Malice

In Criminal Law. The doing a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse. 4 B. & C. 255; Com. v. York, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 104, 43 Am. Dec. 373; Zimmerman v. Whlteley, 134 Mich. 39, 95 N. W. 989. act without lawful excuse. 4 B. & C. 255; Com, V. York, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 104, 43 Am. Dec. 373, A conscious violation of the law, to the prejudice of another, 9 Cl. & F. 32. That state of mind which prompts a conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another.

— 9 C(. & F. 32. In a legal sense malice is never understood to denote general malevolence or unkindness of heart* or enmity towards a particular individual, but it signifies rather the intent from which flows any unlawful and injurious act committed without legal justification. Mc Gurn v. Brackett, 33 Me. 331; State V. Pierce, 7 Ala. 728; Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mas. 116, Fed. Gas. No. 3,867; 90 Ga. 95; R. & R. 26, 465; 1 Mood. C. C. 93; Lovett v. State, 80 Fla. 142, 11 South. 550, 17 L. R. A. 706. It Is not confined to the intention of doing an injury to any particular person, but extends to an evil design, a corrupt and wicked notion against some one at the time of conimitting the crime; Bacon, Max. Reg. 16; 2 Chitty, Cr. Law 727; 3 id. 1104; Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 16 S. E. 92; U. S. v. Reed, 86 Fed. 308; Tinker V. Colwell, 193 U. S. 487, 24 Sup. Ct. 606, 48 L. Ed. 754. Any formed design of mischief may be called malice. Malice is a wicked, vindictive temper, regardle.ss of social duty, and bent on mischief. There may be malice, in a legal sense, in homicide, where there is no actual intention of any mischief, but the killing Is the natural consequence of a careless action; Add. 156; Brooks v. Jones, 33 N. C. 261; 3 Cr. Law Mag. 216; Philadelphia, W. A B. R. Co. V. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 213, 16 L. Ed. 73. “Malice as used in the books, means sometimes malevolence, sometimes absence of excuse, and sometimes absence of a motive for the public good. If so ‘slippery’ a word, to borrow Lord Bowen’s adjective, were eliminated from legal arguments and opinions, only good would follow.” J. B. Ames, In 18 Harv. L. Rev. 422, note. Expreaa malice exists when the party evinces an intention to commit the crime; 3 Bulstr. 171. Implied malice is that inferred by law from the facts proved; Worley v. State, 11 Huraphr. (Tenn.) 172; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 299; 1 East, PI. Cr. 371. In cases of murder this distinction is of no practical value; 2 Bish. N. Cr. L. § G75. Malice ia implied in every case of intentional homicide; and where the fact of killing is proved, all the circumstances of acci- * dent or necessity are to be satisfactorily established by the accused, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him to prove the homicide and the circumstances attending it. If there are, in fact, circumstances of justllication, excuse, or palliation, such proof will naturally indicate them. But where the fact of killing is proved by satisfactory evidence, and there are no circumstances disclosed tending to show justification or excuse, there is nothing to rebut the natural presumption of malice. It is material to the just understanding of this rule that it applies only t6 cases where the killing is proved and nothing further ia ahown;

— for if the circumstances disclosed tend to extenuate the act, the prisoner has the full benefit of such facts; Com. v. York, Malice in fact Is synonymous with "express malice," as distinguished from implied malice; Smith v. Rodecap, 6 Ind. App. 78, 31 N. E. 479; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775. Malice in law is synonymous with Implied malice; Smith v. Rodecap, 5 Ind. App. 78, 31 N, E. 479, it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully, without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling or spite, or a desire to injure another; Tucker v. Cannon, 32 Neb. 444, 49 N. W. 435. It is a general rule that when a man commits an act, unaccompanied by any circumstances justifying its commission, the law presumes he has acted with an intent to produce the consequences which have ensued. And therefore the intent to kill is conclusively inferred from the deiibei’ate violent use of a deadly weapon; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 305, 52 Am. Dec. 711. See 3 M. & S. 15; 1 R. & R. Cr. Cas. 207; 1 East, 1*1. Cr. 223, 232, 340; 15 Vincr, Abr. 50G; Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 South. 312. in Torts. A malicious act is a wrongful act, intentionally done without cause or excuse. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152. A malevolent motive for action without reference to any hope of a remoter benelit to oneself to be accomplished by the intended harm to another. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 308, 19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 12 Am. St. Rep. 560. Malice “is Improper and indirect motive;” but a better definition is said to be, “A wish to injure the party, rather than to vindicate the law.” Pollock, Torts 303. The evil mind that is regardless of social duty and the rights of others. Graham v. Life Ass’n, 98 Teun. 48, 37 S. W. 995. In a lihel. In connection with a privileged communication, malice is any direct and W’icked motive which induces the writer to defame the other party. Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775. See Libel. In slander it is the absence of legal excuse; Branstetter v. Dorrough, 81 Ind. 527. See Slanbeb. This term, as applied to torts, does not' necessarily mean that which must proceed from a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition, but a conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from an ill-regulated mind not sufliciently cautious before It occasions an injury to another; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) ^9. Malice consists in one’s wilful doing of an act or wilful negl^t of an obligation which he knows is liable to injure another, regardless of the consequences, and a malignant spirit or a specific Intention to hurt an individual Is not ah essential element;