Volume 171 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The defendant, Chaquiro Blandino, appealed from a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of (1) first-degree murder of Francis Rodriguez (2) discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (murder), resulting in the death of Rodriguez (3) assault with a dangerous weapon (a firearm) upon Marvin Vasquez (4) discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (assault with a dangerous weapon), without causing injury to Vasquez (5) discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, creating a substantial risk of injury to Rodriguez and Vasquez and (6) unlawfully carrying a pistol without a license. The trial justice imposed consecutive life sentences on counts 1 and 2 a consecutive ten-year sentence on count 3 a consecutive ten-year sentence, non-parolable, on count 4 and concurrent ten-year sentences, suspended with probation, on counts 5 and 6, to run consecutive to count 4. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial justice erred when he denied the defendant's request to order the state to produce the investigative notes of the lead detective. The defendant argued before this Court that he was entitled to the notes pursuant to both Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant also contended that the trial justice erred when he denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to articulate either a Brady or a Rule 16 argument when he sought production of the detective's notes therefore, those arguments were not preserved for appeal. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial justice committed no error in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

The defendant, Luis Padilla, appeals his conviction of first-degree robbery following a jury-waived trial. At the close of evidence, the trial justice denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the robbery charge and found him guilty. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial justice mischaracterized the complaining witness's testimony. Additionally, the defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in relying on a witness's statements to police because the witness could not read and, thus, could not effectively acknowledge those statements as her own. On appeal, the Court concluded that the defendant's first argument, that the trial justice misconstrued the complaining witness's testimony about the attack, was without merit, because the defendant took the trial justice's comments out of context. The Court similarly struck down the defendant's second contention, that the witness could not acknowledge her statements based on her reading impairment. The Court determined that the defendant failed to raise the issue at trial, and, therefore, waived the argument on appeal. Moreover, the Court reasoned that, even if validly raised, the argument would still be unsuccessful, because the defendant failed to consider the witness's avowal that she could follow along with a document when it is read aloud. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The defendant, Daniel Tejeda, was convicted of first-degree murder in a jury trial. On appeal, the defendant argued that his trial commenced outside the statutory time period required by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, G.L. 1956 § 13-13-2. Additionally, he contended that the trial justice erred in denying his motions to suppress the seizure of his cell phone and its records, as well as the bags, zip ties, and a BB gun found in his apartment. The defendant also asserted that the trial justice erred in permitting the admission of some of the defendant's statements taken while he was in the hospital. Finally, the defendant maintains that his sentence pursuant to the habitual offender statute was unduly harsh. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act as the defendant's federal sentence had expired well in advance of trial, nullifying any rights he had under the act. However, even if the act still applied to the defendant at the time of trial, the brief delay in beginning the trial was due to the defendant's own pretrial motions, which the Court held, in any event, was not sufficient to warrant dismissal of the case pursuant to the act. Next, the Court upheld the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the seizure of his cell phone during his arrest because, deferring to the trial justice's findings of fact, the Court concluded that he did not clearly err in finding one of the arresting officers to be a credible witness as compared to the defendant. Even given some inconsistencies among the law enforcement officers' testimony, the trial justice's decision to find the defendant's testimony hard to believe was not clear error. Further, the Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in permitting evidence discovered pursuant to two warrants because the affidavits supporting those warrants demonstrated probable cause. The defendant pointed to a number of purported falsehoods in both affidavits, but the Court held that, even omitting those sections of the affidavits, there was sufficient information in the affidavits to amount to probable cause. With respect to the defendant's statements at the hospital, the Court held that the defendant waived that argument because he failed to object to the trial testimony regarding those statements. Finally, the Court concluded that the trial justice's sentencing the defendant in accordance with the habitual offender statute was consistent with the statute's policy and not in error. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The defendant, Douglas J. Huntley (defendant), appeals from judgments of conviction entered by the Superior Court following a jury trial. The defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime of violence carrying a firearm without a license breaking and entering a dwelling without consent and conspiracy to commit the crime of Breaking and Entering. He was sentenced to a total of twenty years with twelve years to serve and eight years suspended with probation. Before the Supreme Court, the defendant assigns error to the decision of the trial justice denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count and his refusal to grant a new trial on the breaking-and-entering offense. The defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he conspired to commit the act of breaking and entering. The defendant further argues that the evidence to support a conspiracy charge was nothing more than a pyramiding of inferences that was based on speculation and conjecture. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument and held that there was direct evidence, not ambiguous inferences, presented to the jury to support a conviction of conspiracy of breaking-and-entering. Additionally, the Supreme Court held that there was a waiver of defendant's arguments as to the breaking and entering conviction due to the defendant's failure to properly raise his arguments before the trial justice. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.