.</p> <p>2. Statutes — Rules of Construction.</p> <p>When the language of a statute is unambiguous, and its meaning is clear, the legislature must be presumed to have meant what it expressed, and arguments by analogy or from history or attempted judicial construction cannot be resorted to for the purpose of placing a different construction upon it.</p> <p>8. Survival of Actions — Common-Law Rule.</p> <p>While, as a general proposition, in the absence of statutory provision, actions on contracts survive, and actions on torts abate, on the death of the injured party, the real test of survival is not the form, but the substance, of the cause of action; and the true rule is that if the primary cause of the damages sought to be recovered is the breach of a contract, and injuries to the person are mere incidents of the breach, the action survives; but if the proximate cause of the damages claimed is the personal injury, and the breach and the damages therefrom are merely incident to the injury, the action dies.</p>

<p>u Municipal Bonds — Conditions Precedent to Issuance — Effect of Recitals.</p> <p>The recitals of officers who are invested with authority to determine when conditions precedent to the issue of negotiable bonds are complied with, and with power to issue them on the fulfillment of such conditions, that they have been issued “in pursuance of,” or “in conformity with,” or “by virtue of” the statute which authorizes thoir issue under the prescribed conditions, preclude inquiry, as against innocent purchasers for value of the bonds containing such recitals, as to whether or not the precedent conditions had been performed when they were issued.</p> <p>2. Same — Proposition for Issuance Construed.</p> <p>A proposition adopted by the voters of a township authorizing the issuance of bonds “in aid of the construction of a line of railroad passing into the county of Holt from the east, and through the said township to the city of O’Neill, in said county, such proceeds to be given to the Nebraska & Western Railway Company when it shall complete a line of said railroad, and have cars running thereon, to the city of O’Neill,” on or before a date named, the city of O’Neill being situated within said township, does not require as a condition precedent to the issuance of such bonds that the railroad shall be constructed entirely through the township, and their issuance was authorized on the completion of the road and the running of cars thereon, to the city of O’Neill within the time prescribed.</p> <p>8. Same — Presumptions.</p> <p>Acts done or contracts made by a corporation, which presuppose the existence of other acts or conditions in order to make them valid and legally operative, are presumptive proof of the latter.</p> <p>i. Same — Validity—Burden of Proof.</p> <p>Comp. St. Neb. 1897, p. 800, § 4023, requires a railroad company to file for record in the office of the clerk of a county in which bonds are to be voted in its aid a plat of the survey of its line of road through the county within two weeks previous to the election, and provides that no bonds shall be valid in case they are voted, unless such line is built within 40 rods of the survey as so filed. Held, that where bonds were voted, and were issued by the proper officers after the road was built, they, or the coupons therefrom, were prima facie evidence that the statute had been complied with, and, if the statute had not been complied with, that such fact must be pleaded and proved as an affirmative defense in an action on such bonds or coupons.</p> <p>5. Review on Error — Case Tried to Court.</p> <p>Where a case at law is tried by a circuit judge without a jury, and the resulting judgment is taken to the circuit court of appeals by writ of error, it can only be reviewed as to errors committed by the court below, and a defense not presented to nor ruled on by the trial court cannot be considered.</p> <p>Caldwell, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United ¡átales for the District of Colorado.</p>

This was an action on negotiable bonds and coupons issued by defendant county. A jury having been waived in the above case, the evidence was submitted to the court, from which the court finds the facts to be as follows: (1) The plaintiff, G-.

This was an action on funding bonds issued by defendant county.

This was an action brought by the defendant in error, Thomas Pellow, against William D. Rees, the plaintiff in error, to recover commissions claimed to have been earned under an option contract for bringing about the sale of 9,000 shares of stock owned by the said Rees. There was also a count upon a quantum meruit.

This case was tried below on demurrer to an amended complaint, the action being a suit at law upon a contract. Held: and that, to prevent a foreclosure of the aforesaid mortgage on the company’s property, the plaintiffs were compelled to and did negotiate a loan to the company in the sum of $50,000, and in doing so were forced to give up and assign $300,000 worth of their stock in said company to the creditor to induce the loan.

This was an action by the Commercial National Bank of Detroit, Mich., against the Warren-Scharf Asphalt Paving Company, a corporation of the state of New York, but having an office and agency at Detroit. The action was brought for the purpose of recovering §10,000, with interest, alleged to have been advanced or paid out on account of the said Warren-Scharf Asphalt Paving Company under the following circumstances: First.

<p>Bankruptcy — Discharge—Alimony.</p> <p>Alimony awarded to a divorced wife by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, to be paid in fixed weekly installments, and overdue at the time the husband files his petition in bankruptcy, is not such a debt as will be released by his discharge; and therefore the wife will not he stayed, pending the bankruptcy proceedings, from pursuing appropriate remedies for its collection.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On motion of certain creditors of the bankrupt to vacate an appointment of a trustee of bis estate made by the referee in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Liens—Unrecorded Mortgage.</p> <p>A mortgage made more than four months before the filing of a petition-in bankruptcy against tbe mortgagor is not annulled by bis adjudication thereon, although it was not recorded until within a month of the bankruptcy proceedings. But where the law of the state provides that such a mortgage shall not be valid as against any persons who became creditors of the mortgagor during the time between tbe execution and the recording of the mortgage, either by a new credit or the extension of a pre-existing Indebtedness, the same rule will be applied in the bankruptcy proceedings.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. Submitted on bankrupt’s petition for discharge and the objections filed thereto on behalf of creditors.</p>

<p>BANKRtrrrcY- -Creditors— TMurkskntation by Attorney.</p> <p>An attorney at law, retained generally to represent a creditor In bankruptcy proceedings, cannot cast the vote of such creditor in the election of a trustee at a creditors’ meeting, without showing an express authorization thereto as attorney in fact.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On specifications in opposition to bankrupt’s application for discharge.</p> <p>Specifications in opposition to the application of Julius Kamsler for a discharge in bankruptcy were filed by certain of his creditors, and referred to John W. Houston, referee in bankruptcy, for bearing and report. The specifications charged the bankrupt with having concealed bis books of account, and with having made various false oaths in the bankruptcy proceedings. It appeared that the bankrupt had been engaged in retail business in New York City until February 21, 1898, on which day be was closed out by the levy of an execution on his goods and stock in trade by the sheriff of the county of New York. In the schedule attached to his petition in bankruptcy, and in his testimony given before the referee, he stated that the sheriff took possession of the books of account kept in his business, on the levy above mentioned, and that he (the bankrupt) had not seen the books since the levy, and had not been able to find them, and did not know where they were. But in this he was contradicted by other witnesses, and the referee found, upon all the evidence produced before him, that the bankrupt, after the levy, had sent the books and records of bis business to one of his creditors, with the explanation that he intended, if thereafter examined by creditors in supplementary proceedings, to state that he did not know where the books were; and that be had repeatedly, since that time, seen and examined the books, and looked up entries in them, at the offices of the said creditor, where the books were kept pursuant to this plan. The referee accordingly held that the bankrupt had been guilty of “making a false oath in a proceeding in bankruptcy,” within the meaning of Bankr. Act, § 29b, such as to forfeit his right to a discharge. Whether the bankrupt’s conduct with reference to these hooks constituted a concealment of them, “with fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial condition and in., contemplation of bankruptcy,” the referee found it unnecessary to determine'; but he suggested that, while nothing done before the passage of the bankruptcy act could be considered as done “in contemplation of bankruptcy,” yet a concealment of books, unlike their destruction, might be a continuing offense, and might be committed after the passage of the act by leaving the books in the same custody, and falsely swearing that their location was unknown to the bankrupt; the principle of In re Holtz, 1 Nat. Bahkr. News, 201, not being here applicable.</p> <p>The bankrupt, immediately before his failure, had paid §5,000 to the joint account of his wife and his father-in-law; and he testified on his examination that it was in repayment of a bona fide loan of that amount of money from these relations. But the books of account showed no such loau, and the bankrupt, on his examination, made contradictory and inconsistent statements as to the character and source of the alleged indebtedness; and it was shown that the bankrupt, soon after his failure, was nominally in the employment of a firm consisting of his wife and another person, formed soon after the failure, and operating on capital thereafter contributed by the wife. The referee found that the bankrupt, in regard to this matter, had made a “false oath in a proceeding in bankruptcy,” and, on this ground also, reported that he was not eutitled to receive his discharge.</p>

<p>1. BANKRUPTCY — RIGHT TO DISCHARGE— MISCONDUCT OF AoF.NT.</p> <p>Where a business belonging to a married woman is conducted wholly by her husband, to whom she confides its entire management, and he, without her knowledge or privity, fails to keep true books of account, and conceals property, with the design of deceiving and defrauding creditors, and the wife becomes bankrupt, she is not to he deprived of her right to a J discharge by reason of the husband’s misconduct, being herself guiltless of any actual fraudulent intent, and her negligence in relation to the business not being equivalent to fraud, for the purposes of a penal statute.</p> <p>2. Same- -Conditions upon Granting Discharge.</p> <p>Where the bankrupt is a married woman, whose husband has had the ' entire conduct and management of her business, wherein, as found by the referee, he has eoneealed valuable property belonging to the estate, the bankrupt’s discharge may he made conditional upon her using all reasonable means within her power to discover to the bankruptcy court the assets so concealed.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On petition for adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy.</p>

In Bankruptcy. On review of decision of referee in bankruptcy disallowing a claim, offered for proof against tbe estate of the bankrupt by the Guthman, Carpenter §l Telling Company, a creditor.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

These were suits by brewing companies against the collector of internal revenue to recover certain alleged overpayments of taxes required on fermented liquors.

<p>L Criminal Law — Trtal—Improper Argument of Counsf.l.</p> <p>It is prejudicial error for a court to permit counsel for the prosecution, over objection, to comment in argument to the jury upon the failure of the defendant to offer evidence of his previous good character. Such action, with the express approval of the court, in effect destroys the presumption of good character which the law raises in behalf of the defendant, and permits the jury to infer that his character is bad, because he has not produced proof to the contrary.</p> <p>3. Same — Evidence.</p> <p>In the trial of a criminal case, a letter written by defendant, containing reflections upon the conduct of a witness for the prosecution, the contents of which were previously known to the witness, is not admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing that the witness is prejudiced against the defendant, where no foundation has been laid for his impeachment thereby.</p> <p>8. National Banks — False Entries — Indictment of Officer.</p> <p>A count of an indictment, charging that defendant, as president of a national banking association, caused a false entry, which is set out, to be made in the books of the bank, purporting to show that a customer had deposited a certain sum to his general credit, when in fact, as defendant well knew, no such deposit had been made, is not insufficient, in the absence of an application for a bill of particulars, because it does not allege the manner in which defendant “caused” the entry to be made. ■</p> <p>4. Same — -Embezzlement by Offioer.</p> <p>Where the facts averred in an indictment against an officer of a national bank for embezzlement show that defendant wrongfully used the bank’s money in his care and under his control for the purpose of bribing certain city officials in his own interest, it sufficiently avers an appropriation to his own use, and is not vitiated by further averments that there was an Intent to wrongfully convert the money to the use of such officials, and that it was so converted.</p> <p>8. Same — Making False Ektkihs — Intwnt.</p> <p>Under an indictment based upon Kev. St. § 5209, charging an officer of a national bank with having made false entries in its books with the intent to deceive the officers and directors of the bank and any agent appointed by the comptroller to examine the affairs of the bank, and to injure and defraud the association, it is sufficient to prove the wrongful intent in either particular charged.</p>

<p>1. Patents — Construction op Claims — Infrikqkmknt.</p> <p>A patentee, who has simply made an improvement on a device that performed the same function before as after the improvement, is protected only against those who use the very improvement that he describes and claims, or merely colorable evasions of it.</p> <p>3. Same — Enlarging Claim.</p> <p>The claims of a patent covering in terms only improvements in the devices or mechanism forming certain parts of a machine, cannot be enlarged to include other parts or elements not enumerated in the claims, although they may be shown by the specification and drawings, merely because they are essential parts of the machine as a whole, without which it would not he operative.</p> <p>S. Same — Estoppel op Patentee by Claims — Second Patent.</p> <p>The statute (Rev. St. § 48S8) requires an inventor to particularly point out and to claim distinctly the improvement or combination which he claims as his discovery, and when he has made Ms claims he has thereby disclaimed and dedicated to the public ail other devices, combinations, and improvements apparent from his specification and claims that are not mere evasions of those claimed as his own, and he is estopped by his patent from thereafter claiming a monopoly as to such devices, combinations, or improvements either under that or any subsequent, patent.</p> <p>4. Same — Riding Attachments dob Plows.</p> <p>The McBride patent, No. 199,082, for improved riding attachments for plows, was not for a primary invention covering broadly, in combination with the other devices described and claimed, a device for carrying a plow upon wheels, or for holding it rigidly in a fixed relation to the wheels or to the axle for the purpose of regulating tiie depth of the furrow, but is limited, both by the prior state of the art and by the claims themselves, to the combination of the mechanism described for raising and lowering the forward end of the beam, and for canting the plow from side to side. Nor was the attempt of the patentee by his subsequent patent, No. 28-J,-036, to add to the combination the device for rigidly attaching the plow to the axle effective, as such device was disclosed by the specification of the earlier patent, but omitted from the claims.</p>

<p>Cbkbitoks’ Suit-Right to Costs.</p> <p>Where a person is made party to a creditors’ bill, filed to administer an insolvent estate, who has no interest In the estate, and can derive no benefit from its administration, and who promptly disclaims interest therein, he is entitled to his costs.</p>

This was a hearing on exceptions to the master’s report on the amended intervening petition of Otis Kimball and 29 others, holders of the bonds of the Huntingburg, Tell City & Canneiton Railroad Company, to compel the delivery to them, in exchange for their bonds, of bonds of the defendant the Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Consolidated Railroad Company. The principal suit is one for the foreclosure of mortgages against the defendant company.

This is an appeal from a decree of the United States court of appeals in the Indian Territory, which affirmed a decree of the trial court overruling a demurrer to the complaint, and granting a perpetual injunction against the appropriation of the public parks of Vinita, in the Indian Territory, to private use.

On and prior to December 24, 1889, the Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Company (herein called the “Denver Company”) owned and operated a line of railroad from Denver through Pueblo, Leadville, and Newcastle to Rifle Greek, in Colorado; and the Colorado Midland Railway Company (called herein the “Midland Company”) owned and operated a line of railroad from Colorado Springs to Newcastle.

Intervening Petition of Mary R Gray, Administratrix of Fletcher B. Gray, Deceased. Mary R. Gray, administratrix of Fletcher B. Gray, deceased, has filed her intervening' petition seeking to recover damages from S. M. Felton, receiver, appointed under an older of this court herein, and engaged in the operation of the railroad of the Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company.

<p>Master and Servant — Injury of Railroad Employe — Fellow Servants.</p> <p>A bridge builder and repairer employed by a railroad company, and furnished with cars in which he and his assistants and tools áre transported to places along the line of the road where his services are required, the usual custom being to attach his cars to some regular train, is a fellow servant with the employós in charge of such trains, not only while he is engaged in the work of building or repairing bridges, but also while being so moved in his cars from place to place in the discharge of his regular duties, and -he cannot recover from the company for injuries' received through their negligence while being so transported in the usual manner.1</p>

<p>1. Witnesses — Conversation with Deceased Person — Party in Interest.</p> <p>Rev. St. TJ. S. § 858, provides that the law of the state in which the court is held shall determine the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States. 2 Hill’s Code Wash. § 1646, provides that, where a party sues or defends as a personal representative of a deceased person, then a party in interest or a party to the record shall not be admitted to testify in his own behalf as to any statement made to him by such deceased person. The evidence in an action against a railroad company to recover for the death of plaintiffs husband, who was killed by a landslide, showed that he was a section man on defendant’s railroad, and that, with another section man, he was engaged in removing earth which had been deposited on the track, blocking the passage of a train, by a landslide from the bluff overhanging the track; that while so engaged, in answer to interrogatories of the conductor of the delayed train, he stated that there was danger of another landslide occurring at any time, that he had worked there before, and that they could expect another at any time. Held, that the conductor may testify to such statements, as he is not a party to the record or interested in the case.</p> <p>2. Conversation with Deceased Person — Res Oesms.</p> <p>Such conversation constituted a part of the res gestae, and was relevant, as tending to show that decedent was informed of the danger to which he was exposing himself.</p> <p>8. Master and Servant — Raiikoads—Rules—Duty of Conductor.</p> <p>In an action against, a railroad company to recover for the death of plaintiff’s husband, caused by his being swept off defendant’s tracks into a river by a landslide, the evidence disclosed that he was one of defendant’s section men; that, with another, he had been sent out to look for dangerous places in the track, liable to have been caused by the heavy rains which had fallen; that the landslide which swept him into the river occurred while he, under the direction of the conductor of a delayed irain. and pursuant to a rule of the company requiring him to act under such conductor’s direction, was removing a previous slide from the track. Plaintiff claimed that there was a hidden danger in the bank. Held, it was no part of the conductor's business to warn plaintiff of the hidden danger, merely because a rule of the company provided that section men should, in case of accident or delay to a train, obey the orders of the conductor, especially where it was no part of the conductor’s duty to know about the condition of the bluff, but the care thereof was in part intrusted to decedent.</p> <p>4. Same — Negligence—Conductor—Section Man — Fellow Servant.</p> <p>A section man working under the direction of a conductor of a delayed train in removing an obstruction from the track is a fellow servant with the conductor, and the company is not liable for injuries to one occasioned by the negligence of the other, though a rule of the company provides that section men shall always assist the passage of trains, and, in case of accident or delay, obey the orders of the conductor.</p> <p>5. Same.</p> <p>The wife of a section man cannot recover from a railroad company for the death of her husband, who was swept from defendant’s tracks into a river by a landslide, where the slide was caused by the failure of the crew, of which her husband was a member, to properly drain a bluff overhanging the track, where such duty was imposed on them by the rules of ' the company, as such failure is the negligence of fellow servants.</p> <p>6. Same — Assumption op Risk.</p> <p>Where section men on a railroad know that they constitute the usual force detailed for the performance of a particular duty, and during its performance they voluntarily expose themselves to a danger of which they should have known as much as any one, they are deemed to have assumed the risks incident to their situation, and cannot afterwards complain that there was not a sufficient force of men to do the work safely.</p>

This action was brought by the children of George Dana Hill, in their own name where of age, and by their guardian where under age, to recover the amount of a policy of insurance upon the life of their deceased father.

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

This is an action to recover §25,000 and interest, which is the alleged balance of the purchase price of a printing and publishing plant, and of the good will of tlie business of publishing a newspaper. The plaintiff in error, the Housekeeper Publishing Company, a corporation, conveyed this plant and good will to the wives of the defendants in error, Lucian Swift and William JO. Haskell, and received §25,000 for them.

<p>1. Corporations — Action to Enforce Statutory Liability of Stockholders —Kansas Statute.</p> <p>Under the constitution and siatutes of Kansas subjecting stockholders in corporations to an additional liability in favor of creditors to the amount of their stock, and providing (Comp. Laws Kan. 1879, c. 23, § 32) that a judgment creditor of the corporation, after an execution returned unsatisfied, “may proceed by action to charge the stockholders with the amount of his judgment,” such an action is for the individual benefit of the creditor suing, and be may proceed at law against a stockholder in any court of general jurisdiction where personal service may be made on the defendant. 1</p> <p>3. Same— Effect of Appointment of Eeof.iver.</p> <p>Under such a statute, the liability of the stockholder, being directly to the creditor, cannot bo enforced by a receiver appointed for the corporation, and the appointment of such receiver does not affect the right of a judgment creditor to maintain an action against a stockholder to enforce such liability.</p> <p>3. Same — Limitation of Action — Df.ath of Stockholder.</p> <p>The contingent liability of a stockholder in a Kansas corporation under the statutes of that state upon liis death continues against his personal representative, so that his death does not start the statute of limitations to running against an action to enforce such liability bv a creditor whose right of action accrued subsequent to such death.</p> <p>4. Same — Defenses—Effect of ¡State Decision.</p> <p>The supreme court of Kansas having held that a stockholder in a corporation of that state, when sued by a creditor of the corporation under its statutes to enforce the additional liability imposed thereby, which is several, and may be enforced by any judgment creditor, may plead as a defense. either in whole or pro tanto, a bona fide indebtedness from the corporation to him, existing when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued, such holding, being based upon a construction of the statute and the nature of the stockholder’s liability thereunder, becomes a part of the statute law of the state, and determines the rights ol’ the parties to an action brought thereunder in another jurisdiction.</p> <p>5. Same — Equitable or Legal Nature of Defense.</p> <p>Such a defense is not an equitable one in any technical sense, but one which goes directly to the question whether the defendant, as a stockholder. is subject to any liability under ; u statute which the plaintiff can enforce and is cognizable in a court, of taw, which can only enforce the statutory liability according to its limitations as fixed by the courts of the state.</p>

This is an action at law by the receiver of an insolvent national bank to recover the amount of an assessment from stockholders. Heard on motion for judgment for want of sufficient answer.

<p>In Bankruptcy. On certificate of referee.</p> <p>On August 3, 1899, a voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed in this court by the firm of Horgan & Slattery, composed of the two partners Arthur J. Horgan and Vincent J. Slattery, and the firm and its members were on that day duly adjudged bankrupts, and the case was referred to Stanley W. Dexter, Esq., referee in bankruptcy. As bearing on the present question in the case, the referee certified that the following facts appeared in the proceedings had before him: The partnership, composed of Horgan and Slattery, as above mentioned, was formed for the purpose of carrying on the business of architects and builders, but failed in 1894, with liabilities then amounting to about §190,000. Thereafter, for several years, the partners continued in the same business, either under the name of a corporation called the “Horgan & Slattery Company,” or in the names of their wives, in both cases drawing to their own use the entire net proceeds of the business. In 1898, a corporation was formed, for the practice of architecture as a profession, called “Horgan & Slattery.” It was composed of Horgan and his wife, Slattery and his wife, and one James Slattery. Its capital was divided into 1,000 shares of §10 each. Of these, Horgan, Slattery, and James Slattery each held one share, and the remaining 997 shares were in the names of the wife of Horgan and the wife of Slattery. The stated consideration for the issue of this stock to the wives was the conveyance by them to the corporation of the equity of redemption in a certain property; but no money was realized by the corporation on this transaction, and it was doubtful whether the property so conveyed was ever of any value, inasmuch as, when the mortgage was thereafter foreclosed, no surplus was realized on the foreclosure sale. Horgan and the two Slatterys each paid §10 in cash for his one share of stock. Horgan was president of the corporation, and Vincent J. Slattery, the other bankrupt, its secretary and treasurer, and they acted as its directors and had entire control of the management of its business and affairs. Since the formation of this corporation, Horgan and Slattery had each drawn from it, in the way of salary and advances, about §10,000, and the other stockholders had never received any dividends.</p> <p>At the first meeting of creditors, the referee made an order requiring the production of the books of the corporation; and thereafter, on the examination of the bankrupt, Horgan. at the instance of certain of the creditors, in compliance with the said order, he produced a book which he identified under oath as the ledger of the corporation of “Horgan & Slattery,” and stated that it contained all the accounts of that corporation. Counsel for the examining creditors then demanded that the book should be placed in his hands for the purposes of an examination, and the referee so ordered. But the bankrupt, under advice of his counsel, refused to deliver up the ledger, whereupon the referee adjudged him to be in contempt, and certified the facts to the judge.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Debts Rei,eased by Discharge — Aijmony.</p> <p>Alimony awarded to a divorced wife by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, to be paid in fixed weekly installments, and overdue at the time the husband files his petition in voluntary bankruptcy, Is not such a debt as will be released by his discharge; and therefore the wife will not be stayed, pending the bankruptcy proceedings, from pursuing appropriate remedies for its collection, except where a preference upon the assets of the bankrupt is sought.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On petition praying for an order restraining the further prosecution of an action pending in a state court against the bankrupt.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Objection to Allowance of Claims — Estoppel.</p> <p>Where judgment creditors caused execution to be levied on property of their debtor within two months before the filing of a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against him by other creditors, and, pending a contest over the adjudication in bankruptcy, it was agreed between the judgment creditors and the petitioning creditors that the sheriff: should sell the property levied on, deduct-the costs of sale from the proceeds, and hold the balance until further orders, and after the adjudication the sheriff paid such balance to the trustee in bankruptcy, and the judgment creditors, abandoning all claims to .priority, proved their claims as unsecured, held, that the petitioning creditors would not be heard to insist that the costs of the executions should be refunded by the judgment creditors before they were entitled to participate in the fund, being hound by the agreement.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On application for allowance of attorney’s fee and other costs and disbursements.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Custody of Bankrupt’s Property — Conflict of Jurisdiction.</p> <p>When an adjudication is made upon a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, personal property which is then in the possession of the bankrupt, and which he lists in his schedule as assets of his estate, comes within the jurisdiction and into the custody of the court of bankruptcy, although a trustee has not yet been appointed; and it cannot rightfully be seized by an officer acting under a writ of replevin from a state court. If it is so taken, the officer will be forbidden, by injunction, to sell or otherwise dispose of the property under his writ, and will be ordered to restore it to the custody of the court of bankruptcy.</p>

In Bankruptcy. On proceedings before the referee in this case under Bankr.

<p>Act of Bankruptcy — Time of Filing Petition.</p> <p>° Under Bankr. Act 1898, § 3, cl. 3, the act of bankruptcy is in the failure to vacate the execution five days before the sale or other disposition of the property seized on the execution, and the four months period runs from that date; and this is irrespective of the question whether the attachment in the suit in which the execution was issued was made in season to give the attaching creditor a valid lien.</p>

<p>Patents — Damages for Infringement — Interest.</p> <p>Under the settled rule of the supreme court, interest is not recoverable on profits allowed in equity- for infringement of a patent prior to the time the master has liquidated the damages, unless under special circumstances of fraud or wantonness.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>Patents — Invention—Wire-Mattress Frames.</p> <p>The Kenney patent, No. 549,370, for a device for holding woven-wire fabrics on a mattress frame, as to claim 2 discloses no patentable invention, and is void, because its advantages over prior devices are fanciful, or a minimum of which the law does not take cognizance.</p>

<p>1. Shipping — Liability to Shipper — Loss of Memoranda.</p> <p>Memorandum books containing entries of one’s experiences and observations at different times and places in tbe line of bis business, valuable to bim for reference, are “writings,” witbin Rev.- St. § 4281, relating to a large number of small articles of small size, but of proportionately large value, including “writings,” and providing, if a shipper shall lade them as freight on any vessel without .giving notice of the true character and value thereof, the owner of the' vessel shall not be liable therefor; but such memoranda are not within a like exception of the bill of lading as to “documents.”</p> <p>2. Same — Fraud of Shipper — Description of Goods.</p> <p>A shipper who puts books containing valuable memoranda with some clothing in a package described in the bill of lading as worn clothing is guilty of fraud destroying his claim to indemnity.</p>

<p>1, Shipping — Delivery to Customs Officers — Usage.</p> <p>A ship’s delivery of a consignment of dutiable goods to the customs authorities, being required by the law and usage of the place, — delivery to the proper party thereafter devolving on such authorities, — is a good delivery as between the shipper and carrier.</p> <p>%, Same — Rights of Consignee — Application of Payments — Bills of Lading Wrongfully Withheld.</p> <p>H., a commission merchant, had an agreement to buy goods for B. & Co. on their orders, and ship the same to them on their account and risk, and to allow them a credit of $5,000; all invoices to be charged in account current, and to hear interest from date of shipment; payments to be by remittances after notice of shipment; remittances to bear interest from time of receipt. Held, that B. & Co., having, after notice of shipment, hut before arrival of the goods, sent remittances for part of the price, with notice that they were on account of such shipment, and having, after arrival of the goods, made tender and deposit of the balance of the price, were equitably entitled to delivery, — H. having no right to make application of the remittances on an old account; that the bills of lading were wrongfully withheld, and that the carrier was not liable for irregularity in delivering the goods to B. & Co. without the bills of lading.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Cross libels for a collision between the steamship Comanche and Float Xo. 1, in tow of the tug James A. Lawrence.</p>

<p>Í. Public Lands — Railroad Grant of Swamp Lands by State.</p> <p>The Minnesota act of March 9, 1875, granting swamp lands of the state in aid of the construction by the Duluth & Iron Range Railroad Company of a road from Duluth to a designated point on the Mesaba iron range by the “shortest and most feasible route,” provided for the making of a survey, and the filing of a map with- the secretary of state, on which all swamp lands within 10 miles on each side of the line as shown should be withdrawn and reserved from sale; that on the construction of each section of the road the governor should cause it to be examined by commissioners, and on their certificate of its completion in a good and substantial manner, as contemplated by the act, to notify the secretary of state, who should issue swamp-land certificates for the lands earned. Held, that under such provisions the executive department of the state was vested with authority to determine not only as to the proper construction of the road, but also as to whether the route selected was in compliance with the act.; and that, in the absence of fraud, its determination of such questions In favor of the company, and the conveyance to it of a portion of the lands in accordance with the provisions of the act, were conclusive upon the state, not only as to the lands so conveyed, but as to all others earned, and to which the company was entitled, under the terms of the grant.</p> <p>8. Same — Power of Legislature to Amend — -Change of Terminus.</p> <p>The purpose of the grant being to secure the construction of a railroad into ihe mining region, and the northern terminus, as fixed by the act, being short of such region as it subsequently developed, it was within the province or power of the legislature, as it did by the amendatory act of 1888, to change such terminus.</p> <p>8. Samis — Forfeiture of Grant-Constitutional Amendment.</p> <p>The amendment to the constitution of Minnesota, adopted in 1881, providing generally the manner in which “all swamp lands now held by the state” should be disposed of, did not operate as a forfeiture or resumption of the grant of swamp lands that had previously been made by the legislature to the Duluth & Iron Range Railroad Company, although the company was then in default, under the conditions of the grant, in view of the rule ¡hat a declaration of forfeiture must be clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable.</p> <p>4. Railroad Mortgage — Validity.</p> <p>A mortgage given by a railroad company to a trustee is not void under the Minnesota statute oí uses and trusts.</p> <p>5. Public Lands — Grant by State to Railroads- -Power to Forfeit Grant.</p> <p>The Minnesota act of April 21, 1897, purporting to declare a forfeiture of lands previously granted to the Duluth & Iron Range Railroad Company, is invalid, as impairing the obligation of the contract made by the grant, the railroad having been fully completed, and the lands earned, prior to its passage.</p>

This was a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage, in which a cross bill was filed for the foreclosure of a second mortgage, and a cross bill by defendants, to recover penalties for usury taken, under the statute of South Carolina.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>Appeal — Assignments and Specifications of Error — Enforcement of Rules of Court.</p> <p>Under rule 11 of the circuit court of appeals for the Eighth circuit (31 C. C. A. cxlvi., 90 Fed. cxlvi.), requiring assignments of error to “set out separately and particularly each error asserted and intended to be urged”; and rule 24 (31 C. C. A. clxiv., 90 Fed. clxiv.), requiring the brief of tbe plaintiff in error or appellant to contain a specification of errors relied upon, which, in cases brought up by appeal) shall state “as particularly as may be in what the decree is alleged to be erroneous,” — an assignment and specification of errors in an equity ease which, in effect, only charge that the decree was erroneous in being for the wrong party, and suggest none of the questions of fact or law argued in the brief, will be disregarded, and the appeal dismissed.</p>

<p>Mining Claims — Development Work Required — Power of Mining District to Regulate.</p> <p>Rev. St. § 2324, as amended by Act Jan. 22, 1880 (21 Stat. 61), providing that the miners of a district may make regulations, not in conflict with the laws of the United States, governing the location, manner of recording, and amount of work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim, subject to the requirement that not less than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or improvements made during each year until a patent has been issued, and further providing by the amendment that “the period within which the work required to be done annually on all unpatented mineral claims shall commence on the first day of January succeeding the date of location of such claim,” merely fixes the minimum amount of expenditure exacted by the United States, and the maximum limit of time within which it may be made, leaving to the states and mining districts to prescribe such further regulations or requirements within such limits as they may deem advisable; and a mining district has power to make a regulation requiring a prescribed amount of work to be done within 90 days after a location is made, and making the claim subject to relocation in default of such work, notwithstanding the 90 days may expire before the 1st day of January succeeding the date of location.</p> <p>Ross, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the District of Idaho.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

In Equity. This was a suit by Virginia B. Matthews against the board of corporation commissioners of North Carolina, the Carolina Central Railroad Company, and others, to restrain the enforcement of an order of the commissioners reducing rates.

<p>This was a suit in equity to enforce contribution between two indemnitors of a surety and for other relief.</p>

<p>1. Insolvent Corporations — Sale op Property on Foreclosure — Claims Payable prom Proceeds.</p> <p>A claim for services rendered in behalf of bondholders of an insolvent corporation in relation to the foreclosure of a mortgage securing the bonds cannot be allowed and paid from the proceeds of the mortgaged property, especially where there is no proof of a contract for such services with all the bondholders interested in the fund.</p> <p>3, Same.</p> <p>The president of an insolvent mortgagor corporation, who, in the discharge of his duty, cares for the property pending foreclosure, a receiver having been refused, is entitled to payment for the services rendered from its proceeds when sold.</p> <p>8. Same — Counsel Fees.</p> <p>Where the proceeds of the property of an insolvent corporation, sold in proceedings for winding up its affairs, are insufficient to pay creditors, fees of the attorneys representing the corporation cannot he allowed and paid therefrom.</p> <p>4 Same.</p> <p>The fees of the counsel who file the bill under which the affairs of an insolvent corporation are wound up are allowable and payable from the proceeds of the property, the amount to he measured by the results.</p>

<p>Bans Stock — Transfer—Assessment.</p> <p>Title of C. to stock in a bank is devested, so as to relieve him of liability for an assessment levied four years thereafter, on the bank becoming insolvent, where he employed auctioneers to sell it, and put into their hands his stock certificate, having indorsed thereon an assignment in blank, and a power of attorney in blank to transfer the stock, duly executed by him, and they knocked down the stock to S., who was cashier of the bank, and took the certificate to the banking house, and delivered it to S., “as cashier” of the bank, and requested him to transfer the shares to the purchaser thereof; and this, notwithstanding a by-law of the bank that “no officer * * * shall, without permission of the directors, hold stock in the bank,” — the inference from the payment of semiannual dividends to S. for the four years being that the bank had accepted him as a stockholder.</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Materiality—Tendency to Confuse Jury.</p> <p>The general rule that testimony which is relevant to an issue will be admitted, without regard to its weight, is subject to the qualification that testimony, although it has some tendency to establish a material fact, may be and should be rejected when its admission will have a tendency to divert the attention of the jury from the precise issues involved in the ease, and, by raising collateral issues, protract the trial beyond reasonable limits.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>In an action against a mining company for trespassing upon and extracting ore from a claim owned by plaintiff, the principal issues litigated being as to the quantity and value of the ore taken by defendant from . plaintiff’s claim, defendant offered testimony to show the total number of miners engaged in working in its mines, including several on its own claims, the number working on plaintiff’s claim, the total production from all the mines, and that each man took out about the same quantity of ore per day, on an average, in all the workings, as tending to show the quantity taken from plaintiff’s claim; also, the assays made of each shipment of ore at the mill, for the purpose of showing the value of plaintiff’s ore. Held, that such testimony was properly rejected, as its admission would have involved the trial of extensive collateral issues, as to the comparative facility with which the ore could be mined in the different workings, and its comparative richness.</p> <p>3. Same — Opinion of Expert — Value of Ore.</p> <p>In an action to recover the value of ore wrongfully extracted by defendant from plaintiff’s claim, where plaintiff had no knowledge of the trespass until after the work had ceased, a mining engineer, shown to be familiar with the ore deposits in the locality, may be permitted, as a witness for plaintiff, to state his opinion, based upon the assay of samples taken by him from the side walls of the abandoned workings, and upon the testimony of the miners who worked therein as to the character of the ore taken therefrom, as to the average value of the body of ore removed.</p> <p>4. Same — Relevancy.</p> <p>On such a trial evidence is admissible of the average assay value of samples of ore taken from the side walls of the workings and from drifts immediately adjacent, and shown to have been of the same general character as the body of ore removed; the weight and value of such evidence to be determined by the jury in view of all the evidence.</p> <p>5. Damages — Removal and Conversion of Ore from Mining Claim — State Statute.</p> <p>The provision of the Code of South Dakota (Comp. Laws Dak. 1887, § 4603) fixing the measure of the damages recoverable for wrongful conversion of personal property as the value of the property at the lime of conversion, with interest, or. where the action has been prosecuted with reasonable diligence, the highest market value of the property at any time between the conversion and the verdict, without interest, at. the option of plaintiff, governs in actions in the federal courts within the state, and Is applicable to an action for trespass upon a mining claim, whore the only damage claimed or litigated is the value of the ore removed therefrom and converted by defendant; the action being in effect, though not in form, one for the conversion of personal property.</p>

On the night of May 4, 1896, L. O. Price was a conductor in charge of a freight train of the Chicago Great Western Railway Company which was running from Chicago, in the state of Illinois, to Dubuque, in the state of Iowa. The train, consisted of 22 loaded ears. Sycamore is a city in Illinois, on this railroad, about 57 miles west of Chicago.

<p>1. Municipal Bonds — Constitutionality of Statute — Refunding Bonds.</p> <p>Consi. Colo. art. 11, § t>, as amended in 1888, which prohibits the creation of indebtedness by counties without a favorable vote of the electors, does not apply to the refunding of debts; and the act of April 17, 1889 (Seas. Laws Colo. 1889, pp. 31, 32, § 2), authorizing counties to refund their judgment and bonded debts, was not unconstitutional because it failed to make a favorable vote of electors a condition precedent to the issue of refunding bonds.</p> <p>8. Same-Subject of Statute.</p> <p>Such act, which is entitled “An act to enable the several counties of the state to refund their bonded debt which was matured or may hereafter mature and to issue bonds in satisfaction of judgments and matured bonds,” is not in violation of the provision of the constitution of Colorado (article 5, § 21), that no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; the subject being the refunding of county debts, which includes both judgments and bonds.</p> <p>8. Same — Reference to Prior Statute.</p> <p>Neither is the provision of section 4 of the act, which requires the taxes for the payment of bonds issued to bo levied as provided in a former act, the title of which is given, void, under Const. Oolo. art. 5, § 24. providing that “no law shall be revived or amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only, but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length.”</p> <p>4. Same — Act for Raising Revenue.</p> <p>Such act is not one for raising revenue, within the meaning of Const. Colo. art. 5, § 31, requiring that such bills shall originate in the house of representatives; and the fact that it originated in the senate does not, therefore, affect its validity.</p> <p>6. Sam:-: — Defenses—Judgment as Estoppel.</p> <p>£n an action against a county on its bonds issued in satisfaction of a judgment against it, such judgment conclusively estops the county from making the defense that the original indebtedness upon which the judgment was rendered was in excess of the amount which it could legally incur under the limitations imposed by the constitution of the state.</p> <p>6. Same — Effect of Recitals.</p> <p>As against a bona fide purchaser before maturity of negotiable bonds of a county, containing recitals that they were issued, by virtue of a statute, in satisfaction of judgments which had been rendered against the county in courts of record, the county cannot deny the existence of such judgments.</p> <p>7. Pleading — Unnecessary Averments in Complaint.</p> <p>Unnecessary averments in a complaint require proof that would not have been essential if the pleading had been confined to the indispensable allegations only, when such averments constitute an essential part of the cause of action as stated. If the cause is well stated without them, they may be disregarded as surplusage, and do not affect the issues.</p> <p>Caldwell, Circuit Judge, dissenting.</p>

<p>In Error to the United States Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.</p>

Bert A. Watson, the plaintiff in error, brought this action against the city of Huron, the defendant in error, to recover $40,000, on 40 warrants issued by the city, for $1,000 eacb. The form of each of the warrants is as follows: “No. 3,784.

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Oregon.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United ¡States for the District of Colorado.</p>

This action was brought in the circuit court for the district of Washington by the Rock Island Alaska Mining Company, the appellee, against the corporation styled Frank Waterhouse, Limited, appellant, to recover the sum of 821,055.19, with interest, alleged to be due on a certain charter party, and for merchandise furnished and services rendered to the said appellant by the appellee.

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the District of Washington.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Montana.</p>

This is an action to recover for the wrongful killing of plaintiff’s intestate. Heard on demurrer to petition for misjoinder of causes of action.

<p>In Bankruptcy. On questions certified by referee.</p>

<p>L BAr,Kiiuj?Tcr--Acts of Bankruptcy-Admission of Insolvency by Corporation.</p> <p>Under Bankr. Act 1898, § 3a, cl. 5, providing that It shall be an act of bankruptcy if a debtor shall have “admitted in writing his inability to pay his debts, and his willingness to be adjudged a bankrupt on that ground,” where a corporation, by the unanimous vote of its stockholders, authorizes one of its officers to appear on behalf of the company in the federal court, and make the admission of insolvency contemplated by the statute, “in the event of an Involuntary petition in bankruptcy being filed against said company,” this is not in itself such an unqualified admission as is required by the act, and is, therefore, not an act of bankruptcy on the part of the corporation.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>Where an officer of a corporation, in pursuance of authority previously given by a vote of the corporation, makes a written admission that the company is unable to pay its debts, and is willing to be.adjudged a bankrupt on that ground, but this writing is not executed until after the filing of a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against the corporation, it constitutes no ground for an adjudication of bankruptcy on that petition.</p> <p>8. Same — Transfer of Property — Receivership.</p> <p>Where a bill in equity asking for the appointment of a receiver is brought in a state court against a corporation, and the defendant makes no opposition to the suit, but tacitly permits the receiver to be appointed, and to take charge of its property, this is not a conveyance or transfer of the property, within the meaning of Bankr. Act 1898, § 3a, el. 1, providing that it shall be an act of bankruptcy if a person shall have “conveyed or transferred any part of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.”</p> <p>4. Same — Suffering Puefkrknoe — Receivership.</p> <p>Under Bankr. Act 1898, § 3a. cl. 3, providing that It shall be an act of bankruptcy if a person shall have “suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference through legal proceedings, and not having at least five days before a sale or final disposition of any property affected by such preference vacated or discharged such preference,” where a corporation makes no defense to a bill in equity against it in a state court, and tacitly permits the appointment of a receiver, and the vesting of its property in him, it is not an act of bankruptcy by the corporation, although certain classes of persons may be entitled to larger dividends under the receivership'proceedings than they would obtain in bankruptcy, if it does not appear that any such persons are concerned, or that any sale or final disposition of the property affected by the receivership has been made.</p> <p>6. Same — Assignment for Creditors — Receivership.</p> <p>Where a corporation, being made defendant to a bill in equity in a state court asking for a receivership, fails to oppose the action, and tacitly permits the appointment of a receiver, and the vesting of its property in him, this does not constitute an assignment for the benefit of its creditors, within the meaning of the bankruptcy law, and is not an act of bankruptcy.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On opposition to bankrupt’s application for discharge.</p>

<p>Counterfeiting — Blank Form.</p> <p>The making of a blank form of a certificate of residence, such as when filled are issued by the United States to Chinese entitled to remain, in the country, is not within Rev. St. § 5418, making it a crime to counterfeit any writing for the purpose Of defrauding the United States.</p>

<p>In the Matter of a Habeas Corpus on the Relation of Oberlin M. Carter. Writ dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Idaho.</p>

This is an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill filed by the Kisinger-Ison Company, complainant, against the Bradford Belting Company, to enjoin the infringement of two patents, — one No. 428,123, granted to D. B. Morrison, May 20, 1890. for a fence-wire coupling, and No. 492,811, granted to W. S. Kisinger, March 7, 1893, for a trolley-wire connector.

<p>In Admiralty. Appeal from the taxation of costs. '</p>

<p>Collision — Negligence—Right of Way — Two Tows — Crossing Bows.</p> <p>The C., a ferryboat, crossing from her New York slip to her Brooklyn slip, where the river was but 1,400 feet wide, and heading nearly directly across, when it had gone one-third the distance, sounded a single blast to the tug W., and a tandem tow, and the tug B., which had a dumper lashed to it, both of which were proceeding down river on the Brooklyn side, against the flood tide, with the C. on their starboard hand, to which the W. replied with one, turned somewhat to the starboard, and passed under the stern of the C. The B. did not answer, nor follow the course of the W. When in midstream, and before the W. had passed under her stern, the C. gave another blast, and then, getting no answer, gave a third signal of one whistle. The C. cleared the W. by a few feet, and immediate# stopped, and backed or turned to starboard. Held, that the B., which was bound by the rules of the road to stop or turn to starboard, and which could have done so and avoided the accident, was in fault; and that the C. was not in fault, it having had a right, in the first place, to proceed on its course, both tugs having then time and space to keep out of her way, and it having later been unable to stop sooner than It did, without a collision with the W.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction or Federal Courts — Federal Question.</p> <p>A suit by a railroad company to restrain the authorities of a state from collecting a tax levied on its property, on the grounds that the assessment on which such tax was levied was made without authority of law, and that such assessment was discriuiinative, and intended to impose on railroad property an undue share of the burdens of state taxation, is one which involves the construction and application of the provisions of the constitution of the United States prohibiting the taking of property without due process of la.w, and securing to all persons the equal protection of the laws, of which a federal court has jurisdiction, without regard to the citizenship of the parties.2</p> <p>2. Taxation op Railroad Property — Assessment — North Carolina Statutes.</p> <p>The North Carolina act of March 6,’ 1899, creating the North Carolina corporation commission, and defining their duties and powers, did not clothe such commission with authority to appraise and assess railroad property for taxation, nor was such authority given by any subsequent legislation.</p>

<p>Bait,roads — Reorganization Agrkhaihnt — Enforcement by Bondiiorders.</p> <p>Bondlioldors of a railroad company, who have exchanged their bonds for those of a reorganized company, which, by the reorganization agreement, were to he made a first lien on the property, have the right to enforce such agreement, and to insist upon the retention by the reorganization committee of all securities placed in its hands to secure the taking up of prior liens until their extinguishment is assured, and an arrangement by which such liens are to be paid off or extended at the option of tlio holders does not meet the requirements of the agreement.</p>

<p>1, Bill oh Review — Time hob Filing.</p> <p>The rule is well established in courts of equity of the United States that a bill of review must be filed within the time allowed by statute for appeal.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>Where a party against whom a decree has been entered by a circuit court of equity lias no right of appeal therefrom to the supreme court, either because no question appealable to that court was in issue, or because he failed to have a question of jurisdiction involved certified during the term at which the decree was entered, and his right of apx>cal is therefore limited to an appeal 1o ihe circuit court of appeals, the time within which he may file a hill of review is limited, by analogy, to the six months allowed by statute for taking an appeal to that court.</p>

The appellant filed a bill of complaint in the circnit court, in which it was alleged that on December 30. 1869, one J. H. Allen held the legal title to certain lands situated in ihe cily of Eureka, in the state oí California, in trust for the complainant, and that the complainant on said date caused the said trustee to convey the lands to the defendants, the appellees herein, who were the complainant’s brothers, as security for money to be advanced thereafter to the…

<p>Libel — Criticism op Book.</p> <p>To say of a book purporting to show what American citizens are descended from royalty, that it gives no authority for its statements, and that in almost all cases the descendants are proved to be illegitimate, is not libel; the first being within the ordinary scope of literary criticism, and as to the second it being admitted that “some” descents are traced through illegitimates.</p>

<p>Heard on Demurrer to Declaration.</p>

<p>Master and Skrvant^Duty to Furnish Safe Appliances — Negligence op Co-servant.</p> <p>Stakes which fit in sockets on the side of a flat car designed for transportation of lumber are appliances necessary for the proper equipment of the car, and the railroad company is riot relieved from liability for personal Injuries sustained by an employs by reason of the breaking of such stakes on a loaded car, where they were defective and insufficient in number, by showing that they were made and supplied by a co-servant of the person injured.1</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On review of decision of referee in bankruptcy.</p> <p>In proceedings in tbe bankruptcy of Walter R. Cliffe, at a meeting held before tbe referee, one Frederick W. Tunnell was suminoned as a witness by the ii-ustee and the petitioning creditors, and, being sworn, was examined. In the course of the examination, the following interrogatory .was propounded to him: “On January 11, 1899, in what sum was lie [the bankrupt] indebted to you, and what obligations of his did you hold?” Counsel for the witness objected to the question upon the ground that, from evidence of the bankrupt previously given, it appeared that there was a controversy pending between the witness and the trustee in bankruptcy; that the proper forum for its determination, should a suit be brought by the trustee, would be the state court; and that, in advance of such trial in such court, the trustee or the creditors of the bankrupt were not entitled to question the witness in this court about the subjects so in controversy or dispute. On advice of his counsel, witness refused to answer the question; and the referee, deciding that he was bound to answer, certified the matter and his decision thereon to the judge for review, with the following opinion:</p> <p>The witness was called to testily on behalf of the trustee and creditors under section 21a of the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898, which provides that “any designated person * 0 * who is a competent witness under the laws of the state in which the proceedings arc pending” may ho required to appear and “be examined concerning the acts, conduct or property of a bankrupt whose estate is in process of administration under this act.”</p> <p>Under section 26 of the bankruptcy act of March 2, 1867 (see Rev. St. U. S. §§ 5086, 5087), any person could he required to attend as a. witness and be examined as to all “matters concerning the property and estate of the bankrupt and the due settlement thereof.” Section 26 of the act of 1867 has been frequently interpreted by the courts, and a reference to a few of the eases will be made:</p> <p>In Re Fay, Fed. Cas. No. 4,708, Judge Lowell decided that a witness cannot refuse to answer questions concerning bis dealings with the bankrupt on the ground that his answers may furnish evidence against him in a civil case brought or to he brought on behalf of the assignee, and says, “The main, if not the only, purpose of the statute authorizing such an examination, is to enable the assignee to obtain evidence for civil suits, or to ascertain that there is no such evidence.” In this case suit had been begun by the assignee to recover a large sum of money which he alleged had been received by the witness, and the witness denied the right of examination while the suit against him was still pending, contending that he could not be compelled to give evidence against himself.</p> <p>In Re Blake, 2 N. R. R. 10, Fed. Cas. No. 1,492, the district court for the Western district of Michigan decided that a witness cannot rightfully object to being sworn or refuse to be examined upon any matters which shall be within the subjects mentioned in section 26 of the bankruptcy act of 1807.</p> <p>In Re Stuyvesant Bank, 6 Ben. 3", Fed. Gas. No. 13,582. Judge Blatchford decided that in such examination a witness is not entitled to counsel, oven though his examination may establish a liability on his part to the bankrupt’s estate, and must be compelled to answer questions respecting his transactions with the bankrupt. To the same effect are the eases In re Comstock, Fed. Gas. No. 3,080, 3 Sawy. 517; In re Fredenberg, Fed. Gas. No. 5,075, 2 Ben. 133; In re Feinberg, Fed. Gas. No. 4,716, 3 Ben. 162.</p> <p>Section 26 of the act of 1867 and section 21a of the act of 1898 are substantially the same, and the decisions under the former are controlling.</p> <p>But one case upon this subject arising under the act of 1398 has boon reported. In Re Howard (D. G.) 95 Fed. 415, the district court for the Northern district of California has applied the decisions under the act of 1867 to the act of 1898, and decides that a witness must submit to examination relevant to matters concerning the acts, conduct, or property of the bankrupt.</p> <p>As to the objection that the proper forum for the trial of the controversy, which is assumed by counsel for the witness to exist in this case between the trustee and the witness, is the state court, it may be said that this question does not now require decision. If it did, it might perhaps be held that the trustee could bring suit in the United States district court. See Carter v. Hobbs (D. C.) 92 Fed. 594, and In re Sievers (D. C.) 91 Fed. 366.</p> <p>As to the objection that the witness cannot be examined in this proceeding ’ concerning the acts, conduct, or property of the bankrupt, because it may be that the trustee will hereafter bring suit against the witness, and that the witness cannot be compelled to testify, on the ground that his answers may furnish evidence against him in such suit, the referee is of opinion that this objection cannot prevail against the provisions of the act and the decisions by the courts above stated.</p> <p>The referee is of opinion that the objections are-invalid, and overrules them, and orders that the witness be required to answer the question objected to, and all other questions relevant to matters concerning the acts, conduct, or property of the bankrupt. And the question whether or not the examination of the witness can be taken under the objections made is certified to the judge for his opinion.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On review of decision of referee in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Fees of Referee.</p> <p>The compensation of a referee in bankruptcy is fixed by the statute, and will not be abated or diminished in a particular case because some of the duties which ordinarily would be discharged by the referee, in the holding of hearings and making of orders, were assumed by the judge, at the request of the parties, on account of the magnitude of the interests involved, and the unusual character of the proceedings.</p> <p>2, Same — “Dividends” in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>A “dividend” in bankruptcy is a parcel of the fund arising from the assets of the estate, rightfully allotted to a creditor entitled to share in, the fund, whether in the same proportion with other creditors, or in a different proportion.</p> <p>8, Same — Payment of Secured Debt as Dividend — Commissions.</p> <p>Where real property of a bankrupt, incumbered by a mortgage securing a series of bonds in the hands of different holders, is sold by the trustee free of liens, pursuant to an order of the court of bankruptcy on the petition of the trustee and of the secured creditors, and the avails of sale brought Id to court for distribution, that portion of the proceeds which is paid over by the trustee to each bondholder, in satisfaction of his debt, is a “dividend,” within the meaning of Bankr. Act 1898, §§ 40, 48, providing for the compensation of referees and trustees in bankruptcy by commissions on “sums to be paid as dividends.”</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>While a secured creditor may ordinarily collect his debt by foreclosure or sale, as if no bankruptcy were pending, yet if, without his request, and solely to realize a surplus for other creditors, the court directs sale of the property discharged from the incumbrance, his rights must be conserved; and the satisfaction of his secured debt from the proceeds of such sale may not be regarded as a dividend, nor charged with commission.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Dissolution of Liens — Voluntary and Involuntary Cases.</p> <p>Bankr. Act 1898, § 67f, providing tbat “all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt,” is to he construed as applying to voluntary as well as involuntary cases, since section 1, cl. 1, declares tha.t “ ‘a person against whom a petition has been filed’ shall include a person who has filed a voluntary petition”; and a levy of execution on personal property is dissolved by an adjudication of the debtor as a voluntary bankrupt within four months thereafter, although the suit in which the execution issued was begun more than four months before.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On motion to set aside an adjudication in voluntary bankruptcy and dismiss the petition.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On motion to vacate order granting bankrupt’s application for discharge.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Jurisdiction-Suits by Trustee.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Act 1898, § 23b, providing that “suits by the trustee shall only be brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or prosecuted them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted,” is to be strictly construed, as being a limitation upon the general grant of jurisdiction to the courts of bankruptcy in other parts of the act; and this provision applies only to suits upon causes of action originally vested in the bankrupt, and which he might have maintained if there had been no adjudication in bankruptcy, and not to suits upon causes of action created by the bankruptcy proceedings, or vesting originally in the trustee as trustee. Of the latter the courts of bankruptcy have jurisdiction.</p> <p>8. Same--Bill in Equity — Showing Jurisdiction.</p> <p>On demurrer to a bill In equity brought in the court of bankruptcy by a trustee in bankruptcy to quiet his title to a part of the assets of the estate in bankruptcy as against a claim of the defendant, where the bill did not affirmatively show that the right of action was one vesting originally in the trustee, or that it was not one originally accruing to the bankrupt himself, held, that the demurrer should be sustained, with leave to the plaintiff to file an amended bill.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. On opposition to bankrupt’s application for discharge.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Opposition to Discharge — Concealment on Assets.</p> <p>The omission of a bankrupt to include particular property in his schedule of assets will not be ground for refusing his application for discharge, where such omission was not caused, by a fraudulent intent to conceal the property from his trustee, but was the result of a mistake of law or of fact, or of an honest, though erroneous, belief that he had no available interest in the property.</p>

<p>1. Aliens — Status of Chinese Persons — Merchants.</p> <p>A Chinese man, who owns an interest in a mercantile firm, but Is not actively engaged in the conduct of its business, and who works as head cook in a restaurant, of which he is a part proprietor, is a laborer, and not a merchant, within the terms of Act Nov. 3, 1893 (2S Stat. 8).1</p> <p>2. Same — -Deportation of Chinese — Erroneous Decision Permitting Entry.</p> <p>Under Act July 5, 1884, §§ 6, 12 (23 Stat. 116, 117), which requires Chinese persons other than laborers desiring to enter the United States, and not domiciled therein, to procure a certificate from the Chinese authorities, viséd by the consular representative of the United States, and makes such certificate the only evidence receivable to establish the right of such person to enter, a Chinese person erroneously permitted to enter without such certificate is unlawfully within the United States, and may be arrested and deported, without regard to his occupation since his entry; and in such case the action of the customs official in permitting his entry is not even prima facie evidence of his right to remain.</p>

<p>This was an application by Louie You, a Chinese person, for a writ of habeas corpus. On petition for rehearing.</p>

<p>This was an appeal by Jew Sing from an order of deportation made by a commissioner.</p>

<p>Naturalization — Vouchers.</p> <p>An applicant for naturalization should produce a voucher other than one who habitually, and for compensation, appears as such.</p>

<p>This was a suit in equity for unfair competition and fraud. On final hearing.</p>

<p>Copyright — Suit for Infringement — Preliminary Injunction.</p> <p>In a suit for infringement of a copyrighted directory by copying therefrom lists of names used by defendant in a rival publication, where the moving affidavits for a preliminary injunction make a strong showing of infringement, and defendant fails to furnish the testimony of the canvassers whose work is attacked, or the lists returned by them, he will be required to give security to respond for any damages which may ultimately be recovered against him; otherwise, an injunction will be awarded.</p>

This was a suit in equity by the Tesla Electric Company against Scott & Janney and others for infringement of certain letters patent relating to electro-magnetic motors.

<p>These are three suits for infringement of patents. Heard on demurrers to the bills.</p>

<p>Hearing on Bill and Plea.</p>

<p>This was a suit in equity by John P. Lein against Solomon A. Myers and Daniel I. Tompkins, composing the firm of S. A. Myers & Co., for infringement of a patent. On final hearing.</p>

<p>Patents — Infringement—Electric Railway Motors.</p> <p>The Sprague patent, No. 324,892, for an improved electric railway motor, describes an invention for carrying the motor frame suspended beneath the vehicle centered on the axle at one end, and supported at the other by a flexible connection with the truck frame or body of the car, its principal feature being to provide a flexible connection between the motor frame and ¡ruck frame or ear body, so that the position of the motor will not be affected by the movement of the truck on its springs. Claims 2 and 6 construed, and held infringed. ‘</p>

<p>L Patents — Limitation by Foreign Patents — Act Extending Term.</p> <p>Act March 3, 1897 (29 Stat. c. 391), amending the statutes relating to patents, by its terms does not affect patents granted prior to January 1. 1898.</p> <p>2. Same — Suit for Infringement — Right of Licensee to Maintain.</p> <p>A decree reforming a license so as to confer on the licensee the exclusive right to make and vend a patented machine docs not entitle the licensee to maintain a suit for infringement against one not a party, who had previously purchased a machine from the patentee, who then held the title to the patent.</p> <p>8. Same — Brick-Mold Sanding Machine.</p> <p>The Newton patent, No. 407,030, for a brick-mold sanding machine, claim 5, is void for lack of patentable invention in the device shown in the specification.</p> <p>4. Same — Feeding Mechanism.</p> <p>The Newton patent, No. 372,698, for improvements in feeding and delivering mechanism for brick-mold sanding machines, consisting chiefly of an additional feed pulley, which positively separates the lower mold of a series from the table and from the next one above it, and moves it towards the cylinder of thé machine, discloses an invention of merit, and is valid. It is infringed by a machine which embodies such feature, and only differs in having the table provided with anti-friction rollers, on which the lower mold rests, and which facilitate its movement.</p>

<p>Patents — Inerinoement—Improvements in Music Boxes.</p> <p>The Guendet patent, No. 174,520, for improvements in music boxes, as to claim 1, which covers an independent damper, is limited by the prior art, and especially by the Lochmann patent, No. 417,050, to the particular device described in the specification, which is a positive side damper, and to a narrow range of equivalents; and such claim is not infringed by a negative damper, which is applied by its own resilience, and held from engagement by the pressure of another part of the mechanism.</p>

There was an action at law by the Plastic Fireproof Construction Company against the city and county of San Francisco to recover damages for the infringement of a patent. On motion by defendant for direction of a verdict.

<p>1. Patents — Action for Infringement of Design Patent — Evidence.</p> <p>Invention is as essential to the validity of a design patent as of a patent for a mechanical device; and, in an action at law for infringement of a design patent, defendant may introduce in evidence, under the general Issue, other design patents, for the purpose of showing the prior state of the art, and as going to the question of invention.</p> <p>2. Sams.</p> <p>It is not error in such an action to permit a witness to compare the design of plaintiff’s patent with others in evidence, and point out the differences between Diem.</p> <p>8. Appeal — Re view — Ins tructions.</p> <p>Exceptions to the charge of the court cannot be considered by the appellate court where only a portion of the charge is contained in the record.</p>

<p>This” was a suit in equity by the Excelsior Needle Company against the Morse-Keefer Cycle-Supply Company for infringement of certain patents.</p>

<p>1. Patents — Pleading—Multifariousness.</p> <p>A bill based on several patents is multifarious, if it does not appear therefrom that the several improvements covered by such patents are or have been all conjointly used by defendant, or are or have been all embodied for conjoint operation and use in one machine, device, article, or apparatus.</p> <p>A Same — Patent with Numerous Claims — Compelling Election.</p> <p>When a bill is based upon a patent containing numerous claims relating to different groups of elements, the complainant may, on motion therefor, be required to specify the particular claims in respect to which he will attempt to prove infringement.</p>

<p>1. Patents — Infringement—Combinations.</p> <p>To constitute an infringement of a patent for a combination, of mechanical powers in a machine, the elements of which are not separately claimed as the invention of the patentee, the infringing machine must substantially use all the elements of the combination.</p> <p>2. Same — Can-Heading Machines.</p> <p>The Jordan patent, No. 307,197, for improvements in can-ending machines, is not for a pioneer invention either of a machine for heading cans or as to the appliances brought together in the mechanism of the machine described, and its claims cover only the exact union of the exact elements of the device shown. It is not infringed by machines made in accordance with the Wheaton patents, Nos. 477,584 or 499,949, — the latter being for improvements on the former, — as such machines, while performing the same functions as the Jordan machine, do so by entirely different mechanism', in which the principal elements of the combination shown by the Jordan patent are not used.</p>

<p>Patents — Patentable Novelty — Ant-Brake Attachment.</p> <p>The McKenna patent, No. 348,289, for an air-brake attachment which consists of a short flexible tube with a coupling on one end by which it is attached to the train pipe of an ordinary air brake at one end of tbe ear, and a stopcock at the other end, which is carried up so as to be conveniently reached by a. brakeman on the platform, and by means of which he can. vent the air from the train pipe, shows a device which is merely the result of mechanical skill, and the patent is void by reason of lack of patentable novelty in view of the prior art.</p>

<p>Master and Servant — -Personal Injury or Employe — Negligence—Loading Vessels —Independent Contractor.</p> <p>The hatch of a steamer, through which stevedores were loading it by means of a fall from the boom of a derrick, was 20 feet long, and had across it, to support the covers, two beams, C feet from the ends. According to custom, Hie carpenter, in arriving in port, had removed the bolls which fastened the beams, so that the stevedores might manage the beams as they desired, as for the purpose of loading they had the entire management of the hatches and beams; and, before commencing loading, their foreman had the after beam removed, but left in the forward beam. The derrick was so arranged that the vertical line dropped through the after part of the hatch, but D. and co-laborers, working for the stevedores in the hold, not being able to move forward as far as desired a cask which had been lowered, and was somewhat forward of the hatch, attached the fall thereto, and gave the signal to raise it, execution- of which brought the rope against the forward beam and threw it from its place onto D. Held, that there was no improper equipment of the ship, or fault on its part, but any negligence was that of D., his co-laborers, and the foreman of the stevedores, all fellow servants.</p>

<p>Shipping — Proceeding for Forfeiture of Vessel — Measure of Proof Required.</p> <p>A proceeding under Rev. St. § 4377, ior the forfeiture of a vessel and cargo for violation of her license by carrying smuggled goods, is a civil suit, and the government is not required to prove the allegations of its libel beyond a reasonable doubt, but by not more than a preponderance of evidence. Whether Rev. St. § 909, is applicable to the case, quaere.</p>

In Admiralty. The libel alleged that on October 8, 1897, the defendant, a common carrier from Baltimore to Philadelphia and elsewhere, received from the Montana Goal & Coke Company, a corporation of Maryland, doing business in Baltimore, 230 tons of Montana gas coal, to be delivered, “the dangers of the seas only excepted,” to the Philadelphia Bureau of Gas, and issued a bill of lading to the said coal company showing the shipment upon the barge W. E. Weller, belonging to…

<p>Carriers of Passengers — Liability for Loss of Baggage — Steamship Companies.</p> <p>A passenger steamship company is not liable as an innkeeper, and under the general rule applicable to carriers it is not liable for the loss of a passenger’s baggage, where tbe loss is not occcasioned by some particular breach of duty or negligence on the part of its servants, unless tbe baggage has been delivered to and taken into tbe exclusive custody of its officers or servants.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction of Federal Courts — Federal Question.</p> <p>A trespass upon a mining claim does not raise a federal question, nor does a claim of right based upon a mere location of a mining claim, as against a patent regularly issued by the land department, under authority of law, for the land covered by such location. 1</p> <p>2. Minino Claims — Validity of Patent — Area Included in Single Patent.</p> <p>A patent for a lode mining claim, issued under the act of May 10, 1872, is not restricted to the surface ground which may be taken under a single location, and the fact that a patent includes ground extending more than 300 feet on either side of the lode or vein do.es not render it invalid on its face as to the excess.</p>

This is an appeal by the defendant in the court below from two orders made by the circuit court of the United States for the district of Washington, Western division, overruling the demurrer of defendant to the bill of complaint, and granting an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant, as receiver of the Tacoma National Bank, from proceeding further against the plaintiff in an action at law pending in the. same court.

<p>In Error to and Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the District of Washington.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction or Fedbural Courts — Adverse Claims to Public Mineral, Lands — Federal Question.</p> <p>Where the allegations of a.bill show that the respective parties to the suit are making adverse claims to the same land under the mineral land la.ws of the United States, and that the proper determination of such conflicting claims necessarily requires the application and construction of those laws, a federal court has jurisdiction of the suit for such purpose, the property in controversy being alleged to be of the requisite statutory value; and having jurisdiction for that purpose, and such suit being equitable in its nature, the court will entertain and determine all incidental questions between the parties growing out of their conflicting claims, and will grant an injunction or appoint a receiver, where such course is proper.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>A bill asserting rights based on the location of a mining claim under the laws of the United States, which shows that the validity of such location depends on the question whether or not the locators discovered a mineral deposit within the limits of the claim prior to its location, within the meaning of such laws, and which sets out in full the facts relating to such alleged discovery, discloses a question arising under the laws of the United States, which gives a federal court jurisdiction where the requisite, statutory amount is involved.</p> <p>8. Mineral Lands — Oil Placer Claims — Discovery oe Mineral.</p> <p>There can he no valid location of petroleum lands, under the mineral laws relating to placer claims, without a prior valid discovery of mineral within the limits of the claim.</p>

<p>1. Equity — Jurisdiction—Quieting Title — Reluce at Law.</p> <p>A plaintiff out of possession of real estate, and holding the legal title thereto, cannot maintain a bill in equity in the courts of the United States against a defendant in possession to cancel a tax deed regular on i1s face, and which constitutes a cloud upon his title, as the effect would he to draw into a court of equity a controversy properly cognisable at law.</p> <p>2. Same — Enforcing Static Statute.</p> <p>Nor will a United States court enforce a statute of a state enlarging the equitable jurisdiction of its courts, if such statute contravenes the distinction rigidly enforced in the courts of the United States between law and equity, or violates section 723 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides that suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States when a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law, or if it violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by a jury.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>On Exception to Master’s Keport.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

Henry K. Pomeroy and Cornelius B. Gold filed their bill in equity in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Colorado, alleging, in substance, that they were creditors of the Colorado Coal & Iron Development Company, a Colorado corporation; that the company was insolvent, and unable to pay its taxes and other debts; that it owned a largo amount of property, which would be sacrificed unless the court would appoint a receiver of Its property, to “hold,…

<p>1. Corporations — Powers—-Accommodation Paper.</p> <p>A private corporation, by tlie consent oí all of its stockholders and directors, may execute accommodation paper by which it will he bound.</p> <p>2. Same— Neuotiability.</p> <p>A promissory note, executed by a prívale corporation, made payable at a time certain, to the order of “B., or his assignee,” is a negotiable promissory note, and remains a negotiable promissory note into the hands of whomsoever it may pass, notwithstanding B., the payee, indorses it to a third person without using the words, in the indorsement, “to his order” or “to bearer.”</p> <p>8. Accommodation Paper — Transfer.</p> <p>A transferee of negotiable accommodation paper, who acquires the same for a. reasonable consideration, before Us maturity, in the regular course of business, holds the same free from a set-off originating out of collateral matters, and which set-off would be good against his transferror and the original payee, even though the transferee acquired the note with notice of the existence of such set-off, for the reason that a set-off is not an equity which applies to negotiable paper; and the general rule is qualified and restricted to those equities arising out of the bill or note transaction itself.</p> <p>4 Same.</p> <p>For further particulars, see the decision.</p> <p>(Syllabus by the Court.)</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>In Error to t he United States Court of Appeals in the Indian Territory.</p>

Amolie Emmerling, the plaintiff in error, was a German woman, who, it was stated at the bar, talked and understood the English language somewhat imperfectly, and was inexperienced in business affairs and methods. She was 60 years old, and a widow. She was possessed of real-estate mortgages, notes, and bank stock of the par and of the actual value of $8,283.64.

<p>1. Railroads — Injury at Crossing — Contributory Nkgligrnce.</p> <p>A petition in an action to recover for the death of plaintiff’s decedent by being struck by a train on defendant’s railroad at a crossing, which alleges that the decedent, while approaching the crossing in a covered buggy, and when 135 feet dislant therefrom, saw the approaching train, and drove upon the crossing, without again looking in that direction, discloses such contributory negligence on his part as to preclude any recovery, although it alleges negligence on the part of defendant’s servants in running the train at an unusual rate of speed, and in failing to give the proper signals.</p> <p>a. Negligence — Rule as to Effect of Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>The rule that a plaintiff who, by his own negligence, placed himself in a dangerous position, where an injury was likely to result, may still recover for such injury where the defendant, with knowledge, or such notice as is equivalent to knowledge, of plaintiff’s danger, failed to exercise reasonable care by which the injury might have been avoided, has no application to a ease where the injury was the result of the concurrent negligence of both parties.</p>

This was an action to recover on bonds issued by the defendant school district.

<p>This was an action to recover damages for breach of a contract contained in bonds issued by defendant giving the holder an option to exchange them for an equal amount of defendant's preferred stock. On motion by defendant for a new trial.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — I’artnebsiiip Petition — Amendment.</p> <p>Where a voluntary petition in bankruptcy by partners prays that “the petitioners” may be adjudged bankrupt, instead of “the said firm,” but otherwise follows ihe official form for a partnership petition, describing the petitioners as the members of the firm, and the schedules show that all their debts are firm debts, and the order of adjudication corresponds with the petition, the defects of form in the petition and adjudication are not material on opposition to the application for discharge, but may be amended nunc pro tunc.</p> <p>2. Same — Separate Discharge op One Partner.</p> <p>Where a firm has been adjudged bankrupt on the voluntary petition of the partners composing it, either partner, without reference to the others, may present his individual petition for a separate discharge.</p> <p>8. Same — Form op Application.</p> <p>Where one member of a bankrupt firm desires to apply separately for his discharge, the petition therefor should recite the adjudication of the firm and of the petitioner as a member of it, and should pray for a discharge from both firm and individual debts, and the notice to creditors should advise them of the same facts.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy. Submitted on petition for direction to receiver to bring suit.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Fiduciary Debts — Commission Merchant.</p> <p>A debt due by a bankrupt in the character of a commission merchant, arising out of his failure to account for the value of goods consigned to him for sale on commission, on a contract to return the goods or their specific proceeds, is not a debt created by the bankrupt’s “fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary ca.paeity,” and therefore will be released by his discharge in bankruptcy.</p> <p>3. Same — Stay op Suits Begun after Adjudication.</p> <p>A court of bankruptcy has jurisdiction to stay the prosecution of an action against the bankrupt in a state court, on a debt from which his discharge would be a release, pending the determination of the question of his discharge, though the action was begun after the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Priority of Payment — Labor Claims.</p> <p>Where the laws of the state give a preference to the wages of employés, to the extent of $100 to each, person, for labor performed within 90 days before the seizure of the employer’s property on judicial process, or its sequestration in the hands of a receiver or trustee for the purpose of paying his debts, and the courts of the state hold that this preference or charge outranks any liens on the property created by contract, such a labor claim, to the amount of $100, will be entitled to priority of payment out of the estate of the employer in bankruptcy, in preference to a landlord’s statutory lien for rent of the premises in which the bankrupt’s business was carried on.</p> <p>a Same — Landlord’s Lien for Rent.</p> <p>A landlord to whom rent is due for the use of the premises by the bankrupt as a store will not be required to bring an action in a state court for. the establishment of his lien, as provided by the state statute, as a precedent step to the assertion of his rights against the bankrupt’s property in the hands of the trustee, but may at once prove his debt, and be beard in the court of bankruptcy in support of his claim to priority.</p>

<p>Í. Bankruptcy — Proof of Claims — Postponement for Fraud.</p> <p>Where a national bank bought a judgment of record against one of its debtors, paying much less than its face value, and caused execution to bo issued thereon and levied on the debtor’s goods, under a. secret arrangement between the parties that the execution, after reimbursing the bank for the amount actually advanced, should be managed for ike benefit of Ux* debtor, so as to protect him against his other creditors, and wifh tluv result of delaying and defrauding the latter, and within four months thereafter the debtor was adjudged bankrupt, and the bank proved a claim against his estate for the whole amount of .the judgment, and had the saine allowed. held, that such allowance should be set aside, and the claim of the bank postponed to the claims of other creditors.</p> <p>S. Same — Setting Aside Allowance of Claim — Fraud.</p> <p>The allowance of a claim against a bankrupt's estate, in favor of an assignee thereof who acquired it after the adjudication, but from an innocent and bona fide holder, in whose hands it was valid and provable, will not be set aside upon an allegation by other creditors that such assignee bought the claim for the purpose of acquiring a majority interest in the estate, of controlling the bankruptcy proceedings in the interest of the bankrupt and himself, and of hindering and defrauding the other creditors, when it does not appear that such fraudulent purpose has actually been carried out, to the injury of other creditors.</p> <p>8. Same — Secured Creditors.</p> <p>Where judgment is recovered against two co-defendants, and execution thereon is levied upon the property of one of them, and the other is adjudged bankrupt, the judgment creditor may prove his claim against the bankrupt as unsecured.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Fees and Costs — Filing Fee.</p> <p>General order No. 10, in bankruptcy, providing that tbe clerk, marshal, or referee, before incurring expenses of certain kinds, may require tbe bankrupt or other person in whose behalf the duty is to be performed to furnish indemnity for such expenses, and that money advanced by the bankrupt or other person for this purpose shall be repaid him out of the estate, does not apply to the fee of $25 which the clerk is directed to collect upon the filing of a voluntary petition in bankruptcy; and this money is not to be returned to the bankrupt.</p> <p>2. Same — Attorney’s Fee Paid by Bankrupt.</p> <p>A bankrupt is not entitled to be reimbursed, out of the funds in the hands of his trustee, for money paid by him to his attorney before the filing of the petition, as a fee for professional services rendered in preparing the petition and schedule and in connection with the property.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p> <p>The referee certifies a question of exemption claimed by the bankrupt, of “one gold watch, chain, and charm,” and of “a certain uniform and paraphernalia,” further described as a “Masonic uniform.” The certificate states that “the watch and chain were carried upon the person, in the mode of ordinary usage,” and that “the Masonic uniform was not used as ordinary or usual wearing apparel,” and that the referee held the articles not exempt, and ordered their delivery to the trustee.</p>

<p>1. Bankkuptcy — Dissolution ov Liens — Limitation or Time.</p> <p>Bankr. Act 1898, § 67e, providing that an adjudication in bankruptcy shall dissolve “a lien created by or obtained in or pursuant to any suit or proceeding at law or in equity, including an attachment upon mesne process or a judgment by confession, which was begun” against the bankrupt within four months prior to the filing of the petition, does not refer, necessarily, to the beginning of the action or suit itself, but to the beginning of that part or branch of the proceedings whose special object is to secure a lien on property of the debtor.</p> <p>8. Same — Attachment.</p> <p>Where an attachment is sued out in a pending suit, upon the filing of an affidavit and bond as required by the state statute, and is levied- on property of the debtor, within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against him, the lien so acquired will be dissolved by Ills adjudication as a bankrupt, if it appears that such lien was obtained while the defendant was insolvent, and that its enforcement would work a preference, notwithstanding the fact that the original action had been pending for more than a year.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Bankrupt Tenant — Landlord’s Lien for Rent.</p> <p>Where a tenant of realty, holding under a lease which contains a clause of forfeiture and right of re-entry for breach of conditions, becomes bankrupt, and the leasehold interest is sold by the trustee in bankruptcy, the landlord of the demised premises has no lien, under the 2aws of Pennsylvania or at common law, upon the proceeds of the sale of the leasehold, for the rent overdue at the time of the bankruptcy.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas.</p>

<p>1. Thade-Mauks — Arbitrary Names.</p> <p>The name “Coal Oil Johnny’s Petroleum Soap,” as applied to a particular manufacture of soap to distinguish it from others, may constitute a valid trade-mark.</p> <p>2. Same — Assignment.</p> <p>The assignment of a trade mark by the originator and owner to a corporation organized by him to succeed to the manufacturo and sale of the article Is valid.</p> <p>8. Same — Notice of Ownership by Assignee.</p> <p>The ownership of a trade-mark by an assignee or transferee is sufficiently indicated by its placing its name as manufacturer on the article sold under such trade-mark.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern-District of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern Distric t of Ohio.</p>

<p>This was a suit in equity by the Gutter Electrical & Manufacturing Company against the Anchor Electric Company, Mildred B. Stanley, and George L. Patterson, for infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>This was a suit for an accounting for royalties under a license to manufacture and sell articles under certain patents.</p>

<p>Patents — Infringement—Municipal Signal Apparatus.</p> <p>The Noyes patents, Nos. 359,687 and 359,688, for municipal signal £$* paratus, construed, and held not anticipated, valid, and infringed.</p>

<p>This was a suit in equity by the National Folding-Box &. Paper Company against Bobert Gair for infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction of Federad Court — Pleading.</p> <p>Tlie jurisdiction of a federal court must affirmatively appear from the allega!ions of the plaintiff’s pleading.</p> <p>S. Same — Diversity of Citizenship — Real Interest of Parties.</p> <p>A bill by a mortgagee of a water company against the company and the city in which it was located, both defendants being corporations of the same state, alleged that the city had subjected the company to unjust and oppressive regulations and requirements, against which the company had at all times protested, and. which had the effect of jeopardizing complainant’s security; that the company had brought an action at law against the city to recover for water which it had been compelled to furnish, and for which the city refused to pay; and that the only remedy at law was by a multiplicity of actions by the company. It further alleged that the company had yielded to the unjust demands of the city to such an extent as to render its right to recover at law contestable, but alleged no act of hostility on the part of the company towards the complainant, or collusion between the defendants. The prayer was for an injunction against both defendants. Held, that the matter in dispute disclosed by the bill was one in which the interest® of the complainant, and the company were identical, • and the court was without jurisdiction.</p>

The object of this bill is to enjoin the city of Memphis from removing a railroad track on Washington street, in said city, under a claim that same is an obstruction and nuisance, unlawfully maintained on a public street by the complainant. The track in question was laid down in said street in 1875 by the Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company, under whom, through purchase at a mortgage foreclosure sale, the appellant claims, and has been ever since maintained.

In 1896, Tennessee celebrated the one hundredth anniversary of its admis- . in \ state into the federal Union by an exposition given at Nashville tursión as & -tapices of a corporation created by the state for that purpose.

<p>This was a suit in equity to cancel an oil and gas lease. On final hearing.</p>

<p>Tontine Life Insurance Policy — Construction — Method of Computing Dividends.</p> <p>Where a life policy issued under a tontine savings fund plan provided that all surplus or profits derived from such policies of the same class as should not be in force at the date of the completion of the tontine dividend period should be apportioned equitably among those completing such period, and that the holder, provided the policy was then in force, might, at his election, withdraw in cash, in addition to its share of the accumulated reserve, the surplus “apportioned by the society” to such policy, the action of the society in making such apportionment cannot be reviewed by the courts, unless fraud or irregularity in its procedure is shown. ,</p>

This is an action at law on an accident insurance policy to recover for the death of the insured. On demurrer to complaint.

Emma Humble, the defendant in' error, brought this action against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company, the plaintiff in error, to recover compensation for certain personal injuries which she sustained in the defendant’s waiting room or station at Texarkana, Ark., on April 9, 1898, while she was waiting to become a passenger on one of the defendant’s trains.

This action is founded upon three contracts between the American Publishing Company, the defendant in error, hereafter termed the “Publishing Company,” and the Colorádo Springs Company, the plaintiff in error, hereafter termed the “Springs Company.” In the lower court the position of the parties was reversed, the suit having been brought by tbe Publishing Company as plaintiff against the Springs Company as defendant to recover damages for an alleged failure of tbe Springs…

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas.</p>

<p>In Error to the United States Court of Appeals in the-Indian Territory.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.</p> <p>This suit was brought by Theoderie B. Wallace, as receiver of the Missouri National Bank of Kansas (lily, Mo., the defendant in error, against Charles J. Lantry, the plaintiff in error, to recover an assessment, in the sum of £20,-000, which had been theretofore duly assessed by the comptroller of the currency against said Lantry as the owner of 200 shares of stock in the Missouri National Bank of Kansas City, Mo., which had previously become insolvent. The complaint was in the usual form, and alleged that said bank was duly incorporated under the act of congress of tbe United States relative to national banks; that it had become insolvent; that Theoderie B. Wallace was duly-appointed receiver of said bank by the comptroller of the currency on December 3, 1896: that an assessment of £100 per share had been made by the comptroller of the currency on July 30, 1897; that the defendant Lantry was the owner of 200 shares of the stock of said bank; and that by virtue of the aforesaid assessment he was obligated to pay to the receiver the sum of £20,000, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from August 30, 1897. The defendant below filed an answer containing two defenses, separately stated, and a counterclaim. In the first defense it was alleged, in substance, that the defendant on April 18, 1396, purchased 200 shares of stock in the aforesaid bank, and received a certificate therefor; that the stock so purchased was represented by D. Y. Rieger, the president of the bank, to be the property of the bank at the time of the sale, which the bank had theretofore lawfully acquired; that he was induced to make the purchase by certain false and fraudulent representations which were made by said president and other officers of the bank concerning its financial condition, which false representations were set out at great length in the answer; that the stock was held by the defendant from the dato of its purchase on April 18, 1886, until December 3, 1836. when a receiver of the bank was appointed on account of its insolvency; that after the appointment of a receiver that officer had exclusive control of all the books, papers, and assets of the bank, and repeatedly assured the defendant when he applied for informa iion that the bank was solvent, and would pay all of Its debts and liabilities without recourse against the stockholders; that the defendant was lulled into security by such statements of the receiver, and by reason thereof did not gain access to the hooks and papers of the bank until on or about September 1, 1897, at which time he was given access to the books and records of the bank by direction of the comptroller of the currency; that thereafter he discovered the falsity of all of the statements and representations on the faith of which he had been induced originally to purchase the aforesaid stock, and that he thereupon, on or about October 27, 1897, called at the prior place of business of said bank, and there tendered to the receiver, who was in charge of said bank, the certificate for the 200 shares of stock which he had received, and demanded óf said receiver that he should repay to him the sum of $20,000 which he had paid for said stock, or such proportionate part thereof as he would be entitled to. receive as a creditor of the bank for that sum. For a second defense the defendant repeated all of the averments which were contained in his first plea, and in addition thereto he averred, in substance, that the president and cashier of the Missouri National Bank of Kansas City had acquired the stock which was eventually sold to him in the following manner, that is to say: That they had purchased the stock with the funds of the bank from other shareholders when the hank was insolvent, to prevent such other shareholders from throwing the stock on the market at ruinous prices, and thereby disclosing to the public the true condition of the bank; that the stock, when so purchased with the funds of the hank, had been transferred to clerks and other agents of the bank, to conceal the character of the purchase; that such pretended purchasers had then given notes to the bank representing the amount of money that had been expended by the bank to acquire the stock; that the persons who thus gave notes to the bank representing the money that it had so expended were totally insolvent, and never intended to pay their said notes; that all of these facts were concealed from the defendant until long after his purchase of the 200 shares of stock in question; and that the stock so as aforesaid sold to him was a part of certain stock, amounting at its par value to $80,000, which the hank had so unlawfully acquired, whereas at the date of his said purchase, and long afterwards, he believed it to he stock that the hank had lawfully acquired, and had a good right to sell. The counterclaim which the defendant interposed was in the nature of a cross action against the Missouri National Bank to recover the damages which the defendant had sustained by reason of the fraudulent representations that had been made by its officers to induce the sale of the aforesaid stock, and such damages were pleaded as an offset against the comptroller’s assessment. These defenses were adjudged insufficient on demurrer (O. C.; 89 Fed. 11, 1023), whereupon a judgment by default was rendered against the defendant below in the sum of $21,550; he having declined to plead further. The writ of error which was sued out by the defendant below presents the question whether the demurrer to the answer was properly sustained.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota.</p>

Iii Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, This is a suit by the Globe Iron-Worts Company, a corporation of the state of Ohio, against the steamer John B. Kctcham, 2d, her engines, boats, tackle, apparel, and furniture, and against all persons lawfully intervening for their interest therein, for the purpose of enforcing a lien thereon for the price of a boiler and appliances furnished for the original construction of said…

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p> <p>The Minnesota Transfer .Railway Company, plaintiff In error and defendant below, owns and operates a railway transfer yard and stock yard, consisting of many railroad tracks, stock yards, sheds, and various buildings, among which is a freight house and general office in the same building, with a platform extending along its side, from which it is entered. The yard office is across the tracks from the freight office. Jacob A. Field, the defendant in error and plaintiff below, was a stock raiser and shipper in North Dakota, and reached ■¿lie defendant's yards with three cars of stock about 4 o’clock in the morning, December 11, 1896. His stock was billed to the defendant’s yards to be fed, and the bill of lading had to be changed there. This made it necessary for him to visit both the general and the yard office. When he left the cars to go to the yard office, it was dark. He had never been a.t that office, and the directions he received, led him to the building con laming the freight and general offices. The platform of this building was not lighted. The largo globe lamp which customarily lighted it, and which should have been burning on this occasion, was not lighted. He proceeded along this platform in front of this building, seeking for an entrance to the office. Through two Windows he saw a dim light, which he supposed was in the yard office, and, going to a door “that was opened about a couple of feet,” he stepped in, with a view of going to the lighted office, and was precipitated into a cellar, and received the injuries for which this action was brought. He recovered a judgment in the circuit court, and the defendant sued out this writ of error.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>1. Carriers of Passengers — Injury to Passenger — Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>It cannot he held, as a matter of law, that a passenger In a crowded railroad car, by surrendering his seat to one less able to stand than himself, Is guilty of negligence which precludes his recovery for an injury received through the negligence of the carrier, although, such injury would not have been received had he retained his seat.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>A. passenger in a crowded railroad ear, where the seats and aisle are filled, is not guilty of negligence in standing with other passengers on the platform while the ear is in motion.</p> <p>3. Same — -Negligence of Carrier — Failure to Provide Seats for Passengers.</p> <p>It is the duty of a railroad company, having notice of an unusual number of passengers, and which has been instrumental in inducing such extraordinary travel over its line, to provide reasonable seating aceommoda - tions for all passengers to whom it sells tickets; and it is liable for an injury to a passenger resulting from its failure to do so.</p> <p>4 Same — Contributory Negligence of Passenger — Intoxication.</p> <p>The mere fact that a passenger at the time he was injured was intoxicated is not in itself evidence of contributory negligence, but is a circumstance to be considered; and it is for the jury to determine whether it in fact contributed to his injury.</p> <p>5. Same — Degree of Care Required.</p> <p>A railroad company running trains for the carriage of passengers is bound to the exercise of the highest degree of care and skill to protect its passengers from injury.</p> <p>8. Same — Action for Injury — Instructions.</p> <p>An instruction that, to preclude a recovery by a passenger for an injury, he must himself have “substantially or directly” contributed to the injury, is not erroneous, since it is only acts or omissions which substantially or directly contribute to an injury which constitute contributory negligence.</p> <p>7. Trial — Refusal of Instruction Asked.</p> <p>-It is not error to refuse instructions asked, which are based on particular facts or items of evidence, and by thus singling them out give them undue prominence, or which, in stating- the evidence, give it a partisan coloring.</p> <p>8. SamFj.</p> <p>Where the charge given by the court in its own language fully and fairly presents to the jury for their determination all the material issues in the case, it may properly refuse to instruct further.</p>

This is an action by the First National Bank of Butte, plaintiff in error, against Sigmund T. Weidenbeck and Gustave J. Heinrich, the defendants in error, to recover from them the sum of $4,000 on a note executed by tbe Twin City Butte Mining Company, a corporation existing under the laws of the state of Montana, of which the defendants were trustees.

<p>L Carriers — Liability for Injury to Passengers — State Statute Resulating.</p> <p>The validity, under the constitution of Nebraska, of Comp. St. Neb. c. 72, § 3, providing that every railroad company “shall be liable for all damages inflicted upon the person of passengers while being transported over its road, except in cases where the injury done arises from the criminal negligence of the persons injured, or when the injury complained of shall be the violation of some express rule or regulation of said road actoally liri'ii,slit to his or her nolice,” having been uphold by the supreme conn of íhe Ríate, such decisions are binding on the federal courts.1</p> <p>2. Sajiu— Action to Eniíorch Statutory Liability — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Biieh statute is remedial, and not penal, in its nature, and gives a substantive light oí action, which, when it has attached by reason of an injur j received within the state, may be enforced in any court within or without Hie state having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, and in such action the statute furnishes the measure of the plaintiff’s right, so far as its provisions extend.</p> <p>8, Samis — Constitutionality on Statute.</p> <p>Bueli slainte, although it makes a railroad company absolutely liable for an injury to a passenger who is without fault, irrespective of the company’s negligence, is a valid exercise of legislative power, and not in violation of the constitution of the United States, as depriving the company of its property without duo process of law, or denying to it 1he equal protection of the laws.</p>

This is an action at law by a receiver of the Big Rapids National Bank to recover a dividend paid by said bank, out of capital, to the defendant. John Greenup, who was a stockholder. Upon the conclusion of all the evidence, the court instructed the jury that there could he no recovery at law upon the facts proven; that the remedy of the receiver, if any he had, was hy a bill in equity; and that a verdict should be returned in favor of Greenup.

This is an action in assumpsit upon a bond executed by William B. Montgomery, as principal, and M. V. and It. A. Montgomery, as bis sureties, to the AStna Life Insurance Company. March 16, 1896, W. B. Montgomery was appointed the general agent for the ¿Etna Life Insurance Company for the territory included in the lower peninsula of the state of Michigan.

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Preferences—Payment op Money.</p> <p>Payment of a debt in money is a transfer of property, within the purview of Bankr. Act, § 60a, providing that a debtor shall be deemed to have given a preference, if, being insolvent, he has 'made a transfer of any of his property, and the effect of the enforcement of such transfer will he to enable one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the same class.</p> <p>B. Sam is — Proof by Preferred Creditor — Knowledge of Creditor,</p> <p>Under Bankr. Act 1.898, § 57g, providing that “the claims of creditors who have received preferences shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender their preferences,” it is immaterial that the creditor did not know, or have cause to believe, that the debtor was insolvent or that he was receiving a preference, if such was actually the fact. This provision is not limited or modified by the distinct provision of section 60b, that-preferences shall be voidable by the trustee if the creditor “had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended to give a preference.”</p> <p>8 Same — Surrender of Preference.</p> <p>’ Where a creditor, holding four promissory notes of his insolvent debtor, received several payments on account, all within four months before the debtor was adjudged bankrupt, and so applied the payments as to extinguish two of the notes,’partly satisfy the third, and leave the fourth wholly unpaid, held, that he could not prove the fourth note in the character of an unpreferred creditor, but must surrender all the payments received, as-a condition upon being allowed to prove any claim against the estate.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Dissolution op Liens — Mechanic's Lien.</p> <p>Where, under the laws oí the state, a mechanic’s lion attaches only from the date of filing in the office of the county clerk a notice claiming such lien, and not from the doing of the work itself, a lien so acquired will be dissolved by the adjudication of the insolvent debtor as a bankrupt within four months thereafter, under Bankr. Act 1898, § 67f, providing for the dissolution of liens “obtained through legal proceedings.”</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy — Requiring Bankrupt to Pay oyer Money.</p> <p>A court of bankruptcy bas authority to order the bankrupt to pay over to his trustee money in his hands which belongs to his estate in bankruptcy, when the bankrupt’s present possession or control of the money, and bis retention of it in fraud of bis creditors, are proved beyond a reasonable doubt.</p> <p>2. Same — Evidence.</p> <p>Where it appeared that a bankrupt, within a period of seven or eight months before filing his petition, had received and deposited in hank sums of money amounting to over $12,000, all of which he drew out, the last check being drawn and the account balanced three days before the petition was filed; that he kept no books of account, and his cheek book was not produced; that all the checks returned to him by the bank (244 in number) were destroyed, although bis attorney was then engaged in preparing his petition and schedules; that he testified that the money in question was all paid away, but professed ignorance or lack of recollection as to all particulars; that he admitted having received $2,000 for the sale of an equity in real estate, about a month before the bankruptcy, but gave no satisfactory explanation of his disposition of it; and that his testimony in several particulars was inconsistent and contradictory, and in some false, — held, that the evidence warranted an order requiring the bankrupt to pay over to his trustee the money in his hands belonging to his estate, which, making allowance for charges, losses, and expenses, would be fixed at $6,500.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Grounds for .Refusing Discharge — Concealment of Assets.</p> <p>Where a merchant, finding himself insolvent, proceeded to hold out the money received from cash sales and from collections, until his business was closed by the levy of an attachment a few weeks later, and he was thereafter adjudged bankrupt, and It appeared that the money so accumulated by him amounted to a considerable sum, that it was not in his hands at the time of filing the petition in bankruptcy, that he -gave no satisfactory account of it, and there was no evidence to show what had become of it, held to be sufficient ground for refusing to discharge him. especially with evidence of attempts to prefer certain creditors and to transfer his property to others.</p>

<p>Customs Duties — Classification—Lithofonk.</p> <p>Lithofone, which is a compound composed of 70 per cent, sulphate of bárytes, and 80 per cent, sulphide of zinc, is dutiable, under .paragraph 57 of the tariff act of 1897, as a “white paint or pigment containing zinc, but not containing lead, dry,” snd not as sulphide of zinc.</p>

<p>L Criminal Law — Bribery of United States Officials.....Construction of Statute.</p> <p>In Key. St. § 5451, which makes it a criminal offense to bribe or attempt to bribe any officer of the United States, or “any person acting for or on behalf of the United States in an official function, under or by authority of a department or office of thé government thereof,” the latter clause must be construed as including persons not officers, and a secret-service operative employed by the secretary of the treasury to aid in the detection and suppression of frauds or crimes against the revenue laws, with which duty the secretary is charged, while in the performance of such service, is acting on behalf of the United Slates in an “official function” of the secretary, and his bribery or attempted bribery to collude In or allow a fraud on the United States is an offense within the terms of the statute.</p> <p>Si Same — Trial—Coercion of Verdict.</p> <p>The failure to discharge a jury on their announcing a disagreement does not constitute coercion by the court which vitiates a verdict afterwards returned, where it subsequently appeared that the disagreement was entirely because they did not clearly understand the charge of the court in certain particulars, and, when it was further explained, they soon reached an agreement.</p> <p>8. Same — Instructions Asked.</p> <p>Where a point which the court is asked to charge by the defendant is stated in the charge of the court in. substantially the same language, it is, in effect, affirmed, and error cannot he predicated on the fact that it was not read to the jury, and expressly affirmed.</p>

The plaintiff in error, Thomas B. Youtsey, cashier of the First National Bank of Newport, Ky., was indicted for violation of section 5209 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The indictment embraced 27 counts. He was convicted upon the first 25 counts, and acquitted, by direction of the court, upon the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh counts.

<p>This is a suit in equity to enjoin unfair competition in trade. On motion for preliminary injunction.</p>

<p>1. Deposition — Waiver of Objection.</p> <p>A deposition will not be suppressed lor refusal of the witness to answer cross interrogatories, where no objection wa.s made until too late to have the fault corrected.</p> <p>3. Trade-Names — Unfair Competition.</p> <p>‘Ttahtjen’s Composition” having become a well-known article of commerce by that name through the expired English patent and the operations thereunder, so that the name has become descriptive of the article, rather than indicative of its origin, it is not actionable for another manufacturer to make a bid under specifications calling for the article by that name.</p>

<p>Patents — Suit for Infringement — Violation of Injunction.</p> <p>A corporation defendant, which, after the issuance of a restraining order in a suit for infringement, indirectly caused others to manufacture the infringing articles, and stamp them with its trade-mark, which were delivered to it, and which it sold, although It gave no formal orders therefor, Is guilty of contempt.</p>

This was a bill in equity instituted by the Wire-Glass Company, and the American Glass-Manufacturing Company, as assignee and licensee, respectively, of two patents granted to one Frank Shuman in 1892, — one for a process of making wire-glass, and the other for a machine for embedding wire-netting In glass, — against the Streator Cathedral Glass Company and others, for the infringement of these patents. Both patents were granted September 20, 1892.

of Indiana. This appeal Is a decree of dismissal entered on final hearing of a bill in equity for alleged infringement of letters patent No. 379,334, for “Improvements in bookbinding,” issued to Michael Ryan, March 13, 1888, and assigned» to the appellant. 80 Fed. (342. The drawings, specifications, and claims are set forth in the patent as fol lows: “Fig. 1 Is a perspective view of an open book in which my device is used.

<p>Patents — Be issue — Laches.</p> <p>While a higher degree of diligence is perhaps required in applying for a reissue where it broadens the claims of the original patent than in cases where it narrows, or simply makes more specific or certain, such claims, yet diligence must be exercised in all reissues: and, when the original patent Is absolutely inoperative or invalid for any reason, an unexcused delay of 12 years in applying for a reissue constitutes such laches as will invalidate the reissued patent.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.</p> <p>This was a libel for an injury to the libelant, an able seaman, caused by a blow from a rope to which power was being applied by the vessel’s donkey engine in “breasting her,” or bringing the vessel further into a wharf. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. Libel dismissed, but without costs.</p>

<p>1. Seamen — Wages.</p> <p>Itev. St. § 4527, providing that any seaman who has signed an agreement, and i^ afterwards discharged before commencement of the voyage, or before a month’s wages are earned, without fault on his pari, is entitled to a month’s wages in addition to wages earned, applies where the vessel was known to the owner to be wholly unfit for the voyage, and in a smooth sea, in pleasant weather, proved so unseaworthy that it could not proceed, and was compelled to return in a state of wreck.</p> <p>2, Same — Advance Notes.</p> <p>The owners of a fund derived from sale of a vessel cannot urge, as against the assignee of an advance note to seaman for a month’s wages, the wages having thereafter been earned, and not paid, the rule, made for benefit of seamen, that the assignee of such a note cannot recover thereon.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Count of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Tnt® — Process--Construction oi? Admtrat,ty Rules — Jtjeidicau Days.</p> <p>The admiralty rules of a district court provided that,, “where a number of days is limited by these rules, juridical days only shall be understood, and the computation shall be by including one and excluding one.” Held, that the rules were not concerned with the juridical character of any other days than those that begin and end a period.</p>

On motion to confirm report of the commissioner, appointed to assess the libelant’s damages, and on exceptions to said report. For decision at final hearing, see (D. C.) 84 Fed. 1005.

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court oí the United States for the District of Utah.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Georgia.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Oourt of the United States for the Northern District of Iowa.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Easiern District of Michigan.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the District of Washington.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States-for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United' States for the Eastern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for (he District of Utah.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals of the Indian Territory.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the-United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United -States for the District of North-Dakota.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United Slates for ihe Western District of Arkansas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Wyoming.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Gourt of the United States for the District of Vermont.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United Slates for the Northern Division of the District of Washington.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Division of the District of Washington.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Division of the District of Washington.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Dakota.</p>

<p>In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.</p>

<p>Appeals from the Circuit. Court of the United States for the Western Division of the District of Washington.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the District of Washington.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for tlie Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States i'or the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.</p>

<p>In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.</p>

<p>Motion for Preliminary Injunction.</p>

<p>Equity — Taking Testimony.</p>

<p>In Equity. Motion to adjudge plea insufficient</p>

<p>This is a suit in equity by William Pelzer against Z. L. Par-melee & Co. for infringement of a patent. On demurrer to bill.</p>