Volume 158 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, John Cavanaugh (Cavanaugh or defendant), appealed from judgments of conviction in the Superior Court. The defendant argued that the Superior Court justice committed reversible error in failing to strike certain testimony, failing to give an adequate cautionary instruction, denying the defendant's motion to pass the case after the state improperly alluded to an "empty chair," failing to exclude testimony about prior sexual misconduct, and denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal when the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain two counts. The Supreme Court held that, although the state came dangerously close to improper prosecutorial conduct, under the circumstances of this case the state's cross-examination of the defendant and statements during closing argument improperly allude to an empty chair. Furthermore, the Court determined that the cautionary instruction given by the Superior Court justice was sufficient to cure any prejudice. In regard to the prior sexual misconduct, the Court held that such testimony was relevant and necessary to the credibility of the complaining witness. Finally, the Court concluded that the Superior Court justice properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on two of the convictions as the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain those counts.

The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review a Superior Court order denying the state's request to adjudge Anthony Parrillo a probation violator. The hearing justice's decision to deny the state's request was based upon his finding that Parrillo was no longer on probation in 2011, the time that he allegedly committed the offense of felony assault. The Supreme Court held that any credit that Parrillo received on his thirty-year sentence (as a result of time served and/or good behavior) did not actually reduce his sentence instead, it reduced the time that he would spend incarcerated. The Supreme Court held that Parrillo's thirty-year sentence in 1986 meant that he was on probation until 2016, and was subject to being adjudged a violator in 2011. The Supreme Court also entertained Parrillo's argument that, even if he was deemed to be on probation in 2011, the state should have been barred from adjudging him a probation violator based on the principles of equitable estoppel because the state, through the Department of Corrections, informed Parrillo in a 2009 letter that his probation had terminated at that time. Although the Supreme Court rejected this argument—primarily because Parrillo failed to establish the requisite elements to warrant such relief—the Court remanded the case to the Superior Court for a determination of whether the state should be barred based on principles of due process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case thereto.

This appeal involved a dispute over a two-mile stretch of beach in the Misquamicut area of Westerly, Rhode Island. The Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island brought an action against the beachfront property owners to enjoin them from preventing public access to the beach area. The state asserted that, in 1909, five sets of property owners dedicated the beach area to the public through a Plat and Indenture that they signed and recorded. Following a bench trial, a Superior Court justice entered judgment for the landowner-defendants. The trial justice found that the 1909 Plat and Indenture, read together, did not reveal the Plattors' manifest intent to dedicate the beach area to the public. The trial justice deemed the 1909 Plat and Indenture to be unambiguous instruments and, therefore, he did not need to consider extrinsic evidence in reaching his determination. Had he found the 1909 Plat and Indenture ambiguous, however, the trial justice nevertheless determined that the extrinsic evidence did not demonstrate the Plattors' manifest intent to dedicate the beach area. The Attorney General appealed and asserted that the 1909 Plat and Indenture clearly demonstrated the Plattors' intent to dedicate the beach area. Alternatively, the Attorney General maintained that, even if the 1909 Plat and Indenture were ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence revealed the manifest intent to dedicate.