Gift

A voluntary conveyance or transfer of property; that is, one not founded on the consideration of money or blood. A voluntary, immediate and absolute transfer of property without consideration.

Lewis’ Estate, 139 Pa. 640, 22 Atl. 635.

As used by the old text writers. It signified a distinct species of deed, applicable to the creation of an estate tail; while a feoffment was strictly confined to the creation of a fee-simple estate. This use is almost obsolete; Wharton. It has been said that the word denotes rather the motive of the conveyance; so that a feoffment or grant may be called a gift when gratuitous. A gift is of the same nature as a settlement; neither denotes a form of assurance, but the nature of the transaction.

Watk. Conv. 199.

The operative words of this conveyance are do, or dedi

I give

or I have given. The maker of this instrument Is called the donor, and he to whom it is made, the donee, and Littleton 59;.

Shepp. Touchst a 11; 2 Poll. 6 Maitl. 12, 81, 211.

Gifts inter vivos are gifts made from one or more persons, without any prospect of Immediate death, to one or more others. Gifts mortis causa are gifts made in prospect of death. Gifts inter vivos have no reference to the future, and go into immediate and absolute effect; 2 Kent 439; no further act of the parties is needed to give them effect; Robson V. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 62. Delivery is essential. Without actual possession, the title does not pass. A mere Intention or naked promise to give, without some act to pass the property, is not a gift. There may be repentance (the locus paenitenticc) as long as the gift is incomplete in the mode of making it; 1 Pars. Contr. 245; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 26; but see Poullaln v. Poullain, 79 Ga. 11, 4 S. E. 81, where it was held that a donatio inter vivos, as distinguished from a donatio mortis causa, does not require actual delivery, and that it is sufficient to complete a gift inter vivos that the conduct of the parties should show that the ownership of the chattels has been changed. Under a gift, a person “may take a benefit to accrue at a future day — it may be at the donor’s death; but this can be only through I the instrumentality of a trust created either in a third person or in the donor. The effect is to divest at once the former property of the donor in the thing given. Such a gift is no more immediate than in the ordinary case.’’

Robson v. Jones, 3 Del. Ch. 62.

The subject of the gift must be certain; and there must be the mutual consent and concurrent will of both parties. There must be an intention on the part of the donor to make a gift; Thornt. Gifts & Adv. § 70, and expressions of it are admissible as part of the res gestce; 1 Wils. Ch. 212; In re Ward, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 251; Booth v. Cornell, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 261; Stevens v. Stevens, 2 Redf. (N. Y.) 265; Williams v. Guile, 117 N. Y. 343, 22 N. E. 1071, 6 L. R. A. 366; and also declarations of the donor prior to the gift; Smith,v. Maine, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 33;‘if followed up by proof of delivery; Larimore v. Wells, 29 Ohio St. 13; and subsequent to the gift to support it; Blalock v. Mlland, 87 Ga. 573, 13 S. E. 651; Scott v. Bank, 140 Mass. 157, 2 N. E. 925; but not to disapprove it; Baxter V. Knowles, 12 Allen (Mass.) 114.

See Thornt.

Gift § 222.

Acceptance is also necessary; Peirce v. Burroughs, 58 N. H. 302; Nickerson v. Nickerson, 28 Md. 327; Thomas V. Thomas, 107 Mo. 459, 18 S. W. 27; and this is true under both the common and civil law; De Levlllaln v. Evans, 39 Cal. 120. It most be in the lifetime of the donor; Eskridge V. F&rrar, 84 La. Ann. 709; but it is presumed if the gift is of value; Thouvenln 290. Delivery must be according to the nature of the thing. It must be an actual delivery, so far as the subject Is capable of delivery. If the thing be not capable of actual delivery, there must be some act equivalent to it; something sufficient to work an immediate change in the dominion of the property; Gartslde v. Pahlman, 45 Mo. App. 160. The donor must part not only with the possession, but with, the dominion. If the thing given be a chose in action, the law requires an assignment or some equivalent instrument, and the transfer must be executed; 1 Swanst.

436; Picot v, Sanderson, 12 N. C. 309.

Delivery first and gift afterwards of a chattel capable of delivery, is as effectual as gift first and delivery afterwards; 64 Law T. 645. The presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the donor arises where a conveyance has been made, without consideration, to one of an estate or other property which has been purchased with the money of another; but this presumption Is rebutted where the purchase may fairly be deemed to be made for another from motives of natural love and affection; Appeal of Roberts, 85 Pa. 84; Gardner v. Merritt, 32 Md. 78, 3 Am. Rep. 115. Knowledge by the donee that the gift has been made is not necessary; L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 104. The gift Is complete when the legal title has actually vested in the donee; 108 E. C. L. R. 435; and in cases of gifts by husband to wife, or parent to child living at home, the necessity for an actual change of possession does not exist; Appeal of Crawford, 61 Pa. 52, 100 Am. Dec. 609. A chose in action not negotiable and negotiable paper not endorsed may be the subject of a gift, and a delivery which vests in the donee the equitable title is sufficient without a compiete transfer of the legal title; First Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Holland, 99 Va. 495, 39 S. E. 120, 65 L. R. A. 1.55, 86 Am. St. Rep. 898; Basket v. Hassell, 107 U. S. 602, 2 Sup. Ct 415, 27 L. Ed. 500; Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 261, 35 Am. Dec. 319. Where a father gives money deposited in bank to his infant son, the gift will not be defeated by the failure of the father to deliver to the son the pass book evidencing the gift, the father as natural guardian being the proper custodian of such book during the infancy of the son; Beaver V. Beaver, 62 Hun 194, 16 N. Y, Supp. 476, 746. The instances here given are merely illustrative of the cases on the subject of the necessity of delivery, the number of which is almost witliout limit. The mere deposit by one in trust for another does not establish an irrevocable trust. It is a tentative trust, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift during his lifetime; In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. B. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711, 1 Ann. Cas. 900, reversing id., 89 App. Div. 368, 85 387, 69 N. 1.

782, 101 Am. St Rep. 814; Cleveland v. Bank, 182 Mass, 110, 65 N. E. 27; Estate of Smith, 144 Pa. 428, 22 Atl. 916, 27 Am. St. Rep. 641; Rombo v. Pile, 220 Pa'. 235, 69 Atl. 807.

See 14 Yale L. J. 315; Brady, Bank Deposits, The declaration of the depositor may make the trust valid; Merlgan v. Mc Gonigle, 205 Pa. 321, 64 Atl. 994. The retention of the pass book by the depositor does not rebut the idea of a trust; Bath Sav.

Inst v

Ha thorn, 88 Me. 122, 33 Atl. 836, 32 L. R. A. 377, 51 Am. St. Rep. 382; Elstate of Gaffney, 146 Pa., 49, 23 Atl. 163: Robertson v. Mc Carty, 54 App. Div. 103, 66 N, Y. Supp. 327.

But the delivery of the pass book will render the trust irrevocable; In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711, 1 Ann. Cas. 900.. Notice to the beneficiary may create a trust; but absence of notice does not establish conclusively that there was no trust; Bath Sav. Inst. v. Hathorn, 88 Me. 122, 33 Atl. 836, 32