Malice
The Cyclopedic Law Dictionary · Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf; ed. James C. Cahill · 1922
The Cyclopedic Law Dictionary
In Crimes. In its broadest legal sense, the term is substantially synonymous with "criminal intent," and means the state of mind of a person, irrespective of his motive, whenever he consciously violates the law. In this sense, every person who is sui juris, and who, without justification or excuse, willfully does an act which is prohibited and made punishable by law as a crime, does the act maliciously.
1 Clark & Marshall, Crimes, 139.
Malice, in its legal sense, characterizes all acts done intentionally with an evil disposition, a wrong and unlawful motive and purpose; the willful doing an injurious act without lawful excuse. 9 Mete. (Mass.) 93, or just cause, 194 Mich. 197; 4 B. & C. 255; 107 Mich. 215. Malice implies not only willfulness, but an absence of lawful excuse.
12 Fla. 117.
In relation to particular crimes, the term is sometimes used in a narrower sense. Thus, as applied to the offense of malicious mischief, it implies a sense of resentment or ill will towards the owner of the property injured.
3 Cush. (Mass.) 558.
Malice is either express or implied. Express malice is actual malice, and exists where a person actually contemplates the injury or wrong which he inflicts. Implied malice, otherwise called "constructive malice," or "malice in law," is that which is imputed by the law from the nature of the act done, irrespective of the actual intent of the party.
See 10 N. Y. 120.
In Torts. Generally, malice implies no more than an absence of legal excuse (4 Wend. [N. Y.] 13); a mind not sufflciently cautious before it inflicts injury upon another (11 Serg. & R. [Pa.] 39); but in some connections, as, for example, to authorize the allowance of punitive damages, there must be either actual ill will, or a wanton disregard of consequences (37 Mich. 34; 77 111. 280). Malice, to render one liable in punitive damages, contemplates not merely an injurious act, but an act conceived in a spirit of mischief, or of willful indifference to civil obligations.
See 91 U. S. 489.
Specific ill will is not essential (27 Mo. 28); but a general wanton desire to annoy