Volume 156 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

This case stemmed from allegedly unwelcomed visits to the Coventry Health and Rehabilitation Center, a nursing home in Coventry, Rhode Island, by plaintiff, Carel Bainum. Bainum appealed pro se challenging the motion justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Coventry Police Department. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that a genuine issue of material fact existed on her "[c]ollusion and [c]onspiracy" claim, which she described as a scheme by the center's then-administrator to "set [her] up" and "keep her out" of the center. The Court gleaned the underlying tort of malicious prosecution from the plaintiff's papers but held that it failed as a matter of law. Without a viable underlying tort claim, the plaintiff's civil-conspiracy claim also failed. Thus, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment.

This appeal stemmed from a tragic automobile accident that occurred on the evening of March 9, 2003, in Coventry, Rhode Island, the details of which are outlined at length in a predecessor case: O'Connell v. Walmsley, 93 A.3d 60 (R.I. 2014). The defendant, William Walmsley, a driver deemed 3 percent at fault for the accident, sought summary judgment, asserting that the statutory minimum damages amount was previously satisfied by settlement agreements with other defendants. The plaintiffs argued that, despite the prior settlements that exceeded $250,000, G.L. 1956 § 10-7-2—the statutory minimum corresponding with wrongful-death cases—mandated that the defendant was individually liable for $250,000. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' rigid and technical plain-language reading of § 10-7-2 because it would yield an absurd result. Instead, the Court sought to effectuate the underlying compensatory purpose of the Wrongful Death Act. To this end, and reviewing the entire statutory scheme in light of common sense, the Court concluded that the legislature intended the minimum-damages provision to apply on a per-claim—rather than per-defendant—basis. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Abdoulie Njie's application for postconviction relief, premised on ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied in the Superior Court, and he appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the hearing justice's decision was in error. Njie's attorney, however, articulated that his request for postconviction relief should be interpreted as Njie's not having made a knowing and intelligent plea. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not err nor did she overlook or misconceive material evidence when she arrived at her findings. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that Njie failed to provide the evidence required to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the hearing justice appropriately found that Njie's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.