Sentence

* A final determination by a criminal court, or (but less frequently) by a court of admiralty. 1 See 3 Bl. Com. 303. « State ex rel. Belford v. Hueston, 44 Ohio St. 6 (1886), Spear, J. s Steph. Plead. 414. " Judgment " is generally used of a decision in a civil, common-law tribunal; and "decree" of a decision in a court of equity or admiralty. "Sentence," or judgment, appropriately denotes the action of a court of criminal jurisdiction in declaring the consequences to a convict of the fact of guilt, confessed or ascertained by verdict.^ Where, upon the trial of an indictment containing several counts charging distinct misdemeanors, identical in character, a general verdict of guilty is rendered, or a verdict of guilty upon two or more specified counts, the court has no power to impose a, sentence or cumulative sentences exceeding in the aggregate what is prescribed as the maximum punishment for an offense of the character charged.' In such case the court ha£ power to pass separate sentences exceeding in the aggregate the maxim punishment for the offense.. One judgment only can be passed upon a single indictment, and each count is, in effect, a distinct indictment.' It is not error to make one term of imprisonment commence when another ends. There is no other mode by which a delinquent may be sentenced on several convictions.* The judgment having been executed so as to be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law, the power of the court as to that oif ense is at an end.* And so, also, as to other offenses as to which sentence was not imposed." In the absence of express power, the court cannot at a subsequent terra alter its sentence.' A court has power to remand a convict for sentence for as long a period as may be deemed advantageous to the ends of justice, and in the meantime to receive evidence as to what would be an appropriate sentence, where the court has discretion.' Power to suspend sentence is inherent in the court. It is indispensable to the interests of. public justice; it rests upon grounds of public policy, or of legal necessity.' The inquiry whether a convicted person has anything to say "why sentence should not be passed'* upon him, is supposed to have originated at a time when prisoners were not allowed counsel, in order to ■ [Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 325 (1872), Gray, J. 2 People ex rei.. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N. Y..560 (1875). 'Castro (" Tichbome ■') v. The (Jueen, 43 L. T. 78 (1880). Affirmed in the House of Lords, 44 id. 350 (1881), cases. See also Be Donnelly, 30 Kan. 424 (1883); Commonwealth V. Foster, 122 Mass. 818-19 (1877); Exp. Bryan, 76 Mo. 253 (1882); Re Haynes, 30 F. R. 769 (1887). • Kite V. Commonwealth, 11 Mete. 685 (1846)..'Exp. Lange, 18 Wall. 176(1873). • Commonwealth v. Foster, 122 Mass. 319 (18V7), cases. ' Commonwealth v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 201 (1868); State V. Addy, 43 N. J. L. 116 (18S1). « People 1). Mueller, 4 Cr. Law Mag. 725-39 (1883), cases,

— Cir. Ct. Cook Co., 111. See also State v. Addy, enable them to move in arrest of judgment any matter sufficient to stay sentence. See further CoNViCTioN; Eebob, 2 (3); Judomknt; Pardon; Reprieve.