Decree

5 The. decision, judgment, or sentence of a court of equity, admiralty, probate, or divorce.iurisdiction.

A sentence or order of a court of equity, pronounced on hearing and understanding all the points in issue, and determining the right of all the parties to the suit, according to equity and good conscience.* A judgtent in a suit, equitable in nature, rendered by a court exercising equitable powers.' ' ' United States v. Whittier, 5 Dill. 39-11 (1878), cases, Dillon, Cir. J. = Ibid., 4.5, Treat, J. Note by Francis Wharton, Bates's Case, 10 F. E. 07- 100, cases. See also note to Speiden v. State, 3 Tex. Ap. 1 6 (1871), in 30 Am. Eep. 129, cases; Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 222 (1878); People v. Collins, 53 Cal. 185 (1878); State u.

Jansen, 22 Kan. 498 (1879), cases; Commonwealth v. Cohen, 127 Mass. 282 (1879); Wright 7).

State, 7 Tex. Ap. 574 (1880); People v. Noeike, 94 N. T. 137 (1883); 19 P. E. 39; 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 262; 25 Alb. Law J. 184 (1882); 15 Irish L. T. 683. ' United States v. Eapp, 30 F. E. 822 (1887), Neuman, J. ' ' E. deeretum: de cemere, to decide literally, to separate.

2 Daniel, Ch. Pr. 986.

Like a judgment at law, it is the sentence pronounced by the court upon the matter of right between the parties, and is founded on the pleadings and proofs in the cause.

1

See Judgment.

A draft of a decree made by the judge for convenience, that counsel might see in a general way what decree he was prepared to enter, cannot be considered a decree; and in such case the word " decree" on the clerk's docket cannot amount to an entry of the paper as a decree. The word may mean "decree to be entered," or "stands for decree," as well as decree " entered." Decrees in equity operate only upon the person.

Decretal.

In the nature of a final decree. When an " order " (which is interlocutory, and made on motion or petition), in an event resulting from a direction contained in it, may lead to the termination of the suit in like manner as a decree at the hearing, it is calleij a " decretal " order.* Interlocutory decree. A decree which directs an inquiry as to a matter of law or fact preparatory to a final decision.

Final decree

A decree which finally decides and disposes of the merits of the whole cause, and reserves no further question or direction for the future judgment of the court, so that it will not be necessary to bring the cause again before the court for decision.5 A decree is " interlocutory " when it finds the general equities, and the cause is retained for reference, feigned issue, or consideration, to ascertain some matter of fact or law when it again comes under the consideration of the court for final disposition.' A decree is " interlocutory " which leaves anything to be done to afford completely the relief contemplated. Such a decree may always, in a pending cause, on a rehearing, be altered at the sound discretion of the chancellor, however great the lapse of time.' A decree is "final'* which finally disposes of the subject of litigation so far as the court making it is concerned.. It is the last, decree necessary to give the parties the full and entire benefit of the judgment... A decree is not the less final because some further order may become necessary to carry it into effect." When'the decree decides the right to the property in contest, and directs it to be delivered up, or to be 1 Eowley v. Van Benthuysen, 16 Wend. 383 (1836). ''Fairbanks v. Amoskeag Nat. Bank, 32 F. E. 573 (1887), Colt, J. = Wilson V. Joseph, 107 Ind. 491 (1886), cases: 26 Am. Law Eeg. 48 (1887); ib. 50-54, cases. * [Brown, Law Diet.: 22 Mich. 201. '[Beebe v. Eussell, 19 How. 285 (1856), Wayne, J.; Whiting V. Bank of United States, 13 Pet. 15 (1839). "Kelley v. Stanberry, 13 Ohio, 421 (1844). 'Wright V. Strother, 76 Va. 857, 869 (1882); ib. 69, 163; 77 id. 806. sold, 01' that the defendant pay a sum of money to the complainant, and the complainant is entitled to have such decree carried immediately into execution, the decree must be regarded as a "final" one to that extent.! "The current of decisions fully sustains the rule laid down by the late Chief Justice," in the foregoing case. It is not unusual in courts of equity to enter decrees determining the rights of parties, and the extent of the liability of one party to another, giving at the same time a right to apply to the court for modification and directions. It has never been doubted that such decrees are "final." They are all that is necessary to give to the successful party the full benefit of the judgment.' A "final decree" conclusively settles all the legal rights of the parties involved in the pleadings.' See further Final, 3. A final decree in equity may be modified or set aside: by an appeal within the time prescribed by law; by a bill of review, filed within such time, charging error apparent upon the record; and by an original bill charging fraud or newly discovered evidence.' Decrees are also classified as: decrees by default, against parties who do not appear, in which case the plaintiff takes such decree as he can stand by; &ecrees by consent, in which the form depends upon agreement; decrees pro confesso, by admission, in which the form depends upon the case made by the bill — as see below; and decrees on the hearing, which vary with the nature of the suit and the relief prayed for. A bill to " suspend a decree " seeks to avoid or suspend the operation of the decree. A bill to " carry a decree into execution " lies when, from any cause, without further aid, a decree cannot be executed. A decree taldng a hill pro confesso, or in default of an answer, is intended to prepare the case for final decree. Its effect is lilte that of a default at common law, by which the defendant is deemed to have admitted all that is well pleaded in the declaration. The matters in the biU do not pass in rem judicatam untilForgay r. Conrad, 6 How. 204 (1848), Taney, C. J.; Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 109 U. S. 183 (1883); District of Columbia v. Washington Market Co., 108 id. 842 (1883); Parsons v. Robinson, 122 id. 114-16 (1887). "Thomson v. Deaa, 7 Wall. 346 (ISUS), cases. Chase, Chief Justice. s Stovall V. Banks, 10 WaU. 587 (1870), Strong, J.; 2 Daniel, Ch. Pr. 641. French v. Shoemaker, 12 Wall. 98 (1870). See also 70 Ala. 571; 34 Ark. 130; 9 Fla. 47; 105 111. 26; 3 Md. 505; 22 Mich. 201; 2 Miss. 326; 10 Nev. 405: 12 Johns. 508; 14 Wend. 542; 1 Ohio St. 520; 1 Heisk. 526; 1 Wash. T. 174. 6 Huntington v. Little Eock, &o. E. Co., 3 Mo Crary, the final decree is made— which maybe against the plaintiff." The court will decree what is proper upon the statements in the bill assumed to be true." When a bill contains a joint charge against several defendants one of whom makes default, the correct mode of proceeding is to enter a default and a formal decree pro confesso against such one, and proceed with the cause upon the answers of the other defendants. The defaulting defendant has lost his standing in court: he is not entitled to service of noticesj nor to adduce evidence, nor to be heard at the final hearing — he cannot appear in any way. If the suit should be decided against the complainant on the merits, the bill will be dismissed as to all the defendants alike — the defaulter included; but if in the complainant's favor he will be entitled to a final decree against all. A final decree on the merits against the defaulting defendant alone, pending the continuance of the cause, Yould be incongruous and illegal." A final decree affirmed by the highest corni; is conclusive as between the parties,' and as binding as a judgment at law.' When there are no words of qualification indicating a privilege to take further proceedings, it w Ul be presumed to have been rendered upon the merits." The language of a decree is construed with reference to the issue put forward by the prayer for relief and the other pleadings, and which these show it was meant to decide.' See Equity; Eelief, 2; Review, 2; Term, 4.