Volume 161 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

This case arises from a briar patch of litigation between feuding neighbors who are unable to agree about many things, including, particular to this case, the details of an easement that resulted from a court-mandated land partition. The underlying legal battle began in August 2000. By May 2005, Carol and A. L. Ballard had filed an answer to SVF Foundation's fifth amended complaint. Within that pleading, the Ballards counterclaimed, alleging that, among other things, SVF Foundation was interfering with the Ballards' easement that ran across SVF's property. SVF moved for summary judgment on that count, and the Superior Court granted SVF's motion. The Ballards timely appealed to this Court, challenging the Superior Court's decision granting summary judgment to SVF. In addition to countering the Ballards' arguments on appeal, SVF argued to this Court that the matter had been rendered moot during the pendency of this appeal because an express limitation contained within the easement language caused the easement to be extinguished by its own terms.

The defendant, Helberth Perez, was indicted and convicted by a jury of six counts of first-degree sexual assault and three counts of second-degree sexual assault, relating to conduct involving his biological daughter. He appealed from the Superior Court judgment of conviction, arguing that certain testimony should have been precluded at trial and that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on count 5 (second-degree sexual assault) of the indictment. On review, the Supreme Court vacated count 5 of the judgment of conviction and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court in all other respects.

The defendant, Nicholas E. Cambio (the Judgment Debtor), appealed from an order of the Superior Court, which ordered that the plaintiff, Tri-Town Construction Company, Inc. (the Judgment Creditor), "shall be the effective assignee and step in the shoes of the Judgment Debtor and litigate any and all claims of the Judgment Debtor arising out of the Choses in Action." The Supreme Court held that the issue raised on appeal had been waived. Accordingly, solely on the ground of said reason, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Kevin Corleto, appealed from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds a criminal information charging him with breaking and entering a dwelling, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-8-2. Specifically, his motion was predicated on alleged prosecutorial goading that resulted in the declaration of a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in determining that the prosecutor did not intentionally goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

The applicant, Darren Gomes, appealed from the Superior Court's denial of his application for postconviction relief. Gomes argued that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at the violation hearing and that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily admit a violation of probation. When reviewing Gomes's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court focused on the prejudice prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), test and held that the postconviction-relief hearing justice appropriately determined that Gomes was unable to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a competent attorney would have been successful at the violation hearing and that, had Gomes been competently represented, the probation violation hearing justice would not have found him to be a violator. The Supreme Court agreed that there was ample evidence in the record for the hearing justice to find Gomes to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the record clearly demonstrated that Gomes's rights concerning the hearing and the effect of his waiver were adequately explained to him and that his admission was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The Supreme Court's review of the record revealed that the postconviction-relief hearing justice found that, at the violation hearing, the Superior Court engaged in an appropriate colloquy with Gomes before the violation hearing justice determined that he had violated his probation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Tavell D. Yon, appealed from a May 2, 2014 judgment of conviction in Providence County Superior Court for constructive possession of a firearm after a conviction for a crime of violence, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-5. On appeal, he contended that the trial justice erred in: (1) failing to suppress the defendant's statement with respect to the gun at issue in the case (2) failing to "submit to the [j]ury the issue of the voluntariness of [the] defendant's alleged statement" with respect to the gun at issue and (3) denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the statement at issue because the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights. Further, the Supreme Court held that the defendant had waived his contention that the trial justice should have submitted the issue of voluntariness to the jury. Finally, the Supreme Court was unable to perceive any error in the trial justice's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Ernest Sabourin, appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty on two counts of first-degree sexual assault. The defendant had been accused by a woman, both of whom believed was his daughter, of sexually assaulting her at a time when she was too intoxicated to resist. The trial justice sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years on the first count and twenty-five years on the second count, to run concurrently with the first count. On appeal, the defendant argued that his oral statements to the police should have been suppressed because he was in custody while in his home and was subject to interrogation by the police without the benefit of Miranda warnings. He further contended that his post-Miranda statements were inadmissible because the police employed the "question first" interrogation technique, a practice found unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). With respect to the statements the defendant made in his apartment, the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not interrogated by the detectives and that, therefore, his statements were voluntary. The Court reasoned that the detective's questions were merely instinctive reactions to the defendant's unprompted statements. As a result, the Supreme Court did not find it necessary to determine the custody analysis. Furthermore, the Court held that the Central Falls detectives did not engage in the "question first" interrogation technique. The Court reasoned that, because it held that the interrogation requirement was missing, Miranda warnings were not required before they were given at the police station, when the defendant was in custody and interviewed by the lead detective. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights at the police station was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Court agreed with the hearing justice's finding that there was no evidence of any interaction between the defendant and the detectives that would evidence that he was in any way coerced or that he did not understand his rights or the consequences of abandoning them. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

In this slip-and-fall case, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the trial justice misstepped when she granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff, Joseph Aubin, alleged that he slipped on a patch of "black ice" in the paved parking area adjacent to his apartment building, which was owned by the defendant, MAG Realty, LLC. The plaintiff claimed that his fall resulted in a torn rotator cuff that required surgery and caused the plaintiff to be unable to work for a period of several months. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial justice erred because issues of fact remained in dispute and that, when reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it was possible for the plaintiff to prevail in his negligence action. Because the Supreme Court does not weigh evidence when analyzing a Rule 50 motion, the Court held that there was enough evidence to send the case to the jury. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice's grant of judgment as a matter of law was made in error. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

he plaintiff, Amberleigh Hudson (plaintiff), is before the Supreme Court on appeal from a Superior Court judgment in a jury-waived trial in favor of the defendant, GEICO Insurance Agency, Inc., d/b/a GEICO General Insurance Company (defendant or GEICO), in this underinsured motorist (UM) insurance case. The plaintiff, a Good Samaritan, was injured while rendering assistance to victims at the scene of an accident, and she brought this action to recover UM benefits under the policy insuring the motor vehicle in which she had been a passenger moments before her injury. The trial justice concluded that the plaintiff was not "occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of her injuries and, therefore, could not recover under the terms of that policy. The Supreme Court addressed the particular interplay between G.L. 1956 § 11-56-1 and the term "occupying," as defined in an insurance contract. The Supreme Court concluded that, based on the factors set forth by the Court in General Accident Insurance Co. of America v. Olivier, 574 A.2d 1240 (R.I. 1990), the plaintiff was "occupying" the insured motor vehicle for purposes of UM coverage. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case to the Superior Court with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff.

The defendant, Francisco Pacheco (Pacheco or defendant), appealed from a judgment of conviction in the Superior Court the basis of this appeal was that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should have barred the state from prosecuting a chemical breath test refusal under G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1. Specifically, the defendant contended that the ultimate issues of fact relevant to the chemical refusal were already decided in the Traffic Tribunal in connection with a preliminary refusal infraction. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply under the circumstances because the two refusals did not involve identical issues. The Court also determined that the preliminary refusal was not "actually litigated" in the Traffic Tribunal because it was dismissed for a lack of evidentiary foundation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court acknowledged the differences between a civil infraction in the Traffic Tribunal and a criminal charge in Superior Court, but the Court did not base its decision upon these differences.

The defendant, James Adams, appealed from a judgment of conviction of one count of first-degree robbery, two counts of felony assault, one count of second-degree murder, and one count of committing a crime of violence while possessing a firearm. Following the jury's guilty verdict, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was heard and denied by a justice of the Superior Court. On appeal, the defendant maintained that he was entitled to a new trial because the weight of the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the trial justice erred in deciding otherwise. The defendant also appealed the admission of certain evidence relating to cell phone data and analysis that was introduced at trial, which he claimed should have been excluded by the trial justice. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the extensive trial record, including exhibits and transcripts, held that the trial justice had articulated adequate grounds for denying the new-trial motion and had not overlooked or misconceived material evidence nor was he otherwise clearly wrong. The Supreme Court further held that the trial justice had not abused his discretion in admitting the evidence relating to cell phone data and analysis. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction on all counts of which he had been found guilty.