Acknowledgment

Owning to; avowal, admission.

1.

A statement by a debtor that a claim, barred by the statute of limitations, is still a valid obligation. Takes the case out of the statute, and revives the original cause of action. An acknowledgment which will revive the original cause of action must be unqualified and unconditional. It must show positively that the debt is due in whole or in part. If connected with circumstances which affect the claim, or if conditional, it may amount to a new assumpsit for which the old debt is a sufficient consideration; or if it be construed to revive the original debt, that revival is conditional, and the performance of the condition, or a readiness to perform it, must be shown." A new promise, as a new cause of action, ought to be proved in a clear and explicit manner, and be in its terms unequivocal and determinate; and, if any conditions are annexed, they ought to be shown to be performed. If there be no express promise, but a promise to be raised by implication of law from the acknowledgment of the party, such acknowledgment ought to contain an unqualified and direct admission of a subsisting debt, which the party is liable and willing to pay. If there be accompanying circumstances which repel the presumption of a promise or intent Jon to pay; if the expressions be equivocal, vague, and Indeterminate, leading to no certain conclusion, but at best to probable inferences, which may affect different minus 'People V. Braman, 30 Mich. 468-70 (1874), cases. Graves, C. J. See also Commonwealth v. Andrer<!8, 133 Mass. 204 (1882). ' Ferriss v. Knowles, 41 Conn. 308 (1874). in different ways, thsy ought not to go to a jury aa evidence of a new promise to revive the cause of action. Any other course wox Ud open up all the mischiefs against which the statute was intended to guard innocent persons, and expose them to the dangers of heing entrapped in careless conversations, and betrayed by prejudices. It may be that in this manner an honest debt may sometimes be lost, but many mifounded recoveries will be prevented. 1 No case has gone the length of saying that there must be an express promise to pay in terms. A clear, distinct, imequivocal acknowledgment of a debt as an existing obligation, identifying it so that there can be no mistake as to what it refers to, made to a creditor or his agent, takes a case out of the statute.* " I will pay the debt as soon as possible," constitutes a new and sufficient acknowledgment.' Acknowledgment does not necessarily imply words.-* See further Promise, New. 2. The act of a grantor in going before a competent officer and declaring that tlae instrument he produces is his act and deed.' Also, the official certificate that such declaration was made., The acknowledgment or the proof which may authorize the admission of a deed to record, and the recording thereof, are provisions for the security of creditors and purchasei-s. They are essential to the va Udity of the deed as to those persons, not as to the grantor. An acknowledgment, regular on its face, makes the instrument evidence, without further proof, and fits it for being recorded. The exact words of the statute need not be followed: it is sufficient if the meaning be clearly and fully expressed.' In the case of a wife, the certificate must show that she was examined separate and apart from her husband; that she was of full age; that the contents of the deed were first made knovra to her; and that she acted of her own free will. Otherwise, although recorded, her acknowledgment constitutes neither a record nor notice.'

1 Bell V. Morrison, 1 Pet. 368 (1828), Story, J. See also Moore o. Bank of Columbia, 6 id. 91-94 (1832); Fort Scott V. Hickman, 118 U. S. 163 (1884); Green v. Coos Bay Wagon Co., 23 F. R. 67 (1885), cases; Curtis V. Sacramento, TO Cal. 414-16 (1886); Chidsey u. Powell, 91 Mo. 686(1887). 2 Jones V. Lantz, 63 Pa. 326 (1869), Sharswood, J.; Wolf ensbiu-ger i;. Young, 47 id. 517(1864); Shaeter v. Hoffman, 113 id. 5 (1886), cases; 114 id.

— 358; 23 Alb. Law J. 104-5 (1881), cases. 'Norton v. Shepard, 48 Conn. 141 (1880), cases. * Bailey v. Boyd, 59 Ind. 298 (1877). e [Short v. Coulee, 28 111. 228 (1862), Breese, J. Lessee of Sioard v. Davis, 6 Pet. 136 (1832). ' Wiekersham v. Eeeves, 1 Iowa, 417 (1855); Owen v. Norris, 5 Blackf. 481(1840); Becker v. Anderson, 11 Neb. 497 (1881); Spitznagle v. Vanhessch, 13 id. 338 8 See Paxton v. MarshaU, 18 F. R. 361, 364-68 Conveyance of the estates of married women by deed, with separate examination and acknowledgment, has taken the place of the alienation of such estates by " line " in a court of record under the law of England. For fraud in levying a fine, the court of chancery would grant relief, as in the case of any other conveyance. And so now, her deed of conveyance does not bind her if her acknowledgment was obtained by fraud or duress, or if, by reason of infancy or insanity, she was not competent to make the contract. Statute of 18 Edw. L (1890) enacted that if a feme covert should be a party to a fine, she was first to be examined by certain justices; and if she dissented, the fine was not to be levied. This was held to mean that the fine ought not to be received without her examination and consent; but that if it was received, neither she nor her heirs could be permitted to deny that she was examined and freely consented;

— for this would be contradicting the record, and tend to weaken the assurances of real property. The object of statutes requiring the separate examination of the wife to be taken by an officer, to be certffied by him in a particular form, and to be recorded in the public registry, is not only to protect her by making it the duty of such officer to ascertain and to certify that she has not executed the deed by compiilsion or in ignorance of its contents, but to faci Utate the conveyance of the estates of married women, and to secure and perpetuate evidence, upon which transferees may rely, that the requirements of the law have been complied with. The duty of the officer involves the exercise of judgment and disoretiotf, and so is a judicial or quasi judicial act. The conclusion is that, except in case of fraud, his certificate, made and recorded as the statute requires, is the sole and conclusive evidence of the separate examination and acknowledgment, and that, except where fraud in procuring her execution is alleged, extrinsic evidence of the manner in which the examination was conducted is inadmissible.! Whenever substance is found in a certificate, obvious clerical errors and all technical defects will be disregarded, and, in order to uphold it, the certfficate will be read in connection with the instrument and in the light of surrounding circumstances.' See Examination, 5; Notice, 1. 3. Admission of a fact; confession of guilt. See Confession, 2. 7 Michael, id. 571-73 (1883), cases; Langton v. Marshall, 59 Tex. 898 (1883); Schley v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 120 U. S. 675 (1887), citing m. cases; 1 Bl. Com. 444. 1 Hitz V. Jenks, 123 U. S. 301-3 (1887), cases. Gray, J. In this case a notary had taken the acknowledgment in the statutory form, and the wife admitted that the signature was hers, but did not recollect executing the deed, and denied that it was explained to her. Held, there being no proof of fraud or duress, evidence to impeach the certificate was properly rejected. See also Davey v. Turner, 1 Dallas, *13 (1765); Lloyd v. Taylor, ib. *17 (1768); Cox v. GiU, 83 Ky. 669 (1886); Davis V. Agnew, 67 Tex. 310 (1886); Cover v. Manaway, ACQir ArN"TED. Implies a mutual acquaintance; as where one, swears that he is "well acquainted" with an applicant for naturalization.! Having a substantial knowledge of the subject-matter; as of the paper to which a certificate is afiixed.2