Volume 168 — United States Reports

Held: That no grant was made until return should be made by the alcalde, and that, until his action should be approved by the governor, it was without effect; (2) That as there was no evidence in this case, either in the papers presented in support of the petitioner’s claim, or in the facts and circumstances proved, from which an approval c'ould properly be presumed, the petitioner must be held to have failed in a…

<p>The statute of New York of 1885, c. 448, providing that deeds from the comptroller of the State of lands in the forest preserve sold for nonpayment of taxes shall, after having been recorded for two years, and in any action brought more than six months after the act takes effect, be conclusive evidence that there was no irregularity in the assessment of the’taxes, is a statute of limitations, and does not deprive the former owner of such lands of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.</p>

The 14th section of the act of Congress, approved June 10, 1890, c. 407, 26 Stat. 131,, 137, is as follows: “That the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount of duties chargeable upon imported merchandise, including all dutiable costs and charges, and as to all fees and exactions of whatever character, (except duties on tonnage,) shall be final and conclusive against all persons interested therein, unless the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of such…

Held: that by the terms of this contract, whether governed by the law of this country or by the law of England, the carrier was not exempted from responsibility for the loss of sound cattle, forcibly thrown or driven overboard, in rough weather, by order of the master, from unfounded apprehension on his part, in the absence of any pressing peril to the ship, and with no apparent or reasonable necessity for a jettison of…

This was apt appeal from a final order of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington refusing a writ of habeas corpus on the face of the petition therefor.

<p>The validity of a statute is drawn in question whenever the power to enact it, as it is by its terms, or is made to read by construction, is fairly open to denial, and is denied.</p> <p>Under Rev. Stat. § 709, if the ground on which the jurisdiction of this court is invoked to review a judgment of a state court is, that the validity of a state law was drawn in question as in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and the decision of the state court is in favor of its validity, this must appear on the face of the record before the decision below can be reexamined here.</p> <p>A suggestion of such appearance, made on application for reargument, after the judgment of the trial court is affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, comes too late.</p> <p>This court has no jurisdiction on a writ of error to a state court to declare a state law void on account of its collision with the state constitution.</p> <p>An objection in the trial of an action in a state court that an act of the State was “ unconstitutional and void,” when construed in those courts as raising the question whether the state legislature had power, under the state constitution, to pass the act, and not as having reference to any repugnance to the Constitution of the United States, is properly construed.</p> <p>The report of this case in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania shows that it assumed that it was dealing, under the assignments of error, only with the state constitution.</p>

Held: that this was error; that the question whether the defendant was negligent should have been submitted to the jury; and that it was for the jury to say whether the custom on the part of the workmen was known to the company, whether *136 if known it was acquiesced in, whether it was a dangerous custom from which injury should have been apprehended, and whether there was a failure, on the part of the defendant, to…

Held: that the granting papers in this record, taken together, do not justify the presumption of settlement and working by the two Garcia's on the tract contained in the grant of 1788, for the ten years prior to 1798, or for four years thereof, or any confirmation óf the grant thereupon, but that the contrary is to be inferred from the testimony in respect of possession; that Armenta’s *178 certificate of 1798 and the…

Held: that the language used in the documents indicated nothing more than a right to pasture their cattle upon the lands in question; that the grant did not vest the title to the lands in the petitioners, but was a mere license to use them for pasturage, which license, if -not revoked by subsequent grants, was revoked by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ceding the entire territory to the United States; and that the title…

Held: that it was beyond the power of the prefect alone to make the grant in question. Possession of land so granted after the date of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, however exclusive and notorious, cannot be regarded as an element going to make up a perfect title.

This case comes from the United States Court for the Indian Territory on a certificate as to jurisdiction.

The original bill in this case was filed in May, 1892, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of the late Territory of Utah, against Ogden City, a municipal corporation, and its mayor and the members of its common council; and it was thereby sought to restrain the city and its officers from levying assessments upon the real estate of the plaintiffs And others similarly situated, for the purpose of paving a portion of one of the streets of the city.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>This was a petition by the Chief Supervisor for the Northern District of New Tork for fees and disbursements connected with the general election of 1890, amounting to $16,612.79, of which $2752.60 were disallowed by the Treasury Department ; for like fees and disbursements connected with the general election of 1892, amounting to $18,998.94, of which $2581.75 were disallowed ; and also for fees connected with the examination of witnesses to show that certain supervisors, who had been appointed in the city of Troy to attend a Congressional election in 1888 had been deterred from discharging their duties by violence, or threats of violence, by disorderly persons. This account amounted to $624.65, of which $402.65 were disallowed.</p> <p>The petition alleged that all these accounts had been approved and allowed by the District Court.</p> <p>Upon a finding of facts, which do not differ materially from those set up in the petition, the Court of Claims directed a judgment in favor of the petitioner for $678.10, whereupon petitioner appealed to this court.</p>

In the early part of 1892 a revolution was initiated in Yenezuela against the administration thereof, which the revolutionists claimed had ceased to be the legitimate government. The principal parties to this conflict were those who recognized Palacio as their head and those who followed the leadership of Crespo. General Hernandez belonged to the anti-administration party, and commanded its forces in the vicinity of Ciudad Bolivar.

This was an action in assumpsit upon the common counts, by the persons constituting the firm of Henry Pratt & Company, to recover of the Paris Gas Light and Coke Company the agreed consideration of $4850 for manufacturing and setting up at its works in the city of Paris, Edgar County, Illinois, an apparatus for the manufacture of water gas, in accordance with certain patents granted to Pratt ard Evan, April 22, 1884, and April 12, 1887, the component parts of said apparatus…

Held: that this was due process of law, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The words “ due process of law ” do not necessarily require an indictment by a grand jury in a prosecution by a State for murder.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the instructions as given were substantially correct, and there was evidence in the case upon which to found the one given at defendants’ request. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Arthwr A. Birney for appellant, Mr. Job Barnard for appellees. Mr. Henry E. Davis and Mr. James S. Edwards were on his brief. Ms.

Held: That the terms of the bottomry bond included not only the Andrew Johnson and her cargo, but the cargo transhipped on the Leslie; (2) That the owners of the Johnson, to the extent of the damages paid on account of the collision, were liable-to the libellants, as creditors of the ship.

The bill in the first above entitled suit was filed in a District Court of the Territory of New Mexico, in chancery, by Pedro Perea, as sole surviving administrator of the estate of José L. Perea, Second, deceased, and as one of his heirs-at-law, against the defendant, .George "W. Harrison, individually and as administrator of' the estate of his wife, Guadalupe Perea de Harrison, and also against the other heirs-at-law of José L. Perea, Second.

This was a suit brought April 17, 1890, in the third judicial district court of the Territory of TJtah, by Hannaman against Karriok for the dissolution of a partnership, formed February ■3, 1886, by an agreement in writing, by which they agreed.to become partners in a mercantile and laundry business for the term of five years from that date, with a capital stock of $25,000, of which the plaintiff was to furnish $5000, and the defendant $20,000; the. defendant lent the…

Held: that the peremptory instruction by the trial court and the affirmance of its action by the appellate court manifestly proceeded not on the theory that, as a matter of law, there was no negligence on the part of the defendant, but that the proof of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff’ was so conclusive as to leave no question for the consideration of the jury; *340 but that apart from any question…

Held: and is so stated in many of the cases hereinafter cited where similar language has been used in the acts admitting States into the Union. Preliminarily, it may be said, that the Mississippi River at the point in question is a navigable stream. In order to be navigable, it is not necessary that it should be deep enough to admit the passage of boats at all portions of the stream.

Held: and everything appears to be moving along smoothly. In order that no question may be raised by the defence as to my status, and that I may be able to appear before the grand jury, I beg to suggest the advisability of my appointment as *377 a special assistant to the United States-Attorney, without compensation, for these cases.” The plaintiff took the required oath of office and performed the duties assigned to him.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>EEEOE TO THE SUPEEME COUET OE' THE STATE OE GEOEGIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On the twelfth day of November, 1891, the steamers Victory and Piymothian came into collision in the Elizabeth River between Lambert’s Point and Craney Island Light. The Piy-mothian, laden with a cargo of cotton, was outward bound. The Victory was inward bound in ballast. The Piymothian and her cargo were seriously damaged. The Victory was also damaged about the bows.

Held: 68 Fed. Rep. 637 , that the alleged granting papers were ineffectual to perfect title, because there was no showing that the acts required by law to be performed, to wit, the making of an actual survey on the ground ; the certification and approval of the same ; and the delivery of possession, had ever been performed ; that the claim was barred under the act of Congress of May 26, 1824, c. 173, 4 Stat. 52 , entitled…

<p>• A District Court of the United States has jurisdiction of a libel of a vessel for seamen’s wages, which'accrued while the vessel was in the custody of a receiver appointed.by a state court upon the foreclosure of a mortgage upon the property of a railroad company, owner of the vessel, the vessel having been sold and passed into the purchaser’s hands, and the receiver discharged when the warrant of arrest was served.</p> <p>The remedy against the decree of the District Court was an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals.</p>

<p>APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF OREGON.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

ON October 22,1894, plaintiff in error as plaintiff filed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia an amended declaration containing two counts. The first alleged that John Andrew Casey,- plaintiff’s intestate, was killed through the negligence of the defendant company, in the State of Maryland ; that said intestate left surviving no parent or child but only his wife, Alice Triplett Casey, for whose benefit this action was brought.

<p>That which has been decided on one appeal or writ of error, cannot be reexamined on a'second appeal or writ of error, brought in the same suit.</p> <p>Whenever a case comes from the highest court of a State for review, and, by statute or settled practice in that State, the opinion of the court is a part of the record, this court may examine such opinion for the purpose of ascertaining the grounds of the judgment.</p> <p>Although the judgment and the mandate in a given case in this court express its decision, it may examine the opinion for the purpose of determining what matters were considered, upon what grounds the judgment was entered, and what has become settled, for the future disposition of the case.</p> <p>In the former decision of this case, 95 U. S. 391, the decree was reversed on the ground that the bill, as it stood, was technically, a bill of review; but it was further decided that certain matters then in issue were sufficiently and effectually determined by the proofs already in, and the reversal did not throw open the case for additional proofs upon such matters.</p> <p>An infant is ordinarily bound by acts done in good faith by his solicitor or counsel in the course of the suit, to the same extent as a person of full age; and a decree made in a suit in which an infant is a party, by consent of counsel, without fraud or collusion, is binding upon the infant ^nd cannot be set aside by rehearing, appeal or review.</p> <p>A compromise made in a pending suit which appears to the court to be for the benefit of an infant, party to the suit, will be confirmed without reference to a master; and, if sanctioned by the court, cannot be afterwards set aside except for fraud.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.</p> <p>Argued with No. 90 and by the same counsel.</p>

Held: that, without deciding whether the contract sued on was, under the .facts and circumstances disclosed, void as against public policy, the case presented was not one which called for the interposition of a court of equity; but that the plaintiffs remedy was by an action at law.

Held: That the provision when applied to a previously existing lottery grant in the State of Kentucky was not inconsistent with the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States; *489 (2) That a lottery grant is not, in any sense, a contract within the meaning of the Constitution, but is simply a gratuity and license, which the State, under, its police powers, and for the protection of the public morals, may at…

Held: referring to previous decisions, that the certificate is. insufficient under the statute.

Held: that this claim of lien was sufficient under the statute in respect of all these particulars. As between the parties the fact that a lien- is -claimed for a greater sum than is actually owing, or is actually covered by the lien, does not vitiate the claim when honestly made; and under the findings it is impossible to impute bad faith in this instance.

Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), was a United States Supreme Court case that ruled that an alleged confession to a crime, in order to be admissible, must not be obtained by threats or violence, nor by any direct or implied promises, however slight. The decision was based on the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, which meant that confessions deemed involuntary were excluded from federal criminal trials.

Held: that R. & H. were.not bound to accept the deed tendered, and were entitled to have the contract rescinded, and to receive back the money paid by them. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. J. M. Wilson for appellants. Mr. John F. Dillon, Mr. E. Ellery Anderson and Mr. P. L. Williams filed a brief for same. Mr. Charles C. Richards and Mr. James H. Macmillan, for appellees, submitted on their brief. Me.

No number. The Consumers Electric Light and Street Railroad Company of Tampa executed a mortgage to the Central Trust Company of New York, July 1, 1895, to secure an issue of bonds amounting to $350,000 upon all the property of the company, including its street railways, franchises and leases, and, among other things, all its rights under a lease from the Tampa Suburban Railroad Company, made or to be made, and covering all the property of the latter.

<p>The act of September 28, 1850, c. 84, granting swamp lands to the several States, was a grant in prassenti, passing title to all lands which at that date were swamp lands, but leaving to the Secretary of .the Interior to determine and identify what lands- were, and what lands were not, swamp lands.</p> <p>Whenever the granting act specifically provides for the issue of a patent, the legal title'remains in the Government until its issue, with power to inquire into the extent and validity of rights claimed against the Government.</p> <p>Although a survey had been made of the lands in controversy which indicated that they were -swamp lands, it was within the power of the laud office at any time prior to the issue of a patent to order a resurvey and to correct mistakes made in the prior survey.</p> <p>The facts in this case clearly show an adjustment of the grant upon the basis of the resurveys, and their acceptance by the officer of the State charged by the act of Congress with the duty of so doing, and this makes such adjustment final and conclusive.</p> <p>The act of March 3, 1857, c. 117, did not operate to confirm to the State of Michigan the-title to all lands marked on the approved and certified list of January 13, 1854, as swamp and overflowed lands, and direct the issue of a patent or patents therefor, but it simply operated to accept the field notes finally approved as evidence of the-lands passing under the grant, leaving to the land department to make any needed corrections in the surveys and field notes.</p> <p>The decision in Martin v. Marks, 97 IT. S. 345, does not conflict with this construction of the act of 1857.</p>

The facts in this case are as follows: On June 3,1856, c. 43, 11 Stat. 20, Congress made a grant to the State of Wisconsin to aid in the construction of a railroad of every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for six sections in width, on each side of the line, with the right to select indemnity within fifteen-mile limits. The line of this road was definitely fixed September 20,1858.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>In January, 1895, Mary Yan Riswick, widow, and Avarilla Lambert, and Martina Carr, children and heirs of John Yan Riswick, deceased, filed a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against the Commission under the Rock Creek Park Act of September 27, 1890, c. 1001, 26 Stat. 492, seeking to restrain the said Commission from assessing lands of the complainants for any portion of the cost and expenses of locating and improving the Rock Creek Park, for the alleged reason that the sixth section of the said act, under which the Commission was acting in proposing to' make such assessment, was unconstitutional and void.</p> <p>The cause was so proceeded in that, on September 30, 1895, the Supreme .Court of the District rendered a final decree as prayed for in the bill. From that decree an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and by that court, on March 17, 1896, the decree of the Supreme Court of the District was affirmed. The cause was then brought to this court on appeal.</p>

Held: any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding,” to bring about a general uniformity in Federal and state proceedings in civil cases, and to confer upon suitors in courts of the United States the advantage of *619 remedies provided by state legislation, yet it was also the intention to reach that uniformity largely through the discretion of Federal court's, exercised in the form of rules, adopted from time to…

<p>An interlocutory order appointing a receiver is not appealable from the Circuit Court of the United States to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and does not become so by the incorporation into it of 'a direction to the defendant, his agents and employés, to turn over and deliver to the receiver the property in his or their hands.</p>

Held: that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a. conviction under the third count of the indictment. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Arthur O. Butts for plaintiff in error. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Boyd for . defendants in error. .Me. Justice Peckha-m delivered the

<p>In a trial before a state court for murder charged to havé been committed within the State, it is for the state court to decide whether the question of whether the evidence tended to show that the accused was guilty of murder only in the second degree shall or shall not be submitted to the jury, and its decision is not subject to revision in the Circuit Court of the United States, nor here.</p> <p>A writ of habeas corpus cannot be made use of as a writ of error.</p> <p>While the derailment of a train carrying the mails of the United States is a crime which may be punished through the courts of the United States under the provisions of the statutes in that behalf, the death of the engineer thereof produced thereby, is a crime against the laws of the State in which the derailment takes place, for which the person causing it may be proceeded against in the state court through an indictment for murder.</p>

Held: in effect, that such was the transaction in the case at bar, and that the transfer to York and Starkweather was simply to secure them for material actually used by the contractors in performing their contract with the Government, and amounted to nothing more than the giving of security, and not to the assignment of a claim to be enforced against the Government.

This case comes here on a certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and that court certifies several questions' concerning which it desires the instruction of this court for the proper decision of the cause. These questions are founded,- among other papers, upon the bill of complaint which forms part of the record herein.

Held: that this court had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Supreme Court of the State. The case is stated'in the opinion. Mr. William Winans Wall for plaintiff in error. Mr. John Watt was on his brief. Mr. J. Zach. Spearing for defendant in error. ■ Mr. Richard Henry Lea and Mr. Thomas H. Thorpe filed a brief for same.

Held: that these allegations plainly brought the case within the provision in the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826 , conferring upon this court jurisdiction to review by direct appeal any final judgment rendered by a Circuit Court in any case in which the constitution or a \aw of a State is claimed to be in contraven- • tion of the Constitution of the United States.

<p>Appeal from’ the Court of Claims.</p>

<p>Certificate- from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit-.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the-Western District of Arkansas.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia.</p>

<p>Error to and appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the State pf Maryland.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State- of Texas.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court.of the Territory of New Mexico.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme. Court of the Territory of Utah.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.</p>

<p>Certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States-for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>Error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>