Time

Has no distinctly technical signification. '* Present time" usually means a period of some considerable duration — a period within which certain transactions are to take place. ** Future time " means a period to come after such present time, and after the period when such transactions have actually taken place.s Time-toargain. A contract for the sale and delivery of stock at a future day, the vendor intending to purchase the stock before the day of delivery. See Futures. Time, cooling. See Cooling. Time imm.em.orial, or out of mind- Time beyond legal memory, q. v. In California, seems to be five years.* Time policy. A. policy of marine insurance in which the risk is limittd, not to a 1 Schulenberg v. Harriraan, 21 Wall. 64 (1874), Field, Judge; See also Nelson u.

Graff, 12 F. R. 389, 391 (1882), cases; Putnam v. Lewis, 133 Mass. 264 (1S82). 2 Duff V. Bindley, 16 F. R. 1T8 (1883). a Rogers v. Gilinger, 30 Pa. 187-89 (1858), cases, Strong, J.; Leidy v. Proctor, 97 id. 492 (1881). * Bolles Wooden-ware Co. v. United States, 106 U. S. 433 (1882), cases, Miller, J. See also United States v. Mills, 9 F. R. 684 (1881); United States v. Williams, 18 id. 475 (1883): Act 3 June, 1878 (20 St. L. 89), for tbP Pacific States; United States v. Leatherberry, 27 F. R. 606 (1886). voyage, but to a period of time.

See Insurance, Policy of. Time the essence of a contract. The general doctrine in equity is that " time is not of the essence of a contract." It often is ot the essence as to contracts for the purchase and sale of realty, so that equity will not interfere in behalf of either party. It may be made of the essence by express stipulation, or ariseby implication from the nature of the property, or from the avowed object of the seller or purchaser. But in the contracts of merchants time is of the essence.'' Time is not, in equity, of the essence of a contract unless the parties have expressly so treated it, or it necessarily follows from the nature and circumstances of the contract.

— It is regarded so far as it respects good faith and diligence; but if circumstances of a reasonable nature have disabled a party from a strict compliance;

— or if he comes, recenti facto, to ask for a specific performance, the suit is treated with indulgence, and generally with favor; but, in such cases, it should be clear that the remedies are mutual; that there has been no change of circumstances affecting the character or justice of the contract; that compensation for the delay can be fully made; that he who asks a specific performance is in a condition to perform his part of a contract; and that he has shown himself ready, desirous, prompt and eager to pe Eform the contract.

The doctrine was formerly carried to an unreasonable extent; in modern times it has been more guardedly applied. Time may be made of the essence by clear manifestation of the intent of the parties, by subsequent notice from one party, by laches in the party seeking to enforce the contract, by change in the value of land, or other circumstance which would make a decree for specific performance inequitable.* See Performance, Specific. Time, reasonable. What constitutes reasonable time in a particular case must be arrived at by a consideration of all the elements which affect that question; as, when a beneficiary seeks to avoid a sale by his trustee. = What is reasonable time is nowhere so determined as to furnish a rule applicable to all oases.

The ques- 1 Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet. 174 (1840), cases, Story, J.; Secombe v. Steele, 20 How. 101 (1857); Ahl v. Johnson, ib. 620-81 (1857); Holgate v. Eaton, 116 U. S. 40 (18S5); Brown v. Guarantee Trust Co., 128 d.

414 (1888); 30 Minn. 339; IS Pa. 95; 76 Ya..

517. "Norringtoa v. Wright, 115 U. S. 203 (1885), cases, Gray, J.; Cleveland Rolling Mill Co. v. Rhodes, 121 td. 261 (1887), cases. S2 Story, Eq. § 776; Smith v. Cansler, 83 Ky. 367, 3,4 Carter v. Phillips, 144 Mass. 102 (1887), followmBarnard v. Lee, 97 id.

93 (1867); Lumber Co. v. Horrition is to be answered in view of the particular circumstances of each case; as, where an adult would disaffirm a contract made during his infancy. ' Where a demand or a notice is necessary before an action can be brought, and the time is not definitely fixed, reasonable time is allowed. What this is necessarily depends upon circumstances.' In computing time, "until," "from," "between," and like words generally exclude the day to which the word relates; but this rule yields to apparent intention. In the interpretation of contracts, where time is to be computed from a particular day or event, as when an act is to be performed within a specified period " from "or " aftpr " a day named, the mle is to exclude the day thus designated and to include the last day of the specified period.* Cases may be found in which it is held, where an act is required by statute to be done a certain number of days at least before a given event, that the time must be reckoned excluding the day of the act and that of the event. But there is no case in which it has been held that both the day of the act and the day of the event shall be included. There are cases which hold that, where the computation is to be made from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be included. Exceptions exist to that rule, and there are many cases which hold that the last day is included and the first excluded. Different rules prevail in Miff erent jurisdictions.

See further Day, page 312.

See After; At; At Least; Between; By; Forever; For; Forthwith; Immediately; Period; Shortly; Soon; Then; Thereupon; Until; When; With; — Day; Month; Week; Year;

Commence; Date; Delay; Description

4; Fraud; Indictment; Laches; Limitation, 3; Premeditate; Relation, 1; Stale; Temporary; Tenant; Term, 3, 4.

Compare Nunc; Tempus.

Time-table.

A railroad company is liable for damage resulting to a passenger for a negligent failure to run its trains according to its time-tables; but there must be proof of negligence. Neither a timetable nor an advertisement is a warrant of punctuality.' Reasonable notice must be given of a change of time.'

Sims V. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 309 (1880), cases. Strong, J. See also Be Estate of Weston, 91 N. Y. 508 (1883); Gilflllan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U. S. 4M (1883); 18 Cent. Law J. 225-39(1884), cases; 27 id. 376-80 (1888), cases; 10 Wall.; 129; Baldw. 331; 6 Mc Lean, 296; 1 Newb. 171; 71 Ala. 167; 3 Col. 640; 59 Iowa, 452; 101 Mass. 409; 20 Mich. 195; 30 Minn. 415; 77 Pa. 228; 65 Vt. 376; 11 Wis. 417. 5 Atchison, &c. R. Co. v. Burlingame Township, 36 Kan. 631-35 (1887), oases. 3 Kendall v. Kingsley. 120 Mass. 93 (1876), cases. 4 Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 190 (1864), cases. Dutcher v. Wright, 94 U. S. 559-61 (1876), cases. e See Whart. Neg. § 662, cases; Angell, Carriers, 527 a; Gordon v. Manchester, &c. E. Co., 53 N. H. 696, 600 (1873), cases; 2 Wood's Ry. Law, 1174; 9 Am. & Timely. See Dub, 2; Notice.