malice

defamatory statements published with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were true or false

In Crimes.

In its broadest legal sense, the term is substantially synonymous with "criminal intent," and means the state of mind of a person, irrespective of his motive, whenever he consciously violates the law.

In this sense, every person who is sui juris, and who, without justification or excuse, willfully does an act which is prohibited and made punishable by law as a crime, does the act maliciously. 1 Clark & Marshall, Crimes, 139. Malice, in its legal sense, characterizes all acts done intentionally with an evil disposition, a wrong and unlawful motive and purpose; the willful doing an injurious act without lawful excuse. 9 Mete. (Mass.) 93, or just cause, 194 Mich. 197; 4 B. & C. 255; 107 Mich. 215. Malice implies not only willfulness, but an absence of lawful excuse. 12 Fla. 117. In relation to particular crimes, the term is sometimes used in a narrower sense. Thus, as applied to the offense of malicious mischief, it implies a sense of resentment or ill will towards the owner of the property injured. 3 Cush. (Mass.) 558. Malice is either express or implied. Express malice is actual malice, and exists where a person actually contemplates the injury or wrong which he inflicts. Implied malice, otherwise called "constructive malice," or "malice in law," is that which is imputed by the law from the nature of the act done, irrespective of the actual intent of the party. See 10 N. Y. 120. In Torts. Generally, malice implies no more than an absence of legal excuse (4 Wend. [N. Y.] 13); a mind not sufflciently cautious before it inflicts injury upon another (11 Serg. & R. [Pa.] 39); but in some connections, as, for example, to authorize the allowance of punitive damages, there must be either actual ill will, or a wanton disregard of consequences (37 Mich. 34; 77 111. 280). Malice, to render one liable in punitive damages, contemplates not merely an injurious act, but an act conceived in a spirit of mischief, or of willful indifference to civil obligations. See 91 U. S. 489. Specific ill will is not essential (27 Mo. 28); but a general wanton desire to annoy

In its legal sense, a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. See 34 Cal. 48, 91 Am. Dec. 672. The absence of legal justification, excuse or extenuation in the commission of an unlawful act. See 61 Am. St. Rep. 836, note. See, also, 134 Am. St. Rep. 729, note.

In Criminal Law. The doing a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse. 4 B. & C. 255; Com. v. York, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 104, 43 Am. Dec. 373; Zimmerman v. Whlteley, 134 Mich. 39, 95 N. W. 989. act without lawful excuse. 4 B. & C. 255; Com, V. York, 9 Mete. (Mass.) 104, 43 Am. Dec. 373, A conscious violation of the law, to the prejudice of another, 9 Cl. & F. 32. That state of mind which prompts a conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another. 9 C(. & F. 32. In a legal sense malice is never understood to denote general malevolence or unkindness of heart* or enmity towards a particular individual, but it signifies rather the intent from which flows any unlawful and injurious act committed without legal justification. Mc Gurn v. Brackett, 33 Me. 331; State V. Pierce, 7 Ala. 728; Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mas. 116, Fed. Gas. No. 3,867; 90 Ga. 95; R. & R. 26, 465; 1 Mood. C. C. 93; Lovett v. State, 80 Fla. 142, 11 South. 550, 17 L. R. A. 706. It Is not confined to the intention of doing an injury to any particular person, but extends to an evil design, a corrupt and wicked notion against some one at the time of conimitting the crime; Bacon, Max. Reg. 16; 2 Chitty, Cr. Law 727; 3 id. 1104; Johnson v. State, 90 Ga. 441, 16 S. E. 92; U. S. v. Reed, 86 Fed. 308; Tinker V. Colwell, 193 U. S. 487, 24 Sup. Ct. 606, 48 L. Ed. 754. Any formed design of mischief may be called malice. Malice is a wicked, vindictive temper, regardle.ss of social duty, and bent on mischief. There may be malice, in a legal sense, in homicide, where there is no actual intention of any mischief, but the killing Is the natural consequence of a careless action; Add. 156; Brooks v. Jones, 33 N. C. 261; 3 Cr. Law Mag. 216; Philadelphia, W. A B. R. Co. V. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 213, 16 L. Ed. 73. “Malice as used in the books, means sometimes malevolence, sometimes absence of excuse, and sometimes absence of a motive for the public good. If so ‘slippery’ a word, to borrow Lord Bowen’s adjective, were eliminated from legal arguments and opinions, only good would follow.” J. B. Ames, In 18 Harv. L. Rev. 422, note. Expreaa malice exists when the party evinces an intention to commit the crime; 3 Bulstr. 171. Implied malice is that inferred by law from the facts proved; Worley v. State, 11 Huraphr. (Tenn.) 172; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 299; 1 East, PI. Cr. 371. In cases of murder this distinction is of no practical value; 2 Bish. N. Cr. L. § G75. Malice ia implied in every case of intentional homicide; and where the fact of killing is proved, all the circumstances of acci- * dent or necessity are to be satisfactorily established by the accused, unless they arise out of the evidence produced against him to prove the homicide and the circumstances attending it. If there are, in fact, circumstances of justllication, excuse, or palliation, such proof will naturally indicate them. But where the fact of killing is proved by satisfactory evidence, and there are no circumstances disclosed tending to show justification or excuse, there is nothing to rebut the natural presumption of malice. It is material to the just understanding of this rule that it applies only t6 cases where the killing is proved and nothing further ia ahown; for if the circumstances disclosed tend to extenuate the act, the prisoner has the full benefit of such facts; Com. v. York, Malice in fact Is synonymous with "express malice," as distinguished from implied malice; Smith v. Rodecap, 6 Ind. App. 78, 31 N. E. 479; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775. Malice in law is synonymous with Implied malice; Smith v. Rodecap, 5 Ind. App. 78, 31 N, E. 479, it is an act done wrongfully and wilfully, without reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling or spite, or a desire to injure another; Tucker v. Cannon, 32 Neb. 444, 49 N. W. 435. It is a general rule that when a man commits an act, unaccompanied by any circumstances justifying its commission, the law presumes he has acted with an intent to produce the consequences which have ensued. And therefore the intent to kill is conclusively inferred from the deiibei’ate violent use of a deadly weapon; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 305, 52 Am. Dec. 711. See 3 M. & S. 15; 1 R. & R. Cr. Cas. 207; 1 East, 1*1. Cr. 223, 232, 340; 15 Vincr, Abr. 50G; Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. 1, 13 South. 312. in Torts. A malicious act is a wrongful act, intentionally done without cause or excuse. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152. A malevolent motive for action without reference to any hope of a remoter benelit to oneself to be accomplished by the intended harm to another. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 308, 19 N. E. 390, 2 L. R. A. 81, 12 Am. St. Rep. 560. Malice “is Improper and indirect motive;” but a better definition is said to be, “A wish to injure the party, rather than to vindicate the law.” Pollock, Torts 303. The evil mind that is regardless of social duty and the rights of others. Graham v. Life Ass’n, 98 Teun. 48, 37 S. W. 995. In a lihel. In connection with a privileged communication, malice is any direct and W’icked motive which induces the writer to defame the other party. Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 13 S. E. 775. See Libel. In slander it is the absence of legal excuse; Branstetter v. Dorrough, 81 Ind. 527. See Slanbeb. This term, as applied to torts, does not' necessarily mean that which must proceed from a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition, but a conduct injurious to another, though proceeding from an ill-regulated mind not sufliciently cautious before It occasions an injury to another; Weckerly v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. (Pa.) ^9. Malice consists in one’s wilful doing of an act or wilful negl^t of an obligation which he knows is liable to injure another, regardless of the consequences, and a malignant spirit or a specific Intention to hurt an individual Is not ah essential element;

In criminal law.

In its legal sense, this word does not simply mcan ill will against a person, but signifies a wrongful act done intentionally, without Just cause or excuse. Bromage v. Prosser, 4 Bam. & C. 255. A conscious violation of the law (or the prompting of the mind to commit it) which operates to the prejudice of another person. About as clear, comprehensive, and correct a definition as the authorities afford is that "malice is a condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, the existence of which is inferred from acts committed or words spoken." Harris v. State, 8 Tex. App. 109 "Malice," in its common acceptation, means ill will towards some person.

In its legal sense, it applies to a wrongful act done intentionally, without legal justification or excuse. Dunn v. Hall, 1 Ind. 344. A man may do an act willfully, and yet be free of malice. But he cannot do an act maliciously without at the same time doing it willfully. The malicious doing of an act includes the willful doing of it. Malice includes intent and will. State v. Robbins, 66 Me. 328. For other definitions see Shannon v. Jones, 76 Tex. 141, 13 S. W. 477: Williams v. WiLliams, 20 Colo. 51, 37 Pac. 6l4; Smith v. Railroad Co.., 87 Md. 48, 38 Atl. 1072; In re Freche (D. C.) 109 Fed. 621; Craft v. Slate, 3 Kan. 486; Lewis v. Chapman, 16 N. Y. 369; State v. Avery, 113 Mo. 475. 21 S. W. 193; State v. Witt, 34 Kan. 488, 8 Pac. 769; State v. Walker, 9 Honst. (Del.) 464, 33 Atl. 221; Cotton v. State, 32 Tex. 614; Com. v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 54 N. E. 551, 75 Am. St Rep. 306. In the law of libel and slander. An evil intent or motive arising from spite or 111 will; personal hatred or ill will; culpable recklessness or a willful and wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the person defamed. McDonald v. Brown, 23 R. I. 546, 51 Atl. 213, 58 In R. A. 768, 91 Am. St. Rep. 659; Hearne v. De Young, 132 CaL 357, 64 Pac. 576; Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa, 298, 86 N. W. 323, 54 L. R. A. 855, 89 Am. St. Rep. 365; Minter v. Bradstreet Co., 174 Mo. 444, 73 S. W. 668

— Actual malice. Express malice, or malice in fact. Gee v. Culver, 13 Or. 598, 11 Pac. 302.

— Constructive malice. Implied malice; malice inferred from acts; malice imputed bj law; malice which is not shown by direct proof of an intention to do injury, (express malice,) but which is inferentially established by the necessarily injurious results of the acts shown to have been committed. State v. Har-rigan, 9 Houst. (Del.) 369, 31 Atl. 1052; Hogan, v. State, 36 Wis. 238; Caldwell v. Raymond, 2 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 196,

— Express malice. Actuni malice; malice in fact; a deliberate intention to commit an injury, evidenced by external circumstances. Sparf v. U. S., 156 U. S. 61, 15 Sup. Ct. 273, 39 In Ed. 348: Farrer v. State, 42 Tex. 271; Singleton v. State, 1 Tex. App. 507; Jones v. State, 29 Ga. 594; Wynne v. Parsons, 57 Conn. 73, 17 Atl. 362; Howard v. Sexton, 4 N. Y. 161; Herbener v. Crossan, 4 Pennewili (Del.) 38, 55 Atl. 224.

— General malice. General malice is wickedness, a disposition to do wrong, a "black and diabolical heart, regardless of socini duty and fatally bent on mischief." Neal v. Nelson. 117 N. C. 393, 23 S. E. 428. 53 Am. St. Rep. 590; Brooks v. Jones, S3 N. C. 260.

— Implied malice. Malice inferred by legal reasoning and necessary deduction from the res gestœ or the conduct of the party. Malice inferred from any deliberate cruel act committed by one person against another, however sudden. Whart. Horn. 38. What is calied "general malice" is often thus inferred. Sparf v. U. S., 156 U. S. 51, 15 Sup. Ct. 273, 39 L. Ed. 343; Hotema v. U. S., 186 U. S. 413, 22 Sup. Ct. 895, 46 L. Ed. 1225; Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120; State v. Mason, 54 S. a 240, 32 S. E. 357; State v. Neal, 37 Me. 469; State v. Harrigan, 9 Houst. (Del.) 369, 3l Atl. 1052.

— Legal malice. An expression used as the equivalent of "constructive malice," or "malice in law." Humphries v. Parker, 52 Me. 502.

— Malice aforetbongbt. In the definition of "murder," malice aforethought exists where the person doing the act which causes death has an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm to any person, (whether the person is actually killed or not,) or to commit any felony whatever, or has the knowledge that the act will probably cause the death of or grievous bodily harm to some person, although he does not desire it. or even wishes that it may not be caused. Steph. Crim. Dig. 144; 1 Russ. Crimes, 641. The words "malice aforethought" loug ago acquired in law a settled meaning, somewhat different from the popular one. In their legal sense they do not import an actual intention to kill the deceased. The idea is not spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, but evil design in general. the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; not premeditated personal hatred or revenge towards the person killed, but that kind of unlawful purpose which, if persevered in. must produce mischief. State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399, 6 Am. Rep. 533. And see Thiede v. Utah, 159 U. S. 510, l6 Sup. Ct 62. 40 In Ed. 237; State v. Fiske, 63 Co.nn. 388, 28 Atl. 572; Nye v. People, 35 Mich. 19; People v. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336, 58 N. W. 328; Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 120; Alien v. U. S., 164 In S. 492, 17 Sun. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528; Kota v. People, 136 111. 655, 27 N. E. 53; Hogan v. State, 36 Wis. 242.

— Malice in fact. Express or actual malice. Railway Co. v. Behee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 107, 2l S. W. 384; Hotchkiss v. Porter, 30 Co.nn. 414,

— Malice in law. Implied, inferred, or legal malice. See Smith v. Rodecap, 5 Ind. App. 78, 31 N. E. 479; Bacon v. Railroad Co., 66 Mich. 166, 33 N. W. 181.

— Malice prepense. Malice aforethought ; deliberate, predetermined malice. 2 Rolie, 461.

— Particular malice. Malice di-, rected against a particular individual; ill will; a grudge; a desire to be revenged on a particular person. Brooks v. Jones, 33 N. C. 261; State v. Long, 117 N. C. 791, 23 S. E. 431.

— Preconceived malice. Malice prepense or aforethought. See State v. Reidell, 9 Houst. (Del.) 470, 14 Atl. 550.

— Premeditated malice. An intention to kill unlawfully, deliberately formed in the mind as the result of a determination meditated upon and fixed bsfore the act. State v. Gin Pon, 16 Wash. 425, 47 Pac. 961; Milton v. State, 6 Neb. 148 ; State v. Rutten, 13 Wash. 211, 43 Pac. 30.

— Special malice. Particular or personal malice; that is, hatred, ill will, or a vindictive disposition against a particular individual.

— Universal malice. By this term is not meant a malicious purpose to take the life of all persons, but it is that depravity of the human heart which determines to take life upon slight or insufficient provocation, without knowing or caring who may be the victim. Mitchell v. State, 60 Ain. 30.

An intent wrongfully to injure another; a wanton or wilful disregard of the rights of another or of others generally; a spirit of mischief or of criminal indifference to duty to another or others; in the law of homicide, a wicked and malignant intent to take the life of another, or an inhuman or reckless disregard of the life of another. Xalice aforethought, or malice prepense: malice previously and deliberately entertained, — a kind of malice essential to the crime of murdei-. Malice implied, or constructive malice: malice imputed from deliberate, heinous or reckless action. Malice in fact, actual or express malice: an actual intent to injure another.

In criminal law. In its legal pense, this word does not simply meun ill will against a person, but signifies a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause orexcuse. 4 Barn. & C. 255. A conscious violation of the law {or the prompting of the mind to commit it) which operates to the prejudice of another person, About as clear, comprehensive, and correct adefinition as the authorities afford is that “malice is a condition of the mind which shows a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, the existence of which is inferred from acts committed or words spoken.” 8 Tex. App. 109, “Malice,” in ita common acceptztion, means ill willtowards some person.

In its legal sense, it applies to 2 wrongful act done intentionally, without legal justification or excuse, 1 Ind. 844. Aman may do au act willfully, and yet be free of malice. But be cannot do an act maliciously without at the same time doing it willfully. The malicious doing of an act ineludes the willful doing of it. Maliceincludes intent and will 66 Me. 828, Malice is either express or implied. The former is the case where the party declares or manifests a positive intention to commit the érime; while implied malice is gathered, as an inference of law, from the facts and circumstances proved. In the definition of “murder,” malice aforethought exists where the person doing the act which causes death has an intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm to any person, (whether the person is actually killed or not,) or to commit any felony whatever, or hag the knowledge that the act will probably cause the death of or grievous bouily hurm to some person, although he does not desire it, or even wishes that it may not be caused. Steph. Crim. Dig. 144; 1 Kuss. Crimes, 641. The words “malice aforethought” long ago acquired in law asettled meaning, somewhat different from the popular one, In their legal sense they do in particular, but evil design in general, the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; not preméditated personal hatred or revenge towards the person killed, but that kind of unlawiul purpose which, if persevered in, must produce miachief. 49 N. H. 399.

1 Wicked intention to do an injury.2 In law, any improper and sinister motive; not necessarily spite and hatred.^ Wantonness; willful disregard of right and duty: doing an act contrary to a man's own convictions of duty.* The state of mind in which one willfully does that which he knows will injure another's person or property. ^ Not limited to acts done from hatred, revenge, or passion; includes all acts wantonly or willfully done, that is, acts which any man of reason, knowledge, and ability must know to be contrary to his duty.* In homicide, a wicked, malignant, and revengeful act, flowing from a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief.' In trespass, when the injury has been wanton, ol- gross and outrageous.8 Not merely the doing of an unlawful or injurious act, but an act conceived in a spirit of mischief, or of criminal indifference to civil obligation.9 Thus, in malicious prosecution, the term is quite comprehensive, and includes many phases of wrong motive and conduct. There may be ill-will, malevolence, spite, a spirit of revenge, or a purpose to injure without cause, but it is not necessary there should be. If the prosecution is willful, wanton or reckless, or against the prosecutor's sense of duty and right, or for ends he knows or is bound to know are wrong and against the dictates of public policy, it is malicious. ^° ^ F. malipe: L. malitia, badness. See Malitia. 2 Tuttle u Bishop, 80 Conn. 83 (1861). ' Mitchell V. Wall, 111 Mass. 498 (1873), eases. ' United States v. Buggies, S Mas. 192 (1838), Story, J. ii Territory v. Egan, 3 Dak. 130 (1882), Kidder, J. » United States v. Coffin, 1 Sumn. 398 (1833), Story, J.; Wiggin V. Coffln, 3 Story, 1 (1888); Dexter v. Speai', 4 Mas. 117 (1826); United States v. Harriman, 1 Hughes, 5-38 (1878). ' United States v. Ruggles, supra. See also 37 Ind. 114; 89 id. 193; 26 Ga. 156, 275; 30 Miss. 678; 31 Mo. 147; 19 Iowa, 447; 85 Mich. 16. s Day V. Woodworth, 13 How. 371 (1851). « Philadelphia, &c. E. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 214 (1853), Campbell, J.; Milwaukee, &o. R. Co. ^v. Arms, ' 91 U. S. 493 (1876). '» Hamilton v. Smith, 39 Mich. 329 (1878), Graves, J.; In a newspaper publication, malice in uttering false statements may consist either in a direct intention to injure another, or in a reckless disregard of his rights, and of the consequences that may result to him. J Want of knowledge may aggravate the malignity of the case by showing an indiscriminate malice and indifference to the peace of the innocent.-* Actual malice J malice in fact; express m.alice. Malice existing as a matter of fact. Express malice in homicide exists when one, with a sedate, deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill another; which design is evidenced by external circumstances discovering that inward intention; as, lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do bodily harra.^ Express malice consists in the deliberate intention of doing any bodily harm to another, unauthorized by law.^ Express malice means a deliberate intention and design to commit the offense in question^" Constructive malice; implied malice; legal malice. Malice inferred from acts; malice imputed in law. Implied malice, or malice in law, is malice inferred from an act, presumed from a deliberate act, though no particular enmity can be proved. -As. where a man kills another without provocation — which evidences an abandoned heart; or where a criminal kills a, person who is endeavoring to make a lawful arrest; or where a person, intending to commit another felony, kills a man — as, shoots at A and kills B against whom he has no ill-intent; or, a killing by an abortionist. Any such killing is murder, because of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers to the act. Indeed, all felonious homicide is presumed to be malicious until the contrary appears. ° Implied malice is malice which has no existence in fact, but which the law imputes to the guilty party. ^ Implied malice exists where mischief is intentionally done without just cause or excuse." Malice aforethought "or prepense. In homicide, Hot so properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as an evil 1 Gott V. Pulsifer. 133 Mass. 239 (1877), Gray, C. J.; Lothrop V. Adams, 183 id. 479.(1882); Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa.. 393 (1878); Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 171" (1882); Odgers, Lib. & SI. *264; Townshend, SI. & Lib. § 87. 2 Dexter v. Spear, 4 Mas. 11" (1835), Story, J. s 4 Bl. Com. 199. * People V. Clark, 7 N. T. 333 (1858). » [Anthony v. State, 21 Miss. 264 (1850). ' 4 Bl. Com. 199-301. ' Darry v. People, 10 N. Y. 188 (1854). * Parke v. Blackiston, 3 Harr. 378 (Del.. 1841). See, on express and implied malice, 31 Cal. 53; 12 Pla. 135; 8 Ga. 334; 26 id. 156; 101 111. 331; 1 Ind. 3S3; 8 La. An. 969; 37 Me. 468; 9 Mete 104; 15 Pick. 337; 30 Miss. 684; 25 Mo. 151; 43 id. 161, 3!3; 11 S. & R. 40; 82 Tex. design in general; the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and a malignant heart.i Is not confined to homicide committed in cold blood, with settled design and premeditation, but extends to all cases of homicide, however sudden the occasion, when the act is done under such cruel circumstances as are the ordinary symptoms o£ a wicked, depraved, and malignant spirit.^ Includes not ouly anger, hatred, and revenge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. Is not confined to ill-will toward one or more individual persons, but is intended to denote an action flowing from any wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indication of a heart regardless of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief. Therefore, murder is implied from an.y deliberate or cruel act against another, however sudden. The words do not imply deliberation, or the lapse of considerable time between the malicious intent to take life and the actual execution of that intent, but they rather denote purpose and design, in contradistinction to accident and mischance.^ Whenever a homicide is shown to have been committed without lawful authority and with deliberate intent, it is sufficiently proved to have been with malice aforethought. It is not necessary to prove that any special or express hatred or malice was entertained by the accused toward the deceased. It is sufficient to prove that the act was done with deliberate intent, as distinct from an act done under the sudden impulse of passion, in the heat of blood, and without previous malice.* See Murder. Particular malice; personal malice. Particular malice is ill-will, grudge, a desire to be revenged on a particular person.''' Personal malice is spite against some particular individual. It is one of the two varieties of malice in fact, the other being what Blackstone terras " universal " malice, or malice against the world generally, without reference to individuals: as, where a person discharges a gun into a multitude, or starts out to kill and does kill the first man he meets." Malicious. Characterizes an act not only when it arises fi-om personal spite, but when it is a wanton and intentional injury, when it is willful.' ' 4 Bl. Com. 198. ■' United States v. Cornell, 2 Mas. 91 (1820), Story, J. ■Commonwealth, v. Webster, 5 Cush. 304-0(1850), Shaw, C. J. • United States v. Guiteau, 10 F. R. 162, 165 (1882), Cox, J.; Davison v. People, 90 111. 229 (1878); Spies et al. D.Teop Ie, 122 id. 174 (1887). 1 Brooks V. Jones, 11 Ired. L. 261 (1850). " See 4 Bl. Com. 200; Brown's Law Diet. See gen- 'erally 1 Curtis, 4; 1 Dak. 458; 29 Ga. 594; 29 Kan. 427; 13 Mo. 332; Ifl Nev. 307; 49 N. H. 399; 13 Wend. 159; 68 Pa. 9; 14 Tex. Ap. 236, 300, 331; Law Mag. & Rev,, Aug. In a legal sense, describes any unlawful act done willfully and purposely to the prejudice and injury of another.' The intentional doing of a wrongful act with knoivledge of its character, and without cause or excuse.^ Describes the state of mind in which many acts (crimes and torts) are done: as, malicious — abandonment, arrest, battery, burning, communication, desertion, injury, intention, libel, mischief, prosecution, publication, gg. v. Maliciously. With deliberate intention to injure; willful: as, the malicious burning of a building.' Maliciously suing out an attachment means not only malevolent intention to do injury, but also that careless disregard of the rights of others which, without real ill-will, the law implies as malice.* In a spirit of wicked revenge toward a person, or of wanton cruelty toward an animal.^ In misdemeanors and felonies, imports a criminal motive, intent or purpose.^ See Dbuberation, 3; Damages, Exemplary; Intent: Knowledge, 1; Motive.

Express or actual malice is necessary to establish certaitt degrees of criminal liability in certain cases, and may be defined as the'intent of one person to injure any otlier. But in certain other cases of heinous or reckless action, where the law dispenses with proof of actual malice, but af Bxes similar penalties or punishment, there is said to be implied or constructive malice. Actual malice, resulting in the crime of murder, is specially named malice aforethought or malice prepense.