Volume 173 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The applicant, Keith Burke, appealed from the denial of his application for postconviction relief at the conclusion of a March 5, 2015 hearing in Providence County Superior Court. He contended on appeal that the hearing justice erred in denying his postconviction relief application because "on October 12, 1994, [he] negotiated, bargained for, and reached an unambiguous agreement with the state, in which it would dismiss the murder case [pending against Mr. Burke] in exchange for his guilty plea in two other felony cases, and the state breached [that] agreement." The Supreme Court noted that the gravamen of Mr. Burke's application for postconviction relief was, by its own terms, only the breaking and entering and larceny charges against him and that the remedy he sought from the Supreme Court on appeal was the vacating of his 2008 guilty plea to second-degree murder and the dismissal of his 2004 murder indictment. The Supreme Court held that the 2004 murder charge and Mr. Burke's eventual guilty plea were not before the Court in this application. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Pamela Azar, appealed the grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, the Town of Lincoln, the Lincoln School Committee, and John Ward, in his official capacity as finance director for the Town of Lincoln, on her hostile work environment and retaliation claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in granting the motion because the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find both a hostile work environment and that the defendants had retaliated against her in response to her advocacy for her disabled son's education. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's hostile work environment claims pursuant to the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42, and the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities Act (CRPDA), G.L. 1956 chapter 87 of title 42, were barred by the statute of limitations because the events to which the plaintiff testified occurred more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint. The Court also held that the plaintiff's retaliation claim pursuant to the CRPDA was barred because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Finally, the Court concluded that her retaliation claim pursuant to the RICRA failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants' actions were in retaliation for the plaintiff's advocacy for her son. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The plaintiff appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting summary judgment in the defendants' favor. The plaintiff's daughter suffered severe injuries while in the care of a medical facility, where she was treated by two nurses, the defendants. Prior to suing the defendants, however, the plaintiff settled her claims against the medical facility, executing a Joint Tortfeasor Release that released the medical facility from liability. At issue in this case was whether G.L. 1956 § 10-6-2—which mandates that for purposes of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, "a master and servant or principal and agent shall be considered a single tortfeasor"—served as a bar to the plaintiff's claims against the defendants because the plaintiff had already released the defendants' employer, the medical facility. The Supreme Court concluded that it did, affirming the judgment of the Superior Court. Pursuant to § 10-6-2's clear and unambiguous language, a master and servant are considered a single tortfeasor thus the release of either results in the release of both.

The defendant, Thomas Mosley, sought review of a Superior Court judgment that declared him to be in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation. That judgment revoked the suspension of six of the seven years remaining on a suspended sentence. On appeal, the defendant contended that the hearing justice erred in finding that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation he also contended that the sentence imposed by the hearing justice was "excessive." The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in adjudicating the defendant to be a probation violator. The Court also held that the hearing justice's execution of six years of the defendant's suspended sentence was not excessive and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Lehigh Cement Co. (Lehigh), filed suit against the City of Providence (the city), seeking to recover approximately $500,000 in real estate taxes billed and collected by the city from 2006 to 2009. Lehigh appealed to the Supreme Court from a Superior Court judgment granting the city's motion for summary judgment. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court did not err and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

There is no summary for this case.