Volume 160 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The applicant, Yara Chum, appealed the denial of his application for postconviction relief. On appeal, he asserted that the trial justice erred in denying his application because Chum had ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Chum referenced his trial attorney's failure to act when the prosecutor discussed Chum's statement to the police during the state's opening statement and then did not introduce the statement into evidence. Chum asserted that his attorney's failure to request a curative instruction, seek a mistrial, or act at all following the prosecutor's comment, prejudiced him. The Court held that Chum was not prejudiced because there was sufficient evidence of his guilt, namely three eyewitness identifications. The Court also noted that, although the trial attorney failed to request a curative instruction, Chum was not prejudiced because the trial justice instructed the jury on numerous occasions that counsels' arguments were not evidence and such instructions were adequate. Additionally, the attorney's failure to request a mistrial was not prejudicial because the trial justice stated that he would not have granted such a motion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

In this premises liability case, in which the plaintiff alleged that she was injured after falling through a defective stair, the plaintiff, Pocahontas Cooley, appealed from a decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment to the defendant, Paul Kelly. The plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred when he concluded that there was no evidence that the defendant had any notice of a defective condition and that there was no basis for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Supreme Court held that there was no competent evidence in the record to demonstrate that any defect in the step existed for sufficient time to justify charging the defendant with notice. The Supreme Court also held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not properly be applied to the facts of the case because no evidence was submitted to substantiate the plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, John A. McDonough, Jr., appealed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Registered Holders of Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc. Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates 2004-R11. At the center of this case was the defendant's ownership interest in property located on Arnold Street in Lincoln, Rhode Island and, precisely, a dispute related to the note and mortgage associated with it. The Supreme Court gleaned two issues properly before it: whether the Arnold Street note was endorsed in blank and whether the Arnold Street mortgage was validly assigned to the plaintiff. On both of these issues, the Court deemed summary judgment appropriate because the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of putting forth competent evidence that demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to each. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Eric Chase, appealed from a Superior Court order granting the motion of the defendant, Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In his suit, the plaintiff-homeowner sought damages from his insurer, the defendant, because the plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the insurance contract that the defendant had issued to the plaintiff. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred when he granted judgment on the pleadings because: (1) the defendant did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that there were no facts that could entitle the plaintiff to relief and (2) the contractually imposed two-year limitations period to bring suit should not begin to run until the defendant breached the contract by refusing to pay the claim. The Supreme Court held that, even if all of the facts in the plaintiff's complaint were true, the plaintiff could not overcome the two-year limitations provision contained within the insurance contract. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The plaintiff, Joanne C. Miller (plaintiff), appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Wells Fargo Bank (defendant). Before this Court, the plaintiff argues that: (1) the defendant breached federal guidelines regarding loan modification review and improperly foreclosed on her home while her loan modification request was pending (2) the defendant breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and (3) her reliance on the federal regulations, as well as the defendant's failure to adhere in good faith to those regulations, should have estopped the defendant from foreclosing on the property. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's first argument, that the defendant breached federal guidelines regarding loan modification review and improperly foreclosed on her home, was waived. Next, the Supreme Court deferred to the Superior Court justice's conclusion that, because there was no contractual obligation on behalf of the lender to modify the loan, the alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim must fail. Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the Superior Court justice did not err in rejecting the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Hakim Funches (defendant), appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court following a jury trial. The defendant was convicted of one count of domestic assault by strangulation and one count of simple assault. Before the Supreme Court, the defendant contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to pass the case and his motion for judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to pass the case because, although the prosecutor posed an improper question to the defendant, it was not so inflammatory that it could not be cured by the cautionary instruction given to the jury. Likewise, the trial justice did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis that the defendant was twice placed in jeopardy for the same act. The defendant was convicted of only one of the two counts and, therefore, did not face multiple punishments for a single offense.

This breach-of-contract case derived from a dispute over an alleged commercial lease agreement between the plaintiffs, owners of property located at 492 Reservoir Avenue in Cranston, Rhode Island, and the defendants, Interstate Battery Center et al., who the plaintiffs asserted had breached the terms of the lease. The plaintiffs appealed from the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Supreme Court declared summary judgment inappropriate because the motion justice, in granting summary judgment based on what he described as "so many deficiencies in this lease," passed over genuine issues of material fact. Specifically, the Court noted the existence of genuine issues of material fact with respect to: (1) which entity, if any, was bound under the lease and (2) whether someone with authority sufficient to bind the tenant signed the lease. As such, deeming this case not ripe for summary judgment, the Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment.

The defendant, Victor Anthony Properties, Inc., appealed from the entry of final judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Plainfield Pike Development, LLC. The plaintiff filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking adjudication regarding its use of a roadway over the defendant's abutting property. The matter was tried before the Superior Court, and the trial justice found that the plaintiff had an easement or right-of-way over this roadway and that the plaintiff's use of the right-of-way was not limited to a specific use. On appeal, the defendant did not dispute the finding that the plaintiff has a right-of-way over its roadway instead, the defendant asserted that the proposed use of said right-of-way by the plaintiff was "an unreasonable extension of the use intended by the parties when the easement was originally created in 1922." The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. The Supreme Court opined that the trial justice was not clearly wrong when she concluded that there was no restriction on the use of the right-of-way where the language of the deed conveying the right-of-way specifically noted that the right-of-way may be used "with teams and otherwise," several deeds in the chain of title to both pertinent lots contained identical or similar language, and that no limiting language was included in any deed in the chains of title. The Supreme Court also held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in rejecting the defendant's judicial estopple claim, as the defendant had failed to present any evidence to warrant its application. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court.

Mark Quillen (plaintiff), appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of Mary Macera (defendant), the beneficiary of an Amica Insurance Company annuity policy created by Domenic Zubiago (Mr. Zubiago), the plaintiff's great-uncle and the defendant's brother. The plaintiff argued that the trial justice misconstrued his theory of the case and applied the wrong law to the evidence, overlooked and misconceived material evidence, erroneously failed to take judicial notice of the findings made by another Superior Court justice, and erroneously refused to shift the burden of proof. The Supreme Court discerned no error and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

A robbery on the streets of Providence led to a thief's short-term possession of the stolen goods but long-term period of incarceration. The defendant, Keith J. Pittman, appealed from his conviction by a jury of second-degree robbery, for which he was given a twenty-year sentence with sixteen years to serve at the Adult Correctional Institutions and four years suspended with probation. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court, sitting at Woonsocket High School, concluded that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive any material evidence proffered by the state, nor did he commit clear error in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record thereto.