Volume 157 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

When giving his instructions to the jury at the conclusion of the parties' final arguments, the trial justice referred to a suppression hearing that had occurred before trial, and he instructed the jury that the question of whether the police lawfully seized cocaine from José Angeles, the defendant, was a legal issue that he would decide. After a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of felony assault and one count each of possession of a controlled substance, resisting arrest, and reckless driving, the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the trial justice's jury instructions constituted reversible error because the instructions amounted to commenting on the evidence, and were "confusing, misleading, unnecessary and bolstering."

The plaintiff, Gary Lemont, appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, the Estate of Mary Della Ventura. The plaintiff filed a negligence suit after falling and sustaining injuries while on the defendant's property and, following a four-day trial, a jury returned a verdict finding the defendant to be 65 percent negligent. The trial justice, however, subsequently granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial on the grounds that the elements of the plaintiff's negligence claim had not been established by the evidence adduced at trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the Superior Court order granting the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.

This case arose out of a chemical leak that, according to Stephen Limoges, one of the plaintiffs, caused him to suffer respiratory injuries. The plaintiffs brought suit against three defendants and then appealed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, Arden Engineering Constructors, LLC. Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that the hearing justice erred because he made an improper credibility assessment about the affidavit of their expert and because he overlooked material issues of fact that were in dispute. The Supreme Court held that summary judgment was inappropriately granted because the plaintiffs' expert's affidavit was, for the purpose of summary judgment, sufficient to establish a standard of care and a breach thereof. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment because issues of material fact remained in dispute.

This civil matter came before the Court on appeal from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Ms. Victoria Roach. The plaintiff slipped and fell during a shift as a per diem contract nurse at the Rhode Island Veterans Home on November 10, 2008. The state moved for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and to amend judgment and grant a remittitur. The trial justice denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial, but granted a remittitur. The remittitur lessened the plaintiff's award from $500,000 to $382,000 however, the prejudgment interest award increased the judgment to $631,373.66. On appeal, the state argued that: (1) the public-duty doctrine shielded the state from liability (2) the statutory tort cap in G.L. 1956 § 9-31-2 limited damages to $100,000 (3) the prejudgment interest award was improper (4) the trial justice erred in denying the state's motion for judgment as a matter of law and (5) the trial justice erred in failing to instruct the jury on comparative negligence. The Supreme Court held that the public-duty doctrine did not shield the state from tort liability nor did the statutory tort cap limit damages to $100,000. The Court also deemed the award of prejudgment interest appropriate. Under the public-duty doctrine, the Court concluded that the relevant function at issue—care for nursing home resident-patients—was not a discretionary governmental function incapable of private-party performance, and thus, the state was not immune in tort. With respect to the statutory tort cap, the Court deemed resident-patient care a proprietary function, such that damages against the state were not capped at $100,000. Similarly, because the state engaged in a proprietary function, the Court deemed the prejudgment interest award appropriate. The Court reiterated that a party is not required to request prejudgment interest by motion because the award of prejudgment interest is a ministerial act by the clerk of court. Additionally, the Court held that the trial justice properly denied the state's motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and that the trial justice appropriately declined to instruct the jury on comparative negligence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

On October 1, 2004, a jury found Ralph Thibedau, the defendant, guilty of three counts of child molestation against his stepdaughter. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, the defendant claimed that the trial justice committed reversible error when he: (1) allowed the admission of evidence of other wrongful acts under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, (2) allowed the state to introduce a witness in violation of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, (3) precluded defense counsel from cross examining a witness regarding specific instances of conduct concerning the complaining witness's character for untruthfulness, (4) allowed a witness to testify as to the meaning of the complaining witness's body language and demeanor, (5) denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence regarding one hundred incidents of child molestation that occurred in the same time frame set out in count one, rendered count one duplicitous, (6) failed to give an instruction regarding the definition of a person's age where age was an element of the offenses charged, and (7) failed to include an instruction regarding the proper use of the Rule 404(b) evidence in the written instructions given to the jury. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not commit reversible error and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Patrick Timothy McDonald, appealed from a judgment of conviction on three separate counts of embezzlement and one count of conspiracy to commit embezzlement. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial justice erred in allowing a certain fax communication into evidence that he perceived to be irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The defendant also argued that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in allowing the fax communication into evidence as it agreed that such evidence was relevant. The Supreme Court also noted that the defendant had failed to request that certain portions of the fax be redacted to remove characterizations regarding the defendant's credibility. Moreover, after a careful review of the trial transcripts and exhibits, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the trial justice's ruling denying the defendant's motion for a new trial was supported by the record. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Alison E. Glassie, Executrix of the Estate of Jacquelin Caffrey Glassie, (plaintiff), appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Paul Doucette, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie, Jr. (defendant), on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Summary judgment was granted on the basis that the plaintiff was without standing, as the trustee was the proper party to institute an action on behalf of trust beneficiaries. On appeal, the plaintiff averred that her standing was derived from her third-party beneficiary status under her parents' property settlement agreement, which directed that a trust be created and funded for Jacquelin Glassie's benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court judgment, holding that the law of trusts applied and that the trustee was the proper party to institute the action. The Court explained that Jacquelin had received all that was due to her as a third-party beneficiary under the property settlement agreement, and that she benefited from the trust only because she was a trust beneficiary.