50 U.S.C. § 2527
Section 2527 · Nuclear test ban readiness program
Current version, with additions and removals from the November 24, 2003 version.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On September 17, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union announced that they would resume full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on issues relating to nuclear testing, including further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.
(2) It was agreed that the first step in these negotiations would be to reach agreement on verification measures that will make possible the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.
(3) To achieve the agreement on verification measures, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at the test sites of each country during the summer of 1988.
(4) At the Moscow summit in May 1988, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed their commitment to negotiations on “effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process”.
(1) To assure that the United States maintains a vigorous program of stockpile inspection and non-explosive testing so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban is entered into, the United States remains able to detect and identify potential problems in stockpile reliability and safety in existing designs of nuclear weapons.
(1) To assure that the United States maintains a vigorous program of stockpile inspection and non-explosive testing so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban is entered into, the United States remains able to detect and identify potential problems in stockpile reliability and safety in existing designs of nuclear weapons.
(2) To assure that the specific materials, components, processes, and personnel needed for the remanufacture of existing nuclear weapons or the substitution of alternative nuclear warheads are available to support such remanufacture or substitution if such action becomes necessary in order to satisfy reliability and safety requirements under a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement.
(2) To assure that the specific materials, components, processes, and personnel needed for the remanufacture of existing nuclear weapons or the substitution of alternative nuclear warheads are available to support such remanufacture or substitution if such action becomes necessary in order to satisfy reliability and safety requirements under a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement.
(3) To assure that a vigorous program of research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering is supported so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement is entered into, the United States is able to maintain a base of technical knowledge about nuclear weapons design and nuclear weapons effects.
(3) To assure that a vigorous program of research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering is supported so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement is entered into, the United States is able to maintain a base of technical knowledge about nuclear weapons design and nuclear weapons effects.