Volume 172 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

On August 7, 2014, while intoxicated, the defendant, Luke P. Peters (defendant), was a rear-seat passenger of a moving motor vehicle when he suddenly leaped forward, grabbed the steering wheel, and violently turned it, causing the vehicle to veer off the road and an accident to ensue. The defendant was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-5-2 (count 1) driving under the influence of liquor resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.6 (count 2) driving so as to endanger resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of § 31-27-1.2 (count 3) driving as to endanger resulting in nonserious bodily injury in violation of § 31-27-1.2 (count 4) contributing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-9-4 (count 5) and driving with a revoked license in violation of G.L. 1956 § 31-11-18 (count 6). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 9.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial justice granted defendant's motion holding that there was a lack of probable cause to charge defendant as an "operator" or "driver" of a motor vehicle. The state appealed, asserting that the trial justice erred when he determined that defendant was not operating or driving the motor vehicle. This appeal solely rested on the precise question of whether the terms "operating" or "driving," under §§ 31-27-1.2, 31-27-2.6 and 31-11-18, can encompass a passenger in a moving motor vehicle who suddenly seizes the wheel from the driver and steers the vehicle. The Supreme Court held G.L. 1956 § 31-1-17 (c) provides for two types of operators: drivers and those persons who are in actual physical control of a vehicle. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant's actions placed him in the realm of being an "operator" of a moving vehicle under chapter 27 of title 31. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant, Eric Neufville, appealed the hearing justice's sentencing determination on a probation violation and the denial of a motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the defendant argued that the hearing justice erred in denying the motion for reconsideration because he should not have found the key witness's testimony credible in light of newly presented evidence. As to sentencing, the defendant argued that the hearing justice abused his discretion in removing the suspension from the defendant's sixteen-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court first held that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he found the key witness's violation hearing testimony credible. As to the motion for reconsideration, the Court treated it as a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and concluded that the motion was improper due to the defendant's untimely filing. The defendant filed the motion more than sixteen months after the violation hearing judgment. However, the Court noted that even if the defendant's motion was properly before it, the hearing justice did not err in denying the motion after taking into account the newly presented evidence. Finally, the Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in sentencing the defendant to sixteen years in prison. The Court held that based upon the defendant's underlying convictions, coupled with the new robbery offense, the hearing justice was within his discretion to impose the sixteen-year sentence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The defendant, Tonya Withers, appealed the denial of her motion for a new trial and denial of her motion to proceed pro se. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the trial justice erred in denying her motion for a new trial because the trial justice found the only witness who saw the alleged assault not to be credible. The defendant also argued that the trial justice erred in denying her request to represent herself after trial had commenced. The Supreme Court first held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. The Court concluded that even though the trial justice found the complaining witness's testimony inconsistent, her finding that the other two witnesses' testimony offered circumstantial evidence supporting a finding that the defendant committed an assault was not in error. Next, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion to proceed pro se. Although the Court acknowledged a preference for more than a brief discussion with a defendant before ruling on the effectiveness of a requested waiver of right to counsel, the Court ultimately concluded that the trial justice's discussions with the defendant were sufficient to establish that her right to counsel would not have been voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The applicant, Jeremy Motyka, appealed from the December 3, 2014 denial of his application for postconviction relief following a hearing in Newport County Superior Court. One of the applicant's contentions on appeal was that he was not given an adequate opportunity to be heard by the hearing justice. The Supreme Court held that the December 3, 2014 hearing in the instant case did not constitute the evidentiary hearing called for in Tassone v. State, 42 A.3d 1277 (R.I. 2012). In addition, the Court held that its opinions in Tassone and Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), were inconsistent with each other at least in the context before the Court in the instant case. The Supreme Court proceeded to abrogate the procedure set forth in Shatney in any case involving an initial application for postconviction relief by an applicant who has been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court's denial of Mr. Motyka's application for postconviction relief.